

## Independent Evaluation

# IRAQ

## Support for Job Creation and Self-Employment through Promotion of Micro Industries in Ninewa Governorate of Iraq (MISP IV)

**Note:** During the course of the intervention, the project area changed from An-Ninewa Governorate to Al-Anbar Governorate but project title remained unchanged.



UNITED NATIONS  
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION



UNIDO EVALUATION GROUP

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through Promotion of Micro Industries in Ninewa  
Governorate of Iraq (MISP IV)

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## Map of project area



## Abbreviations and acronyms

CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
COSIT	Central Organisation for Statistics and Information Technology
DOA	Department (Directorate) of Agriculture
DOLSA	Department (Directorate) of Labour and Social Affairs
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GOI	Government of Iraq
ID	Iraqi Dinar
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
ISCI	Industry Standard Commercial Identifier
ISF	Information Security Forum
ISRB	Iraq Strategy Review Board
HQ	Headquarters
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MISP	Micro Industries Support Programme
MNFI	Multinational Force Iraq
MSSE	Micro- and Small-Scale Enterprise
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MOD	Miscellaneous Obligation Document
MOLSA	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
MOP	Ministry of Planning
NDS	National Development Strategy
NPC	National Project Coordinator
PA	Production Association
PC	Project Coordinator
PG	Production Group
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PMU	Project Management Unit
PSC	Project Steering Committee
RAA	Rapid Area Assessment
TOB	Training of Beneficiaries, but also in the project, and therefore in this report, used as abbreviation for “Trained Beneficiaries”
ToR	Terms of Reference
TOT	Training of Trainers, but also in the project, and therefore in this report, used as abbreviation for “Trained Trainers”
TWG	Technical Working Group
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDG-ITF	United Nations Development Group – Iraq Trust Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USD	United States Dollars
VTC	Vocational Training Centre
WFP	World Food Programme



## Glossary of evaluation related terms

Term	Definition
Conclusions	Conclusions point out the factors of success and failure of the evaluated intervention, with special attention paid to the intended and unintended results and impacts, and more generally to any other strength or weakness. A conclusion draws on data collection and analyses undertaken, through a transparent chain of arguments.
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.
Impacts	Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.
Indicator	Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a development actor.
Institutional development impact	The extent to which an intervention improves or weakens the ability of a country or region to make more efficient, equitable, and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources, for example through: (a) better definition, stability, transparency, enforceability and predictability of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from these institutional arrangements. Such impacts can include intended and unintended effects of an action.
Lessons learned	Generalizations based on evaluation experiences with projects, programs, or policies that abstract from the specific circumstances to broader situations. Frequently, lessons highlight strengths or weaknesses in preparation, design, and implementation that affect performance, outcome, and impact.
Logframe	Management tool used to improve the design of interventions, most often at the project level. It involves identifying strategic elements (inputs, outputs, outcomes, impact) and their causal relationships, indicators, and the assumptions or risks that may influence success and failure. It thus facilitates planning, execution and evaluation of a development intervention. Related term: results based management.
Outcome	The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs. Related terms: result, outputs, impacts, effect.

Outputs	The products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes.
Recommendations	Proposals aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, quality, or efficiency of a development intervention; at redesigning the objectives; and/or at the reallocation of resources. Recommendations should be linked to conclusions.
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies. Note: Retrospectively, the question of relevance often becomes a question as to whether the objectives of an intervention or its design are still appropriate given changed circumstances.
Results	The output, outcome or impact (intended or unintended, positive and/or negative) of a development intervention. Related terms: outcome, effect, impacts.
Sustainability	The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time.

# Executive Summary

## *The project under evaluation*

MISP IV aims to increase the capabilities of poor and marginalised war-affected communities to engage in economically, viable small-scale productive activities in order to generate income and employment. The project has six elements to achieve this objective: i) training of community leaders, ii) rehabilitation and technical up-grading of selected Vocational Training Centers (VTCs), iii) technical and business management training of trainers (ToT); iv) technical and business management training of end beneficiaries (ToB) (50% of the ToBs shall be women and large share shall be youth), v) delivery of technical tools and basic technical equipment to the ToBs; and vi) creation of (or rehabilitation and technical upgrading of) a number of small scale enterprises.

## *The evaluation*

MISP IV is the fourth of a series of similar projects carried out by UNIDO/FAO in different parts of Iraq. MISP I, II and III were evaluated jointly by UNIDO and FAO, whereas the present evaluation of MISP IV was conducted by UNIDO alone. To this end UNIDO contracted Ms Henny Andersen, an international evaluator who held overall responsibility for the evaluation design, including the preparation of the questionnaires for the beneficiary survey, the final analysis and the reporting. The beneficiary survey was contracted out to SRD, an Amman based consulting firm. In order to enhance the potential for learning lessons, the evaluation included a comparative review of the findings of all four MISP evaluations.

## *Socio-Economic context of the project*

Al-Anbar is among the better off governorates when it comes to overall human development but with one of the highest perceptions of social restrictions on women in the country. The socio-economic context makes it particularly challenging to ensure that women get fair and equal access to opportunities and resources provided by the project. Moreover, Al-Anbar is a vast governorate. There are security threats from insurgency with a political agenda attached to violence. Security threats also come from criminal groups that can perceive development projects as a lucrative way to get money or financially attractive contracts through e.g. ransom and extortion.

## *Project planning*

MISP IV is a replication of three previous FAO/UNIDO supported projects in Thi-Qar Governorate of Southern Iraq; in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah Governorates of Northern Iraq; and Al-Qadessiyah Governorate of Southern Iraq. MISP IV was initially identified and approved for implementation in Ninewa Governorate but was transferred to Al-Anbar Governorate due to deteriorating security in Ninewa.

A Rapid Area Assessment (RRA) was conducted in Al-Anbar to provide the basis for selection of activity areas (farm and non-farm).

The project was designed in a sequential manner. A VTC and subjects/trades were selected. The selected VTC is rehabilitated and provided with equipment. Trainers to be trained are selected and trained (ToT). Thereafter selected end-beneficiaries are trained (ToB). The project suffered from a series of initial problems and thus faced delays in implementation and was therefore extended twice (end December 2010 and end March 2011 respectively).

### ***Project management***

As all UNIDO projects in Iraq, MISP IV is managed by 'remote control'. Overall supervisory and implementation responsibility rests with the project manager in UNIDO HQ. A Project Coordinator (PC) based in the UNIDO Iraq Programme Unit in Amman holds responsibility for field implementation and monitoring. A National Project Coordinator (NPC) in Iraq is responsible for daily implementation of project activities.

A joint Project Steering Committee (PSC) with representatives from UNIDO, FAO, Ministries and the Anbar Governor's Office held five meetings in Amman during 2008-2010. The PSC took decisions about the seven trades/subjects to include and also decided on technical specifications for equipment to be procured for the vocational training facilities and the toolkits for the beneficiaries.

Project monitoring surveys were planned but not fulfilled due to the delayed ToB training and in light of the up-coming evaluation. Cancelling this monitoring procedure has been an unfortunate decision. The planned monitoring would have provided a sound basis for immediate project follow-up, for cross-checking of evaluation survey findings, and a source for potential future impact assessments.

### ***Project financial management and procurement***

Overall financial management and procurement responsibilities rest with UNIDO HQ. Certain procurement has been delegated for local procurement. Equipment for the VTCs, the individual beneficiaries and for production groups amounts to 60% of the total project budget, but amounted to less in implementation.

### ***Project implementation – VTC component***

The VTC in Ramadi was chosen for project implementation. The project agreed to finance the rehabilitation of this VTC. The Governor of Anbar later assigned three additional VTCs (along the river Euphrate). The project was thereby able to deliver training to a number of sub-districts, which was important for reaching women.

All four VTCs were adequately equipped to deliver the training. The Ramadi VTC was the only VTC to provide training within all seven selected subjects: Carpentry (Wood Work), Sewing, Marquetry, Pump & Generator Repair, Mobile Phone Repair, IT, Refrigerator & Air-conditioning Repair.

***Project implementation – ToT component***

Trainers were contracted from the private sector under the condition that they would become VTC trainers under MoLSA contracts. Sixteen of them were selected for training in Jordan. However, eventually the trainers were not hired under MoLSA contracts. Instead, forty four engineers, moved from the military industry to a civilian organisation, were suggested as VTC staff. The project then contracted the trained trainers until the completion of the ToB component. A couple of the engineers were included in each round of training. Some of the trained VTC staff did thereafter conduct own ToB training as part of MISP.

All ToTs except the business trainers conducted ToB training but ToTs had little contact with ToB after completion of the ToB training, indicating weak mentoring. Only two of the 16 selected trainers were women, both in sewing. More women should have been trained in sewing given the large share of ToB training in sewing.

***Project implementation – ToB component***

The selection of ToBs was difficult and time consuming. Several attempts were made to ensure a transparent and equitable selection while the project faced attempts of ‘elite capture’. A scoring system based on seven criteria was finally applied. Survey findings confirm the difficulties to ensure that all selected beneficiaries meet the agreed eligibility criteria.

Each training course was for four weeks. A total of 988 beneficiaries were trained by the project, as compared to 720 beneficiaries initially planned. TOBs perceived the training as useful, although they had little contact with trainers after the end of the training. The envisaged mentoring does not seem to have materialised during the project.

At first sight, the gender distribution seems to be in favour of women: 65% of the beneficiaries were women. However, women were offered training in sewing alone, with the exception of one cycle in IT and one cycle in marquetry. The survey confirmed that sewing does not seem to offer great prospects for improving household income.

A flat incentive sum of USD 200 was paid to all beneficiaries upon completion of the training. In addition, tool kits were distributed to the beneficiaries. Tool kits are perceived as useful and a majority of beneficiaries say they make frequent use of them. More women than men do not often use their tool kits.

The value of tool kits ranges from USD 4000 (mobile phone repair), to USD 2,000 (refrigeration and air-condition repair), down to USD 100 (locally procured sewing machines). Women had less access to tool kit resources than men.

The survey indicates a decrease in unemployment and an increase in employment and/or self-employment for both men and women. The vast majority of men and

women were unemployed prior to the training, with slightly more men than women engaging in self-employment activities. No woman moved into employment whereas men moved into employment and self-employment in equal numbers.

The survey findings also point to an increase in income. Equal shares of men perceive that their income increased a lot and a little, whereas for women two thirds perceived only a little increase in income while only 17% perceived that their income had increased a lot. More women than men perceived no change in income. These survey results indicate that the trades offered to men open up better opportunities to improve household income than the sewing offered to women.

#### ***Project implementation – PG component***

In total, 15 PGs were established and provided equipment. Support to an existing textile factory replaced the initially intended PG in sewing for women. The rationale was to create employment for women ToBs, but this did not happen. The female ToBs seem to have been disadvantaged when it comes to decisions on PGs and associated assets. On the other hand, an initially not intended catering PG was established in response to a request from the Governor.

#### ***Project implementation – community leader component***

The PSC cancelled the training of community leaders due to budget problems and its limited use in the MISP III project.

#### ***Relevance***

Overall, the objectives of the project – as expressed in the Project Document - are consistent with beneficiary requirements, country needs, global priorities and partner and donor policies. The project adopted a multi-sectoral approach to human security in line with the MDGs, i.e. integrating humanitarian and development assistance in the revitalization of productive activities. The evaluation finds that relevance was jeopardized by the lack of depth of analysis in the RRA. In summary, while the project is relevant in its intentions, its relevance would have been considerably enhanced had it taken a more market demand-driven approach in implementation, and had it paid more attention to genuine empowerment of women.

#### ***Ownership***

The pro-active participation of GoI representatives in strategic decisions during implementation indicates a certain degree of ownership. Moreover, the Governor of Al Anbar has taken strong personal interest in the implementation of the project. Local ownership among a broader range of local leaders also from outside the Governor Office is, however, likely to be limited as the component to involve local leaders was dropped. The project has largely been managed by the NPC with little signs of pro-active participation from the VTC management. The initial selection of beneficiaries under the auspices of the VTC management had to be re-

done to ensure proper targeting of beneficiaries. This may have weakened the project ownership of the VTC management. The in-kind contributions from the GoI indicate some ownership by the central Government.

### *Efficiency*

As all for all other UNIDO projects in Iraq, the efficiency of MISP IV has been affected by security issues. In the case of MISP IV these external influences were even more serious because one entire year was lost in preparations for implementation in Ninewa before the decision was made to transfer the project to Anbar governorate.

The number of beneficiaries trained exceeds the initially planned figure by 40%. In particular, more women than initially intended were reached through the decentralisation of sewing training to sub-districts. The VTC itself has been appropriately equipped and thus holds the potential of improved performance. The initial selection and decision about number of PGs changed as the project progressed. It seems fair to say that an assessment of market demand and competition would have been beneficial.

### *Effectiveness and impact*

The project did not produce baselines nor did it monitor results, which makes it impossible to conduct a rigorous assessment of the extent to which it attained its objectives. There is potential for some positive effects but there are also obvious risks that these potential positive effects will not materialise.

There are increases in beneficiary incomes but they may not be sustainability. Risks include the absence of established linkages between the training provided and the local private sector.

The VTC has been rehabilitated with new equipment as well as training materials and some trained staff. There is however no firm long-term financial commitment from GoI to ensure the coverage of VTC running costs for teachers' salaries to provide the intended mentoring of beneficiaries.

So far, the production groups have not provided the intended employment opportunities for the beneficiaries. It is further unclear how the PGs differ from ordinary micro-enterprises and whether the various MISPs are indeed as innovative as intended and to what extent the approach taken differs from UNIDO's general approach to supporting the development of MSMEs.

The cancellation of the training of community leaders is likely to negatively influence the extent to which the objective of a population with capacity to plan and manage economic activities will be reached.

Effectiveness and impact would most likely have been enhanced if the provision of tool kits had been matched with measures to enhance beneficiary access to financing for the establishment of micro-enterprises. Moreover, the provision of

tool kits for free is not a sustainable approach – and thus not effective approach. It merits to be asked to what extent it is in line with ‘do-no-harm’ approaches, as the current approach skews private sector development without guaranteeing that it will provide viable solutions.

### ***Sustainability***

Some of the risks to sustainability follow from the discussion above, such as risk of no continued financing of the VTC, teachers trained not being employed, beneficiaries not being in better position to generate income. There is a basic issue which deserves to be thoroughly assessed/addressed in the MISPs: is the project to be viewed as an emergency project or is it a project to contribute to sustainable development? The current approach to pay for transportation fees and to provide a ‘bonus’ in the form of a toolkit makes the project at risk becoming seen as a ‘study for food’ initiative rather than an initiative to provide sustainable skills for sustainable livelihood.

### ***Issues and lessons learned from four MISP evaluations***

The comparative review of the findings from four MISP evaluations and the thematic evaluation of UNIDO-supported post- crisis projects show the following.

***Skills selection:*** Three MISP evaluations consistently found that the choice of skills for training should have been based on a more solid needs assessment, analysis of market demand and identification of possible private sector linkages. It was found that there is a need for higher degree of creativity in selection of training topics and for higher degree of flexibility in the delivery of training. The thematic evaluation showed that thorough training needs assessments are necessary to avoid training too many beneficiaries in the same basic skills, which seems to be a typical flaw in post-crisis skills development.

***Training facility:*** Decentralised provision of training is particularly important to reach women. The mentoring component has been weak in all four MISPs, although the importance of this component is recognised as crucial. The thematic evaluation found that despite the critical importance of mentoring services for business start up projects, none of the evaluations and progress reports provides specific information about the effectiveness of such services in the projects under evaluation. All four evaluations raised concerns regarding the continued financing of the training facilities.

***Trainers (ToT) selection:*** All four evaluations stressed the importance of a transparent selection process of ToTs based on clear and transparent criteria in order to avoid sub-optimal selections.

***Beneficiary (ToB) selection:*** The selection was found to be fairly transparent in all projects. It is noted that there needs to be a balance between vulnerability and capability, given that not all ToBs are in a position to venture into income-generating activities.

***Selection of production groups (PG):*** Overall, all four evaluations found that the PG concept and the selection of PGs need to be reviewed. The thematic evaluation



of post-crisis projects points to the risks of distribution of assets (tools, equipment, infrastructure, etc.) to self-help groups/production groups. Experience suggests that group members should bring in their own personal funds, if groups are to thrive and survive.

*Tool kits – hand out and composition:* Two evaluations recommended that tool kits should not be donated indiscriminately but only to the best ToBs. The thematic evaluation notes that giving away tool kits and other assets for free can counter the drive towards developing a saving culture and other self-help abilities. Insisting on some kind of “self-contribution” is important to avoid potential distortions.

*Outcome-oriented M&E:* All MISP evaluations consistently pointed out that the intervention logic lacks clarity. One evaluation noticed that the intervention logic follows an activity-based approach rather than a results-based approach. None of the four MISPs used SMART (specific – measurable – achievable – relevant – time-bound) indicators. MISPs focus on output level indicators while the outcome level is most important for measuring results.

*Sustainability – emergency vs. long-term development approach:* The evaluations found that the MISP approach with free hand out of tool kits and equipment is acceptable in an emergency context but questionable under sustainability aspects.

*Sequential project design:* Three of the four MISPs run into delays due to problems related to the rehabilitation of training facilities. The thematic evaluation notes that the sequential approach requires a minimum of 3 to 5 years to achieve measurable employment generation, which disqualifies this approach quite clearly for immediate post-conflict interventions.

*‘Do-no-harm’ principles:* The MISP approach does not pay attention to the ‘do-no-harm’ principle. The thematic evaluation notes that this widely accepted good practice for post-conflict PSD has only been explicitly applied in one of the UNIDO projects covered by this thematic evaluation (Sudan).

## **Recommendations to UNIDO**

- UNIDO should revisit the generic design of its skills-based income creation projects in post-conflict environments. To this end, it should organize a strategic design planning workshop to take stock of the experience made in Iraq, review the generic intervention logic, improve gender aspects, greater involvement of the private sector and establish a generic M&E framework for this type of projects.
- During the design stage of all future skills-based income creation projects in post-conflict environments UNIDO should systematically adapt the generic project design to the specific contextual conditions by a number of steps (in-depth conflict analysis; socio-economic market demand and needs assessment; defining the appropriate design and distribution policy for tool-kits).

- During project implementation, UNIDO and all other project parties should ensure transparency in all selection processes. The selection criteria should be clear, agreed upon by all involved parties and consistently applied by the agreed parties and in the agreed manner. Departing from agreed criteria and agreed procedures may jeopardize the conflict analysis and the conflict sensitive implementation approach.
- During project implementation, UNIDO should ensure equal access to all opportunities and resources for men and women. Gender sensitive implementation is likely to require pro-active and creative solutions and decisions taking into account the specific contextual setting.
- For its project portfolio in Iraq UNIDO should put an independent monitoring mechanism and, as appropriate, other ‘checks-and-balances’ in place to compensate for the implementation risks originating from remote project implementation with no visits of UNIDO international staff on the ground.

#### **Recommendations to GoI**

- Government of Iraq representatives should participate in revisiting the generic design of UNIDO’s skills-based income creation projects in post-conflict environments and adhere to all critical features of this design including a greater involvement of the private sector.
- During the implementation of future similar projects, all project parties, including the Government of Iraq, should adhere to the agreed procedures (selection processes etc) and financial and institutional commitments.

#### **Recommendations to Donors**

- Donors should insist on the greatest possible adherence of UNIDO to RBM principles, better intervention logics and an enhanced use of log-frame.
- Donors should recognize the substantial differences between emergency interventions and interventions at the transition to development. In particular, donors should allow for a longer-term time horizon of such projects and adequate time and resources for an in-depth implementation planning in order to enable informed decisions.

# Introduction

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## **1.1. The evaluation**

This evaluation is an end-of project evaluation. MISP IV is the fourth of a series of similar UNIDO/FAO projects in Iraq. Previously called ‘Community Livelihoods and Micro Industry Support Projects (CLARIS)’, the project name was changed to ‘Job Creation through Cottage and Micro Industries Promotion (MISP)’. The first CLARIS/MISP project covered the Thi Qar governorate in South Iraq, the second the Erbil and Suleiymaniyah governorates of Northern Iraq and the third the Al Qadissiya governorate. MISP IV covered the Al Anbar governorate, although the title mentions Ninewa Governorate. The change of project area was made because of security reasons but the project title remained unchanged (see chapter 5).

The project in Thi Qar has been evaluated in 2007, the one in Northern Iraq in spring 2009 and the one in Al Qadessiya in spring 2010. In spring 2010 the UNIDO Evaluation Group also conducted a ‘thematic evaluation’ of UNIDO projects in ‘post-crisis’ environments. This thematic evaluation was based on a sample of 10 UNIDO project evaluations, among which MISP I and MISP II. The present evaluation builds upon the findings and lessons learned from the three MISP evaluations and the thematic evaluation and uses a methodology that allows for cross-cutting comparisons.

All MISP projects have been carried out jointly by UNIDO and FAO. MISP I, II and III were evaluated jointly by UNIDO and FAO whereas the present evaluation of MISP IV is conducted by UNIDO alone.

The evaluation has been conducted by Ms Henny Andersen, an international evaluator who holds overall responsibility for the evaluation design, including the preparation of the questionnaires for the beneficiary survey, the final analysis and the reporting. Because field missions of international consultants to the project area are not possible for security reasons, the beneficiary survey was contracted out to SRD, an Amman based consulting firm, which used a team of three Iraqi interviewers for the survey. The Terms of Reference for the international evaluator and the Amman based consulting firm are found in Appendix 1. The project management provided requested assistance to carry out the evaluation.

The evaluation was planned for October-November 2010. However, the beneficiary survey was severely delayed and not finalised until end January 2011.

## 1.2. Evaluation methodology

Besides the beneficiary survey stakeholder interviews and review of project progress reporting have been the basic methodology and efforts were made to triangulate findings to the extent possible.

### *Project documents*

The Project Document and all six-monthly progress reports have been reviewed. Meeting notes from Project Steering Committee (PSC) meetings and Technical meetings were also made accessible to the international evaluator. The full set of project documents reviewed is listed in Appendix 2. In addition, evaluation reports of MISP I-III and the thematic evaluation have been consulted.

### *Project stakeholder discussions*

The international evaluator met with project stakeholders in Amman and Vienna. Persons met are listed in Appendix 3.

### *Evaluation survey*

An independent survey among the trained end beneficiaries (ToB) and the trained trainers (ToT) and project staff was conducted (survey questionnaires are included in Appendix 4). This survey was intended to verify/indicate project outputs, outcomes, and impact

### **Training of Trainers (ToTs)**

An initial list of ToTs was provided to the evaluators. The final selection of interviewees included 7 of 16 ToTs (see Table 1 below).

**Table 1: Distribution of trained trainers across subjects**

Subject	Number of persons								Total
	Wood work	Generator & Pump Repair	Mobile Phone	IT	Refrigerator	Sewing	Marquetry	Business	
Trainers trained	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	16
Selected for survey	0	2	1	0	2	2	0	0	7

The survey coverage of ToTs is fairly solid (more than 40% of the ToTs are included in the survey). The final selection of interviewees was in reality done based on accessibility of the ToTs. This implies that the selection may not be en-

tirely unbiased. So for instance is none of the ToTs trained in business included and neither any of the ToTs trained in IT included.

### **Training of Beneficiaries (ToBs)**

#### *Selection of interviewees*

The international consultant made the initial selection of interviewees. For selection of ToBs the project database, which listed beneficiaries in chronological order by trade and location of training, was used. The aim was to have an unbiased selection which proportionally covered both sexes and the various trades and their geographical locations. In order to make an effort to measure indications of outcome and impact, it was decided that ToBs who had completed training within each trade end September 2010 were eligible for inclusion in the survey whereas ToBs completing training at a later stage were not. The first interviewee was randomly selected (using a dice) and thereafter every 10 from the ToB database. It was checked that the intended coverage had been achieved.

During survey implementation, more than 50% of the initially selected ToBs were replaced. The replacement was done in exclusive consultation between the Amman based consulting firm and the national project coordinator. The international consultant realized these replacements only once the survey reports were submitted by the national surveyors. According to the Amman based consulting firm the reason for the replacements was that the initially selected beneficiaries had either changed phone number or moved and that they were thus no longer accessible.

As per ToR for the Amman based consulting company, a total of 80 interviews should have been conducted, covering ToBs, ToTs and government staff. The ToR indicated that 50 of these should be with beneficiaries and 30 with trainers and members of the administration. Given the limited number of trainers and administration members, it was agreed to assign a larger share of interviews to the ToBs, thus allowing an increase in ToB coverage.

Table 2 shows the numbers of trained beneficiaries by trades and regions, the number of beneficiaries initially selected for the survey (in brackets) and the number of beneficiaries who were actually interviewed. ToBs from trainings completed after end September 2010 were not eligible for inclusion in the survey and thus appear in Table 2 but with no ToB from these trainings included in the survey.

Table 1 shows that, although a large share of beneficiaries was changed, the initial coverage remained almost the same, except for a slight change in proportion of selected men/women (with one woman being replaced by a man). The ToB selection is thus a main weakness of the evaluation survey. While the intended coverage was kept comparatively unchanged, there is little doubt that the selection of individual interviewees is no longer unbiased. This does have consequences for the validity of the survey findings (for concerns on survey validity, see Box 1).

**Table 2: Actual survey coverage (initial plans before replacements in parenthesis)**

District	Ramadi	Hadietha	Anaa	Rawa	Heet	Al-Qaem	Bagha- dadi	Ar- rutba	Reyhana	Al-Obaidi	Rumana	Kubasa	Total
<b>Training</b>													
<b>Sewing</b>													
-Beneficiaries													
- women	124	125	40	40	60	40	30	30	20	30	30	30	599
- men	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
- Survey													
-women	9 (9)	11 (11)	3 (4)	4 (3)	5 (6)	5 (4)	...	...	0 (1)	...	3 (3)	...	40 (41)
-men	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>IT</b>													
-Beneficiaries													
- women	20	1			...	...							21
- men	28	29			20	20							97
- Survey													
-women	1 (1)												1 (1)
-men	3 (3)				3 (3)								6 (6)
<b>Refrigeration and Air- con</b>													
-Beneficiaries													
- women	...												...
- men	29												29
- Survey													
-women	...												...
-men	3 (3)												3 (3)
<b>Mobile</b>													
-Beneficiaries													
- women	...	...			...								...
- men	29	10			10								49
- Survey													
-women													
-men	2 (2)	...			1 (1)								3 (3)
<b>Pump and Generator</b>													
-Beneficiaries													
- women	...				...								...
- men	48				30								78
- Survey													
-women													
-men	6 (4)				3 (3)								9 (7)
<b>Wood Working</b>													
-Beneficiaries													
- women	...												...
- men	76												76
- Survey													
-women													
-men	4(5)												4 (5)
<b>Marquetry</b>													
-Beneficiaries													
- women	19												19
- men	20												20
- Survey													
-women	...												...
-men	...												...
<b>Total ToB</b>													
-Beneficiaries													
- women	163	126	40	40	60	40	30	30	20	30	30	30	639
- men	230	39	...	...	60	20	...	...	...	...	...	...	349
- Survey													
-women	10(10)	11(11)	3(4)	4(3)	5(6)	5(4)	...	...	0(1)	...	3(3)	...	41 (42)
-men	18(17)	...	...	...	7(7)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	25 (24)

### *Incomplete information*

In addition to the skewed selection of interviewees, the processing of the survey reports by the international consultant revealed that not all questions were asked during the interviews. No reasonable justification for the omission of some questions has been provided by the Amman based consulting firm. It can therefore be concluded that the quality of the survey has been compromised.

In other instances, the answers in the ToB survey reports were clearly not formulated by the interviewees themselves. Normally, an open-ended question will produce a range of different answers from the interviewees. In this survey, however, there is one example of an open-ended question with no less than close to 80% of the interviewees providing exactly the same elaborate reply. In response to a direct question from the international consultant, the Amman based consulting firm confirmed that this reply was not given by the ToBs but was formulated based on discussions between the national surveyors, ToTs and the NPC. It can therefore again be concluded that the quality of the survey has been compromised.

### *Validity*

There are a number of negative survey aspects to consider when analysing the survey findings, and in particular when trying to extrapolate findings. Key concerns regarding validity are summarised in Box 1 below.

As follows from above, one can experience the difficulties in carrying out the tasks under a less secure environment where under a normal/secure situation the approach would have been different. The project management has experienced similar situations throughout project implementation.

#### **Box 1: Key remarks on survey validity**

While the survey coverage largely remained unchanged despite the replacement of more than 50% of the beneficiaries, the selection of individual beneficiaries can no longer be assessed as random. It is most likely that the intended unbiased selection has been compromised.

The surveyor benefitted from strong support by the NPC in Anbar without which it would apparently not have been possible to conduct the survey. The other side of this coin is, however, that survey independence was compromised. It cannot be excluded that the NPC's personal knowledge about beneficiaries has influenced the selection of beneficiaries to interview. There are indications of a skewed selection and the evaluator assesses that the selection is most likely biased towards including successful beneficiaries and hence more positive experiences.

Given the non-randomness of survey participants a high degree of cautiousness in the interpretation and generalisation of findings has to be applied. Survey findings must - as always but to a higher degree in this case - be seen as indications of reality but not as providing 'the truth'.

### 1.3. Project summary

<b>Project Number:</b> A5-22 <b>Executing Agencies:</b> UNIDO and FAO <b>UNIDO Project Management:</b> Project Manager: UNIDO HQ Vienna International Project Coordinator: PIU in UNIDO Iraq Office Amman National Project Coordinator: Al Anbar	<b>National Counterparts:</b> Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
<b>Start Date:</b> December 2007	<b>Project Duration:</b> 18 Months (2008– 2009) <b>Original End Date:</b> May 2009
<b>1<sup>st</sup> Extension:</b> Till 31 December 2010 <b>2<sup>nd</sup> Extension:</b> Till 30 March 2011	<b>Revised End Date:</b> 30 March 2011
<b>Project Value:</b> UNDG ITF USD 4, 235, 664 GOI in-kind Contribution USD 300,000 <b>Total USD 4,535,664</b>	<b>Project Location:</b> across Al-Anbar Governorate
<b>Development Goal</b>	
Improve the livelihood of approximately 1,400 extremely poor people living in Al-Anbar Governorate by increasing their productive capacities in sustainable and profitable income generating activities through training, introducing efficient processing methods and provision of equipment	
<b>Key Immediate Objectives</b>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Provide targeted communities with the capacity to plan and manage their development activities and restoring a functional base for economic growth and social peace.</li> <li>2. Improve the livelihood of approximately 1,400 people living in the project area through strengthening of their productive capacities in post-harvest and other income-generating activities through trainings in vocational training centers (VTCs) which will be rehabilitated and equipped.</li> <li>3. Enable large number of youth who have been deprived by the conflict to gain basic knowledge in productive skills through practical experiences and activity based learning and provision of tools to start their own business.</li> </ol>	
<b>Outputs</b>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1. Enhanced capacities at the community level in support of socio-economic growth and peaceful coexistence (MDG 1, 3) by creating an environment for productive self employment.</li> <li>2.1. Sources of income and employment for men and women creating an environment for productive employment through training and provision of tools for individuals and organized production groups in manufacturing of food and non-food products (micro-industries) (MDG 1, 3 and 5). Training center will train 1000 trainees per year in metal works, wool cutting, Agro-Mechanic and in food processing (Dairy, biscuits, noodles, vegetable oil, dates,...).</li> <li>2.2 A minimum of 1,400 people (50% female) are provided with marketable skills to enable them to obtain jobs and/or start-up an economic activity to sustain livelihoods for themselves and their families (MDG 1, 3) during the project period.</li> <li>3.1 500 (out of the total beneficiaries) unemployed youth deprived of basic knowledge and training enrolled in project training programmes (in food and non-food technologies), enabling them to take up employment and self-employment.</li> </ol>	





## Country and project context

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In Iraq there remain continuing challenges in terms of provision of basic services, rule of law, human rights, and transparency and accountability within governmental institutions and policies, as well as the overall transformation of the country towards democracy and economic development.

### 2.1. Al Anbar Governorate

Al Anbar is a vast governorate implying long distances to reach all parts of the governorate. Population density also varies between the districts and sub-districts (see map above).

#### 3.1.1 Human development

Table 3 shows four basic human development indexes at governorate level (for definitions see Box 2). Governorate rankings are shown in parenthesis (with rank 1 being the best off and rank 18 the worse off).

#### Box 2: Definitions of human development indexes

**Definitions:**

- *HDI (Human Development Index)*: measures average achievements in three dimensions of human well-being i) long and healthy life, ii) acquisition of knowledge, and iii) decent standard of living.
- *GDI (Gender-Related Development Index)*: adjusts average achievements in human development to reflect inequalities between men and women (i.e. inequalities in the three dimensions: i) long and healthy life, ii) acquisition of knowledge, and iii) decent standard of living).
- *GEM (Gender Empowerment Index)*: focuses on women's opportunities and thus highlights gender inequality in i) political participation and decision-making power, ii) economic participation and decision-making power, and iii) control over economic resources.
- *HPI (Human Poverty Index)*: measures deprivations in the three basic dimensions of human development i) exposure to the risk of death in a relatively early age, ii) exclusion from the world of reading and communications, and iii) exclusion from decent standard of living.

The source (NRSHD: *National Report on the Status of Human Development*) is the first attempt to provide a broad national database on human development in Iraq institutionalising the statistical analysis of human development indicators across governorates.<sup>1</sup>

There are rather significant differences in human development across the governorates. The differences are particularly pronounced in gender-related human development, with GDI ranging from 0.675 down to 0.443.

As seen, Al-Anbar governorate is among the better off when it comes to overall human development (HDI and HPI). However, the GDI indicates that there are differences between men and women in the governorate; while Anbar's comparative ranking is three on HDI it falls down to six on the GDI. Al-Anbar further exhibits one of the lowest GEM indexes in Iraq with one of the highest perceptions of social restrictions on women.

The socio-economic context thus makes it particularly challenging to ensure that women get fair and equal access to opportunities and resources provided through the project.

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<sup>1</sup> Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (2008): *National Report on the Status of Human Development* (NRSHD). The NRSHD builds on previous surveys during the period 2003-2007 and brings together two qualitative methodologies in the analysis: i) statistical analysis of human development indicators and indexes based on annual statistical reports and latest field surveys of official statistical establishments, and ii) development of new statistical indicators based on a special Opinion Poll on human security which adds the views of the Iraqi people on matters vital to their well being which are seldom elicited directly and independently. While NRSHD thus does not include the most recent survey, it provides a basis for comprehensive analysis.

**Table 3: Basic indexes on human development (Governorates)**

Governorate	HDI	GDI	GEM	HPI	Perceived social restrictions on women (%)
	value (rank)	value (rank)	value (rank)	value (rank)	
Nineveh	0.626 (7)	0.603 (4)	0.626 (13)	21.4 (8)	55.0
Kirkuk	0.625 (9)	0.595 (7)	0.567 (17)	19.4 (5)	55.4
Diala	0.615 (11)	0.601 (5)	0.567 (16)	20.7 (7)	98.3
Al-Anbar	0.652 (3)	0.597 (6)	0.618 (14)	16.4 (2)	97.4
Baghdad	0.625 (10)	0.583 (9)	0.731 (6)	18.8 (4)	76.1
Babylon	0.629 (6)	0.577 (10)	0.731 (5)	20.1 (6)	90.7
Kerbela	0.626 (8)	0.617 (3)	0.613 (15)	16.2 (1)	85.4
Wasit	0.600 (14)	0.565 (11)	0.760 (1)	22.7 (10)	69.5
Salahuddin	0.600 (13)	0.506 (17)	0.511 (18)	28.3 (15)	60.3
Al-Najaf	0.600 (15)	0.555 (12)	0.687 (9)	25.0 (12)	6.8
Al-Qadisiya	0.591 (16)	0.544 (14)	0.701 (7)	25.2 (13)	44.9
Al-Muthanna	0.570 (17)	0.524 (16)	0.745 (2)	30.0 (17)	74.6
Thi-Qar	0.612 (12)	0.549 (13)	0.673 (10)	21.9 (9)	37.6
Missan	0.568 (18)	0.443 (18)	0.638 (12)	30.2 (18)	49.1
Basrah	0.634 (5)	0.528 (15)	0.696 (8)	17.5 (3)	68.6
Duhuk	0.638 (4)	0.594 (8)	0.745 (3)	28.9 (16)	(-)
Suleimaniya	0.676 (1)	0.675 (1)	0.672 (11)	22.9 (11)	(-)
Erbil	0.652 (2)	0.620 (2)	0.742 (4)	26.4 (14)	(-)

**Source:** National Report on the Status of Human Development (Tables 1-5)

### 3.1.2 Security

There are security threats from insurgency, constituted by radical anti-West and anti-development groups with a political agenda attached to violence and threats. Other security threats come from criminal groups that can perceive development projects as a lucrative way to get money or financially attractive contracts through e.g. ransom and extortion. There are not always obvious borders between these two groups.

## 2.2. UNIDO in Iraq<sup>2</sup>

Absent from Iraq since the first Gulf War, UNIDO participated in the October 2003 International Donors' Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq in Madrid and in 2004 initiated negotiations with the Government of Iraq, international partners and the donor community. Following discussions during UNIDO's Industrial

<sup>2</sup> Largely citing from: UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization): Iraq Programme, 2010 September Update

Board in 2003, UNIDO had committed itself to supporting sustainable industrial development in countries emerging from crisis. Iraq was among a group of high priority countries.

UNIDO currently works in 11 of Iraq's 18 governorates and is present in some of the most volatile areas in Iraq including Ninewa and Al-Anbar governorates. UNIDO's assistance to Iraq has been focusing on helping reconstruct devastated livelihoods as well as the productive capacity of the country. As the security situation started to improve, the assistance expanded, focusing on private sector initiatives and economic reform, including on supporting government institutions dealing with the private sector and the energy and the environment sector. Iraq's dairy and date sectors also benefited from different UNIDO projects. In a nutshell, UNIDO in Iraq works on: i) private sector development (micro, small and medium enterprises and policy institutional support), and ii) energy and environment.

In light of the overall security situation in Iraq and lack of space in the UN compound in Baghdad the UNIDO Iraq Programme Office is located in Amman, Jordan, providing programming and technical support both to institutional counterparts and national project management units across Iraq. The UNIDO Special Representative and International Project Coordinators based in the Amman office regularly travel to Iraq. UN Offices in Baghdad, Erbil and Mosul are used as meeting and coordination points. Alternatively, Iraqi national experts travel to Amman. As overall security improves, the Government of Iraq has requested UN agencies to shift operations to Baghdad to play a more direct political and operational role. In this respect, UNIDO has recently established a Project Management Unit in Baghdad to support a new private sector development programme.

### **2.3. *The MISP IV positioning in Anbar***

The counterparts are: Ministry of Planning (MoP) – chair – with Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA). MoP is not included as a beneficiary.

In Anbar Governorate there were no other similar initiatives at the outset of MISP IV. Later, South Korea initiated a project with the Ramadi VTC which is similar to MISP IV. The South Korean project will focus on capacity building for the VTC and providing equipment to the VTC and has built a new structure on empty land of the VTC. Trainers were selected from among VTC staff trained through MISP IV but the South Korean project did not wish to coordinate with MISP IV.



## Project planning

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### **3.1. Project identification**

MISP IV is a replication of three previous FAO/UNIDO supported projects: i) “Promotion of Cottage Industries in Rural and Urban Areas Project” (MISP I) in the Thi-Qar Governorate of Southern Iraq; ii) “Community livelihoods and Micro-Industry Support Project in Rural and Urban Areas of Northern Iraq” (MISP II); and iii) ‘Job Creation Through Micro Industries Promotion in Al-Qadessiyah’ project (MISP III).

Prior to the formulation of MISP I, a needs assessment for supporting micro activities/micro industries in Iraq was conducted by FAO in cooperation with the MoA in Baghdad. The needs assessment was based on a project outline prepared by FAO entitled: “*Support to Promotion of Food related Cottage Industries*”, and a project brief prepared by UNIDO entitled: “*Development of Cottage Industries for the Reintegration of IDPs and Returnees*”. Within this framework, the Government of Iraq, UNIDO and FAO collaborated to develop a series of interventions that would promote local community empowerment by building capacities to identify socio-economic needs, improve development planning capabilities, raise income levels for vulnerable households, and create an enabling environment to promote growth of sustainable income generation and micro enterprise activities.

### **3.2. Project formulation**

MISP IV was initially identified and approved for implementation in Ninewa governorate (September 2007). The Government of Iraq had requested the assistance of UNIDO and FAO to support the interventions that would enable Ninewa governorate to address the difficulties faced by its population. The assessment of the socio-economic situation in the Ninewa Governorate was based on the most recent socio-economic statistical data available from the Ministry of Planning (MoP) and the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). The project proposal is based on this assessment and meetings and extensive consultations between UNIDO and FAO and

MoP and MoA regarding potentials for supporting the economic recovery of Ninewa governorate.<sup>3</sup>

Subsequently, the decision was made to shift the project to Al-Anbar governorate. Upon this decision, a Rapid Area Assessment (RRA) was launched (August 2008).<sup>4</sup> The purpose of the RRA was to identify and provide the basis for selection of activity areas (farm and non-farm), and to provide a baseline for project monitoring.

### **3.3. Project logical design**

MISP IV follows the same design as the three previous MISPs. The basic project philosophy is to increase the capability of poor and marginalised war-affected communities to engage in economically viable small-scale productive activities in order to generate income and employment. There are six basic strategic elements to achieve this objective:

- (1) Training of community leaders in community development and leadership (for them to become trainers for other community development leaders).
- (2) Rehabilitation and technical up-grading of selected Vocational Training Centres (VTCs) and provision of state-of-the art training material.
- (3) Technical and business management training of trainers for them to become trainers in the VTCs to train project target beneficiaries.
- (4) Technical and business management training of beneficiaries in the selected VTCs (generally 50% of the beneficiaries should be women and a large share should be youth).
- (5) Delivery of certain technical tools and basic technical equipment to the beneficiaries supporting them in performing their acquired skills as employed or self-employed.
- (6) Creation of (or rehabilitation and technical up-grading of) a number of small scale enterprises for them to become service providers for their local communities and development models for other small enterprises.

The Project log frame does not provide a clear causal chain. There is confusion as to 'what is what', mixing up between objectives, outputs, outcomes and activities. So for instance should an immediate objective express the situation expected to prevail at the end of the project, whereas they are expressed as activities in the log

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<sup>3</sup> Project Document Cover Sheet, section 2.2.1.

<sup>4</sup> (August 2008): *Rapid Area Assessment Of cottage industries in Anbar governorate-Iraq 2008* UNIDO/FAO, Baghdad.

frame. Also, indicators are not always measurable. Outcome indicators are for instance formulated in relative terms without providing a baseline against which to measure progress. Overall, the log frame gives the impression of an ‘activity-based’ design (i.e. a project driven primarily by inputs and intended activities) as opposed to a results-based design (i.e. starting from the intended results to ensure that the processes, products and services of the intervention contribute to the achievement of these results). In results-based management, the outcome represents the most important result level (i.e. the uptake of the outputs rather than the outputs themselves).<sup>5</sup>

Weaknesses of the MISP log frame were identified already in the evaluation of MISP I, which also provided an illustration of the intervention logic that planners may have had in mind.<sup>6</sup> Based on the diagram in the evaluation of MISP I, a tentative rearrangement and rephrasing of the logical framework for MISP IV is presented in Diagram 1.

Despite the weaknesses in the initial design, and using the illustration of the intervention logic included already in the evaluation of MISP I, it has been possible for the project management to establish a fairly good picture of the project concepts, strategies and underlying intervention theory and use them as basis for preparing the project action plan.

### **3.4. Funds mobilisation**


The MISP IV project is funded through the United Nations Development Group – Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG-ITF) with an amount of USD 4 235 664 and with an additional in-kind input from the Government of Iraq equivalent to USD 300 000.

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<sup>5</sup> For a practical guide on results-based management, see e.g.: Norad, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (December 2008): *Results Management in Norwegian Development cooperation. A practical guide*, Oslo.

<sup>6</sup> UNIDO Evaluation Group (2008): *Independent Evaluation Report Iraq: Promotion of cottage industries in rural and urban areas*, section 3.3.

**Diagram 1: Ex-post Logical Framework (as proposed by evaluator)**





# IV

## Project implementation

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### **4.1. General overview**

The project was approved in September 2007 for Ninewa Governorate. After one year of problematic discussions and preparations in Ninewa and a deteriorating security situation the project was shifted to Anbar Governorate. This decision was taken jointly by FAO/UNIDO and the GoI and approved by UNDG.

Once the project was shifted to Anbar, additional delays occurred. There was a delay of six months occurring from the difficulties to find a suitable VTC building owned by MOLSA. There was a change of UNIDO<sup>7</sup> management in both Amman and Anbar (the Project Coordinator (PC) was replaced in December 2009<sup>8</sup> and the National Project Coordinator (NPC) was replaced in mid March 2010).

In summary, the project suffered from a series of initial problems and faced severe delays:

- 1 year lost for preparations in Ninewa before shifting the project
- 6 months lost in Al Anbar to identify a VTC building owned by MOLSA
- 3 months to complete the rehabilitation of the VTC
- 3 months to move to the rehabilitated VTC (from provisional location)

The project is designed in a sequential manner. Firstly a VTC is selected and subjects/trades are selected. Second, the selected VTC is rehabilitated and provided with equipment. Trainers to be trained are selected and trained (ToT). Thereafter selected end-beneficiaries are trained (ToB). The initial delays therefore had consequences for the following steps.

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<sup>7</sup> There were further several changes in FAO management but these are not further touched upon as this evaluation is limited to the UNIDO component.

<sup>8</sup> The previous PC is now managing MISP V in Ninewa Governorate.

The project management undertook activities in parallel, such as conducting ToT training in parallel to rehabilitating the VTC and thus managed to off-set some of the time loss. The project was further extended until end 2010. Nevertheless, the initial delays left the project with comparatively short time for conducting the ToB. The ToT was finished only in February 2010 and only then could the equipment be installed in the VTC. The ToB was thereafter initiated mid-March 2010 and thus had to be finalised within a period of less than 8 months (by beginning of November 2011 only one training course remained). Further details around each project component and the project results are provided below.

**Conclusive assessment of general overview:**

- Over-optimistic time management – which is particularly dangerous in sequentially designed projects.
- Initial delays caused the ToB to become compressed in time, i.e. a large amount of end-beneficiaries to be trained over a short period of time.

**4.2. Financial implementation**

The budget distribution as per the Project Document is seen from Table 4.

**Table 4.a: Budgetary break down across budget items**

Budget Items	Amount (USD)	Percentage of Sub-Total
Personnel (national and international)	604 200	15.9
Contracts (design, rehabilitation and supervision of VTC)	252 000	6.6
Supplies, commodities (computers, printers etc)	24 715	0.7
Training (ToT and ToB)	540 000	14.2
Equipment (VTC, Beneficiaries, cars)	2 265 759	59.7
Travel	110 000	2.9
<b>Project Budget Sub-Total</b>	<b>3 796 674</b>	<b>100</b>
Miscellaneous (3%) and Security (2%)	189 833	5.0
Agency Management Costs	249 157	6.5
<b>Project Budget Total</b>	<b>4 235 664</b>	<b>111.6</b>

Table 4.a shows that 60% of the project budget (excl. miscellaneous, security and agency management costs) is expected to be spent on equipment for VTCs and beneficiaries (individual and production groups) and other supplies.

The budget in Table 4.a is the total project budget, out of which approximately 2 MUSD are for the non-food component (UNIDO) while the remaining share is for the food component (FAO).<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Information from the Project Manager in Vienna HQ (e-mail).

An attempt was made to compile information about equipment procured and provided to the VTCs, the individual beneficiaries and the PGs respectively. It seems, however, that UNIDO financial management system does not easily lend itself to extracting information in such a format. Information was received both from UNIDO HQ and from the Amman Iraq Office, to a large extent listing the same procurement but yet with some differences in coverage. The information provided from the various sources has been compiled into Table 4.b. When compiling Table 4.b, information from the Project Manager (HQ) provided the basis and this information has then been complemented with additional information from the Project Coordinator (Amman) and the Accountant (Amman) and combined with information about distribution of equipment received from the National Project Coordinator (Al Anbar).

Table 4.b shows that UNIDO procured equipment (internationally and locally) for a total of USD 815 318, equivalent to 43% of the UNIDO project budget (excl. UNIDO share of miscellaneous, security and agency management costs), thus below the budgeted share for equipment.

International procurement accounted for 81% while local procurement in Iraq accounted for close to 17%. A very small share (around 2%) was procured locally in Amman. Regarding the generators procured for the 3 VTCs information received from different sources differ: one saying it was internationally procured and one that it was procured in Baghdad.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Information from the Project Manager in Vienna HQ and the National Project Coordinator i Al Anbar respectively.

**Table 4.b: Procured equipment and tool kits**

(Items descriptions follows information provided)

Item	Procurement			
	International	Local (Iraq)	Local (Amman)	Total
<b>Tool kits (for VTC, Beneficiaries, PGs):</b>				
Woodwork tools and machines	91 183			
Sewing machines (110)	64 759			
Local purchase of 200 sewing machines		20 099		
Local procurement 200 house-hold sewing machines		22 220		
Local purchase of 58 sewing machines		15 864		
Local purchase of 60 industrial sewing machines		14 544		
Cellphone repair equipments	158 525			
Generator and Pump repair equipments	82 921			
Refrigeration and Air-conditioning repair equipments	141 569			
Marquetry	12 935	1 946		
Marquetry special wood		2 270		
Local purchase of baking ovens		21 374		
<b>Sub-total tool kits</b>	<b>551 892</b>	<b>98 317</b>		<b>650 209</b>
Computer lab. Training equipments	62 030			
Local purchase of IT equipments for the 3 VTC )			20 630	
Purchase of 3 Generators for the 3 VTCs (Int. procurement)	45 200	Local?		
Local purchase of a project car for Ramadi VTC		21 917		
Mobile phone		459		
Air Conditioners		11244		
Installation costs		2020		
Marquetry tax and transportation		600		
Crane rental and labour for loading and unloading		1010		
<b>Sub-total other equipment</b>	<b>107 229</b>	<b>37250</b>	<b>20 630</b>	<b>165 109</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>659 121</b>	<b>135567</b>	<b>20 630</b>	<b>815 318</b>

### 4.3. Project management

#### Management Structure

MISP IV is a joint UNIDO/FAO project but this evaluation deals only with the UNIDO-led non-food component. The UNIDO project management structure consists of three levels and follows the normal management structure for UNIDO projects in Iraq. Overall supervisory and implementation responsibility rests with the project manager in UNIDO HQ. A Project Coordinator (PC) based in the UNIDO Iraq Programme Unit in Amman holds responsibility for field implementation and monitoring. A National Project Coordinator (NPC) in Iraq is responsi-

ble for daily implementation of project activities. The management manning in both Iraq and Amman was changed during project implementation (the PC being replaced in December 2009 and the NPC in mid March 2010).

A joint Project Steering Committee (PSC) with representatives from UNIDO, FAO, MoA, MoP, MoLSA and the Anbar Governor's Office was formed, which held 5 meetings in Amman during 2008-2010 and made implementation and monitoring decisions.

The project is thus – as all other UNIDO Iraq projects – managed by ‘remote control’. The successful implementation thereby becomes extremely dependent on the NPC (and the replacement of the NPC in mid March 2010 was decided in order to improve management). It must be recognised though that a NPC is indeed a valuable asset to a project adding local knowledge. A NPC is, however, also vulnerable to pressure from influential Iraqi stakeholders, should there be an interest to ‘capture’ the project. The vulnerability of the NPC spills over to becoming vulnerability also of the project.

#### *Project progress reporting*

The joint FAO/UNIDO project management fulfilled all progress reporting as required. Meeting notes of PSC and technical meetings were prepared and semi-annual progress reports submitted to the UNDG.

#### *Project monitoring*

The Project established data bases to track all ToBs trained and the initially selected ToTs trained in Amman.

The UNIDO monitoring plans for PGs and individual beneficiaries were explained during the 4<sup>th</sup> PSC meeting:<sup>11</sup>

- For the PGs there will be three surveys: first before the PG, second after 3 months and third after 6 months. The surveys were to record data on income and employment generation. The trainers in business management were to monitor and provide the necessary back-up support to the PGs.
- For the beneficiaries the trainers for each activity will randomly select 10-20% beneficiaries and record information on the beneficiary profile, income and employment generation.

As the ToB training was delayed, the management did not find it possible to fulfil these monitoring plans. The ToB training was initiated in March, but to accumulate the necessary number of ToBs for initiating the monitoring would take a few months. The management thereafter found that the end-of project evaluation was to include a beneficiary survey and thought it unnecessary duplication of efforts to undertake its own monitoring as intended.

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<sup>11</sup> Notes from 4<sup>th</sup> PSC meeting, 15-16 September 2009.

The planned monitoring would have provided a sound basis not only for immediate project follow-up but also for cross-checking of evaluation survey findings and a source for potential future impact assessments. In the view of the evaluator, cancelling this monitoring procedure has been an unfortunate decision.

***Conclusive assessment of project management and monitoring:***

- Highly vulnerable to attempts of undue ‘pressure’ from GoI representatives or other influential groups.
- The unfortunate cancellation of planned monitoring of beneficiaries and production groups has left the project without a basis for potential future impact assessments.

#### ***4.4. Preparation for implementation in Anbar governorate***

*Rapid Area Assessment (RAA)*

Once the decision had been taken to shift the project to Anbar Governorate, a Rapid Area Assessment (RAA) was commissioned. It is referred to as a baseline in the first Technical Meeting Notes.<sup>12</sup> The RAA is further referred to as a basis for selection of activity areas. In the view of the evaluator, the RAA does not provide adequate information to serve as a baseline and neither does it provide a sufficient situational analysis for the selection of trades.

*Identification of non-food trades*

The PSC decided on the non-food trades to be included. It based its decision on the economic profile presented in the RAA and the recommendations developed during a first Technical Meeting. In a later meeting one additional topic was added. As a result the following seven non-food trades were selected:

- Carpentry (Wood Work)
- Sewing
- Pump & Generator Repair
- Mobile Phone Repair
- IT
- Refrigerator & Air-conditioning Repair
- Marquetry

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<sup>12</sup> (August 2008): *Rapid Area Assessment Of cottage industries in Anbar governorate-Iraq 2008* UNIDO/FAO, Baghdad.

### *Procuring equipment and tool kits*

Technical specifications and procurement of equipment for the VTC and the beneficiary tool kits were decided by the PSC<sup>13</sup> and procurement was made through UNIDO HQ. As the project progressed, the number of ToBs was increased and three more VTCs were selected. The additional procurement of equipment and tool kits for these ToBs and VTCs was conducted by the PIU in Amman. This was possible as the equipment and tool kits in question were available in Iraq and the total value was within the allowed limit for local procurement.

The project budget sets aside no less than 60% of the project budget to equipment for VTC, beneficiaries and cars, out of which 81% was procured internationally (see Table 4.b above). Given a project which aims at generating income and employment, it is surprising that the issue of local procurement does not come up as an issue for discussion during design (which it would inevitably have had a results-based approach been taken to design). The importance of local procurement in order to leave behind a bigger economic foot-print in private sector development cooperation, thus contributing to economic development, unfortunately seems to be a non-issue within UNIDO.

Moreover, a comparison of prices for equipment procured partly internationally and partly locally reveals that the locally procured items are considerable less expensive (see Table 4.b above for details). Comparing costs for international procurement of sewing machines to costs for locally procured sewing machines, it seems that unit cost for the locally procured sewing machines would amount to only 25% of internationally procured. For marquetry tool kits, a similar comparison reveals that a locally procured marquetry tool kit costs approximately 45% of an internationally procured marquetry tool kit.

### ***Conclusive assessment of preparation for implementation:***

- The RAA does not provide sufficient analysis to serve as a basis for the subsequent selection of subjects/trades.
- The issue of local procurement should have been part of the design given the high share of project budget set aside to procurement of equipment. A review of UNIDO procurement guidelines may be merited both from a cost efficiency point of view, and from a development effect point of view.

## **4.5. Vocational Training Centres (VTC)**

The Vocational Training Centre (VTC) in Ramadi was chosen as the first VTC for project implementation.<sup>14</sup> The rehabilitation of the Ramadi VTC had previously been supported by the US but had been stopped 'halfway'. UNIDO HQ agreed with the Governor of Anbar to finalise the rehabilitation of the Ramadi VTC and

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<sup>13</sup> Notes from 2<sup>nd</sup> PSC meeting, 8-9 September, 2008.

<sup>14</sup> Notes from 1<sup>st</sup> Technical Meeting, 13-14 August, 2008.

procured a contractor for the work. Unfortunately a contractual conflict emerged between two Iraqi constructing companies (the company previously contracted by the US and the company contracted by UNIDO). Threats linked to the tense security situation made it difficult for the project management to solve this problem and the rehabilitation was delayed.

At a later stage, the Governor of Anbar assigned three additional VTCs along the river Euphrate (Al Qaem, Ana, Haditha) in order to expand the training to all cities in Anbar (except the one on the border to Jordan). The project was thereby able to deliver training also to a number of sub-districts, which was important for reaching women (the Governor had requested the project to concentrate on women as there are a large number of widows in Anbar).

Sewing was the only training provided in all four VTCs, reflecting that the three additional VTCs mainly focused on reaching women (no men participated in sewing training). In the three additional VTCs (Al Qaem, Ana, Haditha) a total of 9 cycles of sewing training (for 205 women), two cycles of IT training (for 49 men and 1 woman) plus 1 cycle of mobile training (for 10 men) were arranged. In one of the three additional VTCs (Ana) sewing was the only training provided. In fact, sewing training was the only training provided in eight of the twelve districts and sub-districts (for details on distribution of training, see Table 7 below).

The PSC initially decided which equipment to buy for Ramadi VTC in order to be able to fulfil the training within the selected subjects/trades. This equipment was procured by UNIDO HQ. The equipment for the additional three VTCs was at a later stage procured through the PIU Amman.<sup>15</sup> Given that Ramadi is the only VTC which provided training within all seven trades, by far most equipment was provided to the Ramadi VTC.

#### ***Conclusive assessment of VTC:***

- The project might have needed to make more solid situational analysis to avoid the conflict around the rehabilitation of the VTC. The delayed rehabilitation caused delays in activities for end-beneficiaries.

## **4.6. ToT component**

### ***5.6.1 ToT Selection and training***

When the selection of ToT candidates started, the Ramadi VTC did not have any appropriate candidates. Thus, MoLSA suggested to contract private sector people as trainers, under the condition that they would become VTC trainers under MoLSA contract at a later stage. In a first round, MoLSA tested a number of candidates and provided a list of approved candidates to UNIDO Amman. Out of

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<sup>15</sup> Decisions about equipment were taken by the PSC. See meeting notes from 2<sup>nd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> PSC meetings.



these, 16 were selected for training in Jordan during one or two months depending on the subject. Table 5 shows the distribution of ToTs across subjects together with the selection for the ToT survey.

Out of the 16 ToTs, two were women and both trained in sewing. Given the number of female beneficiaries subsequently trained in sewing, in comparison to the total number of beneficiaries trained in other trades, there seems to be a rather gross imbalance in the selection of trainers for training in Jordan (for details on distribution of beneficiaries across trades, see Table 7 below). There should have been more women trained to train beneficiaries in sewing in order to achieve a balance of trainers across trades. It might further be argued that it would have been beneficial to have trained women in some other trades as well (e.g. marquetry and IT).

The ToTs trained in business did not conduct any business training for ToBs (see Table 7 for ToB training across trades). According to the PC their capabilities were used in the ToB consultation processes. As none of the ToT trained in business was included in the survey it is not possible to verify the actual involvement in the project of the ToTs trained in business. It thus remains uncertain whether the selection of three ToTs for training in business was an adequate choice.

After having conducted the training of the selected trainers, MOLSA provided 44 staff to the VTC, all engineers from the military industry suggested to be moved to a civilian organisation. Simultaneously, MOLSA no longer allowed any of the 16 trained trainers to be hired by the VTC but required that 40 out of the assigned engineers be hired to become VTC staff. The project on the other hand, did not have funds to train the newly assigned engineers to become trainers. It was instead agreed with MOLSA that the project would hire the trained trainers until the training of the beneficiaries had been completed while at the same time train the appointed VTC staff.

In every round of ToB training, the VTC would assign a couple of engineers to be trained as well. South Korea established a project similar to MIPS and once the training of VTC staff was completed by the MISP project, some of the trained VTC staff was selected to become trainers in the Korean financed project with Ramadi VTC.

Some of the trained VTC staff conducted own ToB training for the MISP project before being selected to go to Korea for further training (in July 2010). Two of the trained trainers were 'disqualified' and their contracts terminated: after signing the contracts, one refused to work due to family reasons and one refused to work due to being sent to Heet. The decision was agreed with the VTC Director.

***Conclusive assessment of ToT selection and training:***

- The trainers contracted by UNIDO for conducting the training are not anchored at the VTCs.

- There was an imbalance (disfavouring trainers in sewing) in the selection of trainers to be trained across subjects/trained. There was further a gender imbalance in the selection of trainers.
- It is unclear how the trainers in business were involved in the subsequent training of beneficiaries.

### 5.6.2 Evaluation survey findings

As shown in Table 4, seven (7) of the trained trainers were selected for participation in the evaluation survey (thus representing 44% of the initially trained trainers). VTC staff trained in the process to become trainers were not available for interviewing (as mentioned those working had been recruited by a Koren-funded project). The survey findings provide the basis for the qualitative discussion on ToT.

**Table 5: Trainer's characteristics**  
(Number of persons)

Characteristics of Trainers in Survey	Subject	Wood work	Generator & Pump Repair	Mobile Phone	IT	Refrigerator & Air-	Sewing	Marquetry	Business	Total
<b>ToTs</b>										
- trained		2	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	16
- in survey		0	2	1	0	2	2	0	0	7
<b>Gender</b>										
- women			..	..		..	2			2
- men			2	1		2	..			5
<b>Age</b>										
20-30 years				1						1
31-40 years			2			1	1			4
41-45 years						1	1			2
<b>Professional education</b>										
-Teacher Institute							2			2
-Technical Institute			1			1				2
-Industrial School			1			1				2
-B.A.				1						1
<b>Professional Experience</b>										
Sewing							2			2
Air conditioning						2				2
Generator and Pump			2							2
Computer and Mobile				1						1
<b>Position before Trainer</b>										
-International Relief and Development (IRD)			1				2			3
-Anbar University										1
-Ramadi Hospital			1							1
-Unemployed				1						1
						2				2

### *ToT profiles*

Key characteristics of the trainers are summarised in Table 5. The two women trained for sewing were both included in the survey, whereas none of the trainers trained for IT and Marquetry were included. As seen, all trainers are comparatively young (the oldest is 44 years of age).

Professionally, all trainers have relevant educational background as well as professional experience, although two of the trainers were unemployed for quite long time before being recruited as trainers.

It is less clear from the survey findings to what extent the trainers have previous experience with training persons from vulnerable households. It seems that only the two female trainers in sewing have such experience. None of the trainers seem to have been engaged in income-generating activities prior to becoming trainers in the project.

### *Adequacy of project training*

All trainers found the training useful for their own training of beneficiaries. They make frequent use of the training material and the toolkits provided to them. However, three trainers feel that the training period in Jordan was too short and one feels he needs more advanced training. Four trainers emphasised the need to give trainees more time.

Although all trainers found the training sufficient for their work with the beneficiaries, five trainers also found they would need more training to further develop their skills or learn about specified items within their professions.

### *Post-ToT*

Following the training the ToTs did not receive any further support from the project. However, all comment that they meet with the project manager every day to share and discuss about weaknesses and strengths of the training of the beneficiaries.

Table 6 shows the trainings of beneficiaries by the ToTs in the survey.

**Table 6: ToB conducted by the selected trainers**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>No of courses</b>	<b>No of participants</b>	<b>Average number of beneficiaries in training course</b>
Sewing			
- Trainer 1	4	100	25
- Trainer 2	4	102	25-26
Refrigerator & Air-condition			
- Trainer 1	2	30	15
- Trainer 2	2	30	15
Mobile Phone	5	62	12-13
Generator & Pump Repair			
- Trainer 1	3	49	16-17
- Trainer 2	3	47	15-16

As shown in Table 6, the two female trainers in sewing trained a considerably higher number of beneficiaries than the male trainers. As mentioned above, this points to an imbalanced selection of trainers across trades. In addition, the groups of women trainees in sewing have been much larger than the groups of male trainees in other trades.

#### *Trainability and mentoring of ToBs*

Six trainers considered the trainability of the beneficiaries to be good, whereas one rated it only as acceptable. All trainers considered the training provided to the beneficiaries as good. None of the trainers had frequent contact with the trainees after the training

#### ***Conclusive assessment of ToT evaluation survey findings:***

- Trainers with adequate background were selected and provided with adequate training, although there is an understandable wish to have access to more training.
- An imbalance exists across subjects/trades in number of trained trainers in relation to number of subsequently trained beneficiaries, particularly disfavoured beneficiaries trained in sewing (and thus women).
- All trainers - except ToTs trained in business – conducted ToB training following their training but with little contact with trainees after their completion of training.

#### *5.6.3 ToT Output, outcome and impact analysis*

The intended ToT outputs have been produced. The intended number of trainers were trained and most of them did in turn train end-beneficiaries.

The ToT is in itself a means to achieve the end goal – to train beneficiaries to enable them to improve their household income and livelihoods. To this extent, an immediate outcome may be said to be that beneficiaries have been trained as

planned. Outcomes in a medium to longer term cannot yet be assessed, but hinges crucially on continued GoI financing of running costs.

#### **4.7. ToB Component**

##### *5.7.1 ToB selection and training*

The Project Document mentions 1400 as total number of targeted beneficiaries. During the first Technical Meeting, it was decided to aim at an equal number of food and non-food beneficiaries (i.e. 700 beneficiaries to be trained under the UNIDO non-food component). During the second Technical Meeting an increased number of beneficiaries was proposed.<sup>16</sup> Eventually 988 beneficiaries were trained in non-food trades.

##### *Beneficiary selection process and criteria*

The selection of ToBs turned out to be a difficult and time consuming process. Several attempts were made to ensure a transparent and equitable selection.

Initially, the MoLSA provided a data base with names of 8 445 families registered by this Ministry who were presumably unemployed and vulnerable. However, after cross-checking, the project found that 70% of the persons on the MoLSA list were actually employed.

The PC/NPC thus decided to make its own selection using seven criteria. A form was prepared with questions to be asked to each proposed beneficiary. Each answer was then graded according to a pre-determined scale. The questions and the associated grades were about:

1. Marital Status – graded 1-5 points
2. Health Status – graded 1-3 points
3. Quality of Life – graded 1-4 points
4. No. Of Children (Dependents) – 1 extra point for each child
5. Animal Ownership – graded 1-3 points
6. Land Ownership – 1 point less for each area unit
7. Asset Ownership – graded 1-4 points

The minimum age for being eligible was set to 19 years. It was also decided that only one person from each family would be eligible. This could be ensured through using each individual's ID# in combination with the food ratio# of each household.

The first selection round (i.e. to become proposed, to receive the form and then to be interviewed) was initially entrusted to the Ramadi VTC. This did unfortunately not function well as it was discovered that the forms were not distributed to the appropriate candidates. In consultation with the Governor of Ramadi it was therefore decided that the Governor would take over responsibility for the initial selec-

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<sup>16</sup> See technical meeting notes 18-20 May 2010.

tion in Ramadi and that the district Mayors would take over this responsibility in districts outside Ramadi. More than 1 500 candidates were proposed.

All proposed candidates filled in the form and were interviewed. The proposed candidates were thereafter graded on the seven criteria and ranked according to the points obtained. The grading/ranking was further 'cross-checked' by the PC/NPC as it was discovered that the forms had not always been correctly filled in. The neediest were selected first for participating in the non-food training.

The PC/NPC are rather confident that the proposed beneficiaries did belong to the targeted population. The PC/NPC however estimates that 15-20% of the selected beneficiaries do not belong to the 'appropriate target group'.

### *ToB training*

Each training course was for 4 weeks. A total of 988 beneficiaries were trained by the project, distributed across training workshops (trades) and districts as shown in Table 7. The initially planned number of beneficiaries was 720. The project thus exceeded the initially planned number of beneficiaries by 37%, despite the short time available for beneficiary training (8 months as discussed above). The expansion of number of beneficiaries was made possible through running several training courses in parallel. In Ramadi VTC (the main VTC) there were 7 training halls and the additional three VTCs provided additional training facilities. The quality of the training was thus not compromised.

At first sight the gender distribution seems to be in favour of women: 65% of the beneficiaries were women. However, women were offered training in sewing alone, with the exception of one cycle in IT and one cycle in marquetry. As seen below, sewing does not seem to offer great prospects for improving household income.<sup>17</sup> The PMU emphasised the difficult circumstances for women in Al Anbar, thus confirming the Human Development Indicators (see above). The challenges in ensuring that women get fair and equal access to opportunities offered by the project were thus known from the project start. In retrospect it seems fair to say that these challenges should have been paid stronger attention in the preparation for implementation and in the selection of trades suitable for women.

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<sup>17</sup> There is in fact no good example from any country of sewing training 'en masse' as a route to increased household income unless there is a textile industry to absorb the trained beneficiaries.

**Table 7: Distribution of training, beneficiaries and toolkits (by gender) across districts and sub-districts**

District	Ramadi	Haditha	Anaa	Rawwa	Heet	Al-Qaem	Al-Baghdadi	Rutba	Reyhana	Al-Obaidi	Rumana	Kubasa	Total
<b>Training</b>													
<b>Sewing</b>													
- # cycles	5	5	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	24
- Beneficiaries (ToB)													
- women	124	125	40	40	60	40	30	30	20	30	30	30	599
- men	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
- Toolkits	124	15	40	40	60	40	30	30	20	30	30	30	489
<b>IT</b>													
- # cycles	3	1			2	1							7
- Beneficiaries (ToB)													
- women	20	1			...	...							21
- men	28	29			20	20							97
- Toolkits	n/a	n/a			n/a	n/a							n/a
<b>Refrigeration and Air-con</b>													
- # cycles	2												2
- Beneficiaries (ToB)													
- women	...												...
- men	29												29
- Toolkit	29												29
<b>Mobile</b>													
- # cycles	3	1			1								4
- Beneficiaries (ToB)													
- women	...	...			...								...
- men	29	10			10								49
- Toolkit	9	...			1								10
<b>Pump and Generator</b>													
- # cycles	3				2								5
- Beneficiaries (ToB)													
- women	...				...								...
- men	48				30								78
- Toolkit	48				30								78
<b>Wood Working</b>													
- # cycles	4												4
- Beneficiaries (ToB)													
- women	...												...
- men	76												76
- Toolkit	76												76
<b>Marquetry</b>													
- # cycles	2												2
- Beneficiaries (ToB)													
- women	19												19
- men	20												20
- Toolkit	39												39
<b>Total ToB</b>													<b>988</b>
- women	163	126	40	40	60	40	30	30	20	30	30	30	639
- men	230	39	...	...	60	20	...	...	...	...	...	...	349

Source: Project Data Base

As may be expected there is a concentration of training to the Ramadi VTC, conducting 22 cycles of training in all seven trades. It is noticed that no less than eight districts only offered training in sewing – and in six of these only one cycle of

sewing training was provided. These are remote districts, offering training in a trade which does not seem to offer great prospects for improving household income.

#### *Tool kits and incentives*

A flat incentive sum of USD 200 was agreed to be paid to all beneficiaries upon completion of the training.

In addition, tool kits were distributed to the beneficiaries (details are shown in Table 7 above). The IT training did not include the possibility of beneficiaries to receive a tool kit. Only four mobile tool kits were distributed to set up 10 production groups. For other trades, 100% of the beneficiaries should receive a tool kit. An exception was made in Hadietha, where a deal was made between the Governor and the project management to deliver industrial sewing machines to an existing production group instead of household sewing machines to the beneficiaries. The rationale was to expand the production group's capacity. The production group would then hire the trained women (which did not work out well as discussed below).

The value of tool kits ranges between above USD 4000 (mobile phone repair), to just above USD 2000 (refrigeration and air-condition repair toolkit) and down to USD 100 (locally procured sewing machines). Beneficiaries all signed an agreement not to sell the tool kits. For air-conditioning and mobile the beneficiaries signed to repay cash (USD 1800 and USD 2600 respectively) if the tool kit is 'misused' or sold (with no time limit). For sewing machines there is no fine. Nevertheless, the women were requested to sign a commitment not to sell their machines.

It is obvious that the women's access to resources in the form of tool kits is considerable less than the men's. This again underscores the point raised above that from beneficiary gender distribution it may seem that the project has favoured women, whereas when it comes to opportunities and resources the reality is the opposite: men have benefitted considerable more than women in this project.

#### ***Conclusive assessment of ToB selection and training:***

- The selection of beneficiaries was problematic and faced attempts of 'elite capture' and/or undue pressure. The PC/NPC made pro-active efforts to 'balance' such attempts.
- There is a need to balance the value of participatory processes against the risk for negative elite capture.
- Women are in majority number-wise, but with few options for training.



- Whereas there is no doubt that there are restrictions on women, it is a concern that women are confined primarily to sewing training from the outset of the project.
- Tool kits represent an asset/resource made available to the beneficiaries. Women have access to considerable less assets than men.
- The women in Hadietha seem to have been the ‘victims’ of a less successful deal between the local government and the project management.

### 5.7.2 *Evaluation survey findings*

#### *Profile of survey participants/households*

The survey included questions on a few basic features of the beneficiaries and their households as one means to verifying beneficiary profile. From Table 8, it is seen that there are important differences in the situation of male and female participants.

The average age is higher among women. However, among the surveyed beneficiaries, there were five women in the age of 16-18, thus below the set minimum eligible age.

The average school education is higher among men. Among the women, two thirds (66%) had primary or less school education, whereas the opposite is the case for men (64% of the men with more than primary school education).

In women beneficiary households the average household size is below but the dependency rate is higher than average. Women beneficiary households are thus more vulnerable. Almost all households of male beneficiaries are ‘low income’ households, whereas there is more variation in type of household of women beneficiary with less than 50% classified as ‘low income’.

It was further noticed in the survey that brothers and sisters participated in the training. In one occasion it was noted that one man had participated in trainings for two trades. This confirms the perception of the PC/NPC that it was not possible to entirely rule out abuse of the selection process. The survey profile suggests that the share of youth is lower than the intended rate (27% as opposed to intended 36%).

**Table 8: Basic features of survey participants and households**

(% of and number of persons interviewed)

Feature	Women		Men	
<b>Age</b>				
16-25 years	22%	(9)	36%	(9)
26-35 years	36.5%	(15)	48%	(12)
36-45 years	36.5%	(15)	16%	(4)
46 years and above	5%	(2)	0%	(0)
Average	33		29	
<b>Position in Household</b>				
Head	34%	(14)	76%	(19)
Husband/Wife	34%	(14)	0%	(0)
Son/Daughter	27%	(11)	24%	(6)
Single	5%	(2)	0%	(0)
<b>School Education</b>				
None/illiterate	15%	(6)	12%	(3)
Primary 3-6 years	51%	(21)	24%	(6)
Intermediary 7-9 years	15%	(6)	16%	(4)
Secondary 12 years	12%	(5)	28%	(7)
College and BA	7%	(3)	20%	(5)
Average	7		9	
<b>Type of Household</b>				
Martyr	10%	(4)	0%	(0)
Widow	14.5%	(6)	0%	(0)
Woman headed	12%	(5)	4%	(1)
IDP	10%	(4)	0%	(0)
Low Income	48.5%	(20)	96%	(24)
Divorced	5%	(2)		(0)
<b>Household Size</b>				
	Persons		Persons	
Below 16 years	3-4		2-3	
Above 16 years	2-3		3-4	
Total household members	5-6		6-7	
Range	1-17		1-16	

*Perceived usefulness of training and training material*

All ToBs in the survey (100%) of both women and men found the training very useful and use the training material very often. It is rather unusual that 100% of interviewees provide the exact same answer, and certain cautiousness in interpretation must be adhered to.

*Mentoring (post-training support) from ToTs*

The surveyor has inserted a comparative long 'standardised' reply to the question regarding support received from the project after finishing the training, i.e. mentoring. All women who had received post-training support provided this standardised answer (i.e. 30 women) and 21 of the men provided the same reply with one saying that the support was received during trainer's visit. The reply is compara-

tively ‘sophisticated’ referring to project policy. It is unlikely that such a huge majority of the beneficiaries would independently have come up with this reply.

None of the beneficiaries answered a follow-up question on the perceived quality of post-training support. This prompts the concern whether the surveyor has at all asked this question.

**Table 9: Post-training Support from ToTs**  
(% of and number of persons interviewed)

Post-training Support from ToTs	Women		Men	
	%	(n)	%	(n)
Received post-training support	73%	(30)	88%	(22)
Did not receive post-training support	22%	(9)	8%	(2)
No reply	5%	(2)	4%	(1)
Total	100%	(41)	100%	(25)

Of those beneficiaries who had not received any post-training, one of the women said she needed financial support and one that she needed a new training. The other seven women provided no explanation. As for the men, no comments were provided.

#### *Use of tool kits*

In general, beneficiaries who received a tool kit are satisfied and say they use the toolkits frequently (see Table 10). Those unemployed say that they use the toolkit in the household. Three women say that the sewing machine should have had a table and three men (all generator repair training) claim that the tool kit is not enough to open a workshop.

**Table 10: Use of Tool kits**  
(% of and number of those who received tool kits)

Use of Toolkit	Women		Men	
	%	(n)	%	(n)
Very often.	80%	(28)	88%	(15)
Not so often	20%	(7)	12%	(2)
Never	0%	(0)	0%	(0)

#### *Occupation before and after training*

The survey findings clearly point to a decrease in unemployment and an increase in employment and/or self-employment for both men and women (see Table 11). The vast majority of men and women were unemployed prior to the training, with slightly more men than women engaging in self-employment activities. No

woman moved into employment whereas men moved into employment and self-employment in equal numbers. Most unemployed beneficiaries (women and men) say they have been unemployed for several years or 'long time'. It is unfortunately not possible to draw further conclusions about average length of unemployment before training due to the way the surveyors have filled in the questionnaires.

**Table 11: Occupation before and after training**  
(% of and number of persons interviewed)

Occupation	Before Training		After Training	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
<b>Employed</b>	0% (0)	0% (0)	0% (0)	40% (10)
<b>Self-employed</b>	5% (2)	8% (2)	78% (32)	48% (12)
<b>Unemployed</b>	95% (39)	92% (23)	22% (9)	12% (3)
<b>Total</b>	100% (41)	100% (25)	100% (41)	100% (25)

All interviewed women - except for one - participated in sewing workshops. There is thus no need to look further into occupational change by trades for women, except to notice that the lady participating in IT is among the ones unemployed (towards the end of the project, one training cycle in marquetry was provided for women but not included in the survey given its late timing - for details on selection of beneficiaries to be included see above, section 5.7.1)

It is, however, worth noting that in Hadeitha five of the unemployed women were among those who did not get a tool kit as in this location toolkits were replaced by industrial machines for the Women Creativity Centre. The trained women were supposed to get employment in the Centre which four of the unemployed women did but only for a couple of months before they were laid off again by the Centre. One of the women was never offered a job in the Centre.

For male beneficiaries the picture is more varied given that they had no less than six options for training. As seen from Table 12 there is a variation across trades when it comes to continued unemployment for men, with all unemployed men after training having been trained in two of the five surveyed trades: IT and carpentry.

**Table 12: Occupation of men before and after training - by trade**  
% of and (persons) interviewed

Trade	Before Training			After Training		
	Employed	Self-employed	Unemployed	Employed	Self-employed	Unemployed
IT	0% (0)	0% (0)	20% (5)	16% (4)	0% (0)	4% (1)
Refrigeration and Air-con	0% (0)	4% (1)	8% (2)	4% (1)	8% (2)	0% (0)
Mobile	0% (0)	0% (0)	16% (4)	4% (1)	12% (3)	0% (0)
Pump and Generator	0% (0)	4% (1)	32% (8)	12% (3)	24% (6)	0% (0)
Wood Working	0% (0)	0% (0)	16% (4)	4% (1)	4% (1)	8% (2)
<b>Total</b>	<b>0% (0)</b>	<b>8% (2)</b>	<b>92% (23)</b>	<b>40% (10)</b>	<b>48% (12)</b>	<b>12% (3)</b>

According to the survey, none of the ten men who found employment after the training perceived the training to be decisive for their employment, which is a rather odd finding that needs to be interpreted cautiously. Three of them found a job in family business, two in a producer group and five in other businesses.

In addition there may be a 'hidden' geographical effect in the difference between men and women in occupation after training: in the more remote areas only sewing training was provided. The evaluator does not know whether or not some of the male beneficiaries in the Ramadi trainings were recruited from these remote districts. It cannot be excluded that besides a 'trade' effect there may be a pure 'geographical effect', i.e. women have faced more difficulties because they live in remote areas rather than because of the trade in which they were trained.

#### *Perceived changes in living conditions*

An overwhelming majority of the beneficiaries found that their living conditions have improved (see Table 13) – both in material and immaterial terms. It is interesting to note that in particular women beneficiaries found that access to information and communication has improved.

**Table 13: Perceived changes in living conditions**  
(% of and number of persons interviewed)

Better Living Conditions	Women		Men	
Better				
Housing	10%	(4)	16%	(4)
Food	71%	(29)	80%	(20)
Amenities	56%	(23)	64%	(16)
Education	61%	(27)	80%	(20)
Communication	95%	(39)	84%	(21)
Information	97%	(40)	90%	(24)

Regarding material improvements, a huge majority found that their food situation has improved. As the time since training is rather short, it is not unexpected that housing has not improved for many beneficiaries. Should the improved household

situation prove sustainable, which is impossible to judge at this point in time, is seems reasonable to believe that housing will also improve in the future for more beneficiaries.

*Income of beneficiary and household before and after training*

Table 14 shows that, even though the overwhelming majority of female beneficiaries had no income before the training, more women than men belonged to households in the highest income range (equivalent to USD 340 and above). For male beneficiaries the household income is more widely spread, although the highest share of men also had no income before participating in the training. Although it cannot be assumed that the female beneficiaries in the survey are entirely representative of all project female beneficiaries (as discussed above), but this fact does serve as a reminder of whether or not the right women beneficiaries are given the opportunity to participate in the training (given that the vulnerable women were to be targeted).

As regards increase in own and household income, all beneficiaries responded the same qualitative change in own and in household income (see Table 14). For men equal shares perceive that income increased a lot and a little, whereas for women two thirds perceived a little increase in income and only 17% perceived income to have increased a lot. It thus seems that the trades offered to men open up better opportunities to improve household income than does the sewing offered to women (thus confirming the gender differences in occupation before and after training discussed above, Table 11).

**Table 14: Income of beneficiary and household before and after training**

(% of and number of persons interviewed)

Income before Training <i>Iraqi Dinar per Month</i>	Beneficiary				Household			
	Women		Men		Women		Men	
0	88%	(36)	32%	(8)	0%	(0)	0%	(0)
1 – 50 000	0%	(0)	12%	(3)	5%	(2)	0%	(0)
51 000 – 100 000	5%	(2)	16%	(4)	12%	(5)	4%	(1)
101 000 – 150 000	2%	(1)	20%	(5)	14.5%	(6)	20%	(5)
151 000 – 200 000	0%	(0)	0%	(0)	14.5%	(6)	12%	(3)
201 000 - 250 000	2.5%	(1)	4%	(1)	5%	(2)	20%	(5)
251 000 – 300 000	0%	(0)	12%	(3)	7%	(3)	16%	(4)
301 000 – 350000	2.5%	(1)	4%	(1)	2.5%	(1)	12%	(3)
351 000 – 400 000					7%	(3)	4%	(1)
401 000 and above					22%	(9)	12%	(3)
No reply					10%	(4)		
(1000 ID ~ 0.85 USD)								
Income after training	Beneficiary				Household			
<i>Change in Income</i>	Women		Men		Women		Men	
Increased a lot	17%	(7)	44%	(11)	17%	(7)	44%	(11)
Increased a little	63.5%	(26)	44%	(11)	63.5%	(26)	44%	(11)
No change	19.5%	(8)	12%	(3)	19.5%	(8)	12%	(3)

Unfortunately, the surveyor omitted the follow up question in the questionnaire about ‘how much’ the change was. It is therefore not possible to form an idea what ‘a little’ and ‘a lot’ means for each beneficiary.

All but one woman in the survey were trained in sewing. There is thus no need to look into differences in income increases by trade for women (as mentioned above the one woman trained in IT remains unemployed and consequently does not report a change in income).

Men had more choices. The change in income for male beneficiaries is seen from Table 15. Even though the sample is very small and may be biased the figures indicate that three of the trades resulted in changes in income for 100% of the beneficiaries, whereas carpentry (wood working) seems to be the least income-generating training (with 50% reporting no change in income).

**Table 15: Change in income of men after training - by trade**  
(% of and number of persons interviewed)

Change in Income	After Training			Total
	Increased a lot	Increased a little	No change	
Trade				
IT	60% (3)	20% (1)	20% (1)	100% (5)
Refrigeration and Air-con	67% (2)	33% (1)	0% (0)	100% (3)
Mobile	50% (2)	50% (2)	0% (0)	100% (4)
Pump and Generator	22% (2)	78% (7)	0% (0)	100% (9)
Wood Working	50% (2)	0% (0)	50% (2)	100% (4)
Total	(11)	(11)	(3)	(25)

***Conclusive assessment of ToB evaluation survey findings:***

- Households of female beneficiaries are overall more vulnerable than those of male beneficiaries.
- Survey findings confirm the difficulties to ensure that all selected beneficiaries meet the agreed eligibility criteria.
- Training is perceived as useful, although little contact with trainers after training occurred. The mentoring does thus not seem to have materialised.
- Tool kits are perceived as useful and a majority of beneficiaries say they make frequent use of them. More women than men do not often use their tool kits.
- Unemployment decreased for both men and women, with differences across trades for men.
- Living conditions were perceived as improved, particularly for food.
- 22 out of 25 men perceived that their income had increased a lot or a little, whereas two thirds of women perceived their income had increased a little. More women than men perceived no change in income.

- The differences in perceived income across trades for men, and at a lower rate for women than for men, indicate that not all identified trades have been equally beneficial to the trainees.

### 5.7.3 *ToB Output, Outcome and Impact Analysis*

As the survey findings provide the source of information, it is important to keep in mind that the imperfect and skewed selection process makes it difficult to generalise the findings. It cannot be assumed that the survey selection is entirely representative of all project beneficiaries. However, bearing in mind the weaknesses pointed to in the above analysis, the findings do provide indications of results.

In light of the short time since the end of the training it is too early to assess sustainable impact. Immediate outputs and to certain extent outcomes (i.e. the uptake of outputs) will therefore be the focus of the analysis.

All outputs have been achieved and even surpassed when it comes to number of beneficiaries trained. Tool kits have been delivered to most of the beneficiaries intended. Quality of training, training material, and tool kits are assessed by the beneficiaries as useful.

Survey findings point also to positive immediate outcomes. Unemployment has decreased, living conditions improved, and income increased at least a little for most beneficiaries. The findings do not provide information about the sustainability of outcomes though.

There are gender imbalances in the quality of outputs and the extent of potential outcomes. Although the project has aimed at including vast numbers of women in the ToB component, they have been offered only sewing - a trade with little prospect for sustainable increase in household incomes.

## **4.8. *Production Groups (PGs)***

### 5.8.1 *Selection and establishment*

The PGs established are:<sup>18</sup>

- Two carpentry workshops for men started in April.
- One sewing production group in the Women Creativity Centre in Hadi-etha. Initially two female-led sewing production groups were planned for but as the Governor requested, and the PSC agreed, to develop an existing small factory (managed by a man) only one was established.
- One catering production group for women. Recently a generator was provided to this group to complement the previous kitchen and catering equipment, and the group is now becoming operational. This production

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<sup>18</sup> Notes from 5<sup>th</sup> PSC Meeting.



group in a trade not covered by training was requested by the Governor to support 15 widowed women.

- Ten production groups for mobile repair distributed across Anbar Governorate. Initially 30 were planned but this number was reduced because the demand was below expectations. By now all production groups have received their equipment and are ready to become operational. The mobile repair groups were established in already existing workshops (at least 10 years of existence)

As seen, there were changes in the establishment of production groups as the project progressed. An existing factory replaced an intended sewing production group. The number of mobile telephone groups decreased due to limited demand. A new trade was assigned to women which initially was not part of the training. This indicates that it might have been possible to diversify trades for female beneficiaries from the project outset.

It seems fair to say that the initial selection and decision on number of production groups may not have been based on a market analysis. The initial selection was decided by the PSC. Subsequent changes to the PSC decision (the sewing factory and the catering PC) were done in response to the Governor's requests.

#### *Tool kits*

All production groups were provided with equipment to start business. It is not easily visible from the provided financial information which was the share of equipment intended for the production groups. A rough calculation (based on Table 4.b) shows that the value range from USD 4 000 to a mobile repair PG up to close to USD 25 000-35 000 for the catering PG (depending on cost for the generator procured but not included in the financial information provided).

#### *Functional*

The PGs are by now (March 2011) all fully equipped. Some of the PGs received their final equipment only during beginning of 2011.

#### ***Conclusive assessment of PG selection and establishment:***

- The initial selection and orientation of PGs was not based on market analysis.
- The changes made to PG selection were not entirely transparent, such as who was included in the catering PG.
- Women seem to have been disadvantaged when it comes to decisions on PGs and associated assets (with a specific exemption for the catering PG).
- The establishment of a catering production group serves as evidence that other trades than sewing would have been feasible for the female beneficiaries.

### 5.8.2 *PG Output, Outcome and Impact Analysis*

At the time of designing the evaluation only a few of the PGs were operational, as some equipment had not yet been delivered. All PG outputs are now achieved.

As regards outcome, the rationale for decreasing from two to one sewing PG was that an existing factory would receive more equipment to expand capacity and then employ some of the trained women. This did not happen. Similarly, the reason for replacing household sewing machines with industrial sewing machines to the PG in the Women Creativity Centre was that the women would become employed in that PG. Some were employed but laid off after two months. The outcome of the sewing production groups is thus not impressive.

The catering PG is just about to start its operation. It is therefore too early to assess outcome.

The two carpentry PGs are working. Some of the ten mobile PGs were functional as evidenced from the survey.

## **4.9. *Community Leader Component***

The PSC cancelled the training of community leaders due to budget problems and its limited use in the Cottage III project.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Minutes of Meeting (16-19 September 2009): *Cottage IV 4th Project Steering Committee (PSC) Meeting*, Amman.

# V

## Assessment

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### 5.1. *Relevance*

Overall, the objectives of the project – as expressed in the Project Document - are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies. The project objectives are consistent with Iraq’s *National Development Strategy (NDS) 2005-2007* as well as with the *United Nations Assistance Strategy for Iraq 2006-2007*.

The project adopted a multi-sectoral approach to human security in line with the MDGs, i.e. integrating humanitarian and development assistance in the revitalization of productive activities:<sup>20</sup>

- i) Poverty reduction through supporting activities for the creation and rehabilitation of livelihoods;
- ii) Promoting gender equality and empowering women through the association of women in all project activities and decision-making;
- iii) Providing marketable skills to the youths facilitating their self-employment and preventing them from engaging into banditry and crime; and
- iv) Stressing peace-building efforts at community level.

In such an approach, relevance is of course determined to a large extent by the question whether the skills provided by the project through training are indeed “marketable”. Unless there is a demand for products and services from the promoted trades, the newly gained competence is not likely to provide a sustainable basis to rehabilitate livelihoods. Hence the importance of informed choices of the trades is to be promoted and the subjects to be trained.

The evaluation finds that relevance was jeopardized by the lack of depth of analysis in the RRA, which had to be rushed through when, one year after project start, the decision was made to move the project to a different geographic area.

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<sup>20</sup> Project Document Cover Sheet, section 2.1.1

Relevance would have been enhanced substantially - in particular for women beneficiaries - if trades and training subjects had been chosen following an in-depth assessment of market demand. The evaluation finds that project relevance varies across subjects and in particular between men and women.

From a market demand perspective – and thus from a self-employment and income-generating perspective – sewing is to be categorised as an ‘inferior’ subject, i.e. a subject with little prospect of being marketable. It is in this respect highly unfortunate that sewing was the dominant subject for training offered to women. In addition, the assets provided (toolkits) to women were of considerably less value than those offered to the men. The relevance of the project in terms of supporting gender equality and empowering women (see (ii) above) has therefore been very modest.

For young inexperienced and unemployed beneficiaries it is unlikely that the short trainings (4 weeks) will provide them with a sufficiently solid vocational training. The relevance in providing marketable skills for the youths (see (iii) above) has therefore been medium.

The community leader component was dropped. The relevance in contributing to peace-building efforts at community level (see (iv) above) has therefore been very modest.

In summary, while the project is relevant in its intentions, its relevance would have been considerably enhanced had it taken a more market demand-driven approach in implementation, and had it paid more attention to genuine empowerment of women.

## **5.2. Ownership**

GoI representatives from MoA, MoP, MoLSA and from the Office of the Governor of Anbar participated regularly in PSC meetings (since the 2<sup>nd</sup> PSC meeting) and also in the two technical meetings in Amman. This pro-active participation in strategic decisions during implementation indicates a certain degree of ownership.

Moreover, the Governor of Anbar has taken strong personal interest in the implementation of the project. Because the component to involve local leaders was dropped, local ownership among a broader range of local leaders also from outside the Governor Office is, however, likely to be limited.

The project has largely been managed by the NPC with no signs of pro-active participation from the VTC management. The initial selection of beneficiaries under the auspices of the VTC management had to be redone to ensure proper targeting of beneficiaries. This may have weakened the project ownership of the VTC management.

The in-kind contributions from the GoI indicate some ownership by the central Government. Whether the GoI will also allocate the necessary financial resources in the future to cover running costs cannot be assessed at this stage. It is a good sign that MOLSA has put the new four VTC's in their budget. To what extent this budget also includes mentoring costs remains to be seen.

### **5.3. Efficiency**

Efficiency measures how economically inputs (funds, expertise, time etc) are converted to results.

As all for all other UNIDO projects in Iraq, the efficiency of MISP IV has been affected by security issues. In the case of MISP IV these external influences were even more serious because one entire year was lost in preparations for implementation in Ninewa before the decision had to be made to transfer the project to Anbar governorate. The RRA for Anbar was finalised in August 2008, but the rehabilitation of the VTC further delayed the implementation. The ToT was finalised only in February 2010 and the ToB could not be initiated before mid-March 2010.

There were two major changes in UNIDO management: in December 2009 the IPC based in Amman was replaced and in mid-March 2010 the NPC based in Anbar. These changes in management had positive effects on efficiency. Thanks to the NPC, the beneficiary training was accomplished although only eight months were left to conduct this essential part of the project.

The number of beneficiaries trained exceeds the initially planned figure by 40% (988 beneficiaries trained compared to planned 700). In particular, more women than initially intended were reached through the decentralisation of sewing training to sub-districts.

The trainers were recruited from the private sector in cooperation with MoLSA and trained in Jordan as planned. All ToTs were highly satisfied with the quality of their training. The agreement was that these trainers would be hired by Ramadi VTC as trainers. However, the Ramadi VTC was at a later stage assigned redeployed military engineers to become VTC staff and by then declined to hire the privately recruited trainers. This turn of events decreased the efficiency of the ToT component.

The VTC itself has been appropriately equipped and thus holds the potential of improved performance. There were however few signs of the envisaged mentoring at the time of the evaluation survey. It is uncertain if it will come on line or not. The extent to which this is to happen hinges entirely upon GoI decisions about financing running costs. Requests have been submitted for continued financing to continue the training in line with the MISP IV curricula, but as of yet no financing has been secured.

The initial selection and decision about number of PGs changed as the project progressed. It seems fair to say that an assessment of market demand and competition would have been beneficial. Further, instead of establishing a sewing PG, it was decided to develop an existing small factory, managed by a man, thus further decreasing the opportunities for women beneficiaries.

#### **5.4. Effectiveness and impact**

Effectiveness is a measure of the extent to which the project objectives have been achieved, or are expected to be achieved. Immediate objectives are to attain (see Diagram 1): a population with capacity to plan and manage economic activities; improved productive capacity; and sustainable and profitable income-generating opportunities for vulnerable groups at the immediate objectives level. In the medium term (intermediate objectives) income shall have increased and basic services be revitalized, while the livelihoods of approximately 1400 extremely poor people shall have improved (700 through UNIDO support and 700 through FAO support).

The project did not produce baselines or monitoring results on which a rigorous assessment of the extent to which MISP IV has attained its major objectives could be based. It is unfortunate that the project did never produce the intended baseline, as this implies that it will not be possible to credibly measure effectiveness – neither now nor in the future.

At this point in time, it is further difficult to form a solid opinion of the merit of the activities, i.e. an opinion about the extent to which the activities have attained, or may be expected to attain, the intended objectives. More time would need to pass to provide more evidence (note however, that it would in any event remain a 'guestimate' in the absence of baseline information). To the best of this evaluator's judgement an assessment is as discussed below. There is potential for some positive effects – but there are also obvious risks that these potential positive effects will not materialise.

The beneficiaries seem to have appreciated the training. As seen so far, the extent to which training resulted in increased income varies depending on subject. The sustainability of the increased incomes cannot be assessed at this point in time. However, the absence of established linkages between the training provided and the local private sector is likely to pose a risk to achieving the objective of sustainable and profitable income-generating opportunities for the intended number of beneficiaries. In particular, sewing (the single choice offered to women for most part of the project duration) is not likely to provide the basis for sustainable and profitable income-generating opportunities but for a very few of the large number of women trained in sewing.

The VTC has been rehabilitated with new equipment as well as training materials. Some staff of the VTC has been indirectly trained by the project through partici-

pating in training sessions conducted by the project trainers for beneficiaries, but the experienced project teachers are not VTC staff. There is further no firm long-term financial commitment from GoI to ensure the coverage of VTC running costs for teachers' salaries to provide the intended mentoring of beneficiaries, to reprint training materials and/or for replication of training courses. In addition, a pure replication of training in the current subjects would not be effective given the identified limitations in prospects for income-generating activities of some of the subjects.

The viability of the PGs is difficult to form an opinion about. The PGs seem to be expensive in terms of equipment (this conclusion may be either verified/challenged once the information is made available from UNIDO HQ about costs for equipment to the various component sof the project). Further, one (the catering production group) was for instance provided final equipment only beginning of 2011. So far, the production groups have not provided intended employment opportunities for the beneficiaries. It is further unclear how the PGs differ from ordinary micro-enterprises. It should be clearly assessed if the approach take to PGs within the various MISPs is indeed as innovative as intended and to what extent the approach taken differs from UNIDO's general approach to supporting the development of MSMEs.

The cancellation of the training to community leaders is likely to negatively influence the extent to which the objective of a population with capacity to plan and manage economic activities will be attained. The project has limited involvement of local stakeholders to the Governor and his office rather than trying to achieve a broader based sense of involvement.

Effectiveness and impact would most likely have been enhanced if the provision of toolkits had been matched with measures to enhance beneficiary access to financing for the establishment of micro-enterprises. Moreover, the provision of toolkits for free is not a sustainable approach – and thus not effective approach. It merits to be asked to what extent it is in line with 'do-no-harm' approaches, as the current approach skews private sector development without guaranteeing that it will provide viable solutions.

### **5.5. Sustainability**

The sustainability is about the continuation of benefits – the probability of continued long-term benefits - from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed.

Some of the risks to sustainability follow from the discussion above, such as risk of no continued financing of the VTC, teachers trained not being employed, beneficiaries not being in better position to generate income. In addition, there are elements of the approach taken in MISP IV which seriously undermines sustain-

ability. The provision of toolkits free of charge to most beneficiaries as well as the paying of transportation fees pose risks to sustainability.

There is a basic issue which deserves to be thoroughly assessed/addressed in the MISPs: is the project to be viewed as an emergency project or is it a project to contribute to sustainable development? The current approach to pay for transportation fees and to provide a 'bonus' in the form of a toolkit makes the project at risk becoming seen as a 'study for food' initiative rather than an initiative to provide sustainable skills for sustainable livelihood.



# VI

## Issues and lessons emerging from four evaluations

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Including this evaluation, four MISPs have been evaluated (MISP I-IV).<sup>21</sup> In order to enhance the potential for learning lessons and following a request from the UNIDO evaluation group, the evaluator conducted a comparative review of the findings of all four MISP evaluations. The discussion around the emerging issues also draws on findings in a recent thematic evaluation of post-crisis projects (including MISP I and II).<sup>22</sup>

Key comparison criteria were identified and evaluation reports reviewed against these criteria. The findings from this review are summarised in Table 16. The following key issues emerged.

➤ *Trade / skills - selection and delivery*

***Needs assessment, market demand and private sector linkages:*** Only one project evaluation (MISP II) found that the training focused on skills and products with promising demand. The three other evaluations (MISP I+II+IV) consistently found that the choice of skills for training should have been based on a more solid needs assessment, analysis of market demand and identification of possible private sector linkages. Such assessments should have included an analysis of the market situation for MSSEs, including competition from and/or complementarity to larger enterprises, as well as access to finance. The basic business training module was not implemented in MISP IV and weakly implemented in MISP III.

The thematic evaluation on post-crisis projects cites a finding that thorough training needs assessments are necessary to avoid training too many beneficiaries in the same basic skills, which seems to be a typical flaw in post-crisis skills development.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> It should be noted that the evaluation of MISP IV covers only the UNIDO component, whereas the three evaluations of MISP I-III covered the FAO and the UNIDO components.

<sup>22</sup> UNIDO (August 2010). *Thematic Evaluation of Post-Crisis Projects*, Vienna.

<sup>23</sup> EED (2008): *Promoting Livelihood and Employment in Post-Conflict Situations* (cited in Thematic Evaluation of Post-Crisis Projects, p 38).

**Higher degree of creativity in selection of training topics:** The evaluations of two projects (MISP III+IV) recommended to pay more attention to the selection of training topics to improve the project outcome in terms of self-employment or job creation. In MISP IV this was of particular concern for the training offered to women: 639 women were trained, out of which 599 were trained in sewing, thus a strong example of too many ToBs for the same basic skill, and in addition in a skill which is not likely to hold strong market potential.

**Higher degree of flexibility in delivery of training:** Two evaluations (MISP II+III) point to the importance of having more flexibility in the delivery of training, to ensure that trainings match individual needs. The evaluation of MISP IV found that the training is most likely too short to provide solid and operational technical skills.

#### ➤ *Training Facility*

**Decentralised provision of training:** All MISPs except MISP I offered training in venues close to the ToBs. This was found to be of particular importance to allow women to participate. It is however important to ensure that the training for women in these decentralised venues is not limited to sewing alone but includes subjects which are in demand.

**Mentoring:** The mentoring component has been weak in all four MISPs, although this component has been recognised as critical in all evaluations, including the first one.

Thematic evaluation found that despite the critical importance of mentoring services for business start up projects, none of the evaluations and progress reports provides specific information about the effectiveness of such services in the projects under evaluation.<sup>24</sup>

**Sustainability of training facilities:** All four evaluations raised concerns regarding the continued financing of the training facilities. In none of the projects firm commitments were made about continuing the financing beyond project end. Financing should cover running costs and also cover activities, such as mentoring, that are beyond the traditional role of VTCs. Continued financing should be agreed upon prior to rehabilitating and equipping the training facilities.

#### ➤ *Trainers (ToT) Selection*

**Skills-based selection:** All four evaluations stressed the importance of a transparent selection process of ToTs based on clear and transparent criteria in order to avoid sub-optimal selections. It has also been an issue whether ToTs should be preferably selected from VTC or other government bodies or from the private sector. It is noted that a mix would be best, but that it is crucial that ToTs from the private

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<sup>24</sup> See p 41 of *Thematic Evaluation of Post-Crisis Projects*.

sector will subsequently be hired as VTC staff. This was not the case in MISP IV where none of the ToTs initially hired and trained in Jordan were VTC staff and none of them was transferred to the VTC after the project.

➤ *Beneficiary (ToB) selection*

**Selection process:** The selection was found to be fairly transparent in all projects. In MISP II to MISP IV, the selection was based on clear multi-dimensional criteria of vulnerability.

**Vulnerability vs. capability:** In MISP II and MISP III relevant experience and educational background were used as criteria in addition to vulnerability. The MISP III evaluation found that the educational and experimental background requirement had been a key success factor for employability and income. In MISP IV, no capability criteria were applied. The evaluation noted that there needs to be a balance between vulnerability and capability, given that – for various reasons – not all ToBs are in a position to venture into income-generating activities.

➤ *Production Group concept and selection*

**Selection of PGs:** Overall, the evaluations found that the PG concept and the selection of PGs need to be reviewed. MISP I developed PGs from scratch and the evaluation found that an ex-ante demonstration of the viability of the PGs would have been necessary. MISP II and MISP III selected existing MSMEs, which they upgraded, and the evaluations found that the selection process had been fair. Although the outcomes remained to be seen, the respective evaluations found that prospects to generate jobs for the ToBs were high. In MISP IV, on the other hand, it was found that the selection process needed to be more transparent and the viability be assessed. It was proposed in MISP IV to reconsider the PG concept and to clarify how the PGs differ from ordinary micro-enterprises.

The thematic evaluation of post-crisis projects points to the risks of distribution of assets (tools, equipment, infrastructure, etc.) to self-help groups/production groups. It remains a sensitive point, as such assets are of course very attractive to people with limited means. In the sample projects, assets were distributed in two ways: Three projects (incl. MISP I+II) provided production equipment and/or upgraded workspace to groups on a grant basis. In two projects, revolving funds were established for financing the equipment. Evaluations do not provide an independent assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of grants versus loans for essential equipment. International experience suggests that group members should bring in their own personal funds, if groups are to thrive and survive.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> See p 42 of *Thematic Evaluation of Post-Crisis Projects*.

➤ *Tool kits – handout and composition*

**Who, when and if to get:** The evaluation of MISP I recommended that toolkits should not be donated indiscriminately but only to the best ToBs. This is also the conclusion in the evaluation of MISP IV, if that tool kits are at all to remain an instrument of MISPs. The recommended approach is to abolish the provision of free tool kits (see further on sustainability below).

The thematic evaluation notes that the distribution of tool kits free-of-charge during the immediate recovery phase is common practice in many post post-crisis projects. However, this practice also provides incentives for beneficiaries to enrol in skills training, even if there is no market for the skills. Giving away tool-kits and other assets for free can counter the drive towards developing a saving culture and other self-help abilities. Insisting on some kind of “self-contribution” is important to avoid potential distortions.<sup>26</sup>

**Composition and procurement of tool kits:** The evaluator of MISP III argues strongly that the choice of technology and equipment should be based on the socio-economic assessment of the beneficiaries (which should have been part of the needs assessment). The evaluator of MISP IV argues that if free toolkits are to be maintained as part of the MISP approach, more attention should be paid to making informed choices about the composition of the tool-kits and that, whenever possible, local procurement should be preferred to enhance the project’s economic foot-print.

➤ *Outcome-oriented M&E*

**Clear intervention logic:** All MISP evaluations consistently pointed out that the intervention logic lacks clarity. The MISP IV evaluation further noticed that the intervention logic follows an activity-based approach rather than a results-based approach.

**SMART indicators and baseline:** None of the four MISPs used SMART (specific – measurable – achievable – relevant – time-bound) indicators. MISPs focus on output level indicators while the outcome level is most important for measuring results.

➤ *Sustainability: emergency vs. long-term development approach*

**Free hand outs and incentives to participants:** The evaluations found that the MISP approach is acceptable in an emergency context but questionable under sustainability aspects. The evaluators of MISP I noted that donating tool kits is appropriate in an emergency intervention and during the transition from conflict to post-conflict but argued that this approach may lead to an incentive structure jeopardising sustainability. The issue was not further discussed in the MISP II and III evaluations but was again raised in the evaluation of MISP IV, given that MISP

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<sup>26</sup> See pp 40-41 of *Thematic Evaluation of Post-Crisis Projects*.

IV started at a considerably later stage than MISP I and in a post-conflict country moving towards peaceful sustainable development rather than a conflict country moving into post-conflict as in 2004. The MISP IV evaluator strongly supports the assessment in the MISP I evaluation.

***Sequential project design:*** As seen from Table 16, three of the four MISPs run into delays due to problems related to the rehabilitation of training facilities. The thematic evaluation notes that the sequential approach requires a minimum of 3 to 5 years to achieve measurable employment generation, which disqualifies this approach quite clearly for immediate post-conflict interventions. A parallel approach where facilities are rehabilitated and short term training programmes conducted in parallel was used in MISP II and in other countries.<sup>27</sup>

***'Do-no-harm' principles:*** The MISP approach does not pay attention to the 'do-no-harm' principle. The basic message of 'do-no-harm' is that the use and distribution of project resources as well as the implicit messages sent through the behaviour of project personnel and their partners may have an impact on the peace and conflict situation. Doing the right thing the wrong way may cause unintended harmful effects. The thematic evaluation notes that this widely accepted good practice for post-conflict PSD has only been explicitly applied in one of the UNIDO projects covered by this thematic evaluation (Sudan).<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> See p 38 of *Thematic Evaluation of Post-Crisis Projects*.

<sup>28</sup> See p 39 of *Thematic Evaluation of Post-Crisis Projects*.

**Table 16: Findings from review MISP I-IV evaluation reports**

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>MISP I</b> (start 2004 – 24 months, extended to 35 months)		<b>MISP II</b> (start 2006 – 18 months)		<b>MISP III</b> (start 2007 – 18 months, extended 39)		<b>MISP IV</b> (start 2007 – 18 months, extended to 40 months)	
	FAO+UNIDO	(Jan 2008)	FAO+UNIDO	(Oct 2009)	FAO+UNIDO	(Jan 2011)	UNIDO	(April 2011)
<p><b>Trade / skills selection and delivery</b></p> <p><i>*Market analysis – PSD linkage</i>  <i>*What – men and women respectively</i>  <i>*How – men and women respectively</i>  <i>*Who participated in selection – men and women respectively</i>  <i>*Flexibility in delivery of training to allow for differences in TOBs background and for deepening for most adept beneficiaries</i>  <i>*Training material up-to-date while remain adequate for specific situation</i></p>	<p>* Should include needs assessment and analysis of market demand/situation for MSSEs, including competition from/ complementarity to larger enterprises, access to finance to match tool kits as starting capital.</p>		<p>* Focused on training for skills and products with high unsatisfied market demand.            * Missed opportunity not to have had flexibility in provision of training to match individual needs (for those with experience above the average)</p>		<p>* Should undertake on-site market demand survey which should include beneficiaries to guide selection of training topics.            *Need higher degree of creativity in selecting training topics to improve project outcome in terms of income and job creation            * Basic business training modules should be strengthened.            * Should allow more flexibility in provision of training to match individual needs..            * Training material should be printed and available in Arabic</p>		<p>* Should strongly improve the quality and depth of analysis in situational/market/demand assessment to provide a solid basis for the selection of trades/skills. The assessment shall include analysis of how to link up to private sector.            * Should pay considerably more attention to diversifying trades/skills for women - linked to in-depth assessment of demand/market opportunities.            * Should include basic business training module.            * The training is very short - most likely too short to provide solid and operational vocational training.</p>	
<p><b>Training Facility</b></p> <p><i>* Centralised vs. decentralised</i>  <i>* Linked up to PSD</i>  <i>* Role of mentoring / Extension service planned</i>  <i>* Sufficient counterpart funding to run and maintain Training Centre after project</i></p>	<p>* Attempts to involve private sector players for training, coaching and job training during design stage – but effective private sector involvement remained very</p>		<p>* Training provided in VTCs with geographical closeness to facilitate for those who cannot be away from home (particularly women difficult for women to be away from home)</p>		<p>* Training venues geographically close important to women. Training was provided in sub-districts.            * Mentoring component should be improved. Mentoring should continue after project completion</p>		<p>* Decentralised training for women was offered, but unfortunately only in sewing. Trades offered in decentralised training facilities should be more diversified and linked to market demand.</p>	

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>MISP I</b> (start 2004 – 24 months, extended to 35 months)		<b>MISP II</b> (start 2006 – 18 months)		<b>MISP III</b> (start 2007 – 18 months, extended 39)		<b>MISP IV</b> (start 2007 – 18 months, extended to 40 months)	
<b>Evaluation scope (date)</b>	FAO+UNIDO	(Jan 2008)	FAO+UNIDO	(Oct 2009)	FAO+UNIDO	(Jan 2011)	UNIDO	(April 2011)
<i>* Running costs for mentoring, keeping trainers, training material included in such counterpart funding</i>	<p>limited.</p> <p>* Closer links with MSSEs as potential employers of beneficiaries could have complemented the theoretical course with practical elements and contributed to a more needs-relevant content of the courses.</p> <p>* The private sector dimension was not well reflected in the counterpart structure (no ministry in charge of private sector development; no business associations).</p> <p>* The mentoring element was not particularly successful although it had been recognised as critical.</p> <p>* Should ensure that there is budget for continued operation when the project ends.</p>		<p>* ToTs follow up on ToBs after training</p> <p>* Within the fields where the VTCs have received training equipment from the project they are prepared to further develop the concerned departments and meet the expectation to become local centres of excellence for these activities.</p> <p>* The continued financing by government of the training facility is yet to be seen.</p>		<p>(crucial for sustainability).</p> <p>* Should make contractual arrangements with counterpart Ministries to continue operations after project completion.</p>		<p>* Should pay stronger attention to, and specifically allocate resources to, mentoring (extension services) after training has been finalised.</p> <p>* There should be firm agreements with counterpart ministries to continue operations after project completion– and in turn linked to UNIDO own resources for following up extent of fulfilment.</p>	
<b>Trainers (ToT) Selection</b> <i>* Skills-based</i> <i>* Criteria clear and objective</i> <i>* Exclusive to Ministry staff</i> <i>* Transparent process</i>	<p>* Selection should be skills-based. Only about 50% of the trained trainers eventually provided training to beneficiaries</p>		<p>* All staff from ministries or factories – but not always anchored in VTC</p> <p>* Selection process not transparent and not documented</p>		<p>* Criteria: i) permanent employees of the ministries, ii) relevant education and experience; iii) accept to serve as ToT for not less than 5 years,</p>		<p>* Selection should be skills-based including from private sector – as done.</p> <p>*Private sector recruitment was done based on an initial commit-</p>	

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>MISP I</b> (start 2004 – 24 months, extended to 35 months)		<b>MISP II</b> (start 2006 – 18 months)		<b>MISP III</b> (start 2007 – 18 months, extended 39)		<b>MISP IV</b> (start 2007 – 18 months, extended to 40 months)	
<b>Evaluation scope (date)</b>	FAO+UNIDO	(Jan 2008)	FAO+UNIDO	(Oct 2009)	FAO+UNIDO	(Jan 2011)	UNIDO	(April 2011)
	* Staff should preferably be VTC staff		* Clear criteria for food – not for non-food. Non-food ToTs had no training background * Should be skills-based among counterpart and line ministry staff * Should detail profiles and criteria and advertise * Lesson learnt: limited preparation and transparency (no or insufficient candidate profile definition, selection criteria, score table, and TOR) often lead to sub-optimal selections of personnel		* Successful two-stage selection programme: i) in-country training; ii) out-of country more advanced training only for successful candidates.		ment by the VTC to take on the trained trainers as staff – which did not happen. Trainers thus not anchored in the VTC.	
<b>Beneficiary (ToB) Selection</b> * <i>Vulnerability criteria clear and objective</i> * <i>Balance vulnerability and capability</i> * <i>Transparent process</i>	* Selection process considered good arguing that it was done by local government staff		* Selection was objective and transparent * Clear multi-dimensional vulnerability criteria plus minimum relevant experience and educational background. * Advertised, interested were interviewed and points were set on the criteria. * Lesson learnt: the educational and experimental background requirement has been instrumental for the success to generate		* Selection process assessed as transparent with community-led identification * Clear multi-dimensional vulnerability criteria plus minimum of relevant experience and educational background		* The selection process overall transparent based on clear multi-dimensional vulnerability criteria. * No capability factors were used as criteria – would need a balance between vulnerability and capability factors acknowledging that not all are in a position to start income-generating own activities. * The incentive structure (paying 'transport fees', free tool kits) should be rethought – which in turn is linked to reconsidering	



<b>Criteria</b>	<b>MISP I</b> (start 2004 – 24 months, extended to 35 months)		<b>MISP II</b> (start 2006 – 18 months)		<b>MISP III</b> (start 2007 – 18 months, extended 39)		<b>MISP IV</b> (start 2007 – 18 months, extended to 40 months)	
<b>Evaluation scope (date)</b>	FAO+UNIDO	(Jan 2008)	FAO+UNIDO	(Oct 2009)	FAO+UNIDO	(Jan 2011)	UNIDO	(April 2011)
			employment and income				whether the project is to be 'training-for-food'-style project or for sustainable private sector development (see below).	
<b>Production Group Selection and Concept</b> <i>* Skills-based</i> <i>* Criteria clear and objective</i> <i>* Transparent process</i> <i>* How does approach to support differ from support to MSME</i>	<i>* Should look into the selection process of PGs. PGs should be less in numbers and there is a need to prove their viability.</i>		<i>* Upgrading of existing MSME</i> <i>* Selected was fair and based on objective criteria.</i> <i>* The PG should undertake production and services which are lacking/scarce, but highly needed in a certain geographical area</i> <i>* Outcome remains to be seen</i>		<i>* New PGs to be set up should focus on ToB s who should receive support</i> <i>* Existing small enterprises within the non-food training skills were selected for project support comprising rehabilitation of workshop facilities, provision of relevant additional machinery and tools, and training and mentoring (successful model from MISP II aiming at generating jobs for ToBs).</i>		<i>* There is little evidence that PGs are successful and it is unclear how the PGs differ from 'ordinary' micro-enterprises - should reconsider the PG concept.</i> <i>* If the PGs are kept, the selection should be undertaken in a transparent process - based on market/demand analysis and clear skills requirements – as opposed to what was done in the project.</i>	
<b>Tool kits – composition and hand-out</b> <i>* Skills-based</i> <i>* Criteria clear and objective</i> <i>* Transparent process</i> <i>* Quality</i> <i>* Toolkits adapted to local circumstances (flexibility in composition)</i> <i>* Procurement</i>	<i>* Should be handed to the best ToBs (as done)</i>		<i>* Agree to being handed out on successful completion</i> <i>* Proposed to allow more flexibility in tool kit composition rather than uniform sets</i> <i>* Many already have own tool kits</i>		<i>* 90% of ToBs received tool kits.</i> <i>* Complaints that tool kits were outdated – e.g. hand tools despite access to electricity. Differed across trades</i> <i>* The needs assessment does not include a socio-economic assessment of the target benefi-</i>		<i>* Should reconsider the concept of providing tool kits for free – highly unlikely that it is a financially efficient way of providing sustainable support – particularly if it is confined to a household sewing machine for women</i> <i>* If toolkits are kept : i) the distribu-</i>	

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>MISP I</b> (start 2004 – 24 months, extended to 35 months)		<b>MISP II</b> (start 2006 – 18 months)		<b>MISP III</b> (start 2007 – 18 months, extended 39)		<b>MISP IV</b> (start 2007 – 18 months, extended to 40 months)	
<b>Evaluation scope (date)</b>	FAO+UNIDO	(Jan 2008)	FAO+UNIDO	(Oct 2009)	FAO+UNIDO	(Jan 2011)	UNIDO	(April 2011)
					ciaries or an assessment of the tools demanded by micro entrepreneurs within the trades proposed * UNIDO needs to improve understanding of local Iraqi conditions regarding technology and equipment choice through in-depth interviews with ToTs and ToBs * Allow more flexibility in tool kit composition * More should be procured locally		tion should be a bonus to the most apt, with strong requirements about clear criteria and a transparent decision process, ii) proper attention should be paid to needs of the beneficiaries and local conditions in technology and equipment choices. * UNIDO should review its approach to procurement, considering its prospect for further strengthening local private sector development.	
<b>Outcome-oriented M&amp;E</b> * <i>Clear intervention logic in Project Document</i> * <i>Measurable outcome indicators in Project Document</i>	* Should overcome weaknesses in Project Planning. The intervention logic is flawed. * Should pay more attention to 'critical path' of activities * Should establish web-based MIS for all MISPs (part of a recommendation to establish National Project) * Monitoring and reporting weaknesses should be overcome. There should be full documentation of profiles and		* N.A		* Intervention logic in Pro Doc has a mixing up between objectives, output and activities. A rearranged and rephrased Log Frame was presented in the mid-term evaluation which since then formed the project basis. * PMU has developed a comprehensive M&E system built on detailed databases and monitoring systems to track trainers, beneficiaries and production groups as well as procurement supplies and distribution and		* Should clarify intervention logic, based on a results-based management approach (as opposed to current activity-based approach). * Should formulate SMART indicators at in particular outcome level combined with a base line study to be able to monitor results. * Should also include risks monitoring. * Should be more realistic in project logical design and planning – there were serious delays in several stages of the project.	

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>MISP I</b> (start 2004 – 24 months, extended to 35 months)		<b>MISP II</b> (start 2006 – 18 months)		<b>MISP III</b> (start 2007 – 18 months, extended 39)		<b>MISP IV</b> (start 2007 – 18 months, extended to 40 months)	
<b>Evaluation scope (date)</b>	FAO+UNIDO	(Jan 2008)	FAO+UNIDO	(Oct 2009)	FAO+UNIDO	(Jan 2011)	UNIDO	(April 2011)
	activities of trainers and assessments on their performance, ToT providers, trainees/beneficiaries, training modules, material, course forms, certificates, and toolkit distribution.				installation of equipment. * Time planning methodology to avoid delays			
<b>Emergency vs. long-term development - sustainability</b> <i>* 'Do-no-harm' principles</i>	* UNIDO and FAO have managed to strike the difficult balance between an emergency intervention and a long-term development project under difficult circumstances. * Payment of transportation fees for trainees as applied by the project may jeopardise sustainability. * Donation of basic toolkits to individual beneficiaries and to PA/Gs as start-up capital is appropriate in an emergency intervention during a transition from conflict to post-conflict environment. However, in the long run, such an approach would not be sustainable.						* Needs to clarify internally whether the MISPs are to be 'training for food' or 'long-term development' Current approach reminds of the first – but it should be the latter in the current Iraqi context * Should reassess the MISP concept in light of 'do-no-harm' principles – this is particularly important given that so many assets are being distributed as part of the project. * Should consider staying in one place longer to allow for deepening of activities and in that process move beyond the current strong focus on providing equipment as input.	

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>MISP I</b> (start 2004 – 24 months, extended to 35 months)		<b>MISP II</b> (start 2006 – 18 months)		<b>MISP III</b> (start 2007 – 18 months, ex- tended 39)		<b>MISP IV</b> (start 2007 – 18 months, ex- tended to 40 months)	
<b>Evaluation scope (date)</b>	FAO+UNIDO	(Jan 2008)	FAO+UNIDO	(Oct 2009)	FAO+UNIDO	(Jan 2011)	UNIDO	(April 2011)
	<p>* Potential competition from large scale industries for some cottage industry products and uncertain market perspectives may affect the sustainability of project beneficiaries' micro-enterprise development.</p> <p>* Donors need to be convinced that the current short-term financial horizon for emergency projects is counterproductive for achieving sustainable development results.</p>							

# VII

## Recommendations

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The recommendations below address general lessons for MISP-type projects aiming at restoring and building livelihood capacities of individuals and community groups in a post-conflict environment. They are based on the findings of this evaluation and the review of the three previous evaluations of MISP I to MISP III. As requested by the UNIDO evaluation format, the recommendations are structured by addressees.

### *Recommendations to UNIDO*

- 1. UNIDO should revisit the generic design of its skills-based income creation projects in post-conflict environments. To this end, it should organize a strategic design planning workshop to take stock of the experience made in Iraq, review the generic intervention logic, improve gender aspects, greater involvement of the private sector and establish a generic M&E framework for this type of projects.**
  - Establish a generic and results-based design for future MISP projects with an appropriate results chain. A strategic design planning workshop should establish a clear intervention logic, clarify factors influencing the project during its lifespan and post-project sustainability and identify a set of basic indicators at outcome level that are specific to MISP-type interventions. Options should be developed, such as for sequential vs. parallel project implementation, or the planning for flexibility in delivery of training to adapt to individual's capacity.
  - The gender aspects of the MISP approach should be thoroughly reassessed. Putting the opportunities of women at par with the opportunities of men involves more than including a certain number of women in one type of training. The design of future MISP projects should ensure that the trainings and skills offered to women are equally marketable as the trainings and skills provided to men and ensure equal access to all resources and opportunities (in whatever form they come).

- Establish a generic M&E framework for future MISP projects focusing on outcomes by the uptake of outputs. Indicators must be SMART (specific – measurable – achievable – relevant – time-bound). Areas of risk to look into could be identified. Final risk factors shall, however, be specific for the project area.

**2. During the design stage of all future skills-based income creation projects in post-conflict environments UNIDO should systematically adapt the generic project design to the specific contextual conditions by a number of steps (in-depth conflict analysis; socio-economic market demand and needs assessment; defining the appropriate design and distribution policy for tool-kits).**

- ‘Do-no-harm’ assessment: conduct an in-depth conflict analysis for the specific area of implementation to ensure conflict sensitive project implementation. This project specific “do-no-harm analysis’ may lead to stressing, adding, downscaling and/or eliminating certain elements of the ‘generic MISP design’.
- Socio-economic and market demand/needs assessment: conduct an in-depth assessment of the situation in the intended geographical project area. A superficial RRA is not sufficient but the assessment shall include the state of economic development and the private sector, socio-economic aspects, potential for complementarities/linkages between the project and the private sector (and vice versa: ensuring there is no ‘killing competition’ from existing companies which may endanger the intended project results) as well as a proper mapping of access to services, micro-financing opportunities, other services, etc.
- Make informed selection of the trades and skills to be promoted by the project based on the conflict analysis and the socio-economic/market demand assessment. Establish PSD linkages whenever possible. Ensure creativity in selection of trades/skills, and in particular ensure that not too many beneficiaries are trained in the same skill within a confined geographical area.
- Carefully design the composition of tool kits and make informed decisions as to whether or not tool kits should be provided free of charge. Consider the possibility to increase the share of local procurement to enhance the project’s development effects.
- Establish a robust M&E framework for the project, including baselines of the SMART indicators. Proper identification of specific risk factors for the project area - and the monitoring of these - is an integral part of establishing the M&E framework.

**3. During project implementation, UNIDO and all other project parties should ensure transparency in all selection processes. The selection crite-**

ria should be clear, agreed upon by all involved parties and consistently applied by the agreed parties and in the agreed manner. Departing from agreed criteria and agreed procedures may jeopardize the conflict analysis and the conflict sensitive implementation approach.

4. During project implementation, UNIDO should ensure equal access to all opportunities and resources for men and women. Gender sensitive implementation is likely to require pro-active and creative solutions and decisions taking into account the specific contextual setting.
5. For its project portfolio in Iraq UNIDO should put an independent monitoring mechanism and, as appropriate, other ‘checks-and-balances’ in place to compensate for the implementation risks originating from remote project implementation with no visits of UNIDO international staff on the ground.

#### ***Recommendations to GoI***

6. Government of Iraq representatives should participate in revisiting the generic design of UNIDO’s skills-based income creation projects in post-conflict environments and adhere to all critical features of this design including a greater involvement of the private sector.
7. During the implementation of future similar projects, all project parties, including the Government of Iraq, should adhere to the agreed procedures (selection processes etc) and financial and institutional commitments.

#### ***Recommendations to Donors***

8. Donors should insist on the greatest possible adherence of UNIDO to RBM principles, better intervention logics and an enhanced use of log-frame.
9. Donors should recognize the substantial differences between emergency interventions and interventions at the transition to development. In particular, donors should allow for a longer-term time horizon of such projects and adequate time and resources for an in-depth implementation planning in order to enable informed decisions.





## **ANNEX – 1: Terms of Reference: Independent Evaluation**

**Project:**  
**“Support for Job Creation and Self-Employment through Promotion of Micro Industries in Ninewa Governorate of Iraq (MISP IV)”**

**FB/IRQ/07/005 (UNIDO Project Number)**

***N. B.: This project was transferred to Anbar Governorate (but project title remained unchanged)***

## I. BACKGROUND

According to the initial plans this project (“MISP IV”) covered the Ninewa Governorate in Iraq. The project document was signed in October 2007. Due to the deteriorating security situation in Ninewa, FAO/UNIDO and the Government of Iraq decided in spring 2008 to transfer the project to the Anbar Governorate. This decision was approved by UNDG Iraq. However, the project title and the project document remained unchanged.

MISP IV is the fourth of a series of similar UNIDO/FAO projects in Iraq. Previously called “Community Livelihoods and Micro Industry Support Projects (CLARIS)” the project name was changed to “Job Creation through Cottage and Micro Industries Promotion”(MISP). The first CLARIS/MISP project has been implemented in the Thi-Qar governorate in South Iraq, the second in the Erbil and Suleiymaniyah governorates of Northern Iraq and the third in the Qadissiya Governorate. The project in the South has been evaluated in 2007, the one in North Iraq in spring 2009 and the one in Qadessiya in spring 2010.<sup>29</sup>

In spring 2010 the UNIDO Evaluation Group conducted a “thematic evaluation” of UNIDO projects in “post-crisis” environments. This thematic evaluation was based on a sample of 10 UNIDO projects and a number of project evaluations, among which MISP I and MISP II. The present evaluation should build upon the findings and lessons learned from the three MISP evaluations and the thematic evaluation and use a methodology that would allow for crosscutting comparisons.

All MISP projects have been carried out jointly by UNIDO and FAO. The basic project philosophy is to increase the capability of poor and marginalized war-affected communities to engage in economically viable small-scale productive activities in order to generate income and increase employment figures. The main levers in order to achieve this objective are technical and business management trainings provided in cooperation with existing vocational training centres and the delivery of certain technical tools and basic technical equipment to the successful trainees. Furthermore, the approach involves a certain amount of rehabilitation or upgrading of vocational training centres; training of trainers and the production of training material.

A major commonality of all MISP projects are adverse conditions, including security problems, which have led to periods of partial or total implementation standstill. This has also caused challenges with regard to synchronizing the interventions of the two implementing agencies. The restricted access to the regions of implementation for international experts and UN officials is another major challenge. This restriction will also influence the design and implementation of the present evaluation.

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<sup>29</sup> Evaluations available from the UNIDO website.

## II. PROJECT INFORMATION

The project pursues the promotion of self-employment and job creation in micro-enterprise industries in the Anbar Governorate. The geographical focus is on the cities of Falludja, Ramadi, Haditha and Al-Qa'im.

The project receives its funding from the multidonor UN Trust Fund for Iraq (UNDG ITF). In line with the national development strategy and the UN assistance strategy and the general project philosophy described above, the project is expected to increased income and employment of the rural and urban population by facilitating self-employment of the vulnerable groups.

The income generation activities targeted by the project are:

- Food production: Dates processing; teheina; beekeeping; fruits and vegetables; dairy; etc
- Non-food production: carpentry/joinery; boat making; sewing and tailoring;; electrical appliance repairs; refrigeration/cooling systems repairs; mobile phone repairs; irrigation/sprinkler pumps; etc

The project is jointly implemented by UNIDO and FAO following signature of an interagency agreement. The project is being implemented by the project offices of the two Organizations in Amman, headed by a Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) and a National Project Coordinator (NPC) in the target region. At headquarters of the two agencies, project managers, operations officers and technical backstopping officers are assigned to coordinate the overall planning and implementation the project. Short term international and national consultants are recruited for specific activities.

Partners in the Government of Iraq are the Ministries of Planning (MOPDC), Agriculture (MOA) and of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA) and the Regional Government of the Anbar Governorate.

**Initially, the project had been approved for a period of 18 months until June 2009. This initial duration has been extended until the end of 2010.**

## III. PROJECT BUDGET

Total Allotment	
UNDG Iraq Fund	US\$ 4,235,664
Government contribution:	US\$ 300,000 (in kind)
Total	US\$ 4,535,664
UNIDO allotment	US\$
FAO allotment	US\$

#### **IV. EVALUATION PURPOSE**

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the:

1. Project relevance with regard to the priorities and policies of the Government of Iraq, the UNDG ITF; UNIDO and FAO;
2. Project effectiveness in terms of the outputs produced and outcomes achieved as compared to those planned;
3. Efficiency of implementation: quantity, quality, cost and timeliness of UNIDO/FAO and counterpart inputs and activities;
4. Efficiency of the cooperation arrangements between UNIDO and FAO, and if applicable make recommendations for improvements;
5. Prospects for development impact;
6. Long-term sustainability of the support mechanisms results and benefits;

The evaluation should provide the necessary analytical basis and make recommendations to the Government, to the donor, to UNIDO and to FAO for the closure of the project and for ensuring its sustainability. The evaluation should also draw lessons of wider applicability for the replication of the experience gained in this project in other projects.

#### **V. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION**

The evaluation will be carried out in keeping with agreed evaluation standards and requirements. More specifically it will fully respect the principles laid down in the “UN Norms and Standards for Evaluation” and Evaluation Policies of UNIDO and FAO.<sup>30</sup> The evaluation shall determine as systematically and objectively as possible the relevance, efficiency, achievements (outputs, prospects for achieving expected outcomes and impact) and sustainability of the project. To this end, the evaluation will assess the achievements of the project against its key objectives, as set out in the project document and the inception report, including a review of the relevance of the objectives and of the design. It will also identify factors that have facilitated or impeded the achievement of the objectives.

While maintaining independence, the evaluation will be carried out based on a participatory approach, which seeks the views and assessments of all parties. It will address the following issues:

##### Project identification and formulation:

- The extent to which a participatory project identification process was applied in selecting problem areas and counterparts requiring technical cooperation support;
- Relevance of the project to development priorities and needs;

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<sup>30</sup> All documents available from the websites of the UN Evaluation Group:  
<http://www.uneval.org/>

- Clarity and realism of the project's development and immediate objectives, including specification of targets and identification of beneficiaries and prospects for sustainability.
- Clarity and logical consistency between, inputs, activities, outputs and progress towards achievement of objectives (quality, quantity and time-frame);
- Realism and clarity in the specification of prior obligations and prerequisites (assumptions and risks);
- Realism and clarity of external institutional relationships, and in the managerial and institutional framework for implementation and the work plan;
- Likely cost-effectiveness of the project design.

#### Project ownership:

- The extent to which the project was formulated with the participation of the national counterpart and/or target beneficiaries;
- The extent to which counterparts have been appropriately involved and have been participating in the identification of their critical problem areas, in the development of technical cooperation strategies and in the implementation of the project approach
- The extent to which counterpart contributions and other inputs have been received from the Government (including Governorates) as compared to the project document work plan, and the extent to which the project's follow-up is integrated into Government budgets and workplans.

#### Project coordination and management:

- The extent to which the national management and overall field coordination mechanisms of the project have been efficient and effective;
- The extent to which the UNIDO and FAO based management, coordination, quality control and input delivery mechanisms have been efficient and effective;
- The extent to which monitoring and self-evaluation have been carried out effectively, based on indicators for outputs, outcomes and objectives and using that information for project steering and adaptive management;
- The extent to which changes in planning documents during implementation have been approved and documented;
- The extent to which coordination envisaged with any other development cooperation programmes in the country has been realized and benefits achieved.
- The extent to which synergy benefits can be found in relation to other UNIDO/FAO and UN activities in the country.

#### Efficiency of Implementation:

Efficiency and adequacy of project implementation including: availability of funds as compared with the provisional budget (donor and national contribution);

the quality and timeliness of inputs delivered by UNIDO and FAO (expertise, training, equipment, methodologies, etc.) and the Government as compared to the work plan(s); managerial and work efficiency; implementation difficulties; adequacy of monitoring and reporting; the extent of national support and commitment and the quality and quantity of administrative and technical support by UNIDO/FAO.

#### Effectiveness and Project Results:

Full and systematic assessment of outputs produced to date (quantity and quality as compared with work plan and progress towards achieving the immediate objectives);

The quality of the outputs produced and how the target beneficiaries use these outputs, with particular attention to gender aspects; the outcomes, which have occurred or which are likely to happen through utilization of outputs. In particular, this includes an analysis of the likely effects of micro-enterprise industry activities as a means of creating employment and raising household incomes.

#### Prospects to achieve expected outcomes, impact and sustainability:

Prospects to achieve the expected outcomes and impact and prospects for sustaining the project's results by the beneficiaries and the host institutions after the termination of the project, and identification of developmental changes (economic, environmental, social) that are likely to occur as a result of the intervention, and how far they are sustainable.

#### *Cost-effectiveness of the Project*

Assessment of whether the project approach represented the best use of given resources for achieving the planned objectives.

#### Recommendations for a possible next project phase, or replication elsewhere

Based on the above analysis the evaluators will draw specific conclusions and make proposals for any necessary further action by Government and/or UNIDO/FAO and/or the UN or other donors to ensure sustainable development, including any need for additional assistance and activities of the project prior to its completion. The mission will draw attention to any lessons of general interest. Any proposal for further assistance should include precise specification of objectives and the major suggested outputs and inputs.

## **VI. EVALUATION TIMING AND MAIN TASKS**

The evaluation is scheduled to take place between September and December 2010.

The evaluation will be carried out through analyses of various sources of information, including desk analysis, field visits, survey data, and interviews with counterparts, beneficiaries, partner agencies, donor representatives, programme managers and through the cross-validation of data. In view of the particular aspects of this evaluation particular attention will be given to the elaboration of a strategy for field surveys, the elaboration and test of questionnaires and the implementation of the surveys in line with agreed professional and impartiality standards.

The evaluation will encompass the following main tasks:

1. Desk study of available documents and definition of the evaluation methodology with a catalogue of project specific evaluation questions, to which the evaluation should provide answers; this methodology will have to be discussed and agreed with the evaluation units of UNIDO and FAO;
2. Briefing and interviews with UNIDO and FAO project staff in Vienna, Rome and/or Amman;
3. Organization of a two-day kick-off meeting in Amman or in Iraq, as appropriate, involving national and international project staff, counterpart representatives and the entire evaluation team;
4. Analytical review of the economic, political and security conditions in the region of intervention (drawing on information received from policy makers, and also other UN Organizations and providers of technical assistance in Iraq and in the region) and assessment of the relevance, needs orientation and realism of the project design and implementation (gathering information from project stakeholders and private sector players in the region);
5. Design and execution of a survey on the capabilities of the trainers; this survey shall assess *inter alia*: the profile of the trainers and whether their professional qualification and experience are appropriate with a view to empowering vulnerable and marginalized groups to engage in income creation; whether the quality of the training of trainers (TOT) they received has been adequate; how many beneficiaries they have trained; under which conditions these trainings occurred; whether there have been follow-up activities (coaching); and how trainers assess the success of the trainings; this survey would address at least 50% of the trainers who received training under the project;
6. Design and execution of a survey among trainees; this survey would address a representative sample of at least 100 trainees, if possible more; this survey shall assess *inter alia*: the profile of the trainees and to what extent the selection of trainees matches the objectives of the project to support vulnerable and marginalized groups; the quality of the training and of the equipment received and whether these inputs are perceived as adequate

with a view to empowering the target groups to engage in income creation; the status of the income creation activities of the trainees (self employment; business creation; employment in existing companies); the impact of the project on their income and living conditions;

7. On-site visits of the various project sites (vocational training centres; alternative training providers; project partners from the public and private sectors; workshops/micro-enterprises set up by individual beneficiaries and producer groups);
8. Organization of a meeting in Amman where the evaluation team will present its raw results and preliminary findings to project staff and counterparts and collect their feed-back;
9. Production of a first draft evaluation report and submission of this report to the evaluation departments and project managers of UNIDO and FAO for feed-back;
10. Incorporation of comments into a second draft and submission of this draft to the government, project participants and stakeholders for comments;
11. Incorporation of comments into final draft.
12. Final debriefing and presentation of final report with UNIDO and FAO in Vienna, Rome and/or Amman.

## **VII. SERVICES REQUIRED**

The evaluation will require the following functions, competencies and skills:

1. Evaluation team leader with documented experience in:
  - a. Designing and managing complex evaluations;
  - b. Leading multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural teams of evaluators;
  - c. Development projects in Arab speaking countries;
  - d. Development projects related to income generation for vulnerable groups;
  - e. Designing and supervising qualitative and quantitative field surveys;
  - f. Preparing evaluation reports in line with agreed UN and DAC standards;
  - g. Drafting reports in English (excellent drafting skills to be demonstrated).
2. Evaluators with documented experience in executing:
  - a. Development projects for income creation of vulnerable groups;
  - b. Analysis of micro-enterprise industry activities as a means of creating employment and raising household incomes;



- c. Evaluation of vocational training schemes;
- d. Evaluations in Arab speaking countries;
- e. Qualitative and quantitative field surveys;
- f. Interviews in Arab language with the entire range of stakeholders from vulnerable war-affected groups to high-level officials.

The evaluation team must have the necessary technical competence and experience to assess the quality of the technical assistance provided under this project to small scale and micro-level production in the areas of:

- Beekeeping and honey, bread and pastry, date processing, fruit and vegetable processing and tahina production in the food area covered by FAO;
- agro/auto-mechanics, welding, woodwork, machine-operation, cell phone repairing, sewing/tailoring in the non-food area covered by UNIDO.

The above-mentioned functions, competencies and skills may be distributed among several persons in the evaluation team. Team members may be located in different countries but an effective coordination mechanism will have to be demonstrated. Evaluation team members must be independent and not have been involved in the formulation, implementation or backstopping of the project.

The execution of the evaluation will require full command and control of the specific situation in Iraq and full respect of the UN security rules for Iraq. The ability to carry out field operations in Iraq is a key requirement and must be demonstrated.

The evaluation team leader will be responsible for elaboration of an evaluation strategy, including the design of field surveys and elaboration of questionnaires; guiding the national evaluators for their field work in Iraq; analysis of survey results; gathering of complementary information from project staff, collaborators and stakeholders through telephone interviews and other means; and preparing a presentation of conclusions and recommendations as well as a final evaluation report.

**The evaluator(s) will be responsible for carrying out the field surveys (under the guidance of the team leader). The field surveys will provide the foundation for the evaluation and must therefore be executed in line with the highest standards of professionalism and impartiality.**

The UNIDO Evaluation Group and the FAO Evaluation Service will be jointly responsible for the quality control of the evaluation process and report. They will provide inputs regarding findings, lessons learned and recommendations from other evaluations, ensuring that the evaluation report is in compliance with established evaluation norms and standards and useful for organizational learning of all parties.

The project office in Amman will logistically and administratively support the evaluation team to the extent possible. However, it should be understood that the evaluation team is responsible for its own arrangements for transport, lodging, security etc.

### **VIII. CONSULTATIONS AND LIAISON**

Liaison of the evaluation team with the Iraqi authorities will be provided by an official nominated by the Government of Iraq.

The evaluation team will maintain close liaison with the representatives of UNIDO, FAO, other UN agencies and UNDG as well as with the concerned national agencies and with national and international project staff. The evaluation team is free to discuss with the authorities concerned anything relevant to its assignment. However, it is not authorized to make any commitments on behalf of the Government, the donor, UNIDO or FAO.

### **VIII. REPORTING**

The evaluation report shall follow the structure given in Annex 1. Reporting language will be English. The executive summary, recommendations and lessons learned shall be an important part of the presentations to be prepared for debriefing sessions in Amman, Rome and/or Vienna.

Draft reports submitted to UNIDO Evaluation Group and FAO Evaluation Service are shared with the corresponding Programme or Project Officer for initial review and consultation. They may provide feedback on any errors of fact and may highlight the significance of such errors in any conclusions. The consultation also seeks agreement on the findings and recommendations. The evaluators will take the comments into consideration in preparing the final version of the report.

The evaluation will be subject to quality assessments by UNIDO Evaluation Group and the FAO Evaluation Service. These apply evaluation quality assessment criteria and are used as a tool for providing structured feedback. The quality of the evaluation report will be assessed and rated against the criteria set forth in the Checklist on evaluation report quality.



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## **TERMS OF REFERENCE**

**Data collection for the  
Independent Evaluation of the Project  
Support for Job Creation and Self-Employment through Promo-  
tion of Micro Industries in Anbar Governorate of Iraq  
("MISP IV")**

## **1. Background**

This call for tenders concerns the collection of evaluation data through on-site visits and face-to-face interviews with selected stakeholders of the project:

*“Support for Job Creation and Self-Employment through  
Promotion of Micro Industries in Anbar Governorate of Iraq (“MISP IV”)*

MISP IV pursues the promotion of self-employment and job creation in micro-enterprise industries in the Anbar Governorate. The geographical focus is on the cities of Falludja, Ramadi, Haditha and Al-Qa'im. The project has been carried out jointly by UNIDO and FAO in cooperation with the Ministries of Planning (MOPDC), Agriculture (MOA) and of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA) and the Regional Government of the Anbar Governorate.

The project aims to increase the capability of poor and marginalized war-affected people to engage in economically viable small-scale productive activities in order to generate income. The means to achieve this objective are technical and business management trainings provided in cooperation with existing vocational training centres, the delivery of certain technical tools and basic technical equipment to the successful trainees and the formation of production groups. Furthermore, the approach involves a certain amount of rehabilitation or upgrading of vocational training centres; training of trainers and the production of training material.

The technical training concerns a variety of production areas such as:

- Food production: Dates processing; teheina; beekeeping; fruits and vegetables; dairy; etc
- Non-food production: carpentry/joinery; marketry; sewing and tailoring;; IT; refrigeration/cooling systems repairs; mobile phone repairs Pump and generator.

## **2. OBJECTIVE OF THE CONTRACT**

The objective of the contract is the production of evaluation data for the independent evaluation of the project MISP IV through on-site visits and face-to-face interviews in the project area.

## **3. SCOPE OF SERVICES TO BE PROVIDED**

The services to be provided by the contractor concern the collection of evaluation data through face-to-face interviews and site visits in the project area. The face-to-face interviews and site visits will be performed by staff members of the contractor.

The independent evaluation as a whole will be managed by an evaluation expert contracted by UNIDO or FAO who will be based outside Iraq and conduct most of his work from Amman. *(N.B. The services to be provided under this call for tenders do NOT include the services of the evaluation expert but only the collection of data in the project area!)*

The collection of evaluative information through face-to-face interviews and site visits by staff members of the contractor will be based on questionnaires prepared by the evaluation expert.

The following services are to be provided by the contractor:

- Translation of questionnaires into Arabic
- Organization of interview meetings with stakeholders in the project area
- Conducting interviews with trainers, beneficiaries and other stakeholders
- Undertaking site visits and making photographs
- Preparation of interview/site visit reports in English (supported by photographs, if applicable)
- Quality assurance of the interview reports
- Delivery of the interview reports to the evaluation expert contracted by UNIDO/FAO
- Quality improvements of the interview reports upon request of the evaluation expert (if necessary).

#### **4. TIME SCHEDULE OF THE CONTRACT**

**The services under this contract are to be provided between September and November 2010.**

#### **5. PERSONNEL REQUIRED**

The following personnel will be required under this contract:

- Interviewers (at least three or more) with a good understanding of the technical subjects at stake (see above) and a proven track record in conducting interviews;
- Data collection manager with a proven track record in managing data collection exercises and in writing and editing English texts.

#### **6. LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS**

The interviews will be conducted in Arabic. Translation of the questionnaires from English into Arabic is part of the scope of the contract.

The interview reports will be in English. Performing a linguistic quality control of all interview reports is part of the scope of the contract. Interview reports in poor English will not be accepted.

## 7. DELIVERABLES AND PRICING

The deliverables under this contract will be:

- 80 (eighty) interview reports of three pages each (up to 20 formatted questions and 5 free text questions per report)

Services will be paid upon delivery and acceptance of the interview reports. Payments will be based on a lump sum per interview report.

The expected amount per interview report is between 100 and 150 USD. The expected overall amount of the offers is therefore between 8,000 USD and 12,000 USD.

## 8. TECHNICAL EVALUATION CRITERIA

Tenders will be evaluated on the basis of the following technical criteria:

	<b>Number and significance of experience as documented in the tender documents</b>
<b>Evidence that the tenderer has:</b>	
1. Been involved in evaluations	
2. Been involved in development projects in Iraq	
<b>Evidence that the proposed interviewers have:</b>	
1. Knowledge of Arabic (speaking and writing)	
2. Track record in conducting interviews	
3. Knowledge in the relevant areas of food production	
4. Knowledge in the relevant areas of non-food production	
<b>Evidence that the proposed data collection manager has:</b>	
5. Proficient knowledge of Arabic and English	
6. Participated in project/program evaluations	

## **ANNEX – 2: Key documents consulted**

### ***Project Document:***

UNDG ITF (October 2007): *Project Document Cover Sheet: Support for Job Creation and Self Employment Through Promotion of Micro-Industries in Ninewa Governorate of Iraq*, Project Number A5-22

### ***Background and Contextual Documentation:***

UNIDO/FAO (August 2008): *Rapid Area Assessment Of cottage industries in Anbar governorate-Iraq 2008*, Baghdad.

### ***Progress Reports:***

Report Number: 6, Reporting Period: 1 January to June 30 2007 (*Six Month Project Progress Report (January – June 2007): Promotion of Cottage Industries in Rural and Urban Areas*).

Report Number: 1, Reporting Period: 1 July – 31 December 2007

*Half-Yearly Progress Report, January – June 2008.*

UNDG ITF: Date and Quarter Updated: 1 July – 31 December 2008.

Report Number: 4, Reporting Period: 1 January – 30 June 2009 (*Second Six-Month Progress Report (January – June 2009)*).

*Half-Yearly Progress Report, 30 June – 31 December 2009.*

*Annual Programme Narrative Progress Report, 1 January – 31 December 2009.*

UNDG ITF: Date and Quarter Updated: 1<sup>st</sup> Jan. – 31<sup>st</sup> March, 2010, 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter

UNDG ITF: Date and Quarter Updated: 1<sup>st</sup> April – 31 June, 2010, 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter

UNDG ITF; Date and Quarter Updated: 1<sup>st</sup> July – 30 Sept., 2010, 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter

### ***Steering Committee Notes:***

*Minutes of the First Steering Committee – Cottage IV*, 6 April 2008, Conference Room, FAO Office, Amman.

*Minutes of Meeting Cottage IV 2<sup>nd</sup> Project Steering Committee (PSC) Meeting*, 8-9 September 2008, FAO-Iraq office in Amman, Jordan.

*Minutes of Meeting Cottage IV 3<sup>rd</sup> Project Steering Committee (PSC) Meeting*, June 2009, FAO-Iraq office in Amman, Jordan.

*Minutes of Meeting Cottage IV 4<sup>th</sup> Project Steering Committee (PSC) Meeting*, 15-16 September 2009, FAO-Iraq office in Amman, Jordan.

*Minutes of Meeting Cottage IV 5<sup>th</sup> Project Steering Committee (PSC) Meeting, 17 June 2010, FAO-Iraq office in Amman, Jordan.*

***Technical Meeting Notes:***

*First Technical Meeting, August 13&14, 2008*

*Minutes – Technical meeting, 18-20 May 2010, UNIDO HQ, Vienna.*

***Back to Office Reports:***

Samarakoon, N: Amman, 13-17 September 2009. Purpose: To participate in the 3rd Project Steering Committee (PSC) meeting of the project FB/IRQ/07/005, “Support for job creation and self employment through promotion of Micro-Industries in Anbar Governorate of Iraq”, implemented in partnership FAO. The project was funded by the UNDGITF.

Samarakoon, N: Amman, 7-10 September 2008. Purpose: To participate in the Project Steering Committee meeting (PSC) of the project “ Support for job creation and Self Employment Through Promotion of Micro-Industries in the Ninewa Governorate of Iraq” , which is funded by the UNDGITF and implemented in partnership with FAO.

Samarakoon, N: Amman, 9-11 February 2010. Purpose: To participate in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Technical Committee meeting (TCM) of the project FB/IRQ/07/005, “Support for job creation and self employment through promotion of Micro-Industries in Anbar Governorate of Iraq”, implemented in partnership FAO. The project was funded by the UNDGITF.

***MISP I-III and Thematic Evaluations***

UNIDO Evaluation Group (2008): *Independent Evaluation Report Iraq: Promotion of cottage industries in rural and urban areas*, Vienna.

UNIDO Evaluation Group (2009): *Independent Evaluation Report Iraq: Community Livelihoods and Micro-Industry Support Project in Rural and Urban Areas of Northern Iraq (MISP II)*, FB/IRQ/06/002 (UNIDO Project Number) and OSRO/IRQ/602/UDG (FAO Project Number), Vienna.

UNIDO Evaluation Group (2010): *Job Creation through Cottage and Micro Industries Promotion in Al-Qadessiya (MISP III)*, FB(IRQ/001, (UNIDO Project Number) and OSRO/IRQ/603/UDG (FAO Project Number), DRAFT, Vienna.

UNIDO (August 2010). *Thematic Evaluation of Post-Crisis Projects*, Vienna.

***Other documents:***



Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (2008): *National Report on the Status of Human Development* (NRSHD), Baghdad.

Norad, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (December 2008): *Results Management in Norwegian Development cooperation. A practical guide*, Oslo.

UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization): *Iraq Programme*, 2010 September Update, Amman.

## **ANNEX – 3: Persons Met**

### *UNIDO HQ, Vienna*

Mr Chakib Jenane  
Mr Peter Loewe  
Ms Natalie Maabdi  
Mr Namal Samarakoon

### *UNIDO PIU, Amman*

Mr Ahmed Alcubaici  
Mr Wigdan Al Qassy  
Mr Renato Fornocaldo  
Mr Erik Svend Ladefoged

### *SRD, Amman*

Mr Qasem Marsarwah

## **ANNEX – 4: Questionnaires for survey**

- 1. Questionnaire for Beneficiaries**
- 2. Questionnaire for Trainers**



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منظمة الأمم المتحدة للتنمية الصناعية

Beneficiary Form #: MISP/

تقييم برنامج دعم إيجاد فرص عمل والتشغيل الذاتي عن طريق مشاريع صناعية صغيرة في محافظة الأنبار – العراق  
Data Collection for the Independent Evaluation of Support for Job Creation and Self-Employment through Promotion of Micro Industries in An-bar Governorate of Iraq (“MISP IV”)

استمارة جمع المعلومات QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EVALUATION SURVEYS

1 اسم الباحث :Surveyor Name	2 تاريخ المقابلة : Date of Interview	3 وقت المقابلة : Time of Interview
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Basic Respondent Information أساسية عن المستفيد أولاً: معلومات

Household status: الوضع العائلي للمستفيد  
 Head رب الأسرة  Wife or husband of head زوج/أو زوجة المستفيد من المشروع  child طفل  relative قريب المستفيد من المشروع  other (please specify) غير ذلك (يرجى التحديد)

4 Name of Respondent: اسم المستجيب

5 Address and phone number: عنوان المستجيب

Governorate: المحافظة District: القضاء City/Village: البلدة Street: الشارع

6 Contact details: معلومات الإتصال

8 Gender: الجنس  Male ذكر  Female أنثى 7 Age (Years) العمر (بالسنوات)

Profile of Trainee ثانياً: معلومات حول المتدرب

1 School education - number of years: التعليم المدرسي – عدد السنوات

2 Any other education (s)/skills (أو تدريب) حصلت عليه قبل المشروع – نوع التعليم/التدريب وعدد السنوات  
training before project training - type and number of years :

3 Occupation before attending training: طبيعة العمل قبل التحاقك بالتدريب  
 Employed موظف  Self-employed عمل خاص  Unemployed عاطل عن العمل

4 If unemployed - how many months without job ? إذا كنت موظفاً ففي أي  
 If employed – which profession/field? مجال أو مهنة؟

## ANNEX - 4

5 Income (of trainee) per month (or year) before participating in training? الدخل الشهري (للمتدرب) قبل المشاركة في التدريب؟

### Profile of Household: ثالثاً: معلومات حول الأسرة

- 1 Type of household (can be more than one answer) :  martyr family عائلة شهيد  IDP عائلة تراسها امرأة (ولكنها ليست مطلقة)  woman headed (but not widow) مطلقة  widow شهيبة  other (explain) (يرجى التحديد) من ذوي الدخل المتدني  low income villager عائدین  returnee داخليا
- 2 Number of household members: عدد أفراد الأسرة: below the age of 16? تحت سن 16 سنة 16 years and above? فوق سن 16 سنة?
- 3 Monthly (or yearly) income of household before participating in training? الدخل الشهري (للأسرة) قبل المشاركة في التدريب؟

### Training Details: ثالثاً: معلومات التدريب

- 4 Which training course did you participate in:  carpentry النجارة  sewing and garment making الخياطة وحياسة الملابس  mobile phone repair صيانة الهاتف الخليوي  air-conditioning and refrigeration صيانة المولدات والمضخات  Marquetry صيانة مكيفات الهواء والتلاجات  generator and pump repair (يرجى ذلك)  other (specify) مهارات تكنولوجيا المعلومات  IT skills الحرف الخشبية (القشرة) (wood craft skills)
- 5 Address of training facility and name of trainer: عنوان مكان التدريب واسم المدرب
- 6 When and how many days did you attend the training : متى التحقت بالتدريب وكم عدد أيام التدريب
- 7 Number of course participants : عدد المتدربين (المشاركين)
- 8 What acknowledgement did you receive of your training? ما نوع الشهادة التي حصلت عليها بعد التدريب
- 9 None لم أحصل على أي شهادة  Certificate غير ذلك  Diploma دبلوم  Did your course include the possibility of receiving a toolkit grant? هل تضمن البرنامج تزويدك بأدوات العمل؟  
- Yes نعم  No لا
- 10 If yes, did you receive a toolkit from the project? إذا كانت الإجابة (نعم)، هل حصلت على أدوات العمل من المشروع؟
- 11 If no, why do you think you did not receive a toolkit from the project? إذا كانت الإجابة (لا): لماذا لم تحصل على أدوات العمل من المشروع؟

### Selection Process: رابعاً: عملية الاختيار

- 12 How did you learn about the opportunity to participate in the training? كيف عرفت عن إمكانية مشاركتك في التدريب؟
- 13 What did you have to do to get selected for the training ? ما الذي طلب منك عمله كي يتم إختيارك للمشاركة في التدريب ؟

### Quality and Adequacy Of Received Training and Toolkit

خامسا: كفاية التدريب

14 Was the training useful in your work? هل كان التدريب مفيدا لك في عملك ؟  
 غير مفيد A little useful  مفيد نوعا ما  Very useful  مفيد جدا  Not useful

15 Please mention the most important things you have learnt from the training course ؟ ما هو أهم شيء تعلمته من البرنامج التدريبي

16 Which was the least useful subject for your work? ما هو الموضوع الذي كان أقل فائدة لك في عملك

17 How do you use the training materials today? هل يتم استخدام المواد التدريبية حاليا؟؟  
 Never لا استخدمها  Not so often أحيانا  very often معظم الأحيان  أحيانا

18 How do you use the toolkit today? كيف تستخدم أدوات العمل حاليا  
 Never لا استخدمها  Not so often  very often معظم الأحيان  أحيانا

19 Is there any part of the toolkit which is particularly NOT useful? هل هناك أي جزء من أدوات العمل لم يكن مفيدا

20 Is there anything missing in the toolkit to make it more useful? هل هناك أي نقص في أدوات العمل

### Post - Training

سادسا: ما بعد التدريب

21 Occupation now (after training): طبيعة العمل الحالي (بعد حصولك على التدريب)  
 Unemployed عاطل عن العمل  Own enterprise صاحب مشروع  Self-employed عمل خاص  Employed موظف

22 which profession/field عملك : ما هو مجال عملك  
 sewing and garment making الخياطة وحياكة الملابس  carpentry النجارة  air-conditioning and refrigeration صيانة مكيفات الهواء والثلاجات  mobile phone repair صيانة الهاتف الخليوي  generator and pump repair صيانة المولدات والمضخات  Marquetry (wood craft skills) الحرف الخشبية (القشرة)  IT الحرف الخشبية (القشرة)  other (specify) مهارات تكنولوجيا المعلومات غير ذلك (يرجى التحديد)

23 How has your (the trainee's) income per month or year developed since you completed training? كيف أصبح دخلك (كمتدرب) الشهري (أو السنوي) بعد التدريب؟  
 Increased a lot (specify how much) ازداد بشكل كبير (يرجى تحديد ذلك)  increased a little (specify how much) انخفض (يرجى تحديد ذلك)  decreased (specify how much) لم يتغير  not changed (يرجى تحديد ذلك)  Increased a lot (specify how much) ازداد بشكل كبير (يرجى تحديد ذلك)  increased a little (specify how much) انخفض (يرجى تحديد ذلك)  decreased (specify how much) لم يتغير  not changed (يرجى تحديد ذلك)

24 How has your (the household's) income per month or year developed since you completed training? كيف أصبح دخل الأسرة الشهري بعد التدريب؟  
 Increased a lot (specify how much) ازداد بشكل كبير (يرجى تحديد ذلك)  increased a little (specify how much) انخفض (يرجى تحديد ذلك)  decreased (specify how much) لم يتغير  not changed (يرجى تحديد ذلك)

ANNEX - 4

	من ذي قبل أفضل better	نفس الوضع السابق same	أسوأ من ذي قبل worse
- housing/accommodation المسكن	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
- food الطعام	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
- amenities وسائل الراحة	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
- education التعليم	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
- communication وسائل الاتصال	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
- information المعلومات	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
- other thing (specify) غير ذلك (يرجى التحديد)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

25 How has the living conditions of the household developed since training كيف أصبحت ظروف المعيشة للأسرة بعد التدريب :  
:

اختر المناسب من الخيارات الآتية Choose the relevant of the following three choices

**إذا كان عملك خاص If self-employed or own enterprise**

Did your training provide you all skills and information you need to commence income-generating activities? هل زودك التدريب بكافة المعلومات التي تحتاجها لتؤسس مشروع يدر عليك دخلاً؟

نعم Yes ، ما هي المعلومات أو المهارات أو الأدوات التي مكنتك من ذلك؟ What has the training / information empowered or supported you with Knowledge / skills / other ؟

لا No ، ما الشيء الذي لم تحصل عليه؟ what is missing ؟

Have you received further support after finalizing the first training هل تلقيت أي دعم أو مساعدة بعد انتهاء التدريب الأولي

نعم Yes ، ما نوع الدعم أو/المساعدة التي حصلت عليها؟ what kind of support ؟

وما رأيك بنوعية الدعم أو/المساعدة التي حصلت عليها؟ How do you perceive the quality of support?

لا No ، ما نوع الدعم/المساعدة التي احتجتها؟ what kind of support would you need؟

هل أنت عضو في مجموعة إنتاج؟ Are you member of a production group?

نعم If yes - what are the benefits of being part of a production group؟ إذا كانت اجابتك (نعم)، فماذا استفدت من

كونك عضواً في مجموعة إنتاج؟

Input sourcing توفير المصادر ومستلزمات الإنتاج  technical support الدعم الفني

product development تطوير المنتج  marketing تسويق المنتجات

financing توفير التمويل  other (specify) غير ذلك يرجى التحديد

If no – why not لماذا:  did not want to لا حاجة لمجموعات الانتاج  was not invited to لم يتم دعوتي للعمل

غير ذلك (يرجى التحديد) other (specify)  ضمن مجموعة انتاج

How many employees are working in your business? كم موظف لديك?

Household members / others ؟ /من غير أفراد أسرته كم شخص من أسرته

Men/ Women كم عدد النساء؟ كم عدد الرجال؟

**27 If employed** إذا كنت موظفاً:

هل كان التدريب الذي حصلت عليه غير كافي لمساعدتك في الحصول على فرصة عمل

نعم Yes  لا No

Are you employed in the business of a family member? هل أنت موظف في عمل لأحد أفراد اسرتك  نعم Yes  لا No

Are you employed in a producer group? هل أنت موظف في مجموعة إنتاج  نعم Yes  لا No

If yes – what are the benefits of being employed in a producer group? إذا كانت الإجابة (نعم)، فماذا استفدت من كونك موظف ضمن مجموعة إنتاج؟

**28 If unemployed** إذا لم تكن تعمل:

If no income-generating activity has been taken up إذا لم تستطع الحصول على عمل يدر عليك دخلاً فما السبب؟ why not?

ما الذي تحتاجه للحصول على عمل what would you need to be able to commence income-generating activities? يدر عليك دخلاً

What use have you made of the tool kit you received? ما هي الاستخدام التي قمت بها لأدوات العمل التي استلمتها؟

Please ask for permission to take some photos يرجى الحصول على صور للموقع الذي تتم زيارته

ملاحظات إضافية: Notes





United Nations Industrial Development Organization  
منظمة الأمم المتحدة للتنمية الصناعية

Trainers/Counsellors/VTC Staff Form  
#: MISP/

تقييم برنامج دعم إيجاد فرص عمل والتشغيل الذاتي عن طريق مشاريع صناعية صغيرة في محافظة الأنبار – العراق  
Data Collection for the Independent Evaluation of Support for Job Creation and Self-Employment through Promotion of Micro Industries in Anbar Governorate of Iraq (“MISP IV”)

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EVALUATION SURVEYS** استمارة جمع المعلومات

9 Surveyor Name: اسم الباحث	10 Date of Interview: تاريخ المقابلة	11 Time of Interview : وقت المقابلة
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**Basic Respondent Information** أساسية عن المستجيب أولاً: معلومات

12 Classification of Respondent: تصنيف المستجيب <input type="checkbox"/> Trainer مدرب <input type="checkbox"/> Counselor مستشار <input type="checkbox"/> Upgrading Staff موظف <input type="checkbox"/> Entrepreneur صاحب مشروع	16 Age (Years):(العمر (بالسنوات)
13 Name of Respondent: اسم المستجيب	
14 Governorate: المحافظة: القضاء District: المدينة/القرية City/Village: الشارع Street:	
15 Contact details : معلومات الاتصال	
17 Gender: الجنس المستفيد ذكر <input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> أنثى <input type="checkbox"/> Female	

**Profile of Trainer** ثانياً: معلومات حول المدرب

18 Professional education: المؤهلات العلمية
19 Professional experience: الخبرات المهنية
20 Employer: الجهة التي تعمل فيها
21 Present employment and position : الوظيفة الحالية
22 Position before participating in project training: الوظيفة قبل المشاركة في التدريب
23 Number of years in this position: عدد سنوات العمل في الوظيفة قبل المشاركة في التدريب
24 Have you worked directly with vulnerable households and household members before participating in the project training? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No هل عملت بشكل مباشر مع أفراد من المجتمع وخاصة من الفئات الفقيرة أو المهمشة؟
25 If yes: how, when, about what?

## ANNEX - 4

### ثالثا: معلومات التدريب Training Details:

26 Which training course did you participate in في أي برنامج تدريبي شاركت  carpentry النجارة  sewing and garment making الخياطة وحياسة الملابس  mobile phone repair صيانة الهاتف الخليوي  air-conditioning and refrigeration صيانة المولدات والمضخات  Marquetry صيانة مكيفات الهواء والثلاجات  generator and pump repair الحرف الخشبية (القشرة)  IT skills مهارات تكنولوجيا المعلومات  other (specify) (يرجى غير ذلك)

27 Address of training facility and name of trainer عنوان مكان التدريب واسم المدرب

28 When and how many days did you attend the training متى التحقت بالتدريب وكم عدد أيام التدريب

29 Number of course participants (المشاركين) عدد المتدربين

30 What acknowledgement did you receive of your training? ما نوع الشهادة التي حصلت عليها بعد التدريب  
 None لم أحصل على أي شهادة  Other غير ذلك  شهادة مشاركة  Certificate  Diploma دبلوم

### رابعا: عملية الإختيار Selection Process:

31 How did you learn about the opportunity to participate in the training? كيف عرفت عن إمكانية مشاركتك في التدريب

32 What did you have to do to get selected for the training? ما الذي طلب منك عمله كي يتم إختيارك للمشاركة في التدريب

### خامسا: كفاية التدريب Quality and Adequacy Of Received Training and Toolkit

33 Was the training useful in your work? هل كان التدريب مفيدا لك  غير مفيد  A little useful مفيد نوعا ما  Very useful مفيد جدا  Not useful

34 Please mention the most important things you have learnt from the training course? ما هو أهم شيء تعلمته من البرنامج التدريبي

35 Which was the least useful subject for your work? ما هو الموضوع الذي كان أقل فائدة لك في عملك

36 How do you use the training materials today? هل يتم استخدام المواد التدريبية حاليا؟؟  Never لا أستخدامها  Not so often أحيانا  very often معظم الأحيان

37 How do you use the toolkit today? كيف تستخدم أدوات العمل حاليا  very often معظم الأحيان  Not so often لا أستخدامها  Never

38 Do you have any suggestion to improve the quality of the training? هل لديك أي مقترحات لتحسين نوعية التدريب

## ANNEX - 4

### Post - Training سادسا: ما بعد التدريب

#### for the interview with Trainers only (خاص بالمدرسين)

- 39 How many training courses have you conducted and how many persons have attended ? كم برنامج تدريبي قمت بتقديمه وكم عدد المشاركين ؟
- 40 Can you freely release yourself from other duties to conduct training ? هل تستطيع بسهولة أن تحصل على إجازة من واجباتك ومسؤولياتك من أجل المشاركة في التدريب ؟ Yes نعم  No لا
- 41 What have been the subjects of the training courses you have conducted؟ ما هي الموضوعات التدريبية التي قدمتها
- 42 هل التدريب الذي حصلت عليه وقر لك المعلومات التي تحتاجها لتقديم تدريب لأصحاب المشاريع ؟ Yes نعم  No لا  Did your training to become a trainer provide you all the information you need to conduct training for entrepreneurs? ؟ If not, what is missing? إذا كانت الإجابة (لا)، ما المعلومات أو المهارات التي لا زلت بحاجة إليها
- 43 Have you received further training or support from the project after your training to become a trainer? What kind of training or support؟ هل تلقيت دعما أو تدريبا إضافيا من المشروع بعد التدريب الأساسي الذي تلقيته من أجل أن تصبح مدربا ؟ Yes نعم  No لا
- 44 Very often  أحيانا  معظم الأحيان  How often do your trainees contact you؟ هل يتصل بك المتدربون ؟ Never لا يتصلون بي نهائيا  Not so often
- 45 Would you need further support or training? If yes, in which subjects ? إذا كانت الإجابة (نعم) في أي موضوع؟ No لا  Yes نعم  هل تحتاج إلى المزيد من التدريب أو الدعم؟
- 46 How do you assess the trainability of the participants in your courses (considering that they upon the course should be able to establish enterprise)؟ كيف تقيّم قدرات المتدربين في ضوء التدريب الذي حصلوا عليه (من المفترض أن يكونوا قادرين على تأسيس مشروع بعد التدريب) ؟ Good جيدة  acceptable مقبولة  not good enough ليست بالمستوى المطلوب
- 47 How do you assess the usefulness to the entrepreneurs of training courses ؟ كيف تقيّم مستوى الفائدة التي جناها أصحاب المشاريع من التدريب الذي قدمته لهم ؟ Good جيدة  acceptable مقبولة  not good enough ليست بالمستوى المطلوب

#### for the interview with Counselors only (خاص بالمستشارين)

- 31 How many counseling sessions have you conducted؟ كم جلسة استشارية قدمت للمشاريع الجديدة؟ للمشاريع القائمة؟ New enterprises? Existing enterprises?
- 32 هل تستطيع بسهولة أن تحصل على إجازة من واجباتك ومسؤولياتك من أجل تقديم الاستشارات؟ Yes نعم  No لا  Can you freely release yourself from other duties to conduct counseling؟
- 33 What are the main subjects you are providing counseling on؟ ما هي الموضوعات الاستشارية التي قدمتها لأصحاب المشاريع
- 34 Did your training to become a counselor provide you all information you need to conduct counseling ؟ هل التدريب الذي حصلت عليه منك من الحصول على كافة المعلومات التي تحتاجها لتقديم الاستشارات لأصحاب المشاريع ؟ Yes نعم  No لا  If not, what is missing؟ إذا كانت الإجابة (لا)، ما المعلومات أو المهارات التي لا زلت بحاجة إليها؟

## ANNEX - 4

- 35 Have you received further training or support from the project after your training to become counselor? هل تلقيت دعماً أو تدريباً إضافياً من المشروع بعد التدريب الأساسي الذي تلقيته من أجل أن تصبح مستشاراً؟  نعم Yes  لا No
- 36 How often do your entrepreneurs contact you؟ هل يتصل بك أصحاب المشاريع أحياناً  Very often  معظم الأحيان ؟  لا يتصلون نهائياً Never  Not so often
- 37 Would you need further support or training? إذا كانت الإجابة (نعم) في أي موضوع؟ هل تحتاج إلى المزيد من التدريب أو الدعم؟  نعم Yes  لا No
- 38 كيف تقيّم قدرات أصحاب المشاريع في ضوء الاستشارات التي حصلوا عليها (من المفترض أن يكونوا قادرين على تأسيس مشروع بعد التدريب) How do you assess the trainability of the entrepreneurs you are counseling (considering that they upon the course should be able to establish enterprise)?  ليست بالمستوى المطلوب not good enough  مقبولة acceptable  جيدة Good  جيدة Good
- 39 How do you assess the usefulness to the entrepreneurs of your counseling؟ كيف تقيّم مستوى الفائدة التي جناها أصحاب المشاريع من الاستشارات التي قدمتها لهم؟  ليست بالمستوى المطلوب not good enough  مقبولة acceptable  جيدة Good  جيدة Good

### for the interview with VTC management Staff only (خاص بالموظفين في مراكز التدريب المهني)

- 31 Have you received any training from the project? هل تلقيت أي تدريب من المشروع؟  نعم Yes  لا No
- 32 Has your VTC received equipment in order to provide training to beneficiaries? هل استلم مركز التدريب الذي تعمل فيه أجهزة وأدوات من أجل استخدامها أثناء تدريب المشاركين؟  نعم Yes  لا No
- 33 If yes – which equipment? – when did your VTC receive it? متى تم الحصول عليها؟ إذا كانت الإجابة (نعم)، ما هي الأجهزة والأدوات، ومتى تم الحصول عليها؟
- 34 Is the equipment your VTC has received sufficient? هل كانت الأجهزة والأدوات التي حصل عليها المركز كافية؟  نعم Yes  لا No
- 35 If not – what would you need in addition to what you have received? ما الذي تحتاجه إضافة لما استلمتموه لحد الآن؟

Please ask for permission to take some photos يرجى الحصول على صور للموقع الذي تتم زيارته

Notes: ملاحظات إضافية

