### Independent Evaluation Report

## SUDAN

Enhancing the Capacity of Khartoum State in the Delivery of Pro-poor Vocational Training Services

UNIDO project EE/SUD/07/004







### UNIDO EVALUATION GROUP

### Independent Evaluation

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This document has not been formally edited.

### **Contents**

			Page
	Acknowledg	gements	iv
	Abbreviatio	ns and acronyms	V
	Glossary of	evaluation related terms	vii
	Executive s	summary	ix
I. I	ntroduction	1	1
		tion team and field visits	
		re of the evaluation report	
		dology	
	Country and	d project context	3
•••	-	y context	
	•	•	
III.	Project pla	nning	9
IV.	-	olementation	
	Component	1	14
	Component	2	16
	Achievemer	nts	17
٧.	Assessmen	nt of project performance	23
	Relevance		23
	Ownership		24
	Effectivenes	SS	24
	Efficiency		27
	Sustainabilit	ty	30
	Impact		31
VI.	Recommer	ndations and lessons learned	33
		mendations	
		ns Learned	
			0.5
An	nexes		
	ANNEX 1:	List of persons met	
	ANNEX 2:	Terms of Reference of the evaluation	
	ANNEX 3:	Agreed results framework of YED Khartoum project	
	ANNEX 4:	Differing and complementary views	52
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# **Abbreviations and acronyms**

AWPB	Annual Work Programme and Budget
BoQ	Bill of Quantities
BDS	Business Development Services
СВО	Community-based Organization
СВТ	Competency-based Training
СТА	Chief Technical Advisor
СРА	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
EDP	Entrepreneurship Development Programme
HQ	Headquarters
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
ILO	International Labour Organization
IP	Integrated Programme
KSVTAU	Khartoum State Vocational Training Administrative Unit
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MoLPS & HRD	Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development
MSE	Micro and Small Enterprise
NCTTE	National Council for Technical and Technological Education
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NPC	National Project Coordinator
PMU	Project Management Unit
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PSC	Project Steering Committee
SC	Steering Committee
ТоТ	Training of Trainers
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNMIS	United Nations Missions in Sudan
VTC	Vocational Training Center
WEBDA	Wad El Beshir Development Association
YED	Youth Entrepreneur Development

# **Glossary of evaluation related terms**

Term	Definition
Conclusions	Conclusions point out the factors of success and failure of the evaluated intervention, with special attention paid to the intended and unintended results and impacts, and more generally to any other strength or weakness. A conclusion draws on data collection and analyses undertaken, through a transparent chain of arguments.
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.
Impacts	Positive and negative, primary and secondary long- term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.
Indicator	Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a development actor.
Institutional development impact	The extent to which an intervention improves or weakens the ability of a country or region to make more efficient, equitable, and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources, for example through:  (a) better definition, stability, transparency, enforceability and predictability of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from these institutional arrangements. Such impacts can include intended and unintended effects of an action.
Lessons learned	Generalizations based on evaluation experiences with projects, programs, or policies that abstract from the specific circumstances to broader situations. Frequently, lessons highlight strengths or weaknesses in preparation, design, and implementation that affect performance, outcome, and impact.

Management tool used to improve the design of interventions, most often at the project level. It involves identifying strategic elements (inputs, outputs, outcomes, impact) and their causal relationships, indicators, and the assumptions or risks that may influence success and failure. It thus facilitates planning, execution and evaluation of a development intervention. Related term: results based management.
The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs. Related terms: result, outputs, impacts, effect.
The products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes.
Proposals aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, quality, or efficiency of a development intervention; at redesigning the objectives; and/or at the reallocation of resources. Recommendations should be linked to conclusions.
The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies.
Note: Retrospectively, the question of relevance often becomes a question as to whether the objectives of an intervention or its design are still appropriate given changed circumstances.
The output, outcome or impact (intended or unintended, positive and/or negative) of a development intervention. Related terms: outcome, effect, impacts.
The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time.

### **Executive summary**

#### Introduction

This evaluation report covers the EU funded project "Enhancing the capacity of Khartoum State in the delivery of pro-poor vocational training services". In combination with two other Youth Entrepreneurship Development (YED) projects in the Wau and Malakal regions of Southern Sudan, the YED Khartoum project forms the YED component of the UNIDO Integrated Programme (IP) in Sudan. With a budget of 11 million euro the YED Khartoum project has been the biggest project under the IP and it was given special attention under the larger framework of the independent evaluation of the IP Sudan. The evaluation was conducted between December 2009 and February 2010 by Jeffrey Tines and Ahmed Kheir under the direction of the IP evaluation team leader Johannes Dobinger from the UNIDO Evaluation Group.

### **Post-conflict context**

Due to rural-urban migration originated by wars and natural crises, the population of Khartoum State has more than quadrupled over the last decades. Employment creation, income generation and re-integration of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) are among the top priorities of the Khartoum State Government.

The UNIDO approach applied under the YED Khartoum project is consistent with the UN policy and principles for post-crisis interventions stipulating three different "tracks": (1) stabilizing income generation and emergency employment; (2) promoting employment at the local level in order to facilitate local economic recovery; and (3) supporting policy development and institutional capacity building in order to sustain employment creation and decent work.

In line with these principles, the YED Khartoum combines short-term vocational skills training and income generation for IDPs with medium- and long-term capacity building of vocational training centres (VTCs) and of the vocational training system in Sudan.

### Project planning and implementation

In 2007, UNIDO responded to a request from the Governor's office of Khartoum State by developing a project proposal that aimed to: (a) provide informal vocational and entrepreneurship training in IDP areas in Khartoum State through community based organizations and non-governmental organizations

(CBOs/NGOs) and (b) develop human and institutional capacity of five VTCs in Khartoum State. EU funding was secured in June 2007 and implementation started in July with an inception mission. In 2008 the initial project budget of 10 million euro was increased to 11 million euro and the initial time frame was extended from 21 to 39 months (March 2007 to June 2010). The main counterpart of the project has been the Khartoum State Vocational Training Administrative Unit (KSVTAU).

The project design focuses on five sectors for which the greatest demand for skilled labor was identified (food processing, building construction, automobile repair/maintenance, electrical work, and welding and carpentry). The project was structured under two separate components including short-term interventions on one hand (supporting CBOs/NGOs to provide vocational and entrepreneurship training to IDPs) and medium- to long-term interventions on the other hand (equipping VTCs; shifting the VTC philosophy from the traditional three-year apprenticeship approach towards a much more flexible and needs oriented Competence Based Training (CBT) approach; developing curricula for CBT; capacity building of technical and managerial VTC staff).

The synergies between these two project components were not obvious but became gradually apparent over time. For example, the CBOs/NGOs started offering pre-vocational training, a measure which is expected to help marginalized IDP populations gain easier access to the formal vocational training system. These linkages between the informal and formal vocational training systems are an achievement in itself but additional measures will be necessary to further reinforce and sustain such linkages.

The project is being implemented by a Project Management Unit (PMU) that has been in charge of implementing a wide range of activities. Some of these activities go beyond the limited time frame of the project, such as convincing and enabling the various stakeholders to change the philosophy of the VTC system and adopting the CBT approach in practice. Identifying, negotiating, purchasing and implementing the quite heavy VTC equipment has been another challenge. Government counterparts and stakeholders recognized that the PMU was very efficiently managed but there are still a number of challenges:

- 1) The equipping of the four VTCs has taken longer than had been expected and thus delayed the initiation of training courses;
- 2) VTC staffing proved more difficult than expected because of difficulties to find qualified staff, in particular for management and administration;
- 3) Draft technical curricula are not yet completed, which delayed the review, field-testing and adoption by the government counterparts;

- 4) Technical and managerial capacity of the newly created Khartoum State Vocational Training Administrative Unit must be further strengthened;
- 5) Linkages between the Khartoum State VTCs and the CBOs/NGOs in IDP populated areas need to be further developed;

Due to these challenges, the project was not able to implement all planned interventions and, as a result, it is not yet clear whether the anticipated outcome of better access to the formal vocational training system for marginalized groups will eventually materialize. All in all, it became apparent that UNIDO is gradually developing a full understanding of the intricacies of such an ambitious and multifacetted VTC approach and the necessary time frame for implementing this approach under post-crisis conditions.

#### Relevance

The two-pronged approach of the YED Khartoum project has been adequate and appropriate to the post-conflict context in Khartoum State. Both sides of the approach are relevant: (1) short-term delivery of informal training to IDPs and other marginalized groups and capacity building of CBOs/NGOs to continue with the provision of such training on the one hand, as well as (2) modernizing the formal VTC system by shifting its approach towards CBT; training VTC managers and technical instructors and equipping VTCs.

However, the project found it difficult to raise sufficient awareness amongst the implementing partners with regard to the inter-relationships of the two components of the approach and the ultimate need to come up with an integrated vocational training system for marginalized populations.

Ensuring a balanced relevance of the project for both components (marginalized groups and the mainstream vocational training system) proved to be challenging. The project worked under the assumption that by developing "state-of-the-art" VTCs that focus on the demand for skilled labor for the formal economy it could also simultaneously accommodate the needs of poor, marginalized youth and women from IDP communities. However, when selecting the VTC equipment and designing the formal VTC courses, the project gave priority to serving the training needs of the "modern" economy while complementing these efforts with the provision of basic vocational and entrepreneurship training for selected marginalized groups in order to facilitate their transition towards gainful self-employment or informal, income generation.

### **Efficiency**

Efficient project implementation was ensured by a PMU that was well managed by the same Chief Technical Advisor throughout the entire duration of the project. While the vocational and entrepreneurship trainings of IDPs through CBOs/NGOs under component 1 were implemented in a timely manner, the middle- and long-term VTC capacity building under component 2 encountered numerous delays. The latter was mostly due to overambitious planning.

#### **Effectiveness**

The informal vocational and entrepreneurship training courses provided by CBOs/NGOs in marginalized communities were relatively effective. More than 1,500 male and female participants from these communities benefited from the informal short-term technical and entrepreneurship development training courses and subsequently initiated income-generating activities in their local communities. At the same time, the project developed the capacity of the CBOs/NGOs that participated in this initiative, so that they are better prepared to continue providing training courses related to income-generation after the end of the project.

The effectiveness of the project in meeting its targets with regard to the formal training system is less obvious. The above mentioned delays in operationalizing the VTCs and in human and institutional capacity building weakened the project's ability to deliver. The project draws to a close soon and the capacity of the VTCs to produce the expected results remains unknown. It remains also unclear whether the project will be ultimately effective in facilitating the transition of marginalized youth from the IDP populated areas into the newly established formal vocational training system which is primarily designed to prepare skilled workers for the formal sector labor market.

In conclusion, the project has been very active in ensuring a solid foundation for the VTCs to become operational in the near future. Many interventions were initiated but the overall objective of creating an integrated vocational training system that serves both marginalized persons and the mainstream labor market will not be achieved by the end of the project.

### Sustainability and ownership

The Presidency, the Federal Ministry of Labour and the Khartoum State Government have demonstrated a keen interest in and ownership of the project during its implementation as demonstrated by the significant investment into the construction of four VTCs and the recruitment of more than a hundred new staff members. The VTCs have also demonstrated a strong ownership of the project

by: (a) strong commitment to the CBT and YED approaches; and (b) enthusiastic participation by VTC management and technical staff in the various training and upgrading courses that the project has implemented.

The commitment of the Khartoum State government to the YED/CBT approach is undeniable but the successful implementation of this approach will depend upon the degree to which the VTC managers and technical staff adopt a more proactive, business-oriented approach to vocational training. It remains to be seen whether it will be possible to create a pool of committed, qualified and dedicated personnel who will be able to operate the cultural shift towards the YED/CBT approach in the long run.

### **Impact**

At this point in time, it is too early to assess the extent to which the UNIDO strategic approach has impacted on the lives of marginalized populations throughout Khartoum State. Vocational training has not yet begun; the curricula are not yet implemented; management and technical staff have not applied the newly acquired knowledge, skills and attitudes; and the combined approach of vocational and entrepreneurship training is not yet implemented.

#### Recommendations

- A. The project should use the remaining duration to help establishing formal links between the CBOs/NGOs in the IDP populated areas, the VTCs and the Khartoum State Vocational Training Administrative Unit to sustainably attain the project objective that participants in the informal vocational and entrepreneurship training courses from marginalized communities can transition into formal vocational training programmes of the public VTCs.
- B. The project should implement as soon as possible the CBT preparatory course across all VTCs in order to ascertain the appropriateness of course content and the capacity of VTC instructors to implement a CBT curriculum.
- C. It is recommended to UNIDO and to the EU to pursue the capacity building of the Khartoum State Vocational Training Administrative Unit (KSVTAU) beyond the end of the project. This will be necessary to enable the KSVTAU to sustain the achievements of the project; to drive the further implementation of the CBT based approach to vocational training; to foster the emergence of a private sector culture in the vocational training system; to establish and sustain a firm mechanism for trainees to move from the informal to the formal vocational training system; and to establish stronger

- relationships with the private sector, micro-finance institutions, local community and other key stakeholders.
- D. Every VTC that was supported under the project should establish a specific business plan that defines the short-, medium- and long-term objectives of the VTC; identifies its main stakeholders and clients; describes its role visà-vis the local communities; identifies the main strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the VTC and establishes a development plan for the years to come. Establishing such plans will require support from the Khartoum State Government and the KSVTAU.
- E. During the remaining duration of the project it is recommended to establish a monitoring and evaluation system that will allow the KSVTAU to assess results of the project through follow-up and tracer studies after the project. There is a vital need for all parties (UNIDO, Khartoum State and donor) to monitor and assess whether the objectives of the project will be met in the medium and longer term.
- F. With a view to the strategic importance of the approach and the considerable budget of the project, it is recommended to UNIDO and to the EU to conduct an impact evaluation of the project in 2012.

#### Lessons learned

- 1. The two-pronged approach of the project to serve both marginalized groups and the mainstream vocational training system is attractive. However, the basic working hypothesis remains to be verified whether developing "state-ofthe-art" VTCs focusing on the demand for skilled labor by the formal economy can simultaneously accommodate the training and income creation needs of the poor, marginalized youth and women from IDP communities.
- 2. The time period of the project was insufficient to adequately transition trainees from informal vocational and entrepreneurship training courses provided by the CBOs/NGOs into a formal vocational training system that trains skilled laborers for market demands and/or self-employment. For similar projects a more realistic time planning and/or a phased approach is required.
- 3. An in-country Project Management Unit (PMU) under the direction of one CTA that cooperates very closely with responsible Government authorities throughout the duration of the project is critical to the successful implementation of a complex YED project under post-crisis conditions.

- 4. The project experience suggests that the likelihood of sustainability is enhanced when (a) public-private partnerships are created; (b) the VTC is supported by a strong Steering/Advisory Committee comprised of key stakeholders from the local community; and (c) there is ownership on the part of the community which views the VTC as a resource for its benefit.
- 5. The introduction of informal pre-vocational training courses by CBOs/NGOs is a first step to provide persons from marginalized communities with a better access to the formal vocational training system. However, more explicit, continuous and mutually agreed linkages between the CBOs/NGOs and the formal vocational training system are necessary to sustain these initial successes and to bridge the gap between the informal and formal training systems.

### Introduction

#### 1.1. Evaluation team and field visits

The Evaluation Team was composed of one international evaluator, Mr. Jeffrey Tines, and one national evaluator, Mr. Ahmed Kheir. The evaluation mission to Sudan took place between 24 January 2010 and 12 February 2010, i.e. at month 36 of the project duration and four months before the expected end date in June 2010. The visit to the Project Management Unit and the four VTCs, as well as the meetings held with key stakeholders took place from 2 to 12 February, 2010.

### 1.2. Structure of the evaluation report

In order to achieve the objectives of the evaluation, the Evaluation Team was expected to: (a) review relevant documents; (b) meet project staff, government representatives, key stakeholders, and vocational training centre (VTC) management and technical staff; and (c) make field visits to the vocational training centres as well as to the government counterparts, donor agencies and key stakeholders. (The detailed Terms of Reference and proposed work schedule are attached in the Annexes 1 and 2).

The evaluation team was assigned to prepare a report that:

- 1. records and evaluates progress achieved by the project vis-à-vis the project objectives and results;
- 2. addresses the key cross-cutting issues of the thematic evaluation framework for UNIDO post-conflict projects;
- 3. provides lessons learned, conclusions and recommendations.

Chapter 1 presents the evaluation approach. Chapter 2 describes the country and project context. Chapter 3 discusses the project identification and formulation process. Chapter 4 discusses project implementation and describes the project's progress vis-à-vis results. Chapter 5 evaluates the project based on the DAC

evaluation criteria; and Chapter 6 presents lessons learned, conclusions and recommendations.

### 1.3. Methodology

The international evaluator received an initial briefing from the UNIDO Evaluation Group and the YED Project Manager in Vienna in January 2010 prior to the field visit to Sudan. At the same time, the international consultant was provided with various background documents, i.e., progress reports, the project document and substantive reports from project staff.

Prior to the independent evaluation a self-evaluation report was prepared that represented a valuable source of information for the evaluation team.

During the field mission the international and national evaluators visited the various vocational training centres (VTCs) and several Community Based Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations (CBOs/NGOs) throughout Khartoum State. Additionally, the evaluators met with VTC management and technical staff, key State and Federal government officials, project staff as well as a donor representative from the European Union.

### **Country and project context**

### 2.1. Country context

Since its independence in 1956, Sudan has been beset by many problems, chief among which have been political unrest and poverty. The combined forces of political conflict and poverty have led to the high prevalence of displaced families, IDPs, and ex-combatants which are common to post-conflict environments. The economic situation of these groups is further complicated by their lack of marketable skills which are needed for gainful employment. In terms of economic and social development, Southern Sudan, among the least developed regions in Africa, lags far behind Northern Sudan; which itself lags behind the capital of Khartoum. This marked disparity has been the cause of many woes related to governance and has contributed to an uneven demographic distribution.

Rural to urban migration has been a national phenomenon in Sudan even before the problems related to political unrest. Over the last 4 decades, the population of Khartoum State has more than quadrupled. It is estimated that 28% of Khartoum's population are IDP's and that 36% of the IDP's will probably become permanent residents.

### Public vocational training in Sudan

The first law governing vocational training and apprenticeship in Sudan was promulgated in 1908 and amended in 1947. Formal, organized and public vocational training in Sudan began shortly after independence in 1956 under the aegis of the Ministry of Labour. In 1964, the Khartoum Vocational Training Centre was established with support from the German government. By 2007, fourteen government vocational training centres had been created throughout Sudan by the Ministry of Labour, eleven of which were in Northern Sudan. Six of the eleven Northern VTCs are in Khartoum. Table 1 lists all public vocational training centres in Sudan.

**Table 1: Vocational Training Centres in Sudan** 

	Name and Location	State	Year Established	Maximum Number of Students	Donor
1	Khartoum, 1	Khartoum	In 1956	400	Government of the Sudan / UNDP / ILO
2	Khartoum, 2	Khartoum	In 1964	500	Government of the Sudan / Federal Republic of Germany
3	Kosti	The White Nile	In 1969	300	Government of the Sudan / loan from the World Bank
4	Wad Madani	El Jazeera	In 1970	400	Government of the Sudan / Federal Republic of Germany
5	Wau	Bahr al- Ghazal	In 1970	230	Government of the Sudan / UNDP / ILO
6	Juba	Bahr al- Jabal	In 1974	300	Government of the Sudan / UNDP / ILO
7	Port Sudan	Red Sea	In 1984	400	Government of the Sudan / Federal Republic of Germany
8	Malakal	Upper Nile	In 1981	160	Government of the Sudan / Switzerland / ILO
9	Omdurman Friendship	Khartoum	In 1989	400	Government of the Sudan / China loan
10	Nyala	South Darfur	In 1991	100	Government of the Sudan / UNDP / ILO
11	El Obeid	North Kordofan	In 1991	200	Government of the Sudan / UNDP / ILO
12	Khartoum (3)	Khartoum	In 1994	150	Government of Sudan
13	Sudanese Korean	Khartoum	In 1996	320	Government of Sudan / Republic of South Korea
14	Khartoum North	Khartoum	In 2003	150	Government of Sudan

VTCs offer 13 different specializations to the trainees that are primarily oriented towards the engineering domain. The training needs of the agricultural, hotel and catering, health and business management sectors are largely unmet.

Table 2: Occupations and Disciplines of the Vocational Training Centres of Sudan

No.	Occupational group	Disciplines
1	Metal	Fitting - Turning - blacksmithing - sheet metal- welding
2	General Electricity	Household installations – motor rewinding - control circuits - Maintenance of electrical equipment
3	Auto Mechanics	Diesel and gasoline vehicles – auto electricity
4	Refrigeration and air conditioning	Central air conditioning - automotive air conditioning – domestic refrigeration and air conditioning
5	Carpentry	Joinery Machines - Wood Turning- Furniture - Decoration - architectural Carpentry
6	Buildings	Architectural drawing - building construction - tiles and plastering
7	Plumbing	Pipe fitting - sewage systems- sanitary plumbing
8	Garments	Design - tailoring - Sewing - Embroidery - needlework - Batik
9	Electronics	Maintenance of radio and TV - Industrial Electronics – office equipment maintenance
10	Technical drawing	Technical drawing - mechanical drawing - architectural drawing
11	Computers	Computer Science - Internet - Maintenance
12	Mechanics of agricultural machinery	Tractors - Harvesters - agricultural mechanization
13	Food Industries	Extraction and manufacture of dairy products - food industry and preservation

In 1994, Sudan adopted a federal system of government which was accompanied by the decentralization to the States of all responsibility for the VTCs. As a result, each State assumes responsibility for the administration and finance of the VTCs, while the technical oversight remains with the central government. In order to ensure that the federal government could properly provide technical support to all of the vocational training centres, a Supreme Council for Vocational Training and Apprenticeship (SCVTA) was established in 2001 based on the "Apprenticeship and Vocational Training" law. The SCVTA is a tripartite organization (government, workers and employers). The mandate of the SCVTA includes policy development; planning; curriculum approval; training of instructors; establishment of trade standards as well as trade testing and certification.

At present, JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) is helping the SCVTA with the development of its national policy and strategic vision documents. It is also finalising plans for a new VTC, a centre for training of trainers, a headquarters building for the SCVTA, a management information centre and a central storage facility.

However, the SVTA (Ministry of Labour) is not the sole government agency providing vocational training. The Ministry of Education (under the title of "technical education") also provides vocational and technical education. The Education Ministry has 118 "technical schools" offering industrial, agricultural, commercial and 'women's trades' as well as 48 "crafts" centres. Studies in the industrial schools are primarily academic in nature with less emphasis devoted to practical skills. Additionally, the Ministry of Youth runs a number of training centres similar to those of the Ministry of Labour, while the Ministry of Social Affairs administers several centres for persons with disabilities and street children. Lastly, some government departments, such as the Army, Sudan Railways and Agriculture, have small centres for in-service staff training.

### Vocational training supported by private sector and NGOs

Fifty-nine VTCs in Sudan are run by either private entities and/or non-governmental organizations. The majority of these VTCs are located in Khartoum State. Presently, the Government of Sudan does not have a system of national standards that are used to accredit private and/or non-governmental VTCs. As a result, the quality of services varies widely.

### Current status of public vocational training in Sudan

The current vocational training system is referred to as the "apprenticeship system" which was introduced in the 1960s. This system is a three-year vocational training scheme for youth who have completed 8 years of basic schooling. It includes two years of formal, institution-based technical training followed by one year of apprenticeship training as a job attachment.

In theory, vocational training programmes offer different options to the trainee. An individual who enters into a public vocational training programme has five different options depending upon his/her profile and needs.

### 1) Apprenticeship:

The apprenticeship programme is a three-year vocational training scheme for youth who have completed 8 years of basic schooling. This scheme includes two years of formal, institution-based technical training followed by one year of apprenticeship training as a job attachment.

### 2) Short courses:

Short courses consist of a three month programme for school drop outs. The short courses employ ILO's Modules of Employable Skills as their curricular content.

### 3) Skills upgrading:

The skill upgrading programme is an in-service programme from three to six months in duration for workers who are already employed.

### 4) Special women development courses:

The special women development courses was conceived as an "affirmative action" programme that strives to facilitate the integration of women into the work force. These courses are short-term in nature an range from 2 to 6 months in length.

### 5) Mobile training programme:

The mobile training programme focuses on providing vocational training services to persons who are located in remote rural areas and are not able to re-locate to a vocational training centre. This programme is flexible in nature but also focuses on short-term training.

However, in practice, the standard approach to vocational training that is present across all VTCs is the three-year apprenticeship programme, which places a significant time burden upon the trainee who is not able to transition into gainful employment until s/he has invested three years in the system.

The vocational training system in Sudan has been characterized as ineffective with respect to developing a labor force that can contribute to the industrial development of the country (ILO, 2008a). Despite a strong market demand for skilled laborers in Sudan, the vocational training service delivery system does not have the capacity to produce skilled laborers who possess the knowledge, skills and attitudes needed. This lack of capacity is due in part to weak managerial and technical skills within the VTCs. However, another key reason is the lack of linkages between the VTCs and the market demands. Abeywickrama (2007) identified a number of weaknesses of the Sudanese vocational training system:

- The vocational training system is outdated and needs upgrading in order to meet current market needs.
- Ineffective management capacity of the vocational training centres.
- The VTC management is divorced from the business community and does not produce skilled labor that address market needs.

- Equipment for training is outdated. Many machines and pieces of equipment require maintenance and repairs.
- The VTC and their equipment/machines are poorly maintained.
- Absence of national skills standards, testing and certification
- Lack of qualified trainers.
- Lack of life skills/employability training

In an effort to ensure that VTCs become more oriented towards the demands of the labour market and better prepare trainees for the demands of the workplace, the project has proposed the adoption by the Khartoum State VTCs of a competency-based training (CBT) model. CBT essentially involves structuring training programmes in terms of "competencies"; it is not time-based and trainees progress through a training programme by successive demonstration of competence in preceding modules (ILO, 2008b). By developing appropriate curricular content and processes the prospects for formal sector employment, self-employment and further training should be enhanced.



### **Project planning**

The areas of Khartoum State that have a high concentration of IDP populations suffer from very high unemployment. Employment opportunities in such areas are predominantly in the informal sector and generated through self-employment. Equipping the workforce with the skills needed to create employment opportunities is a major challenge given the low educational level and high illiteracy rates among the IDP population.

In 2006, following a request from the Governor's Office of Khartoum State, UNIDO developed a project proposal aiming to build the capacity of seven VTCs in Khartoum State and to provide vocational training in IDP areas. The proposal for Khartoum State was developed in 2007, based on the experience of UNIDO's YED project in Malakal and an extension of previous UNIDO assistance and support in Sudan to rehabilitate and revitalize VTCs for job creation through YED.

### The project strategy

Overall, the project strategy aims to satisfy the demand of the formal labor market for skilled labor on the one hand and the needs of poor, marginalized youth and women for self-employment opportunities on the other.

To this end, the project was structured into two components. Component 1 focused on matching equipment and curricula of the VTCs with the needs of the formal labour market; whereas Component 2 focused on enabling young urban poor from IDP areas with the opportunity to improve their skills for employability and entrepreneurial activities. Component 1 was considered a medium- or long-term intervention, while Component 2 was primarily a short-term intervention, albeit with medium-term potential.

The simultaneous implementation of activities across the two components aims to create a VTC system that is coherent, integrated and comprehensive. In theory, this system is expected to allow an individual from a marginalized IDP community to begin the vocational training process by receiving informal, short-term training courses offered by CBOs/NGOs and subsequently transition

towards a formal, standardized demand-driven vocational training programme provided by the State Government that prepares skilled workers for mainstream labor market demands. The idea is that, as the two components of the strategy become operational, the target populations from the marginalized communities would be able to progress through the system and ultimately find gainful employment in the formal sector or through self-employment.

All vocational training courses offered, whether they are non-formal short-term courses delivered by CBOs/NGOs or long-term, short-term or mobile formal courses delivered by a governmental VTC, were to be determined by preprogramming and labor market analyses in order to ensure that the knowledge, skills and attitudes delivered by the courses respond to relevant market needs. At the same time, the project strategy would ensure coordination amongst beneficiaries, representatives from CBOs/NGOs, VTC managerial and technical staff, and representatives from the private sector/future employers so that all are working towards the same objective – gainful employment for skilled workers.

The project in general strives to create a vocational and technical training culture that is demand-driven and to support youth entrepreneurship development (YED) so that formal sector employment and self-employment opportunities are generated. Youth would be provided with market-oriented skills in demand-driven vocational skills training sub-sections through the development of a competency-based training (CBT) system. The CBT system represents a major curricular reform of the existing 3-year apprenticeship curricula used in all public VTCs.

The project document did, however, not clearly describe the relationship between the CBOs/NGOs, which were responsible for providing short-term vocational and entrepreneurship training courses, and the Khartoum State VTCs and the way in which the two Components would interact and complement one another.

### The project design

The logical framework shown in Table 3 resumes the project design.

Table 3: Objectives and Indicator Framework of the YED Khartoum State Project

Overall Objective	Indicator
To significantly contribute to improving the livelihood of urban poor (unemployed youth and IDPs) in Khartoum State, through building vocational training capacity for YED, building public-private sector linkages for job creation, and enhancing their access to employment and sustainable income.	Socio-economic and development indicators related to VTC capacities to serve target groups and areas, such as number of people trained, linked to the number of job opportunities provided/used, business start-ups (MSE-level), and sustained income earnings for the graduates.
Specific Objective – Component 1	Indicators – Component 1
To match equipment and training programmes at various levels in five selected VTCs in Khartoum State with labour market needs and productive sector demands, while training facilities are made widely accessible to the main beneficiaries (unemployed youth, women and IDPs).	<ol> <li>Selected VTCs fully functional.</li> <li>Number of urban poor enrolled in VTCs is increased in Khartoum State;</li> <li>Private sector agencies consider services provided by the selected VTCs satisfactory to match labour market needs and productive sector demands;</li> <li>A significant share of graduates has a business plan and/or job prospects to find paid employment within three months after graduation from the selected supported VTCs.</li> </ol>
Specific Objective – Component 2	Indicators – Component 2
To enable a significant share of young urban poor in IDP areas of Khartoum State, including women, to improve their skills for employability and entrepreneurial activities through YED.	<ol> <li>Share of beneficiaries engaged in setting up MSEs (group/individual) and/or gaining productive income generation (jobs);</li> <li>Share of beneficiaries enabled to apply technical and YED skills, and obtain micro-credit.</li> </ol>

The initial project document defined 14 expected outputs to achieve these specific objectives (or "outcomes"). Under the "Addendum to the Description to the Action" (August 2008) it was agreed to streamline the project structure by consolidating the 14 outputs into five "results" (see Table 4) that were laid down in a revised results framework. This framework provides also for 20 performance indicators agreed between the donor and UNIDO.

Table 4: Streamlined results framework of the YED Khartoum state project

Component 1	Component 2
Result 1.1	Result 2.1
Four new VTCs are operational, one existing VTC given new equipment, are providing urban poor access to technical and entrepreneurial training in line with market demands, taking a gender mainstreaming approach.	NGOs/CBOs (operating in the IDP areas) have enhanced capacities to organize, set-up demand-oriented training courses (entrepreneurship and technical) and to provide business support for job creation.
Result 1.2  VTC curricula updated/developed and offered in line with market demands and integrating YED modules to increase employabilitity of trainees and potential for self-employment along the lines of gender mainstreaming.	Result 2.2 Increased access of the urban poor, especially the youth and women, to demand-oriented vocational skills and entrepreneurship training to widen the human resource base in support of self-employment opportunities.
Result 1.3  Policy framework in partnership with the private and public sector for the promotion of vocational training in Khartoum State presented for approval.	

The initial project budget of 10 million Euros funded by the European Union was increased to 11 million Euros in 2008 (see Table 5). Initially the length of the project was for 21 months from March 2007 to December 2008. Subsequently, the project was modified to focus only on five instead of seven VTCs and the project duration was extended to 39 months (March 2007 to June 2010).

Table 5: Extended Budget of YED Khartoum State Project (EE/SUD/07/004)

Component Title	Extended Budget (Euros in 2008)
Component 1	9,587,865
Component 2	1,389,031
TOTAL (including contingency and support costs)	10,999,904

### Post-conflict project design issues

The UN Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration (2009) is built around guiding principles and programming tracks that strive to promote employment in order to deliver economic benefits to affected populations in post-conflict environments. The policy proposes short, medium and long-term programming tracks. The short-term track focuses on stabilizing income generation to consolidate security. The medium-term track focuses on promoting employment in order to create local economy recovery; and the long-term track focuses on sustainable employment creation through policies and institutional capacity building. The programming tracks are guided by key principles critical to post-conflict environments. These principles include: (a) a coherent and comprehensive approach; (b) "do not harm" interventions; (c) being conflict sensitive; (d) aiming for sustainability; and (e) promotion of gender equality.

The YED Khartoum project design is consistent with the UN Policy programmatic tracks and embraces the guiding principles outlined in the policy document. The project strives to facilitate local economic recovery through short- and medium-term employment promotion interventions, while also laying the foundation for sustainable employment creation through institutional and human capacity building at the local and national levels.

### **Partnerships**

The implementation of the project was envisioned to be in close collaboration with Khartoum State Governor, Khartoum State VTCs management and trainers, and private sector organizations. The coordinating agency of the project is the Governor's Office of Khartoum State and the State Ministry of Education.

The project approach emphasizes the need to create partnerships between the private and public sector, raise awareness, form a Steering/Advisory Committee, undertake networking and coordination initiatives, and establish relationships with micro-finance institutions and Chambers of Commerce.

### **Project management**

The overall management of the project was envisioned to be provided by a Project Management Unit (PMU) comprised of a National Project Coordinator (NPC), an international senior expert based in Khartoum, a national technical expert on vocational training for YED, and an international technical expert with professional experience in entrepreneurship development.

The establishment of a Project Steering Committee (SC) comprised of key stakeholders was another important factor in the development of the project.

# IV

### **Project implementation**

### **Component 1**

In 2007, the project conducted a market analysis to identify those economic sectors that had the greatest potential for employment opportunities in Khartoum State. The five with the greatest market demand for skilled workers were: food processing, building construction, automobile repair/maintenance, electrical work, and welding and carpentry.

On this basis, the activities related to redesigning the vocational skills training system were initiated, such as definition of the type of equipment required, developing the content of training courses, training of managerial and technical staff, developing of competency-based curricula, etc.

At the time of the evaluation, the re-wiring of the VTCs was approaching completion and the equipment was under installation except for the purchase, installation and training associated with the management information system.

At the time of the evaluation, significant training of newly recruited staff had already been undertaken (Table 6) but Other trainings of existing staff such as the VTC Directors, Khartoum State Vocational Training Administrative Unit (KSVTAU) staff, Senior Trainers and other VTC training and administrative staff remains to be done. Unfortunately, a significant number of VTC management and administrative staff had yet to be recruited and would also require training before being able to implement activities. The delay in the staffing of the VTCs was due, in part, to the difficulty associated with finding qualified staff.

Table 6: Component 1 – Khartoum State VTC Capacity Building Training<sup>1</sup>

VTC Capacity Building Training Activity	Number of VTC Staff Trained	
1.Policy Makers – Study Tour	10	
2.VTC Management and KSVTAC		
Orientation Programme	14	
Study Tour	5	
- VTC Mgt and English	16	
3.Senior Trainer		
- CBT and English Language	25	
4.English Trainer		
- English Language and Pedagogy	22	
5.ICT Trainer		
- ICDL	16	
6.Trainers and Assistant Trainers		
- TOT Pedagogy	80	
7.In-house Training		
Basic computer operations	77	
Basic English	80	
- CBT	60	

The curricula development process was a very complex activity that required the coordination and guidance of the PMU with an international contractor and national governmental entities. The curricula development process was supported by the National Government because of its interest in piloting the CBT approach in the Khartoum State vocational training centres. The National Council for Technical and Technological Education (NCTTE) was responsible for ensuring that the CBT curricula were suitable to the Sudanese context. The different entities that were involved in the curricula development and review process were Castle College in the United Kingdom, the High Committee (created by a governmental decree of the Ministry of Labour which was responsible for overseeing the development of the new curricula), the NCTTE and the Supreme Council for Vocational Training and Apprenticeship (SCVTA). Given the participation of the many key players in the curriculum development process, the PMU had overall responsibility for coordinating the process. This process, albeit complex and challenging, was managed very well by the PMU whereby the preparatory curriculum had been completed and reviewed by the key partners.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Status of Indicator Report of 10 February 2010.

The preparatory curriculum was planned to be implemented in March or April 2010. Subsequently, once the technical CBT curricula had been completed by Castle College, it would be reviewed by the Technical Committee (comprised of persons from the private sector, NCTTE and SCVTA), revised and eventually endorsed by the High Committee and Supreme Council for implementation in the Khartoum State VTCs. It should be underlined that the Competency-based Training (CBT) approach has been fully endorsed and supported by the Khartoum State Governor's office as well as the two most noted government institutions in vocational training – NCTTE and SCVTA.

### Component 2

With respect to the implementation of Component 2 – capacity building of CBOs/NGOs to provide vocational and entrepreneurship training to marginalized populations in densely populated IDP areas - the PMU has worked very effectively in developing the capacity of such institutions as well as supporting their efforts to deliver vocational and entrepreneurship training services. The capacity building courses delivered to the CBOs/NGOs are listed in Table 7.

Table 7: Component 2 – Khartoum State CBO/NGO Capacity Building Training<sup>2</sup>

CBO/NGO Capacity Building Activity	Number of CBO/NGO Staff Trained		
EDP Training	45		
Pre-Vocational TOT	21		
Marquob TOT	18		
Butchery/Slaughtering and Hides/Skins			
EDP-Reflect TOT	21		
Project Design	21		

Twenty-eight CBOs/NGOs have developed the capacity to offer pre-vocational training courses, which will potentially prove beneficial not only to individuals who is interested in receiving vocational training from the CBO/NGO but also to those who may be interested in enrolling in the newly established VTCs of the Khartoum State Government.

The CBOs/NGOs, whose capacities have been developed by the project, are successful in delivering targeted vocational and entrepreneurship training courses to marginalized youth and women from IDP communities surrounding Khartoum. As shown in Table 8, the CBOs/NGOs trained 848 persons in

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Status of Indicator Report of 10 February 2010.

entrepreneurship training (90% achievement of the target) and 688 in technical training (35% achievement of the target). <sup>3</sup>

Table 8: Component 2 – Khartoum State CBO/NGO Entrepreneurship Development and Vocational Skills Training<sup>4</sup>

Type of Training	Number of Male Beneficiaries	Number of Female Beneficiaries	Total Beneficiaries
Entrepreneurship Development Training			
EDP Training	342	140	482
EDP Literacy Training		366	366
Total	342	506	848
Percentage Distribution	40.3%	59.7%	100%
Technical Training			
Pre-vocational Training	278	82	360
Henna Tattoo		200	200
Basic Plastering	64		64
Basic Painting	61	3	64
Total	403	285	688
Percentage Distribution	58.5%	41.5	100%

#### **Achievements**

The project document envisioned that by the end of the project (39 months), the VTCs would be equipped and operational; employing CBT curricula; and the trainees from IDP areas would be enrolled and receiving training. It turned out that, within the context of Sudan, human resource capacity building, curricula development, VTC equipping and the establishment of private-public partnerships require significantly more time than planned. As a result, it is not yet entirely certain whether the project interventions will eventually lead to the anticipated results.

The following review of the actual achievements of the project against the five expected results of the "streamlined results framework" (Table 4) presents the status of the project at the time of the evaluation.

Component 1, Result 1: Four new VTCs are operational and one existing VTC which is given equipment are providing the urban poor access to technical and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Status of Indicator Report of 10 February 2010

entrepreneurial training in line with market demands, taking a gender mainstreaming approach.

The rewiring of the VTCs is almost complete and the technical workshops of four of the five VTCs are, for the most part, equipped with the exception of a few items related to the administrative services such as the Management Information System and textbooks for the technical curricula. During the visit it was observed that some of the equipment was not operational. However, the CTA is confident that in the near future the equipment will be operational and the technical staff will have the capacity to use it.

The level of equipment across many VTC workshops such as Autotronics, Automotive Engine and Auto Body is very sophisticated. The decision of the project to equip the VTCs with "state-of-the art" equipment reflects the priority of the Government on modernization of the economy and on making available skilled labor with the necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes. It is assumed that the kind of equipment and tools delivered to the VTCs is similar to the one that many graduates are expected to use in their future jobs in the formal modern economy. At the same time, the equipment is also considered appropriate to train those individuals who will not be able to access formal sector employment and hence strive for informal or self-employment. Of course, striking a balance between the two objectives is difficult but it seems to be obvious that, in case of doubt, the modernization argument has been given more weight.

With respect to the recruitment and training of the VTC human resource base, the VTCs have had a difficult time finding qualified staff for administrative and technical positions and consequently many positions have not been filled. This implies that many VTCs do not yet have the qualified staff needed to manage and administer the VTCs. Even though current senior management and technical staff have received extensive training in a range of subjects such as on English language, TOT, ICT, ICDL, CBT and management, many positions remain to be filled and once they are filled the newly recruited staff will not have benefited from the training that their colleagues received under the project.

The extent to which the supported VTCs are already collaborating with the private sector and, as it is expected, adopting a private sector culture is limited for the simple reason that the VTCs are not yet operational. However, the principle of private-public partnerships (PPP) has been introduced as a result of the collaboration that already exists with the private sector in the development of the

CBT curricula. It is anticipated that once the VTCs become operational, the PPP mentality will spread and the VTCs will increasingly adopt a private sector culture.

Also, it is anticipated that once the VTCs become operational and the Directors of the VTCs can dedicate more time and effort to the planning process, the VTCs will develop their operational and business plans. The Directors of the VTCs have received training on how to develop operational plans and thus should not find this task too challenging. However, developing business plans on how the centre might work more closely with the private sector and possibly generate its own income will be more challenging.

Lastly, the operationalization of the Management Information System is far from being achieved for several reasons. The MIS system has yet to be purchased. Less than a third of the management and administrative staff of the VTCs have been recruited and, as a consequence, none of them have been trained. Against this background, it is unlikely that the MIS system will become completely operational before the end of the project in June 2010.

<u>Component 1, Result 2:</u> VTC curricula updated/developed and offered in line with market demands and integrating YED modules to increase employability of trainees and potential for self-employment along lines of gender mainstreaming.

The Technical Committee has yet to receive the draft curricula for technical CBT courses from Castle College and the in-country review of these drafts is not likely to begin before April or May 2010. As a consequence, the curricula are not likely to be finalized and staff trained on how to use it until the third or fourth quarter of 2010, i.e. this will only happen after the end of the project.

The situation for the curricula for pre-vocational training courses for technical math, drawing and English is more positive. The respective drafts were received from Castle College and have been reviewed and approved by the Technical Committee. The introduction of the preparatory course is planned for March/April 2010. The implementation of these courses will provide valuable information to the Technical Committee, the Supreme Council for Vocational Training and Apprenticeship (SCVTA) and the National Council on Technical and Technological Education (NCTTE) about the effectiveness and efficiency of the CBT approach to training. Even though the SCVTA and NCTTE have adopted the CBT approach in principle, the implementation of the preparatory course will

provide them with valuable information about the applicability and effectiveness of the CBT approach in a practical setting.

<u>Component 1. Result 3:</u> Policy framework in partnership with the private and public sector for the promotion of vocational training in Khartoum State presented for approval.

The most significant development with regard to developing the policy framework has been the establishment of the Khartoum State Vocational Training Administration Unit (KSVTAU). It is envisioned that the KSVTAU should evolve from a temporary body into a secretariat that will coordinate the development and implementation of State policies based upon PPPs. Presently it is too early to determine whether the KSVTAU has the leadership, managerial and technical capability to conduct an initiative that foments the establishment of PPPs. Most probably further capacity building of the KSVTAU will be necessary to orient the Unit in its efforts to lead this initiative.

Despite the limitations of the KSVTAU, the project has done an excellent job of bringing together key stakeholders, such as representatives from the private sector, the SCTVA, NCTTE, Governor of Khartoum State, to discuss a forward strategy. If the KSVTAU builds on this collaboration in the future, it should be in a position to mobilize the same key stakeholders for introducing a private sector culture in the VTCs and establishing concrete PPPs in other matters.

One word of caution though. Since the KSVTAU has not been able to take the lead in assisting the Directors of the Khartoum State VTCs in developing business and operational plans, additional capacity in the Unit may be needed so that it can proceed positively in the development of a policy framework.

<u>Component 2, Result 1:</u> NGO/CBOs (operating in the IDP areas) have enhanced capacities to organize, set-up demand oriented training courses (entrepreneurship and technical) and to provide business support for job creation.

The project enhanced the capacity of 28 CBOs/NGOs to deliver vocational and entrepreneurship skills to the marginalized populations living in the IDP populated areas of Khartoum State and support them with generating income. More specifically, the project introduced new training courses in Henna tattoo, plastering, painting, as well as on enterprise development programming, pre-

vocational training and product design. Many of the trainees were successfully transitioned into self-employment and/or income-generating activities.

The project has made significant progress with respect to linking trainees to micro-finance, banks and/or pools of entrepreneurs who could provide continuous business development support. The number of trainees who have obtained loans from local banks increased by 60%. Also, a recent business review found that all 79 participants of EDP training had established new businesses. In fact, all of the 29 women who had been trained in henna tattoo became self-employed. Lastly, in an effort to ensure the sustainability of the CBOs/NGOs so that they are able to continue to provide vocational and entrepreneurship training as well as facilitate the linking up of trainees to micro-finance and business development support, the project has implemented several capacity building activities so that they are better able to sustain the delivery of these same services after the project end.

The evaluators question whether all vocational training courses were appropriate in the real world context of IDPs. This is in recognition of the fact that the project introduced trainings in non-traditional skills because of their potential for incomegeneration in trades that do not require significant investment. Nevertheless, the evaluators interviewed several graduates from courses such as painting and plastering who were unable to find employment opportunities within their own communities. Finding a job in the trade for which they were trained would require traveling to the city centre but the interviewed individuals did not have the necessary resources to commute. The income-generating potential of persons trained in henna tattoo was better because there were many opportunities within their own community.

In conclusion, the project developed the capacity of the CBOs/NGOs in the IDP areas to: (a) provide entrepreneurship development training for current and new business owners; (b) mobilize resource for and organize skills training activities in their respective communities; (c) orient youth through pre-vocational training from IDP areas to transition into the formal vocational training centres; and (d) design and provide advisory services to the local population vis-à-vis micro-finance, skills development and the like.

<u>Component 2, Result 2:</u> Increased access of the urban poor, especially the youth and women, to demand-oriented vocational skills and entrepreneurship training to widen the human resource base in support of self-employment opportunities.

Some potential synergies between the CBOs/NGOs and the Khartoum State VTCs vis-à-vis the training of individuals from IDP populated areas have been established. For example, numerous awareness raising workshops were held in the communities informing the residents of the construction of new VTCs. Thus far, most activities implemented with the CBOs/NGOs have been implemented in isolation of those implemented with the VTCs primarily because the VTCs are not operational. However, it is expected that once the VTCs become operational and begin to provide vocational and entrepreneurship training, closer collaboration and coordination will be established so that IDPs will to be able to gain access into these centres. One example of coordination and/or collaboration that has already begun is in the area of *pre-vocational* training. Presently, an individual can take a pre-vocational training course from a CBO/NGO and potentially gain access to the VTC. Collaboration between the CBOs/NGOs and the VTCs has begun and further collaboration is possible in the future.

V

## **Evaluation of project performance**

#### Relevance

The overall objective of the project and the specific objectives of both components are highly relevant to the dual Government objectives and policies that are aiming, at Federal and Khartoum State levels, to modernize the economy while improving the livelihoods of the urban poor. The project is also relevant because it is consistent with the UN Millennium Development Goals 1, 3 and 8.

Vocational training can contribute to the integration and re-integration of marginalized and vulnerable groups such as unemployed youth and IDPs (ILO, 2008a). In a wider sense, by facilitating the prospect of productive work for such groups, vocational training can contribute to a sense of purpose and direction, and foments social cohesion within society (Barcia and Date-Bah, 2003), elements that are particularly relevant in a post-conflict envronment.

The project is relevant to the UN strategic framework for employment promotion in post-conflict countries and to the UNIDO IP strategy in Sudan, which strives to improve the overall socio-economic standards of living of youth, in particular those displaced by war.

The underlying strategic approach of the project strives to establish PPPs between the VTC and key stakeholders in the economy and local communities so that the training provided by the VTC is demand-driven, provides marketable knowledge and skills to the target population and enhances transition of marginalized populations into gainful employment. This approach is particularly relevant in the context of modernizing the VTC system Sudan.

In an effort to ensure that VTCs become more oriented towards the demands of the labor market and better meet the training needs of poor trainees, the project pursued the reform of the VTC system towards competency-based training (CBT). CBT is appropriate and relevant to training the urban poor for either formal private or public sector employment or self-employment opportunities. It facilitates trainee mobility and lifelong learning through the transferability or

"portability" of credits. By virtue of these features, introducing the CBT approach to Sudan appears to be clearly relevant.

## **Ownership**

Project ownership is assessed at three levels: Government; VTCs and communities.

The Khartoum State Government demonstrated a keen interest and project ownership demonstrated by: (a) an enthusiastic commitment to CBT and YED and support for the implementation of these approaches and programmes by the VTCs; (b) a high level of awareness regarding the design and implementation of the project as well as the challenges that the project has faced with respect to the timely completion of project activities; and (c) significant financial contributions to the construction of four VTCs and the recruitment of more than hundred new staff members.

The VTCs have also demonstrated a strong ownership of the project by: (a) a strong commitment to the CBT and YED approaches; and (b) enthusiastic participation by VTC management and technical staff in the various training and upgrading courses that the project has implemented. The participation of key stakeholders in the curriculum development process has contributed to a strong degree of commitment towards and ownership of the training programmes that will be implemented once the VTCs are operational.

With respect to community ownership of the project and their perception of the VTCs, linkages between the VTCs and the communities are still weak. This is a result of the fact that the VTCs are not yet generating graduates who would successfully transition into gainful employment in the local community. It is therefore not surprising that the local communities do not yet see the positive contribution that the VTCs can make to its economic development.

## **Effectiveness**

The evaluation of effectiveness pertains to the achievement of objectives and indicators included in Table 3 and the results framework in Table 4.

Any evaluation of effectiveness is of course subject to key assumptions. It appears that, at the design stage, UNIDO made three implicit key assumptions:

 First, UNIDO assumed that qualified VTC staff would be available on the labor market and that Khartoum State Government would be able to recruit such staff in a timely manner and that the UNIDO capacity building role would be less demanding than what it proved to be.

- Second, UNIDO assumed that the relatively short duration of the project would be sufficient to make significant steps from a traditional to a CBT based VTC system; implement sophisticated "state-of-the-art" equipment; build VTC capacity; develop curricula and establish private-public sector partnerships in the context of Sudan.
- Third, UNIDO assumed that the establishment of "state-of-the-art" VTCs in Khartoum State that primarily focus on offering training courses which are targeted towards a market demand for skilled laborers will also be able to accommodate simultaneously the needs of poor, marginalized youth and women from IDP communities whose interests and needs are for basic vocational and entrepreneurship training that will facilitate their transition into self-employment.

All three assumptions proved problematic. The evaluation of effectiveness has to take into account that, in a nutshell, assumptions one and two proved unrealistic and that, therefore, assumption three remains to be demonstrated.

The overall objective of the project was "to significantly contribute to improving the livelihood of urban poor (unemployed youth and IDPs) in Khartoum State, through building vocational training capacity for YED, building public-private sector linkages for job creation, and enhancing their access to employment and sustainable income".

At the time of the evaluation, this objective had not been met because the planned vocational training system in Khartoum State is not yet operational. In fact, none of the Khartoum State VTCs have started to offer courses nor have they generated vocational training graduates who could transition into gainful employment and begin to generate a sustainable income. As a result, the livelihood of the urban poor in Khartoum State has yet to benefit from the formal vocational training service delivery system.

The specific objective for component 1 was "to match equipment and training programmes at various levels in five selected VTCs in Khartoum State with labour market needs and productive sector demands, while training facilities are made widely accessible to the main beneficiaries (unemployed youth, women and IDPs)".

Four of the five VTCs in Khartoum State are still completing the equipping processes and finalizing the curricula of their CBT programmes. Besides the delays in the equipment, several other factors prevented the VTCs from

becoming fully operational. The development, review and field testing of the CBT curricula are not yet finalized. No vocational training courses, except the preparatory course, can be offered by the VTCs due to a lack of training curricula.

In the future, as part of the capacity building initiative, the VTC trainers will need to be trained on the new curricula as well as the YED programme. They also will require supervisory visits to ensure that they are implementing the curricula in an effective manner. However, the project draws to a close and the VTC instructors have not had the opportunity to implement the CBT or YED programmes. This has negatively impacted on the effectiveness of the project to reach its targets.

Therefore, it is too early to determine whether this objective will be achieved because it remains unclear as to whether the economic sectors identified by the market analysis truly reflect market demand, and if the vocational training workshops equipped and training courses developed will provide the urban poor with the knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary to successfully transition them into formal or informal sector employment.

However, it is reasonable to expect that component 1 will ultimately achieve its specific objective. More than 50 curricula are under preparation and Castle College should be able to deliver a good product despite the delays. The shortcomings with regard to effective curricula development are not necessarily due to implementation but rather to a project design that underestimated the amount of time required to produce quality curricula.

Component 2 was more effective than component 1 in achieving its specific objective "to enable a significant share of young urban poor in IDP areas of Khartoum State, including women, to improve their skills for employability and entrepreneurial activities through YED".

Through the capacity building of CBOs/NGOs in IDP areas of Khartoum State, the project has been able to assist a substantial number of urban poor youth and women in their efforts to improve their livelihoods. All of the urban poor youth and women who have been trained have received such training from CBOs/NGOs in their local communities. As of February 2010 approximately 33% of the beneficiaries of vocational and entrepreneurship training provided by the CBOs/NGOs have been able to find employment and 15% of them have either established or improved their businesses upon completion of training. (848 persons have received entrepreneurship training and 688 have received vocational training).<sup>5</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Status of Indicators as of 10 February 2010.

In contrast, it has yet to be demonstrated whether the Khartoum State VTCs are able to provide vocational and entrepreneurship training to urban poor youth and women from IDP areas of Khartoum State in an efficient and effective manner which results in their gainful employment. Persons who had completed prevocational training with a CBO/NGO had yet to gain access to the VTCs. They were not able to access the VTCs, not because of a lack of capacity or interest, but rather because the VTCs were not operational and could not receive trainees who had been referred by the CBOs/NGOs.

The complementarity between the short-, medium- and long-term interventions to the different implementing partners (CBOs/NGOs and VTCs) needs further clarification. Potentially, both types of service providers could co-exist and complement each other within an integrated vocational training service delivery system, inclusive of the short-term and mobile courses offered by the VTCs; but this type of relationship still has yet to be realized. However, insufficient awareness raising took place amongst the implementing partners vis-à-vis the inter-relationship of the different interventions of the project to the creation of an integrated vocational training service delivery system for marginalized populations. Currently, the only link between the informal vocational skills development training provided by the CBOs/NGOs and the formal Khartoum State VTCs is pre-vocational training.

After 36 months of the project, it remains unclear as to whether the development of "state-of-the-art" VTCs in Khartoum State, which would produce a skilled labor force to meet the private and public sector market demands, can also simultaneously accommodate the needs of poor, marginalized youth and women from IDP communities by equipping them with basic vocational and entrepreneurship skills needed for self-employment.

## **Efficiency**

Efficiency measures how economically inputs are converted into outputs.

In this respect the high proportion of the overall project budget that was dedicated to equipment should be borne in mind. Table 10 shows that almost 70% of the funding was allocated to equipment, more than three times as much as to international and national experts and training combined.

Table 10: Project Budget for EE/SUD/07/004

Budget Line	Total Allotment (US Dollars)	Percentage
Equipment	10,101,633	68.1
Experts	2,075,162	13.9
Study tours and in service training	1,145,331	7.7
Total	14,834,033	

As mentioned above, the project opted for purchasing expensive and sophisticated state-of-the-art equipment for the VTCs. Considering the overall objective of the project to "contribute to improving the livelihood of the urban poor (unemployed youth and IDPs) in Khartoum State" this choice could definitely be challenged. Purchasing less sophisticated and less expensive equipment would have been sufficient and probably even more appropriate, hence more efficient, to satisfy the needs of the target group. However, the technology choice of the project reflects quite clearly the dual strategy of the project and the priorities of the Government.

The evaluation of implementation efficiency is less ambiguous. Efficient design and a number of positive decisions during implementation should be highlighted.

The project document proposed the creation of a Project Management Unit (PMU) staffed by two senior international consultants, one of whom would be a senior technical advisor and the other with expertise in entrepreneurship development, as well as two national experts, one of whom would be a National Project Coordinator and the other with experience in vocational training and youth enterprise development.

However, in the actual implementation of the project that staffing changed. The project was managed by the Project Manager based in UNIDO Headquarters in Vienna (which is UNIDO general practice), one in-country Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) and three national experts responsible for tasks related to (1) VTC equipping and procurement, (2) curriculum development, and (3) NGOs/CBOs capacity building and vocational training services. The project hired additional staff to support the international as well as national experts. The staffing approach of employing only one, and not two, senior international consultant/staff member proved to be very efficient.

The efficiency of the PMU is due to the fact that it was continuously managed by the same Chief Technical Advisor throughout the entire duration of the project. The CTA took the initiative of making key decisions and was viewed by the Khartoum State counterparts and the project staff as an individual who had the authority of decision-making powers. The de-facto delegation of authority by the UNIDO Project Manager to the CTA proved extremely important to the efficient implementation of the project.

The project approach emphasizes the need for networking: create PPPs, raise awareness, form a multi-stakeholder Steering/Advisory Committee, undertake networking and coordination initiatives, and establish relationships with microfinance institutions and Chambers of Commerce. All these activities have been initiated during in parallel to the rehabilitation of the infrastructure of the VTCs. The management of the project was very efficient in that many of the necessary networking and coordinating activities were initiated with the help of the Steering Committee. Thus, when the equipping of the VTCs is completed, some of the "networking" infrastructure will already be in place in order to ensure that the necessary support services are present to support the VTCs in their relationships with the private sector and the local community.

The Steering Committee, comprised of key stakeholders, provided important support and guidance to the Project Management Unit (PMU) in the implementation of the project. Numerous key government stakeholders such as representatives from the Supreme Council on Vocational Training Apprenticeship (SCVTA) and the National Council on Technical and Technological Education (NCTTE) became actively involved the implementation of project activities related to such issues of curriculum development, policy articulation and training. Additionally, the Steering Committee played an important role in maintaining good communication with the Khartoum State Government and the European Union delegation.

The close cooperation of the PMU with the Advisory/Steering Committee and stakeholders can serve as an example for the VTCs who will need to initiate and nurture partnerships with stakeholders for strengthening their services to industry and local communities. The PMU set a very good example how to build strategic partnerships and the Steering Committee facilitated the development of such partnerships and encouraged the participation of key stakeholders. In this sense, the project paved the way for an efficient and participative management approach of the Khartoum State VTCs in the future.

At the moment, the VTCs are in a preparatory phase before vocational training begins. In the meantime, the VTC staff are making efficient use of their time, e.g., computers are being utilized in conducting the computer courses for the staff; the

trainers are working with the equipment suppliers on the layout and installation of the equipment; the English teachers have been conducting English courses for their colleagues; and the staff and trainers are fully involved in getting the VTCs ready by forming committees to undertake certain tasks i.e. civil works, electrical, equipment installation.

Quite clearly, the middle- and long-term interventions under component 1 were dependent on many external factors. They encountered numerous delays and will not be completed by the end of the project. Having said this, all important interventions were initiated and the PMU has been very active in ensuring that a solid foundation has been laid so that the VTCs can become operational in the near future and an integrated vocational training system will evolve.

It can be concluded that the inability of the project to deliver on all of the expected results has not been a result of inefficiency or lack of commitment but rather a consequence of the complex and ambitious nature of the project and underestimation of the challenges during the planning phase.

## Sustainability

There are a number of concerns related to the sustainability of the achievements of component 1.

First, the Khartoum State has demonstrated its capacity to provide funds to construct four new VTCs and partly furnish and equip them. However, once the VTCs are completely equipped and operational, the running costs of the VTCs such as salaries and raw material are likely to present a significant problem to the Khartoum State Government. Hopefully, this issue will be addressed adequately and not negatively impact on the operations of the VTCs.

Second, it is questionable whether the Khartoum State VTCs have the commitment and capacity to maintain the newly acquired equipment. A culture of equipment maintenance is not common in other VTCs in Sudan. In the past, well-equipped workshops soon became victims of neglect, machines that broke down were seldom repaired and, more likely than not, the parts from some machines that had broken down were used to repair other machines. The capacity building by the project may not have adequately addressed these issues and it cannot be excluded that the Khartoum State VTCs may fall victim of the same phenomenon.

Third, historically speaking the typical civil servant of a VTC is not encouraged to be innovative and adopt new approaches to service provision. The UNIDO approach that aims at fostering a private sector culture within the VTCs, will be challenged very soon because unless the Khartoum State civil servants, managers and technical instructors adopt a different perspective towards the role

of the vocational training within the community and the private sector, it is unlikely that the VTC will evolve towards the private sector oriented culture that is envisaged by the project and which is also needed for the VTC to become actively involved in such activities as technology transfer, BDS one-stop-shop services and as a resource to the local community. Further capacity building and support is needed to enable the Khartoum State VTC Directors to instill a private sector mentality into the VTC system.

The key to sustainability of a modern, business-oriented and demand-driven vocational training system is to create a pool of committed, qualified and dedicated personnel who will support the initiatives of business-oriented manager. The UNIDO approach suggests that the likelihood of sustainability is enhanced when (a) PPPs are created; (b) the VTC is supported by a strong Steering/Advisor Committee comprised of key stakeholders from the local community; and (c) there is ownership on the part of the community which views the VTC as a resource for its benefit. It is hoped that the project has begun to instill these values amongst the VTC staff.

The sustainability of the Khartoum State Vocational Training Administrative Unit (KSVTU), which project has supported, will be critical. The mandate of this unit will be to facilitate the development of the policy framework for the eventual establishment of private-public partnerships. In the meantime, the Khartoum State Vocational Training Administrative Unit has responsibility for the supervision and management of the Khartoum State VTCs.

The sustainability challenges under component 2 appear to be less critical, although it is questionable whether the CBOs/NGOs will be able to ensure the sustainability of vocational and entrepreneurship training courses for IDPs in the same way as these were offered during the project. According to the Directors of several CBOs/NGOs interviewed they were not sure whether they would be able to continue providing the EDP and pre-vocational training after the project has ended. However, it was also noticed that several organizations were providing these same services without any financial support from the project. Therefore, for some CBOs/NGOs the sustainability of services that were introduced by the project is not a concern whereas for others it might be.

## **Impact**

Unfortunately, not all necessary components of the approach are already "in place" or likely to be operational before the last quarter of 2010. The impact that the vocational training system potentially will have on the target population will not be known until the system has had the opportunity to function for an extended period of time.

At the present stage of reform of the vocational training system in Khartoum State it is much too early to assess whether and when the UNIDO approach will be durably adopted by Khartoum State Government and the extent to which this adoption will impact on the lives of marginalized populations throughout the State. Vocational training has not yet begun; the curricula are being developed but not implemented yet; institutional and human capacity has not yet been adequately developed; and the combined approach of vocational and entrepreneurship training is not yet implemented. Therefore, it is too early to determine whether the UNIDO approach will effectively and efficiently lead to the desired impact of preparing marginalized youth for gainful self-employment.

# VI

## Recommendations and lessons learned

#### 6.1. Recommendations

- A. The project should use the remaining duration to help establishing formal links between the CBOs/NGOs in the IDP populated areas, the VTCs and the Khartoum State Vocational Training Administrative Unit to sustainably attain the project objective that participants in the informal vocational and entrepreneurship training courses from marginalized communities can transition into formal vocational training programmes of the public VTCs.
- B. The project should implement as soon as possible the CBT preparatory course across all VTCs in order to ascertain the appropriateness of course content and the capacity of VTC instructors to implement a CBT curriculum.
- C. It is recommended to UNIDO and to the EU to pursue the capacity building of the Khartoum State Vocational Training Administrative Unit (KSVTAU) beyond the end of the project. This will be necessary to enable the KSVTAU to sustain the achievements of the project; to drive the further implementation of the CBT based approach to vocational training; to foster the emergence of a private sector culture in the vocational training system; to establish and sustain a firm mechanism for trainees to move from the informal to the formal vocational training system; and to establish stronger relationships with the private sector, micro-finance institutions, local community and other key stakeholders.
- D. Every VTC that was supported under the project should establish a specific business plan that defines the short-, medium- and long-term objectives of the VTC; identifies its main stakeholders and clients; describes its role visà-vis the local communities; identifies the main strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the VTC and establishes a development plan for the years to come. Establishing such plans will require support from the Khartoum State Government and the KSVTAU.

- E. During the remaining duration of the project it is recommended to establish a monitoring and evaluation system that will allow the KSVTAU to assess results of the project through follow-up and tracer studies after the project. There is a vital need for all parties (UNIDO, Khartoum State and donor) to monitor and assess whether the objectives of the project will be met in the medium and longer term.
- F. With a view to the strategic importance of the approach and the considerable budget of the project, it is recommended to UNIDO and to the EU to conduct an impact evaluation of the project in 2012.

#### 6.2. Lessons Learned

- 1. The two-pronged approach of the project to serve both marginalized groups and the mainstream vocational training system is attractive. However, the basic working hypothesis remains to be verified whether developing "state-of-the-art" VTCs focusing on the demand for skilled labor by the formal economy can simultaneously accommodate the training and income creation needs of the poor, marginalized youth and women from IDP communities.
- The time period of the project was insufficient for trainees to migrate from informal vocational and entrepreneurship training courses provided by the CBOs/NGOs into a formal vocational training system that trains skilled laborers for market demands and/or self-employment. For similar projects a more realistic time planning and/or a phased approach is required.
- 3. An in-country Project Management Unit (PMU) under the direction of one CTA that cooperates very closely with responsible Government authorities throughout the duration of the project is critical to the successful implementation of a complex YED project under post-crisis conditions.
- 4. The project experience suggests that the likelihood of sustainability is enhanced when (a) public-private partnerships are created; (b) the VTC is supported by a strong Steering/Advisory Committee comprised of key stakeholders from the local community; and (c) there is ownership on the part of the community which views the VTC as a resource for its benefit.
- 5. The introduction of informal pre-vocational training courses by CBOs/NGOs is a first step to provide persons from marginalized communities with a better access to the formal vocational training system. However, more explicit, continuous and mutually agreed links between the CBOs/NGOs and the formal vocational training system are necessary to sustain these initial successes.

## **Annexes**

## **ANNEX 1: List of persons met**

## Date/Activity

## 23 January (Saturday)

Arrival in Khartoum: to be met by Mr. Ali Protocol Officer. Proceed to Hotel Kannon

## 24 January (Sunday)

Briefing with Mr. Cheikh Sakho, UR (together with National Consultants) at UNIDO Office

Administration: Discussion on logistics, UNMIS ID, police registration, security briefing

Briefing and intensive discussions with the YED Khartoum Project Management Unit

## 25 January (Monday)

Continue intensive discussions with PMU

Meeting with Khartoum State: Ms. Ishraga Sayd Mahmoud Salih, Adviser to the Governor and in-charged of the project

Meeting with Ministry of International Cooperation: Mr. Mekki Osman Mirgani, Deputy Director, National Authorizing Office

Meeting with European Union: Mr. Antonio Fernandez-de- Velasco, Acting Head of Governance and Social Sector

## 26 January (Tuesday)

Visit to the 5 VTCs; CTA and Site Engineer to go with the consultant: Kerary, Hag Yousif, Halfait, Souk El Mahali and Khartoum 1

#### 27 January (Wednesday)

Meeting with the Ms. Corinna Van Der Laan, Deputy Head of Mission, Dutch Embassy

Meeting with the Supreme Council for Vocational Training and Apprenticeship: Lt. Gen. (Ret) Eng. Mohamed Ahmed Rasmi, Director General

Meeting with the National Council for Technical and Technological Education; Mr. Abdulmahmoud Mansour, Director General

Meeting with the members of the Technical Committee for Curriculum Development and some sector leaders representing the private sector: Venue: PMU Office

## 28 January (Thursday)

Elfateh: Interview partner CBO (Azza Women's Association) and clients/beneficiaries; 1hour drive to resettlement area

Leave El Fateh for Omdurman/Umbadda

Visit: BADR, Society of artisans making marquob

Visit: Usratuna an NGO operating a VTC training the disabled

Visit: Umbadda: interview partner CBO WEBDA and PDA and clients trained

#### 31 January (Sunday)

Meeting with all the VTC Directors at the PMU Office

Meeting with Sr. Trainers

Meeting with CBO/NGO Partner Institutions not interviewed

## 01 February (Monday)- Wau

Khartoum-Wau

Arrival- checking in at hotel

Briefing and discussions with UNIDO team

Meeting with VTC Management

Visit to VTC/Workshops

## 02 February (Tuesday) in Wau

Meeting with VTC staff/Magt

Individual staff/student meetings

Visit to Wau Town-Entrepreneurs/businesses

## 03 February (Wednesday) in Wau

Visit to Don Bosco VTC Wau

Meeting- Head IOM

Meeting-Salvatore- former UNIDO Specialist on project and PO LivelihoodsIOM

Meeting Director Prison Services/UNMIS

Meeting with Advisory/Steering Committee

## 04 February (Thursday)

Meeting with Directorate of Labour

Meeting PO- UNICEF Child Protection

Meeting with Community elders/Reps

Debriefing/findings

## 05 February (Friday)

Wau-Malakal (UNMIS)

Checking in at UNICEF Guesthouse/Lunch

Briefings/visit to MVTC Mangement/Centre

## 06-07 February (Saturday-Sunday) - weekend in South

meeting with Chamber of Commerce (on Saturday-06Feb)

visit to town/markets/enterprises/UNMIS etc

## 08 February (Monday) in Malakal

Visit to VTC and individual meetings

Visit to Directorate of Labour and Hosing Ministry

## 09 February (Tuesday)

Debriefing/findings

## flight to Juba (WFP)

## 10 February (Wednesday) - Juba

MDTF Technical team/DRHC

Meeting with GOSS- joint meeting with CABIHRD Dir+DG of Labour and technical teams

Meeting WB Representative (Consult Sanjeev)

## Flight (UNMIS)- JUBA-KHARTOUM

Dinner meeting with UR, Johannes to discuss presentation for debriefing with project staff and counterparts of IP evaluation

## 11 February (Thursday)

Work on presentation

Presentation of findings and recommendations of overall evaluation; to be attended by project staff and counterparts

Debriefing with the Ministry of Industry

## 12 February (Friday) Leave Khartoum

## ANNEX 2: Terms of Reference of the evaluation

This Independent Evaluation will produce a comprehensive evaluation report covering the Integrated Programme of UNIDO in Sudan in its entirety. The evaluation will give particular emphasis to the project "Youth Entrepreneurial Development in Khartoum State", taking into account the particular importance and considerable financial volume of this project. The evaluation team will produce a separate evaluation report for the said project taking into account the contractual arrangements with the donor (EU) and the mutually agreed evaluation procedures.

## History and Background

The initial IP. In the late nineties UNIDO made a strategic decision to move away from "stand-alone projects" and to formulate ambitious country specific "Integrated Programmes" (IP). As part of this initiative, the initial IP Sudan was designed in 1998 under the title of 'Capacity Building to Enhance Industrial Competitiveness and Sustainability' with a planned budget of USD 5.8 million for three years. UNIDO dedicated programmable funds ("seed money") of around USD 560,000 to the IP but, by 2002, only around USD 730,000 of external funds had been mobilized.

**Reformulation of the IP.** Taking into account the changing country context, the IP was redesigned in 2003 into 'An Industrial Agenda for Poverty Relief and Transition to Sustainable Development'. The new IP design comprised four components with a budget of USD 5.74 million covering a five-year planning period from 2003 to 2008. This redesigned IP is subject to the present independent evaluation.

**IP objective and components.** Against the background of 20 years of civil war, the new design focused on creating economically viable and peaceful communities through community-based income-generation interventions with the objective to enhance the productive capacities of local industries and rural communities and to support sustainable livelihoods. The IP comprises four components:

- <u>Social Stabilization:</u> to revive production capacities of rural communities in post-conflict areas;
- Sustainable Agro-Business: to enhance long-term growth of the Sudanese agro-processing industries;
- <u>Environment and Rural Energy:</u> to improve environmental performance of local industries and promote the role of rural energy for productive use;

- <u>Industrial Governance System:</u> to improve governance capacities and support services for sustainable agro-industry development.

Table 1: Initially planned IP structure and budget

Component 1		Componen	it 2	Component	t 3	Component 4			
Name of output	USD	Name of output	USD	Name of output	USD	Name of output	US D		
Participation in the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal Program (CAP) and Quick Impact Peace Support Program	90	Revival of local production of edible oils (pilot project)	125	Introduction of environmental management systems in two SME clusters (textiles, leather and food)	112	Institutional capacities for industrial policy formulation, implementation, monitoring, and auditing including industrial policy management	225		
Increased local food production and consumption in the Nuba Mountains area	235	Linking the textile industries with local markets and humanitarian supplies	98	National Cleaner Production Centre	165	Public-private sector partnership platform	56		
Improved village capacity for repair and maintenance of agricultural implements in the Nuba Mountains area	235	Improved competitive position of selected leather industries at the domestic and export markets	198	Introduction of cleaner artisanal gold mining and extraction technologies (GEF)	640	Strengthening of national capabilities in investment and technology promotion	190		
Establishment of effective village women's cooperatives in the Nuba Mountains area	550	Upgrading technical services for leather and leather products producers	243	National Refrigerant Management Plan (MP)	600	Industrial development competencies and skills	72		
Setting up low- cost building materials production units for local housing in selected post- conflict and rural areas	260	Promotion and diversification of community-based, micro and home-based manufacturing in a pilot location focusing on women and displaced persons (UNDP, UNIDO and FAO)	470	Energy-efficient brick kilns (demonstration project)	155	Improving the industrial statistics system	147		
Youth entrepreneurship development in selected locations, with special emphasis on mobility aids for war victims and promotion of informal manufacturing activities	219	Promotion of business alliances for agro- industrial development	194	Renewable energy for rural development	206	Information networking of domestic producers with humanitarian procurement	260		
Sub-total Component 1	1,589	Sub-total Component 2	1,328	Sub-total Component 3	1,878	Sub-total Component 4	950		

Source: IP document (April 2003)

Table 1 shows the IP structure and budget by outputs, as initially planned. However, as will be explained below, this planning did not materialize. Significant implementation activities took place in only 8 out of the 24 planned outputs (shaded in table 1).

## Geographical areas of intervention

The IP Sudan intervenes in the following States of Sudan: Khartoum State; Southern Kordofan; Blue Nile; Upper Nile; Western Bahr el Ghazal and Central Equatoria.



## Funding and implementation status of the IP

**Funding and major donors.** The redesigned programme was more successful than the initial IP in attracting donor interest. Donors allocated funds of about USD 18.45 million, almost three times more than planned. Nearly 63% of the funds came from the European Union, 15% from two Multi-Donor Trust Funds (the MDTF-North and the MDTF for Southern Sudan) and 13% from bilateral and other international development donors. The Government of Sudan contributed more than USD 300,000 and UNIDO contributed about USD 170,000 from its programmable funds.

However, due to the reality on the ground and to the dynamics of funds mobilization, the IP Sudan drifted away from the initial planning. Component 2 remained below 10% of the envisaged funding and component 3 remained at about 3%. Almost 92% of the funding went into the "social stabilization" component 1, which was initially designed to account for only about 30% of the budget. Table 2 shows the actual funding of the IP as compared to the planned budget.

**Table 2: Actual funding of the IP (\$US)** 

#	Component title	Planned budget (2003)	Current allotment (2009)	Status
1	Social Stabilization	1,589,000	17,050,377	Greatly expanded
2	Sustainable Agro business	1,328,000	128,622	Marginally realized
3	Environment and Rural Energy	1,878,000	65,467	Marginally realized
4	Industrial Governance System	950,000	893,133	Partly realized
	IP management	0	317,106	
	TOTAL	5,745,000	18,454,704	

Source: UNIDO project and programme management system AGRESSO/InfoBase as of May 2009 and IP document

In total, the IP includes 25 projects of very different size, in different stages of advancement and in different regions of the country. Annex 1 provides a full overview of all projects counted under the IP.

However, many of these projects are in actual fact preparatory assistance or formulation missions or projects of very limited size that did not lead to significant implementation activities. Table 3 shows the list of the major projects covered by this independent evaluation broken down by project clusters and regions.

Table 3: Break down of the IP Sudan by major project clusters and regions

	Project Title	Project Number	Total Allotment	Expenditure rate (%)	Donor	Started	Completed	Status
	Component 1: Social Stabilization		17,050,377	88				
1	Establishment of a Technology Demonstration & Production Centre in Port Sudan for the Production of Local Resource- Based Low-Cost Building Materials	USSUD06004	110,619	17	Slovakia	Jan-07		Ongoing
	CLARIS I		1,319,770	100				
2	Community Livelihood and Rural Industry Support Programme in Sudan, phase I (CLARIS I)	TFSUD03001	1,141,690	100	UNJTF	Nov- 03	Jun-07	Closed
	CLARIS II		2,216,136	75				
3	Community Livelihood and Rural Industry Support Programme CLARIS II: Italian Contribution	TESUD07005	733,948	47	Italy	Sep- 07	Apr-09	Ongoing
4	Rehabilitation of Kadugli Vocational Training Centre: Emergency Stage (Component 4 of the Multi Donor Trust Fund Start-up /Emergency Project for South Kordofan State)	FBSUD07006	475,926	98	MDTF	Dec- 07	Apr-09	Ongoing
5	Rural Livelihood Support - Emergency State - Promoting Community Building and Participation for Food Security and Poverty Alleviation in South Kordofan and Abyei area (Component 6 of the Multi Donor Trust Fund Start-up /Emergency Project for South Kordofa	FBSUD07008	552,755	99	MDTF	Dec- 07		Ongoing
6	Blue Nile Start-Up Emergency project in Sudan	FBSUD08001	369,391	64	MDTF	May- 08		Ongoing
	Youth Entrepreneurial Development (YED)		13,403,852	89				
7	YED in Malakal, phase I	TESUD05002	822,482	98	Nether- lands	Nov- 05		Ongoing
8	YED in Malakal, phase II	FBSUD08006	328,506	34	MDTF	Dec- 08		Ongoing
9	YED in Khartoum State	EESUD07004	11,641,864	90	EU	Jun-07		Ongoing
10	YED in WAU, Southern Sudan	FBSUD08002	611,000	94	MDTF	Apr-08		Ongoing
	Component 2: Sustainable Agro	-business	128,622	100				

No projects implemented under this component during the period under evaluation

	Project Title	Project Number	Total Allotment	Expenditure rate (%)	Donor	Started	Completed	Status
	Component 3: Environment and	Rural Energy	65,467	72				
11	Solar Cooking in Sudan - Promotion, Dissemination and Local Production Preparatory Assistance	TESUD09001	33,069	47	Italy	Jan-09		Ongoing
12	Removal of Barriers to Introduction of Cleaner Artisanal Gold Mining and Extraction Technologies (this project is the a component of a global project covering Brazil; Indonesia; Lao PDR; Sudan; Tanzania; Zimbabwe)	EGGLO01G34	6,806,800 (for the entire global Project)	100	GEF	Jul- 02		Closed
	Component 4: Industrial Govern	ance System	893,133	65				
13	Provision of Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Industry	TFSUD07002	186,306	75	UK	May- 07	Dec- 07	Closed
14	Investment Promotion and Technical Assistance Programme	TFSUD07009	193,894	57	Islamic Dev. Bank	Dec- 07		Ongoing
	(ITAP) for Sudan	SESUD07007	158,950	28	Sudan	Sep- 08		Ongoing
15	Building industrial capacity in Southern Sudan	FBSUD08003	353,982	80	MDTF	Sep- 08		Ongoing
16	Comprehensive Industrial Survey Project	YA/SUD/99/416			UNIDO & UNDP	2001	2005	closed

## The YED project in Khartoum State

The IP evaluation will give particular emphasis to the Youth Employment Development (YED) project in Khartoum State (EESUD07004) because of its financial volume and because this project is due for an independent evaluation according to the UNIDO Evaluation Policy. A separate evaluation report will be produced for this project (see below).

The project was developed in 2007, based on the experience of UNIDO's YED project in Malakal. The project document includes a logical framework matrix defining the overall objective, the specific objectives, the outputs, the objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs), the sources of verification and the risks and assumptions of the project and fixed the initial budget as of about Euro 10 million.

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UNIDO prodoc EE/SUD/007/004, dated 16 March 2007. The UNIDO project relates to another EU funded project that is implemented by UN-HABITAT and aims at strengthening urban planning capacities of Khartoum State. The budget of the UN-HABITAT project is Euro 2 million. UNIDO and UN-HABITAT agreed to cooperate intensively during project implementation to maximize synergy among these complementary projects.

The overall objective of the project was to 'significantly contribute to improving the livelihood of the urban poor (unemployed youth and internally displaced persons - IDPs) in Khartoum State, through building vocational training capacity for Youth Entrepreneurship Development, building public-private sector linkages for job creation and enhancing their access to employment and sustainable income'.

The logframe structured the project into two components and 14 expected outputs:

- 1. Capacity Building in seven Vocational Training centres (VTCs) in Khartoum State;
  - 1.1. VTC staff, management and local authorities are fully aware and able to use resources and strategies required to meet labour market demands and the training needs of beneficiaries.
  - Public-private sector partnerships developed with VTCs for programme demand orientation.
  - 1.3. All supported VTCs are rehabilitated, properly equipped, managed, and operate at full capacity.
  - 1.4. Instructors, trainers and managers are fully trained through Training of Trainers programmes (ToTs) and innovative management development approaches.
  - 1.5. Entry and enrolment facilities at VTCs reviewed and adjusted to enable access of urban poor (unemployed young men and women, including IDPs).
  - 1.6. Technical and entrepreneurship development training and business support services (BDS) provided by the selected VTCs.
  - 1.7. YED modules are fully integrated into technical skills courses to increase employability of trainees.
  - 1.8. Experience of the selected VTCs reviewed by the private sector and agencies at the national and state level to develop a YED strategy and policy.
- 2. Vocational training in IDP areas to promote entrepreneurial and business development activities;
  - 2.1. Information on labour market demands and skills needs among young urban poor in IDP areas regularly updated.
  - 2.2. Training programmes and courses are accessible for IDPs with potential and enrolment effectively established.
  - 2.3. CBOs and NGOs are assisted to organise and set up demand oriented training courses for YED, provide business support for job creation.
  - 2.4. New private sector BDS providers supported and strengthened to develop the BDS market targeting young/women entrepreneurs.
  - 2.5. Linkages set up between businesses, employers and trainees (i.e. through apprenticeships).
  - 2.6. Young/women entrepreneurs have access to commercially based micro finance facilities and credit schemes.

Based on the findings of the inception mission in July 2007, the Government of Khartoum State, the Delegation of the European Commission to the Sudan and UNIDO agreed to amend the target of component 1 follows: "the project will

support a total of five VTCs, i.e. four new ones constructed by the Khartoum State and one existing one, VTC Khartoum 1."7

In September 2008, the project budget was further increased by Euro 1 million and the duration of the project was extended by one year until the end of June, extending the implementation period from 21 to 39 months.

Table 5: Extended budget of YED Khartoum State project (EE/SUD/07/004)

Component title	Extended budget ( euro in 2008)
Component 1	8,817,708
Component 2	2,182,195
TOTAL (excluding contingency & support costs)	10,999,904

Under the Addendum to the Description of the Action (August 2008) it was also agreed to streamline the project structure by consolidating the 14 expected outputs into four "results" (see table 6). The agreed objectives and results are laid down in a revised results framework. This framework provides also for 20 performance indicators as agreed between the donor and UNIDO (see Annex 2).

Table 6: Streamlined Results Framework of the YED Khartoum project

Component 1	Component 2
Result 1.1 Four new VTCs are operational, one existing VTC given new equipment, are providing the urban poor access to technical and entrepreneurial training in line with market demands, taking a gender mainstreaming approach.	Result 2.1 NGOs/CBOs (operating in the IDP areas) have enhanced capacities to organize, set-up demand oriented training courses (entrepreneurship and technical) and to provide business support for job creation.
Result 1.2  VTC curricula updated/developed and offered in line with market demands and integrating YED modules to increase employability of trainees and potential for self-employment along the lines of gender mainstreaming.	Result 2.2 Increased access of the urban poor, especially the youth and women, to demand oriented vocational skills and entrepreneurship training to widen the human resource base in support of self-employment opportunities

The project is managed from a Project Management Unit (PMU) based in Khartoum. The Government Coordinating Agency of the project is the Governor's Office of Khartoum State. Under component 2 the project collaborates with three international and 14 national NGOs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Consolidated progress report (4 April – 30 September 2007); p. 2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Updated log frame for project: Ref. N. 9 ACP SU -12 (EU document dated 8 August 2008)

## Purpose of the evaluation

This independent evaluation will be conducted by the UNIDO Evaluation Group (OSL/EVA) in accordance with the UNIDO Evaluation Policy and the UNIDO Guidelines for Technical Cooperation Programmes and Projects.

The main purposes of the evaluation are to:

- Assess the design and performance of the IP in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact;
- Identify reasons for limited funds mobilization under the initial IP and the underfunded components 2 and 3 of the current IP (see table 1);
- Draw conclusions and make recommendations for enhancing the implementation of the ongoing IP and for identifying opportunities and potentials for possible future projects that might attract donor interest;
- Feed conclusions and recommendations into a Multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peace-building in Southern Sudan that is planned to take place in 2010;
- Develop lessons learned of wider applicability and feed these lessons into a "Thematic Evaluation" of UNIDO post-crisis intervention projects that will be conducted towards the end of 2009.

Since the IP reached its completion in 2008, the independent evaluation comes in timely for feeding lessons learnt into the development of the next UNIDO country programme for Sudan.

## Evaluation scope and approach

*Scope of the evaluation*. The independent evaluation of the UNIDO IP in Sudan will cover the projects listed in Table 3.

The project on Youth Entrepreneurship Development in Khartoum State financed by the EU (project No 9 in table 3) is the only individual project for which an independent evaluation is mandatory in accordance with the UNIDO Evaluation Policy and with the requirements of the donor (EU). The evaluation of this project will be carried out as part of the independent evaluation of the IP but a separate and stand-alone evaluation report will be produced.

**Evaluation approach.** The evaluation will be conducted as an Independent Terminal Evaluation that will apply the standard evaluation approach of the OECD/DAC. The evaluation will also take into account the methodological guidance provided in the OECD/DAC document *Guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peace-building activities – Working draft for application period.* 9

The DAC criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability) will be applied both to the IP as a whole and to the individual projects. Under relevance, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> www.oecd.org/.../0,2834,en 21571361 34047972 39774574 1 1 1 1,00.pdf

evaluation will assess whether the design has been responsive to the needs of the target groups, to the country's development priorities, to donor policies and to UNIDO's comparative advantages and strategic objectives, taking into account the changing environment and policy priorities in Sudan. Under effectiveness the evaluation will examine to what extent the projects have achieved their intended results. Under efficiency the evaluation will determine how economically the resources/inputs (in terms of funding, expertise, time...) have been converted into outputs. It will also look into the timeliness of the projects in producing outputs and delivering inputs. Wherever possible, the evaluation will attempt to provide data on impact (or potential impact). It will also look into the sustainability of the achieved results.

The evaluation will be carried out in line with the UNIDO Evaluation Policy. While underscoring the need for independence, this policy states that: "Transparency and consultation with the major stakeholders are essential at all stages of the evaluation process. Involvement of and consultation with stakeholders facilitates consensus building and ownership of the findings, conclusions and recommendations; it also heightens the credibility and quality of the evaluation". <sup>10</sup>

This independent cooperative approach will be applied for all stages of the evaluation. The main evaluation users will be invited to review and comment on the proposed evaluation methodology and process as set out in these terms of reference; to participate in key discussions of the preliminary findings; and to review and comment on the draft evaluation report. The main evaluation users are: Government representatives; Permanent Mission of Sudan; representatives of counterpart organizations; representatives from key donors; UNIDO staff at HQ and in the field; Chief Technical Advisors and heads of project management/coordination units (national project coordinators).

## The reference basis for the independent evaluation will be

- the IP document;
- the individual project documents;
- any planning revisions as far as these have been officially and mutually agreed.

## Evaluation team

The evaluation team will include the following members:

- A member of the UNIDO Evaluation Group who will be the team leader and take care of evaluating projects (1); and (11) to (16) of table 3 as well as of UNIDO specific issues such as funds mobilization; IP integration; inter-branch cooperation; procurement; etc.
- An international evaluation expert with extensive experience in the evaluation of rural development and livelihood development projects in post-conflict environments.
- An international evaluation expert with extensive experience in the evaluation of vocational training, skills development and entrepreneurship projects in post-conflict environments.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See http://www.unido.org/index.php?id=5700

- An national evaluation consultant with experience in vocational training, entrepreneurship and SME development.
- An national evaluation consultant with experience in rural development and rural entrepreneurship development.

For each national evaluator post, the Government will nominate three appropriate candidates (consultants with professional experience in evaluation) among whom Government and UNIDO will jointly select the most suitable candidate.

All evaluation experts will be contracted by UNIDO.

None of the members of the evaluation team must have been involved in the design and/or implementation and coordination of the IP and its components/projects. This principle is underlined in the UNIDO Evaluation Policy: "For independent evaluations, the members of an evaluation team must not have been directly responsible for the policy-setting, design or overall management of the subject of evaluation (nor expect to be so in the near future)".

## Evaluation tasks, timing and deliverables

The evaluation will be structured into the following four work packages and tasks:

- 1. Preparatory work (September and October 2009)
  - Information of Government, Permanent Mission of Sudan in Vienna and of the EU Delegation in Khartoum;
  - Endorsement of international evaluators and nomination of national evaluators by Government;
  - Collection of comments on draft TORs and, if applicable, revision of TORs;
  - Desk review of project documents and reports by the evaluation team;
  - Interviews with project managers at UNIDO HQ;
  - Preparation of individual preliminary assessment papers for the CLARIS and YED projects, including assessments of the (explicit and implicit) theories of change, the planning process, the planning documents and the progress made;
  - Project managers in HQ and on the ground comment of on the preliminary assessment papers;
  - Preparation of a synthesis self-evaluation report based on the individual preliminary assessment papers and comments received.

## 2. Initial evaluation mission (November and December 2009)

 Initial evaluation mission conducted by the team leader and the international evaluation expert for rural development to collect information and interview key actors such as Government counterparts at national and regional levels; management and staff of counterpart institutions and other entities directly

- benefiting from the IP; representatives of the targeted rural communities; donor representatives;
- Evaluation of projects (1); and (11) to (16) of table 3 as well as of UNIDO specific issues such as funds mobilization; IP integration; inter-branch cooperation; procurement by the evaluation team leader;
- Evaluation of CLARIS projects by the international and the national evaluation expert for rural development to Khartoum, South Kordofan and Blue Nile to;
- Debriefing of stakeholders in Khartoum and Juba;
- Preparation of a draft evaluation report on CLARIS;
- Contributions by the national and international evaluation experts to finalizing the comprehensive IP evaluation report
- 3. Evaluation mission for YED projects (December 2009 to February 2010)
  - Desk work of the international evaluation expert for vocational training and briefing at UNIDO HQ (December 2009)
  - Evaluation mission of the international and the national evaluation expert for vocational training and youth and women entrepreneurship to Khartoum, South Kordofan and Blue Nile to collect information and interview key actors such as Government counterparts at national and regional levels; management and staff of counterpart institutions and other entities directly benefiting from the IP; representatives of the targeted rural communities; donor representatives (January 2010);
  - Debriefing of stakeholders in Khartoum and Juba;
  - Preparation of a self-standing draft evaluation report on YED Khartoum (February 2010);
  - Preparation of three evaluation reports on YED projects in Khartoum; Wau and Malakal for integration into the comprehensive IP evaluation report (February 2010);
  - Contributions by the national and international evaluation experts to finalizing the comprehensive IP evaluation report (February 2010);
- 4. Integration of evaluation results into a comprehensive IP evaluation report (February and March 2010)
  - Drafting of comprehensive IP evaluation report by the team leader with contributions from all team members;
  - Presentation of preliminary evaluation results to stakeholders at UNIDO HO:
  - Evaluation mission of the team leader to Khartoum for additional collection of information and presentation of the draft evaluation report to the Government and to donors;
  - Finalization of comprehensive IP evaluation report by the team leader with contributions from all team members;

**Logistical support.** The UNIDO Field Office in Khartoum and the coordination units of the projects will provide logistical support the evaluation field mission. The evaluation will be structured into five major packages of work:

The evaluation deliverables. The main deliverables of the evaluation are

- The three preliminary assessment papers;
- The evaluation report covering the YED Khartoum State project;
- The evaluation report covering the IP.

The evaluation team will provide draft evaluation reports to the UNIDO Evaluation Group at the latest six weeks after the end of the respective evaluation field missions.

The reporting language will be English.

**Validation of evaluation report.** The UNIDO Evaluation Group will share the draft report with UNIDO staff and the Government counterparts and donors for initial review and consultation. They may provide feedback on any error or fact and may highlight the significance of such errors in conclusions. The process will also seek agreement on the findings and recommendations. The evaluators will take comments into consideration when preparing the final version of the report. In the event of differing views being expressed, these are reflected in the analysis and in the report. <sup>11</sup>

**Quality assessment of the evaluation report.** All UNIDO evaluation reports are subject to quality assurance by the UNIDO Evaluation Group. The quality of the evaluation report will be assessed and rated against the criteria set forth in the Checklist on evaluation report quality in annex 4. The Final Evaluation Report will be submitted to the Government of Sudan and the donors and UNIDO's Executive Board. The evaluation reports will be posted on the UNIDO Internet website. 12

**Follow-up of recommendations.** The UNIDO Evaluation Group will follow up on the implementation of recommendations. The Group will prepare an Evaluation Management Response Sheet with the evaluation recommendations. The IP Team Leader and the concerned project managers will be responsible to provide comments (of acceptance or non-acceptance of the evaluation recommendations), actions for follow-up and deadlines in the document. This document, which will be posted on the UNIDO intranet, allows tracking of the follow-up of each recommendation and is a tool to ensure learning across UNIDO.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> UNIDO Evaluation Policy; page 11

<sup>12</sup> http://www.unido.org/evaluation

# ANNEX 3: Agreed results framework of YED Khartoum project<sup>13</sup>

## Component 2 Component 2

#### Result 1.1

Four new VTCs are operational, one existing VTC given new equipment, are providing the urban poor access to technical and entrepreneurial training in line with market demands, taking a gender mainstreaming approach.

## **Indicators:**

- Four VTCs equipped with appropriate machinery, tools and equipment for courses offered, and one existing VTC provided with new equipment
- The human resources development base of VTCs (management, staff and trainers) recruited by the Khartoum State are trained and working in partnership with the private sector following a private sector culture with a business management focus and financial self-sustainability
- VTCs administrative, operational and financial systems are in place and offering training programmes with equal access and opportunities for urban poor, men and women
- A management information system for monitoring students, services provided and established at the VTCs

#### Result 2.1

NGOs/CBOs (operating in the IDP areas) have enhanced capacities to organize, setup demand oriented training courses (entrepreneurship and technical) and to provide business support for job creation.

## **Indicators:**

- Number of partner organizations (minimum of 20) that are cooperating with the project
- Number of NGO/CBO staff and entrepreneur advisers trained (minimum 100) in conducting and/or organizing technical/vocational training and entrepreneurship development courses through Training of Trainers (TOTs) with a private sector focus as well as organizational and management skills, including Results-Based Management and environmental awareness
- Workable linkages for micro finance established with CBOs/NGOs and/or other micro finance providers
- At least 90 tailor-made short courses in technical/vocational skills, which are complementary to the VTC programmes organized by CBOs/NGOs
- At least 45 entrepreneurship-training courses offered by partner organizations
- Four partner organizations establish a pool of entrepreneurs to provide basic business support services to trainees/start-ups who have undergone EDP and/or technical training
- Institutional sustainability of partner

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Source: Updated log frame for project: Ref. N. 9 ACP SU -12 (EU document dated 8 August 2008)

CBOs/NGOs to continue providing training services established

## Result 1.2

VTC curricula updated/developed and offered in line with market demands and integrating YED modules to increase employability of trainees and potential for self-employment along the lines of gender mainstreaming.

## **Indicators:**

- Number of VTC competency-based curricula with YED modules, offered by the VTCs and certified by the competent authorities
- Number of special skills upgrading coursed developed for industry offered by the VTCs and certified by the competent authorities
- National vocational qualifications and system of certification for courses offered in the VTCs established by the National Council for Technical Education and Technology with the Supreme Council for Vocational Training
- Number of trainers/instructors (disaggregated by gender) trained for new curricula and operations of new training equipment
- Number of trainees (at least 6,000-disaggregated by gender) provide UNIT certificates for CBT courses completed

## Result 2.2

Increased access of the urban poor, especially the youth and women, to demand oriented vocational skills and entrepreneurship training to widen the human resource base in support of self-employment opportunities.

## **Indicators:**

- Number of beneficiaries from the IDP areas (at least 1,000-disaggregated by gender) endorsed by NGOs/CBOs trained by the VTCs
- Number of beneficiaries (at least 1,800 in technical areas and 900 in EDP disaggregated by gender) from the IDP communities trained by partner CBOs/NGOs
- One-third of the beneficiaries have found employment and 15% have established or improved their business after completion of training
- Increased sales and net worth because of the improvement in the product and business operations of existing micro entrepreneurs trained

## Result 1.3

Policy framework in partnership with the private and public sector for the promotion of Vocational Training in Khartoum State presented for approval

#### Indicator:

 Khartoum State established an institutional base for developing and implementing Vocational Training Policies for the State based on publicprivate partnerships, to instil a private sector culture

## **ANNEX 4: Differing and complementary views**

In line with UNIDO evaluation policy and practice a draft version of the present report has been submitted to the previous and current ITPO management for factual verification and comments. The evaluation team examined facts and observations received and integrated them into the main body of the report as appropriate. In addition, the following Annex documents differing and complementary views.<sup>14</sup>

# Contesting statement to the independent evaluation of the YED Khartoum project, EE/SUD/07/004

The following text quotes the text submitted by the project manager of the evaluated project. The reactions of UNIDO Evaluation Group (EVA) are in italics and in boxes with cross-references to the page numbers of the main body of the present report.

## 1. Timeline of the Evaluation

The first phase of the evaluation took place in September 2009 and the last phase took place in February 2010. The final evaluation report was released only in September 2010 and did not reflect the project progress made between February and September. Project implementation continued in the meanwhile and has finalized its major concrete outputs as per project document. The final project implementation report will testify the project status as of 31<sup>st</sup> October 2010.

It should be further noted that projects of this scale, involving the establishment of new vocational centres, curricula and substantial human resources management development, need at least 4-5 years to achieve full results. However, project implementation lasted for 3.5 years (including the extension) as per donor stipulations. The evaluation report failed to take this maturation factor into account. Moreover, with the report being released in September 2010, one month before the closure of the project, it was too late to address the evaluation recommendations in terms of improving the delivery of the programme, both for UNIDO and its project partners.

expressed, these are reflected in the analysis and in the report."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The documentation of differing views in this annex is in line with paragraph 65 of the UNIDO evaluation policy: "Evaluation reports are based on consultations among all parties involved. The evaluation team is responsible for the reliability and quality of the information contained in the report and reflects any factual corrections brought to its attention prior to finalizing the report. The evaluation reports are the outputs of the evaluation team. In the event of differing views being

EVA agrees that the project progress between February and October is not reflected in the report. At a meeting with the project manager we agreed that a detailed final report will be the opportunity to document the achievements at project end. EVA maintains that the recommendations of the report are valid and provide lessons for similar projects in the future (learning in the sense of further improving the innovative UNIDO approach to vocational training). One of these lessons is that such projects take much longer than initially expected in the Sudan case.

## 2. Incorrect Assumption for Evaluation

The evaluation assumes that youth trained in Component 2 of the project graduate to the formal vocational training system of Component 1. This is an incorrect assumption. The focus of training programmes in Component 2 are geared toward providing entrepreneurship and skills training for immediate job creation.

The synergy between Components 1 and 2 is that the CBOs/NGOs would help prepare the youth in their respective communities to qualify for entry into the new VTECs through information dissemination and conducting pre-vocational training on technical math, technical drawing and technical English. However, the pre-vocational training is not a skills training programme, and hence there is no formal graduation from informal to formal vocational training.

Essentially, "Competence Based Training" (CBT) aims at opening up formal VTCs for trainees with non-formal competences, which is the case of the target group of component 2. The evaluation concludes that better linkages between component 1 and component 2 could have raised synergies by making component 1 more relevant to the target group of component 2. On page 27, paragraph 2, the report states: "The complementarity between the short-, medium- and long-term interventions to the different implementing partners (CBOs/NGOs and VTCs) needs further clarification. Potentially, both types of service providers could co-exist and complement each other within an integrated vocational training service delivery system, inclusive of the short-term and mobile courses offered by the VTCs; but this type of relationship still has yet to be realized."

While such linkages might not have been envisaged at project design, it is an issue to be considered in future projects. Furthermore, the report does not use the concept of "graduating" to the formal VTC system, but rather the concept

## 3. Process vs. Product Evaluation

The evaluation took a one-sided approach that focussed only on the "end products" rather than the entire process of project implementation. It failed to

highlight the participation, contribution, and the engagement of national agencies such as the National Council for Technical and Technological Education (NCTTE), the Supreme Council for Vocational Training and Apprenticeship, the Employer's Federation, the Workers Union, the VTECs, the Academe and the Khartoum State in the general framework of developing a demand-oriented curriculum using the Competency-Based Training (CBT) approach.

This is the first time that Sudan has a curriculum that reflects the industrial relevance and the needs of the SME sector; and which was developed with all concerned agencies involved in the implementation process. This project had laid the foundation for a new system of technical vocational training in Sudan which should be considered a significant achievement of the project.

The report does mention all the institutions mentioned above, their contributions and the achievements of the project. However, at the time of the evaluation the final CBT curriculum had not yet been received by the Sudanese authorities, which is why the evaluation cannot endorse the achievement of the envisaged major curriculum reform. But it is correct that the report does not analyse in detail the many constraints and problems of project implementation in Sudan that project management at HQ and in the PMU has managed to overcome.

## 4. Sustainability and Commitment

The evaluation report states that the running costs of the VTCs are likely to present a significant problem to the Khartoum State Government and questions the commitment of the Government in maintaining the VTC equipment. It should be noted in this regard that the Khartoum State has established a Council for Vocational Training and Technical Education, which is headed by the Governor himself to ensure the sustainability of the project after UNIDO pulls out, and to demonstrate a strong ownership of the project partners.

Furthermore, the Khartoum State Government's contribution to the project funds is  $2/3^{rd}$  of the overall project budget, i.e. 22 million Euros in total, while the EU contribution has been 11 million Euros. The Khartoum State Government has also incorporated in their yearly VTEC budget the running and staff costs for the centres, while they do admit that further technical assistance will be required to fine-tune the VTEC operations and management needs.

It is recommended that any further evaluation is conducted in coordination with the Khartoum State Council for Vocational Training. It is correct that the report mentions the possibility of future difficulties in covering running cost without providing evidence for this expectation. It seems that the evaluators arrived at this conclusion by extrapolation and EVA accepts that this is a weakness. However, the recommendation holds that running and maintenance cost should be given particular attention.

## 5. Organization of the Evaluation Team

It should be noted that the approach and technical competence of a Team Leader of an Evaluation is an important variable affecting the results of an evaluation. It is imperative that the profile and experience of the evaluator matches the profile of the project being evaluated. The evaluator of the YED Khartoum Project was replaced due to unforeseen circumstances contributing to discrepancies in the final evaluation report which failed to take into account the ground realities in the "field". It is not clear to what extent the preliminary findings of the initial Evaluator were incorporated into the final reports for the YED Khartoum, as well as the YED projects for Wau and Malakal.

It is recommended that continuity is maintained between Evaluators in the eventuality that the previously or originally assigned Evaluator is unable to complete the assignment.

It is correct that there was a problem because the initial evaluator fell ill. Immediately after this happened EVA launched a public call, identified more than 30 possible candidates, screened them and prepared a shortlist. However, the Ministry picked number 4 on the list instead of number 1 who is a very experienced evaluator whom we used to full satisfaction for other evaluations. Therefore, the problem did not arise from the roster but from the Ministry not accepting our choice, which they are of course entitled to do. All documents and the inception report prepared by the original evaluator were handed over

Inez Wijngaarde Project Manager, on behalf of the Project Management Unit November 2010

## **ANNEX 5: References**

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