Evaluation of “Enabling policy framework for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private sector development”

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>BIAP</td>
<td>Baghdad International Airport</td>
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<td>CAMP</td>
<td>Civil Aviation Master Plan</td>
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<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Country Programme Action Plan</td>
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<td>CPD</td>
<td>Country Programme Document</td>
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<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community-based Organisations</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
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<td>CTA</td>
<td>Chief Technical Adviser</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee of the OECD</td>
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<td>DEX</td>
<td>Direct Execution Modality</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State (US)</td>
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<td>ERPAP</td>
<td>Economic Recovery Programme Action Pillar—UNDP-I</td>
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<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnants of War</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>Food and Agricultural Organisation</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FMA</td>
<td>Fiduciary Management Agent</td>
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<td>General Directorate of Mine Action</td>
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<td>Government of Iraq</td>
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<td>ICAA</td>
<td>Iraq Civil Aviation Authority</td>
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<td>ICAO</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>Iraq Partner Forum</td>
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<td>Iraq Trust Fund</td>
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<td>JBIC</td>
<td>Japan Bank for International Cooperation</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
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<td>KRG</td>
<td>Kurdistan Regional Government</td>
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<td>LADP</td>
<td>Local Area Development Programme</td>
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<td>LC</td>
<td>Letter of Credit</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>PER</td>
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<td>Prime Minister's Advisory Commission</td>
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<td>Project Management Team</td>
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<td>PMU</td>
<td>Project Management Unit</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSDP-I</td>
<td>Private Sector Development Programme-Iraq</td>
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<td>PWG</td>
<td>Priority Working Group</td>
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<td>RMAC</td>
<td>Regional Mine Action Centre</td>
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<td>RMEK</td>
<td>Regional Ministry of Electricity of Kurdistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprises</td>
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<td>SOE</td>
<td>State-Owned Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFER</td>
<td>Task Force on Economic Reforms</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNDP-I</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme-Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organisation</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Operations Project Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WBG</td>
<td>World Bank Group</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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A draft version of this Report was circulated to UNDP Iraq senior management and programme staff. In response, the Evaluation Team received helpful comments and factual clarifications. These have been incorporated as appropriate.

Irrespective of the high quality of the inputs provided by the UNDP Country Office, Government, external development agencies, and other interlocutors, the Evaluation Team is ultimately responsible for any errors or omissions. Finally, this report represents the assessments and findings of the Team, and does not necessarily reflect the position of the UNDP.
UNDP CPAP Outcome 5 Evaluation

Executive Summary

This independent Outcome Evaluation was commissioned by UNDP Iraq in July 2011 to conduct an assessment of the CPAP Outcome 5 in accordance with the ToR (Annex A) and the Country Programme Evaluation Plan. Outcome 5 reflects a portfolio of 19 projects worth US$113 million, and roughly consists of four main sectors: PSDP, Mine Action, Energy, and the restoration of Infrastructure (including capacity building for PFM) and addressing cross-cutting theme of gender inclusion. The report addresses three issues: (a) to what extent were the envisaged development objectives met? If not, why not? (b) what was the role and contribution of UNDP in the design, implementation, and progress (or lack thereof) toward the attainment of the intended results; and (c) what can be done in the future and how?

Using an elaborate evaluation methodology and employing universally-accepted criteria and standards in line with the UNDP Evaluation Policy, the evaluation findings are based on: (a) document reviews; (b) field visits; and (c) cross-checking or triangulation of the achievements to date. These are presented in brief below:

(A) Assessment of Overall Outcome

Notwithstanding that some of UNDP’s current portfolio\(^1\) is still in progress, the overarching outcome of “enabling policy and frameworks for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private sector development” is not fully on track to achieve results as envisaged and sustain them in the foreseeable future. Still, there are areas where the direction of change has been positive. These include PSDP-I, Capacity Loan Management Support, and some projects related to the rehabilitation of cultural sites and the development of navigation aids.

Assessment of Outputs/Achievements

UNDP’s development interventions: (a) a multi-agency joint programme for policy and technical assistance to PSDP-I; (b) Mine Action under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty; (c) development of the Iraqi electricity sector; and (d) other infrastructure restoration/enhancement of fiduciary and monitoring capabilities (all undertaken through CPAP 5) have achieved modest results with an Overall rating of Moderately Satisfactory—ranging from some successes to untenable situations. The successes are mostly evident from the building blocks provided for the enabling environment for private sector development and building capacity for fiduciary risk management.

Output-Outcome Linkages

Nothing in the findings of the Evaluation Team suggests UNDP’s significant direct attribution between the achievements so far and the intended outcomes. Doubtless, the security situation has not been conducive to furthering the objectives on the ground. A more serious aspect was the inadequate administrative capacity of the government. But these are risks that should have been identified at the outset with commensurate mitigation measures put in place. Part of the problem lies in the ambitiousness of programme design which overestimated the pace of progress and the timeframe allocated for the implementation of the targets. Insufficient donor coordination posed an additional problem, and so was the relatively weak management oversight for mid-stream corrections in the projects/programmes. It is worth noting that with the responsibilities being totally within the domain of the various UN agencies and external partners, the factors underlying the shortfalls in meeting the targets cannot be primarily assigned to the recipient of technical assistance (i.e., the GoI) under the auspices of CPAP 5.

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\(^1\) It is important to note that all of the projects/programmes were designed before the formulation of the CPAP. Still, UNDP has been assisting GoI for a long time under various TA modalities. The current CPAP could have suggested mid-stream corrections and a re-prioritization/alignment of strategies.
(B) UNDP’s Strategic Positioning and Partnership Strategy

UNDP Iraq’s first CPD (2011-2014) approved in September 2010, and the signing of the first CPAP in March 2011, is rightly based on the priorities and challenges identified in the 2009 Common Country Assessment and the UNDAF—taking into account the NDP (2010-2014) and the UNDP Strategic Plan. Also, UNDP’s continuous engagement with the GoI has been crucial to the dialogue with the key officials—at the Centre and in the Governorates. But, the approaches being applied in the context of Outcome 5—both at the upstream and downstream levels—have and still suffer from insufficient rigour and coherence in programme design, inadequate oversight, less-than-candid reporting, and little mid-stream corrections of the assistance. It needs to be appreciated, however, that all of the projects under Outcome 5 were designed before the formulation of the CPAP. In that sense they are legacy projects, with little or no room for re-scoping or re-strategizing. In any transition of one programming framework to another, it is not unusual to have on-going projects being bundled under the best fit Outcome Statement with strategies to have future portfolio completely aligned. Also, despite the immense advantage of UN’s presence in the field, donor coordination (among the 30+ multilateral and bilateral agencies) was sub-optimal during the programme design, implementation stages, and for the monitoring and accountability of results.

(C) Recommendations, Lessons Learned, Guidance for Future Programming, and Conclusions

The portfolio-specific recommendations are summarized in the subsequent section. These pertain to selectivity in and prioritizing amongst the on-going PSDP-I sub-components; enhanced capacity building for Loan Management; revisiting of the entire Mine Action programme; horizontal scaling up of the electricity generation projects based on the KRG experience; and termination of involvement or significant changes in areas that are not yielding tangible results.

UNDP has a clearly defined strategic focus with several areas of institutional competence. But, the Organisation has had to contend with constant internal and external pressure to migrate outside of these boundaries, including when donors created funding opportunities dictated by their bilateral priorities. Consequently, UNDP tends to underperform when it works outside of its core strategic competence and comparative advantage. Surely, in the Iraqi context, the GoI had established the priorities (which also fall within UNDP’s mandate and practice areas). But, in the absence of other key players in the field, UNDP was left with no choice but to single-handedly embark on numerous ambitious activities such as civil aviation and housing. While a well performing civil aviation and ports sectors as well as a developed housing finance market are indeed critical for Iraq’s economic recovery, diversification and private sector development, the timeframe envisaged for these initiatives was unrealistic.

Going forward, the UNDP is presented with enormous constraints and opportunities. With the expected future reduction and phasing out of UNAMI’s mission and progressive decline in the role of some UN agencies, UNDP is likely to assume additional responsibilities. While committed to greater presence in Iraq, the success of UNDP’s mandated role will be contingent upon mustering additional resources in the face of declining financing from external development partners. The anticipated developments will necessitate:

- A robust engagement with the CSOs, and prioritizing the engagement across the board and at all levels. Similarly, a dialogue to be vigorously undertaken to encourage CSR for activities at the local level.\(^2\) Finally, a greater degree of cost-sharing agreement to be solicited with GoI in line with the goal of moving to NEX.

- UNDP, being a global player in capacity building and human resources development, should internalize these aspects in all future interventions. In the Outcome 5 cohort, all 19 projects had some degree of capacity development component. Yet, limited efforts for pursuing this objective were evident in the vast majority of cases—except for PSDP-I support of PMAC and the

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\(^2\) Lately, UNDP catalyzed the launch of a UN Global compact in Iraq and has been discussing partnerships with the private sector on CSR activities.
strengthening of the fiduciary capacity under the aegis of the Japanese Government. Besides, UNDP is the apex UN agency to monitor the progress toward meeting the MDGs, which in itself warrants both developing its own capacity and the competencies of the GoI for developing responsive and accountable institutions (including inter-provincial coordination) for the delivery of essential public services.

- So far, conflict sensitivity (i.e., sectarian clashes, internal tensions within a nascent democracy, and unresolved border disputes) has been treated in isolation to the development efforts and not as a worthy stand-alone goal. Simultaneously, insufficient attention is being paid to governance and equity considerations. To emphasize: the quality and delivery of essential public services continues to deteriorate, the country faces (for the first time in its long history) a serious water shortage problem, a burgeoning population of disaffected youth, and widening rural-urban income disparities. More important, GoI’s Anti-Corruption strategy is ineffective. These are complex issues, but will require considerable innovative advocacy approaches: institutionalization of the agenda within ERPAP of the Iraq Country Office, utilization of UNDP’s regional and global expertise, and strengthening the voice and participation of the indigenous CSOs.

- Within the new programming framework, it would be critical to augment the functions of the Programme Management Support Unit in the Country Office for conducting enhanced quality control and quality assurance functions, including M&E, to support the Programmes/projects on the following issues: (a) developing and use of robust data collection systems; (b) cross-agency and cross-programme comparisons; (b) agreement up-front on monitorable indicators; and (c) greater resource allocation to facilitate the incorporation of evaluation lessons in formulating all new programmes. These functions, in turn, require a rigorous risk assessment and mid-term self-evaluation by the concerned programme managers.

Lastly, and notwithstanding the less-than-satisfactory achievements of Outcome 5 portfolio (for several reasons detailed in this Report), the Evaluation Team commends the UNDP’s Country Offices in Amman and Baghdad for having taken the initiative, availed of its presence in the field under trying mid-conflict circumstances, and sought situation-specific “windows of opportunity” in assisting the Government and people of Iraq. The challenge persists of ensuring a sustained and equitable socioeconomic growth and development, beyond stabilization and reconstruction.

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3 This is a relatively new area; but increasingly “conflict sensitivity” tools and approaches are being used across new projects—benefiting from training conducted for relevant staff.
Summary of Selected Recommendations Related to the Portfolio

The following recommendations emanate from the evaluation of the programmes/projects contained in the 2011 evaluation cohort of CPAP Outcome 5:

**PSDP-I**

For the continuation of PSDP-I programme, the three priority areas should be: (a) SME/Access to Finance; (b) Legislative Reform (including Land Management); and (c) SOE Restructuring. These three sub-components could effectively subsume the other objectives relating to taxation policy, investment promotion, and social dialogue and mitigation (the latter a pervasive theme across these sub-components). All these target areas should run parallel to creating an enabling environment for private sector development, broadening the consultative process, devolution of implementation responsibilities, and decentralization of decision-making—with commensurate emphasis on the cross-cutting themes of gender mainstreaming, maintenance of security, and equity considerations.

**Loan Management Support**

Sustained engagement will be required on the part of the Japanese Government and the UNDP—preferably in the form of secondment of procurement and PFM experts (both at the Centre and in the Governorates). Equally important, success stories should be prominently show-cased for their demonstration effect. The Loan Management Team should further promote its experience as Fiduciary Monitoring Agents with the Government’s ODA Loan projects and the ODA Loan Management Support (Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project in Kurdistan Region) with the purpose of replicating these experiences more widely at the national and international levels.\(^4\)

**Mine Action**

The UNDP should conduct a review of its Mine Action programme on an urgent basis. The purpose of the review should be to: (a) identify whether the conditions exist for future UNDP engagement with Mine Action in Iraq; and (b) based on the findings, propose strategic options for continued support or withdrawal.

The review will serve as the basis for any future programme or withdrawal plan, and requires full support and engagement from UNDP’s Senior Management. It should be supported by independent experts, in research and facilitation roles. Note is made that the portfolio has generally not had a sufficient peer review, and requires a knowledgeable but independent perspective. Mine Action stakeholders from the Government, civil society, and the international community could participate as appropriate. Further, the Mine Action portfolio 2004 to 2011 should be subject to an independent evaluation during 2012, consistent with UNDP policy and procedures. While the review and evaluation may be mutually reinforcing, these should be conducted as separate exercises.

**Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project in Kurdistan Region**

The Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project in Kurdistan Region and the UNDP’s role in the Loan Management project were based on a new model, where the UNDP provides effective fiduciary and operational management for Government and donors. UNDP’s performance and core institutional capacity indicate that the model has high strategic relevance in the Iraq context, and can be scaled up in other sectors. The UNDP should actively pursue this.

**Housing Sector**

The Housing Sector project is outside the UNDP’s area of core competence, and the value added by UNDP is unclear. It was intended to contribute to private sector development and accelerated employment generation. However, the project’s contribution in these specific areas after two years of implementation could not be identified. On completion of the project, the UNDP should terminate its involvement and not enter Phase III.

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\(^4\) Some attempts have already been initiated, such as presentations to JICA and UNDP Headquarters.
1. Introduction

1.1 The Iraqi Country Context

Iraq as a middle-income country, suffering from decades of international sanctions and ravages of war and internal strife, faces challenges that are often found in many low-income economies. These include dependence on one primary commodity, significant reconstruction and rehabilitation needs, unprecedented requirements of strengthening local and indigenous capabilities, and a legacy of poorly-performing institutions. Some recent successes in stabilising its macroeconomic and budgetary situation have been instrumental to reversing the trends, but more progress is needed in diversifying its economy and in generating sustainable livelihoods for the majority of its population. Most important, this transition is expected to take place in a fragile political, security, and institutional context.

Building of Iraqi State is described as a process with three parallel undertakings: the consolidation of the State and its governing institutions; the legitimisation of the state through democratic structure and process; and the formation of a national identity, to unify Iraq’s diverse ethno-sectarian population and a one that could serve as a basis for the compact between State and society. These are historical challenges that remain the focus of Iraqi and international attention. Ethno-sectarian divisions had defined political competition during the period of occupation, and still pose as a problem as Iraq moves into the post-occupation era.

Economic development became a major priority during the years immediately prior to drafting of the current UNDAF and UNDP CPAP, as an essential part of the nation-building equation. Increasingly, the legitimacy of the State before citizens based on its ability not only to provide security, but to deliver basic services and economic opportunity. The shift reflects broader changes in Iraqi context, as the county gradually moves from a recovery to a development setting. The trend exists even in the midst of political instability, and underscores public frustration with the leadership. The key economic challenges include:

a. Strengthening the State’s ability to deliver the goods and services essential for human development and security. In broadest sense, these include guarantees of physical security, rule of law, economic infrastructure and human capital formation—education, healthcare, and water and sanitation among them.

b. Creating the conditions for growth and diversification of the economy. These include the legal and regulatory framework for private sector development; creating economic opportunity for Iraq’s growing labour force; and expanding the economic participation of women and youth. The State currently plays a key role, given historical centralisation of economic power within the state apparatus and its continued dominant position.

The emergence of sustained economic recovery and development as a priority is based on at least five inter-related trends:

1. The security situation had improved since peak violence in 2006-07, though new patterns of violence are emerging. Violence escalated significantly between 2005 and 2006, peaking in 2007 and showing dramatic improvement between mid-2007 to early 2008. There have been spikes in the level of violence since mid-2008, often related to specific political events such as the 2010 elections and the withdrawal of US Forces from Iraq. Violence also spiked with tension in the unity government that emerged in late 2011 and early 2012, and multiple high-casualty car bombings. However, the average number of security incidents per month during the first half of 2011 was 32 percent lower than the monthly average for 2009. Baghdad, Nineawa, Kirkuk, and Diyala remain the most insecure governorates in Iraq.

The long-term trend, therefore, is for an improvement to the security situation. Nevertheless, the situation remains volatile and security problems continue to undermine Iraq’s development outcomes. There is also evidence of a shift in the pattern of violence. While the number of major events has declined, such as the use of IED that accounted for 70 percent of casualties between 2004 and 2009, violence appears to be more specifically targeted:
• Attacks intended to generate sectarian tension continue, as well as in the disputed areas along the northern borders with the Kurdish Governorates.

• There is a trend to the targeted assassination of government officials, public servants or members of the Iraqi Security Forces.

• Weak implementation of the rule of law that creates an uncertain environment for the State to perform functions and overall development to occur.

• The impact of the insecurity in the Arab region is not known at the time of writing. However, there was particular concern that fighting Syria might spill over into Iraq, given the shared borders and close links between communities in the two countries.

There has been an increase in the incidence of violent crime, kidnapping and extortion. While data is weak, related attacks appear to have increased significantly since major fighting declined. Criminal violence may be an indicator of future risk in Iraq for national and international investors and businesses. Weak implementation of the rule of law and an uncertain security situation create an unpredictable environment for the State to perform essential functions and overall development to occur.5

2. The political situation in Iraq remains volatile. The CPAP was developed in the context of on-going political uncertainty. Iraq’s political parties remain ethno-sectarian based, with the support base of the parties fixed along these lines. The political landscape is fragmented, with many centres of power. No party has emerged claiming to represent Iraqis across the ethno-sectarian divides.

International assistance to the Governance sector has supported development of the procedural framework for a democratic system. However, some analysts argue the imposition of political rules has had little effect on the actual political behaviour of the parties and political leadership. “Iraq demonstrates resilience of domestic political forces even in the face of eight year occupation [and that] culture and power relations do not change on demand to accommodate the goals of outsiders”.6

In this context, the March 2010 elections produced a fragile coalition government with ministries shared between the different political blocs, after nine months of intense negotiations.7 Since then, partisan political behaviour has focused on the narrow interest of different political blocs, rather than the greater public good or stabilising the political situation. The result has been and the undermining of public confidence in political leadership, and gridlock in the policy and legislative systems. Gridlock has slowed progress on the resolution of issues critical to the future of the Iraqi State:

• The nature of Iraqi federalism, the division of powers with the system and interpretation of the constitution on issues such as regional autonomy. This has occurred around Iraq’s constitutional arrangement that allows for some regional autonomy at the same time as the central government seeks to centralise that power.

• The status of the disputed areas along the northern border with the Kurdish governorates. Disagreement about the precise boundaries of the Kurdistan Region are exacerbated by issues surrounding hydrocarbon allocation, land, security responsibility, service delivery, demographic change and historical area legacy.8

Iraq, therefore, is still divided on ethno-sectarian boundaries. Cleavages and competition based on the particularistic interests can extend down into ministries, through the appointment of officials along partisan or sectarian lines. Tensions within the coalition came to a breaking point in late 2011, coinciding with the final withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. The crisis had its roots in partisan

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7 On 15 January 2010, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) banned 499 candidates from the election due to alleged links with the Ba'ath Party. The decision was controversial, and disadvantaged the opposition parties.
competition since the 2010 elections, but escalated in the ensuing months. There has been an increase in violence events throughout the country with opposition alleging that the Shiite dominated government is attempting to purge Sunni representatives.

3. **The Iraqi economy is gradually recovering, though concerns remain for slow private sector development and concentration of economic activity in the petroleum sector.** By 2004, Iraq’s GDP was estimated at US$800 per capita, down from US$2,300 per capita in 1990 and gradually deteriorating after the First Gulf War and as the result of sanctions. In this period, Iraq’s economic infrastructure was seriously degraded and the country suffered under a crippling debt burden. By 2011, GDP had recovered beyond 1990 levels, over US$2,900 per capita with GDP growth of 12 percent estimated for 2012.

The structure of the Iraqi economy is highly dependent on the Petroleum sector. Public expenditures account for almost 90 percent of total investment and 30 percent of employment. In turn, Iraq’s oil revenue generates about 80 percent of GDP and accrues to the Government, leaving little room for private initiatives.9

Private investment is expected to account for 4.8 percent of GDP in 2011, showing modest growth since 2008 and in decline relative to public sector investment. The lack of economic diversification (crowded out by oil proceeds), the doubling of public-sector employment in recent years, a constantly-suppressed private sector, a demographic growth of 3 percent annually (with limited opportunities for new entrants in the labour market) all pose significant constraints on ensuring sustained economic growth and poverty alleviation.

**Public and Private Investment as % of GDP**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in % of GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Gross domestic investment (GInv)</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. of which public</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIVATE investment (1.-2.)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Gross domestic consumption (GDCons)</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>71.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. of which public</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIVATE consumption (3.-4.)</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GDP=G + C + I + NX where G stands for Government spending, C is private consumption (households), I is private investment and NX is net exports

\[G = Ginv + Gcons\]

\[GDP = GInv(public and private) + GDCons(public and private) +NX\]

Growth of employment in the private sector remains low, particularly for women whose participation in the labour force remains among the lowest in the Middle East and North Africa region. Seventy two percent of males are in the labour force and just 13 percent of females. Of all working women, 60 percent are employed in the public sector, where the main growth in women’s employment was recorded.11 The private sector, therefore, has not yet emerged as a major source of economic opportunity for women.

In this context, the major economic challenges identified by Government in successive development plans have been the diversification of the economy (non-oil sector), job creation in the Petroleum sector, and strengthening of the private sector. The major security and political challenges are compounded by the crucial needs for macroeconomic and structural reforms. Despite the country’s remarkable natural wealth of oil, gas, and other natural resources, the Government has not successfully dealt with the high fiscal imbalances experienced despite the change in the regime several years ago. Federal budget deficits have been increasing to unmanageable levels, and the State-administered oil-related participation (above 50 percent of the GDP) in the economy continues to grow unabated. SOE losses remain a significant drain on the financial resources of the country.

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10 Data provided by the UNDP Private Sector Development project, based on IMF data for 2011.
11 http://www.iauiraq.org/ikn
4. **As conditions improve, there is growing public focus on the economy.** Even as security and political conditions remain volatile, data shows an important and positive shift, as concerns over security give way to material worries, such as jobs, basic services, and corruption. Polls over the period 2008 to 2011 show that a majority of Iraqis believe the country is headed in the wrong direction. However, there is a modest but gradual improvement in the public’s perception of the situation, including the state of the economy and their personal well-being. At the same time, there has been a marked shift in the public’s perception of priority issues. Concern for the security situation remains strong among. There is some fluctuation in the polling results, based on geography and the proximity of the poll to specific events. Regardless, polls show a significant growth in concern with basic service delivery, the economy and employment. There is also growing public anger on the issue of corruption, and concern for security and the rule of law (e.g., effectiveness of police). The trend begins in 2009, and grows to the point of primary concern of the Iraqis consistently since 2010.

As a visible example, there were demonstrations in throughout Iraq during late 2010 and the first months of 2011, with a national “Day of Rage” on February 25, 2011. Protesters called for improvement in the delivery of essential services, more jobs and employment opportunities, and an end to corruption. In response, GoI established a 100-day deadline to evaluate ministerial programmes and determine a way to better respond to needs. The 100 days were extended, and the Government produced a Government Strategic Programme 2011-2014, which focused priorities around improved governance, service delivery, the economy and employment. In this regard, the Government felt compelled to respond to public pressure.

5. **Reduced international assistance and presence in Iraq is creating new challenges and opportunities for UNDP.** UNDP is being assigned greater responsibility and visibility, with other international entities leave Iraq. UN previously worked in an assistance environment dominated by the US, and the presence of MNF-I forces in Iraq. The last US forces in Iraq were withdrawn in December 2011. Currently, UNDP continues to work within an integrated mission framework since 2003, led by UNAMI. However, there are anticipated reductions to the mission and plans for a progressive phasing out of some UN agencies. These changes would be occurring in a context of sharp decline in international assistance to Iraq, in particular the closure of the UNDG ITF. Reductions in assistance are somewhat offset by increasing government revenues and ability to fund international technical assistance. The combination of increased visibility and shift in the funding is challenging the UNDP to sharpen its own strategic focus, and provide upstream and technical assistance that are competitive in a market context, where the Government has numerous options for service providers.

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12 A poll conducted by the International Republican Institute in 2010 found the 59 percent of the population believed the Iraq was headed in the wrong direction, while 49 percent believed the direction was positive. A spring 2011 poll by Greenberg Quinlan Rosner and NDI Public Opinion Research, concluded “although a 49 percent plurality see the country heading in the wrong direction, a 5-point increase since our first survey in November 2010, 42 percent still think the country is moving in the right direction, which is relatively high by international standards.” A February 2012 poll by the Oxford Research Group found 70 percent of Iraqis believed the situation was improving, with 79 percent saying the situation was the same or better than the previous year.

13 For example, while polling between 2009 and 2011 showed a decline in the security as a priority, the 2012 Oxford Research Group poll, taken at the during period of tension in the Unity Government and a spike in violence, showed increasing concern for security.

14 The 2010 IRI poll found that 43 percent of Iraqis cited security as the biggest single problem facing Iraq 2009, while 23 percent cited basic service and 18 percent cited unemployment. The 2012 Greenberg Quinlan Rosner and NDI Public Opinion found “nearly two-thirds of Iraqis name job opportunities as one of their top two concerns, up from 54 percent last November, and the share who cite basic services is up 18 points, to 47 percent... There is also sharp and persistent anger about corruption. A 58 percent majority see corruption as getting worse in Iraq. ... Concerns over jobs and unemployment are prevalent throughout Iraq, but there is some distinction across regions, particularly with basic services.”
1.2 Overview of the Outcome 5 Portfolio

Overview of the Portfolio

The evaluation cohort consisted of 19 projects/programmes amounting to US$113 million, with UNDP’s contribution of US$83 million. This represents around 35 percent of UNDP’s total resource mobilization from beginning of 2009 until December 2010. The portfolio under review is divided into four main sectors: Private Sector Development, Mine Action, Energy, and other projects related to the restoration of infrastructure including institutional capacity development. The evaluation was conducted using the following results matrix, taken from the CPAP document.

### CPAP Outcome 5 Results Matrix

| UNDAF 2011-2014 Outcome 2.1: People in Iraq have improved access to job and income opportunities in a diversified and competitive market economy. |
| CPAP Outcome Indicators (Baselines 2010 and Targets 2014): | CPAP Country Programme Outputs |
| 1. Iraqi airspace and air traffic regulated and managed in line with international standards (2010: no; 2014: yes) | 1. GoI has technical expertise to link multi-sector infrastructure investments to national budgets and IFI financing |
| 2. Volume (US$) of growth related and bankable projects developed across infrastructure sectors (2009: below 1 billion; 2014: 2 billion) | 2. GoI is better able to implement national civil aviation and ports regulatory frameworks in compliance with international standards |
| 3. Change in national level perception of improved electricity supply (2009: 40%; 2014: 70%) | 3. GoI is better placed to address participation issues of vulnerable groups in civilian sector economic activities |
| 4. Number of State-owned enterprises restructured with adequate social mitigation measures (2010: 0; 2014: 2) | 4. Support GOI to promote economic diversification and job creation through enabling policies and regulatory systems for private sector development |
| 5. % increase in employment in the private sector disaggregated by gender and age (2008: 22%, 2014: 35%) | 5. Enhanced GoI capacity to implement relevant reintegration, social inclusion and protection measures in selected areas |
| 6. % of female professional and technical workers (2008: 61.8%; 2014: 72%) | 6. Regulatory and coordination mechanism established for a GoI led sustainable national mine action programme to reduce the land mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) impact in Iraq |

1.3 Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation was undertaken in compliance with UNDP corporate policy: to evaluate its development cooperation with the host government on a regular basis; and specifically, to assess whether and how UNDP-funded interventions in Outcome 5 contributed to the achievement of agreed outcomes. For sequencing, the report focuses on:

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15 The complete list of projects is provided in Annex B to this report.
a. Outcome analysis - what and how much progress has been made towards the achievement of the outcome, including contributing factors and constraints?

b. Output analysis - the relevance of and progress made in terms of the UNDP outputs, including an analysis of soft-assistance activities.

c. Output-outcome link - what contribution UNDP has made/is making to the progress towards the achievement of the outcome, including an analysis of the partnership strategy?

The Evaluation Criteria and Dimensions outlined in the Terms of Reference were based on standard UNED/ OECD DAC guidelines. As the core criteria, the evaluation was directed to assess: Relevance and Strategic Fit; Validity of Design/the Re-design; Achievements (Implementation and Development Effectiveness); Effectiveness of Management Arrangements and Efficiency of Resource Use, and Result Orientation and Sustainability. In so doing, the evaluation also attempts to clarify the underlying factors affecting the achievements of the intervention. Particularly, it identifies unintended consequences (positive and negative), formulates lessons learned, and offers recommendations for improving future programming and fostering a partnership strategy. The evaluation used a numerical rating scale to summarise performance against each of evaluation criteria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly Satisfactory (1)</th>
<th>There were no shortcomings in the operation’s achievement of its objectives, in its efficiency, or in its relevance.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Satisfactory (2)</td>
<td>There were minor shortcomings in the operation’s achievement of its objectives, in its efficiency, or in its relevance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory (3)</td>
<td>There were moderate shortcomings in the operation’s achievement of its objectives, in its efficiency, or in its relevance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moderately Unsatisfactory (4)</td>
<td>There were significant shortcomings in the operation’s achievement of its objectives, in its efficiency, or in its relevance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unsatisfactory (5)</td>
<td>There were major shortcomings in the operation’s achievement of its objectives, in its efficiency, or in its relevance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly Unsatisfactory (6)</td>
<td>There were severe shortcomings in the operation’s achievement of its objectives, in its efficiency, or in its relevance.</td>
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</table>

The following comprised the Team’s work programme and the development of an evaluation methodology:

a. A review of the CPAP strategic, project and performance documents, as these related to the 19 Outcome 5 projects.

b. Drafting of an Inception Report, to confirm the methodology and the tools to support the field study. The included Diagnostic Templates and Questionnaires designed to generate project-level information and findings at the sector outcome level.

c. Results of the document review supported three field study elements:

- Initial interviews with UNDP and UN stakeholders, conducted in Amman during August 2011;
- Field visits and interviews conducted in Iraq during September and October 2011, in Baghdad, Basra, Mussaiab and Erbil. The study included site inspection and verification, as well as structured interviews with Stakeholders from Government at the national and Governorate levels.

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16 The Terms of Reference, Outcome Evaluation of “Enabling policy and frameworks for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private sector development” (UNDP Iraq, April 2011), are attached as Annex A to this report.

17 The complete List of Documents Reviewed is included as Annex E to this report.

18 The complete list of Persons Interviewed is included as Annex D to this report.
UNDP CPAP Outcome 5 Evaluation

Civil Society Organisations, donors and UNDP and UN officials. Some additional interviews were conducted in New York and Washington; and

- A follow up visit to Amman, Baghdad and Erbil, to complete the interviews, address information gaps, and verify some findings.

Initial findings were presented to UNDP stakeholders at the end of the first field mission. The draft report has subsequently been circulated internally for comments, and for finalisation.

1.4 Summary of Performance Factors in the Portfolio

For evaluation purposes, the UNDP CPAPOutcome #5 portfolio can be divided into two distinct “generations”. The “Generation One” component of the portfolio consisted of legacy projects, developed between 2004 and 2008 and brought forward into the current CPAP because of implementation delays. The projects were approved under the previous strategic framework focused on early recovery, primarily the rehabilitation of essential public infrastructure, and often funded through the UNDG ITF mechanism.

“Generation One” projects showed mixed results. They were generally brought to a satisfactory conclusion, but after significant delays and with the loss of scope and effectiveness. As a result, many project outputs were delivered outside of their originally intended outcome framework and timeline. To the extent that outputs were not delivered, or delivered late, outcomes could not be achieved and the benefit to Iraqis was degraded. The impact of late delivery on outcomes is rarely discussed in UNDP reporting.

The general characteristics of legacy projects were uneven design and planning and, in some cases, the lack of UNDP core institutional competence for effective implementation. Many projects were approved within the UNDG ITF mechanism, which had incentives for unrealistic timeframes. External pressure and incentives, from the donors and the Government, to assume implementation roles outside of UNDP core competence was accompanied by opportunity to augment the portfolio and expand revenue generation. There were limited systemic checks on growth, as the UNDP’s strategic framework was evolving and the UNDG ITF decision-making process tended to dilute effective peer review and oversight of decisions. The UNDP’s own internal processes were also still in a development phase.

Projects were also implemented with uneven political commitment and institutional support from Government. This situation varies by project. In part, Government entities had limited capacity to engage fully and provide leadership. Some projects showed poor consultation during the design process, and did not generate the level of ownership or consensus needed to sustain them. The pressure of implementation deadlines was a factor. Projects lacked the necessary institutional support, even though formal approval was granted. They were often vulnerable, therefore, to political pressures and institutional instability and lacked effective risk mitigation. The real scope of political and institutional support did not appear well understood during design, nor was it the subject of assessment during implementation.

Subsequently, there were two common variables supporting performance improvements for “Generation One” projects. First was the improvement in the programme environment and the strengthening of Government capacity and support. The effectiveness of outcome was reduced where this did not occur. Second, new personnel joining the UNDP between 2009 and 2010 engaged more robustly in the resolution of implementation bottlenecks, and delivery of outputs.

In contrast, “Generation Two” projects were initiated during the current UNDAF/CPAP, or immediately preceding the shift. Projects were designed at a time when improvements in the programme environment and shifts in public opinion allowed for a change in focus, to “development” from recovery. The situation remains volatile, but there is better clarity on the government's priorities, improved institutional performance, and better data availability.

As a result, “Generation Two” projects are more deeply embedded into Government priorities and systems, and are performing better. Though international assistance to Iraq has declined significantly beginning in 2008, including with closure of the UNDG ITF in 2011, it created new incentives and opportunities for the UNDP to strengthen its strategic focus. The CPAP has now a limited number of strategic interventions, with the UNDP acting in a more competitive assistance market where the Government has other options.

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19 A complete list of sites visited during field study is included in Annex C to this report.
for technical assistance. An accomplishment of the UNDP in this context is precisely that some of its products are deemed competitive in the commercial technical assistance market.

“Generation Two” projects, therefore, tend to have a more clearly articulated strategic focus, which provides a basis for synergies within the portfolio. The key performance variables are the introduction of a more coherent strategic framework (the CPAP), better peer review, and decision-making procedures to ensure the compliance of projects with the UNDP’s emerging strategic orientation and more robust Government engagement. The latter appears to benefit from improved security conditions, the gradual strengthening of state institutions and definition of strategic development priorities. However, political instability remains an important constraint, when it presents an obstacle to the passage of key legislative, regulatory or policy reform, or when ethno-sectarian competition reaches down into State institutions at the operational level.
2. Outcome Evaluation

2.1 Private Sector Development Programme (PSDP) - Iraq

With the setting in motion of democratic process in Iraq, the PSDP attempted to address the critical political challenges of consensus building at the highest echelons of GoI for embarking upon complex and transformational economic reforms as well as initiate a difficult and unique transition toward a market-based economy.

a) UNDAF and CP Outcome: UNDAF 2.1: People in Iraq have improved access to equal job and income opportunities in a diversified and competitive market economy.

b) Total Budget: US$32.9 million (with UNDP contribution of: US$9.7 million)

c) Status: On-going

d) Outcome 1: Improved policies, strategies, and related institutional developments that are sensitive to MDGs, social inclusiveness, gender equality, and pro-poor economic growth.

IP Output 1.1: Strengthened national capacities and policies for private sector development. UNDP to take lead on:

- 1.1.1 Technical support is provided to the task force working within the Prime Minister’s Office to formulate, implement, and monitor the public PSD initiatives of the GoI.
- 1.1.3 Draft legislations related to SoE corporatization (amendment of Law 22), privatization, investment law rules and regulations, land title reform, competition, PPPs, mitigation package, agricultural and trade policies are available.
- 1.1.6 A tripartite consultation mechanism of the Government, Employers, and Workers representatives in the Socio-Economic Council of Iraq is available to promote social dialogue.
- 1.1.7 A comprehensive Private Sector Development Strategy for Iraq is available.

IP Output 1.2: Improved Efficiency of Public Micro-Lending Programme (implemented by MoLSA and MoIM). UNDP to take lead on:

- 1.2.1 Improved management of Government guaranteed Micro-Lending Programme (implemented by MoLSA and MoIM).
- 1.2.2 Enhanced Mechanisms to access to credit by SMEs.
- 1.2.3 Draft laws and by-laws related to GoI micro lending programme are available.

IP Output 1.3: Strengthened operational, regulatory, and legislative environment for SMEs development.

e) Outcome 2: Enhance key sectors of local economy in most deprived areas.

IP Output 2.1: Local economic strategies and development plans are in line with provincial frameworks in three governorates. UNDP to take lead on:

- 2.1.3 Strengthen governorate-level construction and development institutions to implement and sustain local planning capacities.
IP Output 2.2: Economic and social regeneration pilot projects in three selected governorates. UNDP to take lead on:

- 2.2.2 Technical support provided to identify priorities and programme implementation in the following sectors: key economic infrastructure (UNDP).

PSDP-I Programme Overview

PSDP-I forms the core of the CPAP 5 portfolio in numerous respects: (a) nearly one-third of the financial allocation; (b) pursuing the latest (post-2008) UNDP framework and GoI’s commitment and priorities; and (c) the centrepiece of envisaged objectives of sustained economic recovery. The programme is thus an important and essential intervention in alignment with the NDP, UNDAF, CPAP, and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. There was considerable government ownership at the outset of the programme, and its design consisted of several key sub-components both upstream (at the central level) and downstream (provincial and governorate levels). Though its design was inevitably ambitious, some of its decentralization efforts were built upon the lessons learned from the experience of LADP (albeit the latter was more focused on community development).

PSDP-I Outcome

To the credit of GoI, especially PMAC, necessary measures were instituted at inception regarding the implementation and supervisory set up. Noteworthy among these were the formation of a Steering Committee, the TFER, and working groups on: (a) SOE Restructuring; (b) SME and Access to Finance; (c) Land Policy; (d) Taxation and Financial Management; (e) Strategic Investment; (f) Legislative Reforms; and (g) Social Dialogue and Mitigation. UNDP’s advisory role was pivotal for its strategic positioning in the transition of the economy and seeking “windows of opportunity” for bringing out economic change and reforms.

Efforts continue to ensure synergies of projects related to reforms through consultations with the Iraq Partner Forum (IPF) and the UNDAF Priority Working Groups. Further, additional funding is being sought from the 2012 Federal Budget: (i) SOE restructuring fund (US$275 million); and (ii) the international partnership fund (US$250 million, which is still to be utilized)—to leverage new funding for the PDSP as well as solicit cost-sharing with the GoI. [To date, both these figures have been reduced and the effort has not materialized].

However, limited attention has been paid to assess the absorptive capacity of the line ministries. This is evident from the low rate of disbursement (less than 50 percent aggregate for almost all the sub-components of the programme). Additionally, there is neither a clear agenda nor adequate technical capacity/sufficient decision-making authority for the regional/governorate-level programme steering committees to promote the economic reforms. Finally, little attention is being paid to the cross-cutting themes of poverty alleviation, gender mainstreaming, and security considerations that had been recommended as essential forward-looking aspects in earlier progress reports (commissioned by UNDP) for creating an overall enabling environment for private sector development in Iraq.

Equally important, little headway is being made in overcoming the obstacles inherent in Outcome 2 (the downstream strategy). Even in a relatively advanced region—the KRG—the technical and administrative capacity has not markedly improved. The main problems stem from: (a) lack of clarity in the mandate, functions, and feedback of the Governorate Steering Committees; and (b) continuing heritage of the previous regime’s culture of lack of initiative by public officials to undertake the reform efforts (such as the planned work on SMEs). The weakest link in the programme is the structure and content of training for institution building—both at the central and governorate levels. According to the stakeholders, including the middle-level managers, the endeavours have not been specific and targeted enough for beneficiaries to achieve the desired results.
PSDP-I Outputs

Evaluation Ratings

Aggregate [3]

The PSDP programme is assessed to be Moderately Satisfactory (3) overall and for the Achievements, Efficiency of Resource Use, and Impact Orientation. The dimension of Relevance and Strategic Fit receives very high marks: Highly Satisfactory (1); and the Design are considered Satisfactory (2).

Relevance and Strategic Fit [1]

The programme was timely and highly relevant to the conditions prevailing in Iraq in 2008, and continues to be so in the ensuing years and the future. The initiative for the programme also came from the GoI, which through the then Prime Minister’s Advisory Board (PMAB) and now PMAC, requested UN’s assistance in June 2008 for strategic intervention in support of restructuring and diversifying the national economy in line with the NDS, the International Compact with Iraq, and the IMF Stand-By Arrangement’s performance criteria.

In response, the UNDP-led Policy Group for Economic Development in Baghdad organized several working groups in coordination with the PMAB advisors to identify needs and obstacles in the opportunities for private sector development. PSDP-I was launched in January 2009 for a three-year time horizon (2009-2011).

Using a “with or without” scenario, the UN was one of the most active and impartial organizations with a presence in the field. It sought “windows of opportunity” for consensus-building within the top echelons of the government and attempted to provide the basic foundations for a transition to a market-based economy. All these endeavours took place in a fragile political environment and in difficult working conditions.

Validity of Design/Re-design [2]

Inevitably, the details of the programme’s design, baselines, activities, and outputs (both the upstream and downstream levels) had to be appropriately “supply driven” because there was hardly any institutional and technical capacity within the implementing agencies (beyond the overall guidance by top officials in the administration. A tripartite agreement among GoI, UNDP, and OECD led to the preparation of PSDP in December 2008 under the coordination of UNDP and with the direct cooperation of six other UN agencies: UNIDO, ILO, FAO, UNOPS, UN-Habitat, and UNIFEM/UNWOMEN.

By the Council of Ministers’ Order, the TFER was established with the participation of key line ministries (Planning, Trade, Agriculture, Transportation, Industry and Minerals), the Central Bank of Iraq, the Iraqi Stock Market, and several employers’ organizations. Accordingly, the programme established seven crucial working groups chaired by high-ranking government officials under the aegis of a Steering Committee of the Prime Minister’s Advisory Commission (PMAC) to oversee the progress of the seven sub-components: (a) SOE restructuring; (b) SME and Access to Finance; (c) Land Policy; (d) Taxation and Financial Management; (e) Strategic Investment; (f) Legislative Reforms; and (g) Social Dialogue and Mitigation—both at the upstream and downstream levels of the programme. The work plan has undergone various adjustments over the last three years in response to changed development priorities.

The downstream components were anticipated to facilitate direct agency-specific interventions in three selected governorates for: (a) rehabilitation of energy production, water management, and economic infrastructure (UNDP); (b) agro-industrial business development (UNIDO); (c) private sector expansion in agriculture (FAO); (d) business development services (ILO/UNOPS); (e) micro-lending (UNDP); (f) land development and housing industry (UN-Habitat); and (g) gender-balanced business climate enabling and enhanced women’s participation in private enterprises (UNIFEM/UNWOMEN).
Achievements (Implementation of Development Effectiveness) [3]

Nonetheless, the achievements have been modest. After a slow start, even to date, the progress has been limited to the ad hoc meetings of committees/working groups, drafting of laws/regulations, conducting of study tours, and imparting of training. The proposed legislations are still awaiting finalization and/or implementation; the White Paper/Roadmap for SOE restructuring took long in gaining approval from the Cabinet; a comprehensive private sector survey has only recently been completed and released; and the SME programme has only now gained some momentum. More significantly, downstream interventions—along with the commensurate meaningful engagement with the CSOs have yet to commence in selected governorates.

The main problem within the UN agencies stems from the fact that the allocations have made for the several agencies involved in the effort at the upstream level and NOT for the assignment of respective tasks and programmes—leading to perverse incentives for overlapping functions, competition for funding, and lack of accountability for results—let alone pursuing the downstream-level strategy.

Donor coordination—with assigned areas of responsibility—has been a perennial challenge for the UNDP. Doubtless, convening of national conferences has been conducive to developing a working relationship with the international investors. But these forums have yet to produce tangible solutions for building public-private partnerships.

Effectiveness of Management Arrangements and Efficiency of Resource Use [3]

There is little evidence of any actions being taken for mid-stream corrections of the programme. In this context, UNAMI’s Monitoring and Evaluation Unit could have played a stronger role in coordinating the progress of the various UN agencies. Progress of the programme is being measured by disbursements, inputs, and activities—rather than outputs let alone outcomes. Even for disbursement, the ratios of expenditures (as one indicator of efficient allocation of resources) are very low—given that the programme is now in its fourth year of gestation. Surprisingly, no concrete figures are available for the overhead costs of the programme vis-a-vis the actual technical assistance provided to the target agencies within the government or the governorates. On a slightly positive note, the UN-coordinated IPF has assumed the responsibility of regularly assessing progress so that the interventions for sub-components are continually adjusted.

Result Orientation and Sustainability [3]

Impact orientation remains a serious concern for several reasons: (a) the programme has a limited number of individual “champions”; (b) the security situation is still volatile particularly in the vulnerable regions to create the envisaged “enabling environment; (c) and even with the requested “no-budget” extension, it is doubtful that the programme will produce definable results within the stipulated one-year period.

Despite the formulation of a roadmap for SOE restructuring, reforming/corporatizing these 180+ entities which employ 630,000 workers would not be an easy task without commensurate still-to-be-created jobs in the small and medium-sized firms. To recapitulate to prevailing situation: nearly seven million people in Iraq today live below the poverty line (US$2.20 person/day). The Iraqi economy is still unable to provide enough work for 28 percent of the labour force, with at least 18 percent unemployed and 10 percent under-employed. The public sector accounts for almost 60 percent of all full-time employment. Notably, the oil sector provides 97 percent of the revenue, but only one percent of the labour force. Significantly, the risk of “Dutch Disease” continues where national income is dependent on a commodity where all other economic sectors remain inefficient and stagnant.

Economic governance (rent seeking and elite capture) is likely to persist in Iraq for the foreseeable future. In sum, no remedial actions have been contemplated which are specific to the “costs of doing business” in Iraq.
PSDP-I Output to Outcome Linkage

In the end, the programme has been marred by nascent administrative and technical capacity within the various agencies entrusted with the sub-components—which reflects the legacy of the historical state-owned system of economic governance. As a consequence: the achievements, efficiency of assistance, and the results on the ground have been modest especially at the downstream level (see: Outcome 2); and steep hills lie ahead. To contend with the shortcomings, substantial mid-stream corrections would be needed in juxtaposition with follow-up operations in collaboration with the initiatives of other development partners and non-state actors in Iraq.

Recommendation

The programme would need to prioritize the sub-components in the remaining time allocated for its financial and operational closing even with the sought-for no-cost/budget extension. For example, the areas of enhanced emphasis will be legislative strengthening, access to finance, and SOE restructuring. Simultaneously, additional efforts will be required to re-formulate the agenda with an emphasis on CSR and for public-private partnerships, including the enhanced identification and involvement of CSOs (chambers of commerce, think-tanks, and academia/research institutions).

2.2 Loan Management Support (I)

JICA (in partnership with UNDP-I) used its comparative advantage for TA for monitoring and capacity building initiatives to the maximum, and with hands-on involvement in the project design and follow-up activities.

Loan Monitoring Programme

Project Details

(a) Project Description:

  Partnership Services for FMA

(b) UNDAF and CP Outcome: UNDAF 2.1: People in Iraq have improved access to equal job and income opportunities in a diversified and competitive market economy.

(c) Total Budget: US$1.99 million

(d) Status: On-going

(e) Intended outputs as stated in the project document:

  • Procurement Management: procurement plans established and monitored with monthly reports;
  • Financial Management: improved financial management of implementing ministries and agencies; and
  • Capacity Development: areas necessary for capacity building support identified and capacity building provided.
Loan Monitoring Programme Overview

Although the PSDP-I and Capacity Building for Loan Management Support share the same UNDAF and CP Outcome, yet the Loan Monitoring Programme has a standalone mandate that also falls under the economic governance improvement of the public sector. In addition to strengthening procurement and PFM, enhancing the institutional setup and project management is an important objective of this programme.

Loan Monitoring Programme Outcome

The project is rated as Satisfactory (2) in all the evaluation criteria, except for the achievements to date which are rated as Moderately Satisfactory (3). The individual dimensions are discussed below.

Loan Monitoring Programme Outputs

Evaluation Ratings

Aggregate [2]

Relevance and Strategic Fit [2]

Despite the setting in motion of democratic processes in Iraq in recent years, significant changes in the operational environment persist—with gaps in both national capacity and institutions. These deficits directly affect the way the UNDP can develop capacity and execution modality. Most important, there continues to be a need for developing the banking sector and the GoI does not presently have a procurement system in place that meets universally-accepted standards.

With the launch of the NDP for the period: 2010-2014, the signing of the UNDAF for 2011-2014, and the development of CPAP, concerted efforts are underway for introducing the hybrid and/or NEX in alignment with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and for a shift from a direct DEX wherever capacities are proven.

In this context, and after an early economic recovery stage in Iraq, Japanese assistance has shifted its focus from grant contributions to soft loans for mid- and long-term development. It pledged US$5 billion, which consisted of US$1.5 billion in grants and US$3.5 billion in loans. Grant contributions are nearly completed and the focus has moved to loans to improve the social and economic infrastructure toward inclusive growth. The particular objective has been to build financial management and procurement capacity in the line ministries through the creation of PMUs and PMTs in 15 projects (which have a total financing of US$3.2 billion).

Validity of Design/Re-design [2]

Under the security-imposed limitations to project sites, UNDP-Iraq identified JICA’s priorities and UNDP’s comparative advantages to establish the partnerships in facilitating loan management of projects through effective monitoring and capacity building. The GoI is the owner of projects and more than 10 line ministries/agencies were to be in charge of implementation.

A monitoring platform was established in collaboration with the Japanese Government, GoI, and UNDP. Through such close monitoring mechanism and detailed project analysis, the areas of improvement were to be identified and capacity building efforts were to concentrate on responsiveness to the pace of implementation progress of projects.

Achievements (Implementation of Development Effectiveness) [3]

The Loan Management Support facilitated the implementation of the ODA Loan projects via fiduciary monitoring on behalf of the joint Monitoring Committee and JICA, and performance evaluation in 2010 that became the key reference for the Monitoring Committee. In addition, several training courses/workshops/seminars were offered to key government officials, with specific modules on: (a)
opening and reviewing of LCs; (b) formulating disbursement plans; (c) refining procurement procedures, and (d) preparing and submitting quarterly reports.

The targeted courses have presented the counterfactuals of various scenarios, and have been well received by the participants. Nonetheless, the overall programme has been hampered by some bureaucratic bottlenecks and weaknesses—prominent among these: lack of motivation and incentive structures for mainstreaming the training to official duties and functions in the line ministries and agencies. Further and frequently, implementation delays have resulted from project design issues (e.g., revisiting of preparatory and feasibility studies in the case of Basra water project (IQ-P9)).

On a positive note, the disbursement rates of this assistance have gradually increased in the recent years. Though disbursement does not correlate with the achievement of results (i.e., these can be considered as activities/inputs rather than outputs/outcomes), the trend reflects increasing utilization of funds for expanding/extending the utilization of training across the various sectors.

**Effectiveness of Management Arrangements and Efficiency of Resource Use [2]**

Instead of remote management, the UNDP Loan Management Staff conducted on-site visits in addition to using their expertise and resources judiciously and in a cost-effective manner.

**Result Orientation and Sustainability [2]**

JICA is expecting discussions with the MoP about the possibility of extending UNDP’s monitoring services to the GoI’s national budget projects and/or to provide capacity building. For furthering these proposals, JICA and UNDP have extended their collaborative agreement until February 2013 with JICA’s additional contribution of US$1.4 million.

Loan Monitoring Programme Output to Outcome Linkage

Doubtless, institutional development for public financial management in Iraq is a work-in-progress. The project has indeed provided the building blocks as pilots for learning and mainstreaming.

**Recommendation**

So far, limited assessment is being made of the impact of training provided. Greater attention should be paid to how this training is directly leading to improved FM and procurement in the management of projects. This needs to be further confirmed by performance evaluation of PMTs (i.e., reduction in costs and time for the bidding and award processes).

### 2.3 Loan Management Support (II)

**Loan Management Support**

**Project Details**

(a) **Project Description:** Partnership SVCs-JBIC_Kurdistan

(b) **UNDAF and CP Outcome:** UNDAF 2.1: People in Iraq have improved access to equal job and income opportunities in a diversified and competitive market economy.

(c) **Total Budget:** US$ 0.74 million

(d) **Status:** Operationally Closed

(e) Intended outputs as stated in the project document:
UNDP CPAP Outcome 5 Evaluation

- The three sub-projects' scope of work finalized;
- RMEK supported in the Pre-Qualification (PQ) and tendering stage of the three sub-projects;
- RMEK supported to maintain adequate co-ordination and communication between RMEK and JBIC; and
- The increased capacity of RMEK staff Capacity Development: areas necessary for capacity building support identified and capacity building provided.

Loan Management Support Project Overview

The objective of this project is to provide project management services including capacity building. The partnership with JBIC brought tangible results that led to a cost-sharing agreement with RMEK, where RMEK requested UNDP to continue its project management support. RMEK contributed US$6.4 million from the loan—considered as a highly-successful intervention that a funding from the donor resulted in government contribution.

Loan Management Support Project Outcome

The project is rated as Highly Satisfactory (1) overall, the achievements to date and sustainability are rated as Satisfactory (2). The successful Partnership for the SVCs-JBIC Kurdistan project where the Japanese Government (in partnership with UNDP) has assisted the RMEK in developing the technical specifications suitable for international procurement based on JBIC procurement procedures. It is a very good example of ensuring timely implementation of a project and the sustainability of results—thereby of replication and scaling-up (vertical and horizontal)—and then relying on the country systems in the longer term.

Loan Management Support Project Outputs

Evaluation Ratings

Aggregate [1]

Relevance and Strategic Fit [1]

Immediately after signing of the partnership agreement in October 2007, UNDP assigned a project team consisting of a technical project manager and one international distribution expert and two national engineers in order to carry out the agreed ToRs. Also, in 2008, the UNDP and the Japanese designated a team leader for financial management and a procurement specialist.

Validity of Design/Re-design [1]

UNDP successfully completed the preparation of draft documents for the employment of consultant for implementation of the project, and promptly finalized the bidding documents for the sub-projects.

Achievements (Implementation of Development Effectiveness) [2]

This loan-funded project by JICA (IQ-P10) was the best-performing amongst the 10 loan-funded projects. However, some of the difficulties faced in the management of the project were two-fold: (a) change of scope of sub-projects by RMEK and limited technical information available for equipment; and (b) insufficient technical experience of RMEK in loan management.

Effectiveness of Management Arrangements and Efficiency of Resource Use [1]
RMEK assigned very qualified counterpart technical team for this project. Concurrently, UNDP’s team conducted regular face-to-face meetings instead of remote management from country office.

**Result Orientation and Sustainability [2]**

The only main obstacle to replicability and sustainability of results pertains to overly-centralized decision-making processes of the RMEK—which can lead to delays in procurement and bidding/tendering processes.

**Loan Management Support Project Output to Outcome Linkage**

The only main obstacle to replicability and sustainability of results pertains to overly-centralized decision-making processes of the RMEK—which can lead to delays in procurement and bidding/tendering processes.

**Recommendation**

JICA is expecting discussions with the MoP about the possibility of extending UNDP’s monitoring services to the GoI’s national budget projects and/or to provide capacity building and this is something UNDP should prioritize.

2.4 Mine Action

**The Mine Action Outcome**

Progress towards clearance of landmines and ERW since 2004 has been modest, despite the scope and impact of contamination. Iraq is one of the countries most affected. The full extent of contamination is not known, as reliable data on contamination and clearance is not available. Regardless, political uncertainty hinders the development of Iraqi mine action policy and institutions, and the development of national capacity to address the problem, in the State, civil society and private sector.

Estimates currently used are still based in the Iraq Landmine Impact Study, conducted between 2004 and 2006 in 13 of 18 Governorates, and published in 2007. Significant areas of the country were not covered, and some results have since been proven inaccurate. Estimates range up to 25 million mines contaminating 1,730 square km, and affecting around 1.6 million people around 3673 hazardous sites. Landmine contamination is concentrated in the Kurdish governorates, around major oil infrastructure and along the full border with Iran. ERW are found throughout the country, but particularly in the southern and central governorates.

The exact number of unexploded cluster bomblets is still not known. An estimated 50 million cluster munitions were used during the 1991 and 2003 conflicts. UNDP further estimates there are anywhere between two and six million unexploded sub-munitions remnants. Usage was concentrated around transport and economic infrastructure. There is also growing concern about contamination from depleted uranium munitions, which were used in heavily-populated areas during the 1991 and 2003 conflicts and are linked with the high incidence of certain diseases in the Iraqi population. A 2009 joint report from the UNDP and UNICEF estimated that clearance activities “might take decades to complete” (2009: 39).

Data on casualties is kept in the Kurdish Governorates where there were 82 victims (injured or killed) in 2010, up slightly from 79 casualties in 2009. There was also no reliable data on casualties in the other Governorates, although “it is certain that there are many more casualties in these areas that were not identified” (LCM Monitor 2011: 14).

There was no comprehensive estimate on the economic impact of mine and ERW contamination. While long understood as a constraint to agriculture, the presence of mines and ERW now affects Iraq’s expanding oil sector. Media reports indicate that contamination is slowing development of some of Iraq’s key oil fields, and billions of dollars in investments. Mines have blocked companies from sinking new wells, and building pipelines and the other infrastructure needed to fulfil Iraq’s increased production targets. In turn, constraints on production have an impact on Government revenues and employment creation. Mines
are difficult to remove, as they have often moved or buried meters below shifting sand. The constraint posed by contamination appears more acute as the economy itself recovers and expands. In this regard, the position of the UN has been that “clearance is a key element within broader efforts to stimulate Iraq's economy”.

Data is inadequate to make a determination on the extent of clearance at the national level. This is an indicator of modest institutional development. The total clearance and land release reported between 2006 and 2010 is 38.8 km², including 10.1 km² in 2010 that was up from 5.7 km² in 2006. However, available data relates primarily to the Kurdish Governorates, which is also where most of the humanitarian demining takes place. The military and a growing number of private contractors working in the oil sector are the primary demining entities in the Central and Southern Governorates. Tasks undertaken in 2010 focused on clearance for the oil industry, utilities and infrastructure. However, the clearance data is not centrally reported to government and the UNDP has expressed concerns about the quality of some clearance. Work according to an international humanitarian standard was only being done by a small number of international organisations, working with Iraqi counterparts (LCM Monitor 2010).

Mine Action Portfolio Overview

The Mine Action portfolio consisted of 10 projects, implemented between 2004 and 2011 in three sectoral areas. Total value of the portfolio was US$35 million. Three of the 10 projects are open, and scheduled for operational and financial closure in 2012. There are currently no new projects pending approval. The exception may be some funding for Victim Assistance work in the Kurdish governorates, over which discussion with a donor was on-going. The CPAP Mine Action results matrix included the following elements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of Mine Action Results Matrix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CPAP Mine Action Indicator:</strong> Regulatory and coordination mechanism established for a GoI led sustainable national mine action programme to reduce the land mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) impact in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CPAP Mine Action Output:</strong> Regulatory and coordination mechanism established for a GoI led sustainable national mine action programme to reduce the land mine and explosive remnants of war impact in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CPAP Mine Action Indicators:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regulatory framework and coordination mechanism based on Iraqi National Mine Action Standards and quality management established (2010: No; 2014: Yes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Number of persons with disabilities received rehabilitation and vocational training services from non-governmental organizations (2010: 4,880; 2014: 18,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- National humanitarian demining organisation capable of conducting MRE and UXO/Landmine clearance established (2010: No; 2014: Yes/National)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Projects in the Mine Action portfolio date back to 2004, with the first efforts by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to establish a national mine action authority. The portfolio covers the full historical period of Mine Action in Iraq; from the immediate post-invasion period under the CPA, through to the creation of a National Mine Action Authority in the then Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC), and its subsequent transition to the Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) within the MoE.

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20 UNDP advises that negotiations are on-going with the US, Australia and the GoI. However, at the point of writing, the US State Department advised it was not considering funding through the UNDP and resources from the GoI appeared unlikely. In general, donors have withdrawn from Mine Action in Iraq due to either a general draw down of assistance to Iraq and/or concern over the lack of progress.
Mine Action is central to the UNDP’s global mandate. The agency is not usually involved in mine clearance activities. Rather, it focuses on the technical assistance to helping countries meet international treaty obligations, the application of international norms and standards in national legal and policy frameworks, national demining strategies, institution building and gender. These are essential enabling conditions for clearance to take place, and to establish a linkage between demining and recovery and development activities.\(^{21}\)

Iraq projects were implemented in three distinct sectors within a unified UNDP Mine Action strategy, which included:

a. **Strengthening National Capacity for Mine Action**, focusing on State institutions. The four related projects includes the following outputs: Support accession and adherence to international conventions; Strengthen Iraq’s legislative, regulatory and institutional framework, at the national and regional levels; Develop a national Mine Action strategy, and provide technical support to operations in the areas of National Mine Action Standards, a national mine action data base, landmine impact and technical and non-technical surveys, and; Strengthen the State’s capacity to task, coordinate, monitor and quality assure Mine Action operations, between State responsible entities, international and national NGOs and the private sector.

b. **Support to Civil Society Involvement in Demining.** Four projects were dedicated to establish and support a national demining NGO in Basra, the Rafidain Demining Organisation (RDO). Work was done in collaboration with the Danish Demining Group (DDG), which had oversight, supervision and technical assistance responsibilities inside Iraq. The projects’ outputs included; Establish the RDO and ensure compliance with international standards; Develop the management, technical and resource mobilisation capacity of the RDO to ensure sustainability, and support resource mobilisation; Build capacity to conduct surveys, quality assurance, clearance and awareness operations, and implementation of national standards; Establish and meet targets for clearance activities, with a focus on community development priorities, and; Coordinate with other national (NMAA, RMAC) and international entities involved in mine action, including the private sector.

c. **Support to Victim Assistance**, delivered through two projects in the Kurdish governorates. Initial programme development for victim assistance was also done in Basra during 2010. Outputs related to strengthening State policy, State and NGO organisational capacity and the delivery of victim assistance services, through three NGOs.

A *de facto* fourth sector of advocacy emerged early in the portfolio. Advocacy was directed at the political/policy process, and at the senior levels of government. It was strategic component of the portfolio at the national level, specifically to address constraints to progress development Iraq’s normative, legal, regulatory and institutional framework. Work was undertaken within the existing portfolio framework and did involve separate projects. The scope of advocacy work increased from 2007-2008 onward, becoming a primary Mine Action activity and involving a significant investment of UNDP staff resources.

The portfolio also had a regional dimension. Projects to **Strengthen Iraqi National Capacity for Mine Action** were national in scope, while **Support to Civil Society Involvement in Demining** focused on Basra and the south. Projects in the Kurdish governorates focused exclusively on **Victim Assistance**, although they were also to implicitly benefit from national-level work. The Mine Action institutions under the KRG, IKMWA, and the GDMA, were established in 1997. Institutions have been functioning for 15 years, with support from United Nations and other international entities, and are generally not in need of capacity development

\(^{21}\) UNDP reports it is involved in all five mine action pillars, although actual demining activity is limited: Demining (surveying, clearing, and destroying landmines and explosive remnants of war); Victim assistance (providing assistance and rehabilitation and reintegration services to victims); Mine-risk education (mitigating risk by helping people understand how to stay out of harm’s way and preventing new victims); Advocacy (promoting a total ban on antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions and compliance with relevant international legal instruments), and Stockpile destruction: helping countries destroy their stockpiles of landmines and explosive remnants of war). Within this framework, UNDP supports Mine Action planning and integration into national development strategies, helping countries meet international treaty obligations and ensuring consideration of gender in mine actions interventions. [http://www.beta.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/fast-facts/english/FF-Mine%20Action-2011.pdf](http://www.beta.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/fast-facts/english/FF-Mine%20Action-2011.pdf)
support. However, Victim Assistance was identified by the KRG as an area where international support is still needed.

The Mine Action Project Outputs

Overall Assessment of Outputs

The Mine Action portfolio had major shortcomings. There is no evidence that it contributed to economic recovery, except for Victim Assistance activities (in the Kurdish governorates, with some initial work in Basra). With exceptions, projects were generally not designed with an economic orientation, as all projects predated the CPAP. General progress towards de-contamination is, at best, modest. Where clearance activities related to the Mine Action portfolio were to focus on locations identified as those of humanitarian and economic significance, such as through the RDO or support to the DMA, capacity development to the DMA the number of mines and ERW actually removed is few. Also, the portfolio did not develop synergies with development activities, conducted by the UNDP or others.22

Poor performance on de-contamination and building synergies to economic recovery relates directly to a lack of progress at the political level. However, the legislative, institutional and operational framework for Mine Action has also not been consolidated, eight years after the first national Mine Action authority was established. Progress in the northern Kurdish Governorates has been more substantial. Iraq became a signatory to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in 2007. Yet there is little meaningful progress towards Iraq’s Convention obligations, or Iraq’s stated national objectives. This includes only limited clearance activity that is compliant with international standards.

Primary responsibility for slow progress rests with the Government, as the main obstacles are political. Despite difficulties, the UNDP has not engaged in a comprehensive strategic assessment of its role in Mine Action, at the corporate level. The UNDP’s position is now becoming untenable. Performance and reputation risk for the UNDP have increased with:

a. Ongoing poor performance of UNDP-managed projects subject to political constraints. The result has been a general loss of credibility for Mine Action work in Iraq, with declining donor support.

b. Personalisation of advocacy work occurring in the absence of robust senior management oversight and policy engagement, and without consistent corporate messaging.

On the latter, UNDP advocacy has taken place at a high level, in a complex political and institutional dynamic, often informally and outside an established process. There is insufficient UNDP Senior Management oversight and support to anchor an advocacy strategy. In the absence of such an engagement, advocacy has become personalised between UNDP programme staff and Iraqi officials, across competing ministries. The approach is also not fully transparent, and lacks appropriate UNDP’s corporate support. In this context, the UNDP is highly vulnerable to shifts in personal relations as well as perceptions of whether it is impartial in its dealings with all stakeholders.23

Evaluation Ratings

Aggregate Ratings [5]

The Mine Action portfolio is assessed overall as Unsatisfactory (5). There are major shortcomings in achieving sector-level outcomes and outputs. Achievements against CPAP Outcome 5 were assessed as Unsatisfactory (5), the positive achievements of Victim Assistance projects notwithstanding. Relevance and strategic fit was assessed as Moderately Unsatisfactory (4), while the Validity of Design was also considered as Moderately Unsatisfactory (4). Though Primary responsibility for difficulties lies with the

22 It should be noted that UNDP was not the only international entity involved in Mine Action. Resources channelled through MNF-I and US organisations were many times larger than those channelled by the UNDP. In this regard, the UNDP was one actor in a much larger context.

23 UNDP advises that management support was limited at the period when the first and second national development strategies were being developed. As a result, the UNDP did not have the capacity to influence GoI policy or strategy. UNDP’s position is that Senior Management has been more engaged during recent years. Regardless, the evaluation did not find support necessary to address the political obstacles.
Government, the UNDP’s strategic approach to Mine Action has not benefitted from sufficient corporate support from the UNDP.

**Overview of the Mine Action in Iraq**

The full scope of Iraq's mine and ERW problem is not known. There have been no recent comprehensive surveys. The 2004 and 2006 *Landmine Impact Survey* (LIS) conducted in 13 of Iraq's 18 Governorates is out of date, and there have been no follow up surveys. The scope of the LIS was limited to populated areas, and many areas were not surveyed. There have been various regional surveys, including by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and clearance by the operations by military, private contractors and NGOs. Contractors are active, as oil production expands and contractors fill the commercial gap left by absence of effective State and civil society entities. However, there is no effective verification, quality assurance or coordination, and confidence in the *Information Management System for Mine Action* (IMSMA) as the national data source is low. The scope and quality of clearance, therefore, is not known.

Iraq signed the *Anti-Mine Ban Convention* (APMBC) in 2007. It is committed to destruction of stockpiles by 2012 and the clearance and destruction of all mines by 2018. International treaty obligations were to provide a normative framework for Iraq's national laws, regulation and institutions for achieved demining objectives. The quality of Iraq's engagement and reporting is mixed, and stakeholder confidence is low in the data being presented by Iraq in the annual *Transparency Reports*. The data itself is only as credible as Mine Action information systems. At present, Iraq is not on track to meet its convention deadlines for either stockpile destruction or clearance.

The main constraint on progress is the lack of effective Iraqi political support. Key issues related to the legislative, regulatory, institutional and operational framework are unresolved, eight years after the first national authority was created. Political intervention is required, and Prime Minister now chairs a Higher Committee on Mine Action. While considered a positive development, the Committee has no legal status, meets infrequently and has not moved legislation, contributed to strategy discussion or provided effective coordination. The committee has not resolved tensions between various Government ministries. Neither the Higher Committee nor another government entity provides oversight of the national institution building or clearance effort.

Mine Action, therefore, lacks political credibility and institutional coherence, and the effects of contamination are not prominent in Government planning. In particular, Mine Action does not appear in the last two Iraqi development strategy documents, or in the revised *Government Strategic Programme 2011-2014*. Also, there is no Mine Action strategic plan in place and under implementation.

Mine Action also has no legal status before law and the institutions created to implement have no such authority. Countries are expected to ratify enabling legislation on signing the Mine Ban Convention, providing a legal framework for mine action institutions, and the regulatory basis for operations. Legislation drafted in 2006 has not been ratified, and would need significant amendment. Stakeholders advised there is no current plan to put Mine Action on the 2012 legislative agenda.

National Mine Action does not have an effective institutional framework. Mine action was originally assigned to the MoP, and then moved to the MoE in 2008. In both situations, Mine Action has received limited institutional support. Under the current arrangement, the Directorate for Mine Action:

a. Does not appear in the Ministry of Environment's organisational structure or regulations. The DMA, therefore, lacks a legal and institutional framework for operations, which is compounded by the absence of national legislation. The affect is to undermine the DMA's authority, particularly in areas where responsibility is contested with other stakeholders.

b. Has been without a Director General (DG) since mine action was placed under the Ministry of Environment mandate almost four years ago. Stakeholders speculated that failure to assign a DG was the result of a partisan political dispute over the allocation of positions within the Ministry.

c. Lacks the qualified personnel to implement its functions, despite what stakeholders agree was a threefold growth in the number of staff since the transition from the MoP. There was a unanimous perception, in Government, the UN and donors, supported by reporting, that the DMA's lacks of technical competence is a binding constraint on its operations and credibility.
What is often described as a political tension between the DMA and other Government entities, therefore, has an institutional and technical dimension in the DMA’s limited ability to carry out its mandated functions. Institutional constraints are further complicated by partisan political dynamics and interpersonal conflicts between Iraqi officials. These dynamics have a material impact on effectiveness. Most seriously, there is a longstanding dispute between the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Defence over mandate and responsibilities. Among other consequences, tensions contributed to a MoD decision in December 2008 to stop all humanitarian demining, with the suspension lasting until August 2009. Agreement on a Memorandum of Understanding between the two ministries has produced only limited, uneven and selectively implemented cooperation and sharing of information. While reducing tensions, the agreement does not appear to have improved overall effectiveness.

In this context, the basic operating and coordination systems have either not been established or are ineffective and lack credibility. A 2011 assessment done by the UNDP found that of 41 core Mine Action requirements to meet international commitments and stated national objectives, only two have been completed. Eleven tasks were assessed as partially complete and 28 were incomplete or almost 70 percent of requirements. Beyond what is already noted, the incomplete requirements include:

a. Only one of three Regional Mine Action Centres (RMACs) has been established. The RMAC- South (RMAC-S) has limited capacity, resources and authority from the DMA to act as its regional implementing entity. The RMAC-S has no operations plan, ability to conduct surveys, task or coordinate operators, perform quality assurance tasks or verification, or collect data. These deficiencies have significant and negative implications for the scope and quality of clearance work in the South.

b. Basic systems and standards are not in place. Part of the National Mine Action Standards have been developed, but are not effectively implemented. The IMSMA and mine action data base are not functional, in part because of the poor quality of information entering the system. The capacity for surveys conducted to international standards is also limited, owing to the lack of qualified personnel.

Relevance and Strategic Fit [4]

The relevance of the Mine Action portfolio to the context in Iraq was high. Iraq is one the country’s most affected by mines and ERW. Contamination is a significant threat to human security, and a constraint to development and economic recovery. In particular, contamination will be an important constraint on development of Iraq’s petroleum sector, and related support sectors that extend out further into the economy. It is also essential to restore unused agricultural lands to production. Relevance to the UNDP was also high. The UNDP has a strong global competence in Mine Action, and a normative and corporate obligation to establish and sustain a programme. The UNDP established its presence in Mine Action early, and continues to be engaged. Arguably, the importance of the UNDP’s role has increased with slow progress and the decline in donor interest.

At the same time, the relevance of Mine Action to overall Government priorities is low. The position of the current Government appeared fragmented, and the current political crisis is likely to distract the Government from defining a policy. While Iraqi is a signatory to the Mine Ban Convention, treaty obligations are not yet integrated into Iraq’s legal, regulatory or institutional framework. Nor has the Government integrated Mine Action into its development priorities and planning. In particular, the two most recent national development planning documents do not mention Mine Action, nor does the 2011 Strategic Government Programme. These reflect the low political priority being given to Mine Action, with the exception of the northern Kurdish Governorates.

Relevance to CPAP Outcome 5 and economic recovery priorities is low. The Common Country Assessment identifies contamination as a constraint to economic growth (2008: 36), and the CPAP identifies “the removal of landmines and ERW as an important area of recovery work (2010: 10).” However, neither document develops the linkage between clearance and economic recovery. Individual Mine Action projects generally do not address development or economic recovery objectives. Also, the portfolio did not develop synergies with development activities, conducted by the UNDP or others. The exception was with livelihood activities related to Victim Assistance, which were a relatively small part of the overall portfolio. Mine Action, therefore, appears as a “legacy” portfolio placed in Outcome #5 as a matter of convenience rather than the programme relevance to UNDP economic recovery objectives. This is corporate-level planning responsibility.
Validity of Design/Re-design [4]

The original portfolio was based on a coherent design concept; establish the legal and institutional framework, develop capacity in the State and Civil Society and provide some service delivery in clearance and victim assistance until Iraqi entities were able to take them over. Projects were designed as mutually reinforcing, within this framework. The UNDP’s minor financial position relative to other international Mine Action stakeholders was offset by the quality of its technical assistance and advice, unique position relative to the international normative framework, and close relationship with Government. The UNDP also appeared to enjoy donor confidence, and a broadly held perception of impartiality in its dealings with all stakeholders. This perception of impartiality appeared particularly important during the period when the MNF-I was dominant.

Regardless, the strength of design has eroded over time, with the lack of progress establishing the institutional framework and termination of support to the RDO civil society organisation in Basra. There have been adjustments to strategy and projects within the programme unit. Principally, the UNDP shifted its strategic focus from the projects to advocacy, as the productivity of those resources declined. Regardless of the shift, there has been no UNDP mid-term assessment of portfolio strategy or relationship with Iraqi Counterparts. UN notes there have been several internal reviews, in 2009 and 2010-11. However, there has been no external evaluation of a project, or other form of review, to identify new approaches. Beyond basic planning and accountability functions, the lack of reflection and evaluation appeared reduced the flow of information internally and restricted access to outside thinking on how to address problems.

Design of the Victim Assistance projects remains strong, given the involvement of Government and the value-added of the UNDP contribution. The programmes have performed well, and there is a good synergy with other services being provided by the State. It appeared that most aspects of the programme will eventually be absorbed by the KRG, or otherwise receive financial support. In contrast, the design validity of continuing support to a civil society organisation in Basra is unclear. Support to nationalising the DDG is based in the same design concepts as support to the RDO, and there did not appear to be a strategic rethinking of the approach. Some stakeholders stated that establishing a national NGO in Iraq at the present is not an option, owing to the lack of donor interest given credibility and corruption issues.

Achievements (Implementation of Development Effectiveness) [4]

All Mine Action projects were DEX implemented. Projects related to institutional development and victim assistance were highly dependent on the performance of Government counterparts. UNDP had direct influence over the second component of strengthening civil society. Strategy and activities related to advocacy were generated by the UNDP, and are primary responsibility of the organization.

Project-level outcomes and outputs were not met for Strengthening Iraqi National Capacity component. After eight years, there is little evidence of progress towards the indicator of “regulatory framework and coordination mechanism based on Iraqi National Mine Action Standards and quality management established”. As a result, overall progress towards reducing contamination is modest, at best. The UNDP’s contribution was not directly linked to clearance, but the institutional frameworks through which clearance and the linkage to economic recovery could take place.

The UNDP has provided good-quality TA and advice over the duration of the portfolio. All Government stakeholders and donors demonstrated respect and appreciation for the UNDP’s role and the high quality of its personnel. Government stakeholders acknowledge their responsibility for constraints on the portfolio’s performance, and there were no specific criticisms of the UNDP’s performance.

Regardless, there is limited or no progress towards consolidating the legal, regulatory and institutional framework for Mine Action in Iraq. While there has was a recent and high level intervention (formation of the Higher Committee and the MOU between the MoE and MoD), there was no evidence that these actions will resolve the fundamental political and institutional constraints to Mine Action. Inter-personal tension between key Iraqi stakeholders is also a constraint to progress. The programme environment, therefore, remains volatile and difficult to predict. The significant investment of resources allocated to capacity development has not translated into improved operational efficiency within the DMA. Effectively, the DMA does not appear to have sufficient qualified persons, despite the significant growth in personnel.
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At the same time as it lacks the leadership of a Director General. Addressing the issue of capacity will be a difficult institutional issue.

Operational systems have either not been established, or are inefficient and lack credibility. There has been limited State-supported clearance that is consistent with international standards. Where clearance operations have taken place, by the State, non-governmental or private entities, information management system and quality assurance measures are either not in place, or not credible. It is not possible, therefore, to determine either the extent of contamination, the total area cleared or whether clearance was done in compliance with international standards. Regardless, existing data indicates that clearance has been modest. There was also little evidence that Mine Action will become an economic or development priority for Government. These are the main requirements of a linkage to economic recovery.

Project-level outcomes and outputs were not met for Support to Civil Society. UNDP withdrew its support from the Rafidain Demining Organisation in 2010, more than five years after the organisation was founded and three years after it registered as an independent organisation. The organization has since closed and the investment has been effectively lost. The evaluation confirmed there were serious deficiencies with the RDO’s management performance, operational record and organizational culture, consistent with UNDP reporting. No clearance targets were met, there was no effective cooperation with the RMAC little evidence of a focus on community-based action. As such, no expansion of demining capacity in civil society was achieved through the projects.

The UNDP made the correct decision to terminate support to the project, after efforts to improve RDO’s performance were unsuccessful. It did not appear that reform efforts would succeed given political and personal dynamics, and UNDP would have incurred an unacceptable level of risk. Levels of oversight and engagement appeared appropriate, including through the DDG. However, the UNDP played direct role in the design of the organisation and the original recruitment of personnel, and must accept the appropriate level of responsibility for the choices made.

The two Victim Assistance project generally met their objectives, and that results can be sustained. The UNDP has high credibility with KRG officials, based on the quality of its long-term support. The current projects include a development component, related to vocational training and livelihood support. The key enabling factor has been strong political and institutional support from the Kurdish Regional Authority, albeit hindered by a lack of clarity on institutional arrangements in recent years. Government official advised that departments in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah will be merged into a single authority for the region. Negotiations have been protracted, but officials believed the main issues were resolved and pending a political decision.

There was limited evidence that UNDP advocacy resulted in tangible results, including resolution of the core political and institutional obstacles to Mine Action. UNDP’s role in the area of advocacy is generally respected by Iraqi stakeholders. At different times, the UNDP contributed to the solution for an impasse, such as advice on the formation of a Higher Committee on Mine Action or the Memorandum of Understanding of between the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Defence. Regardless, the binding constraint on progress is a lack of political support within the Government of Iraq for Mine Action, at the national level. UNDP advocacy has not resulted in a change in this situation, which is arguably beyond the scope of the UNDP’s influence.

With limited corporate support, the UNDP’s advocacy strategy is also generating reputation risk. There has been limited UNDP Senior Management engagement with Mine Action programme, over the duration of the portfolio and including the recent period of impasse. UNDP did not appear to have a clear corporate position or consistent political messaging in its relationship with Government on Mine Action. This is in contrast with later programmes, such as the PSDP-I, where advocacy is clearly anchored in a corporate position. The latter was established with strong UNDP management support and Iraqi leadership, which provided a framework for contact with Iraqi officials.

In the absence of corporate position, Mine Action programme staff engaged in advocacy at the middle to senior-levels, with officials that have political-level reports. The nature of representation in ministries has become personalized over time, and the institutional tensions around Mine Action have an important interpersonal dimension. In this context, the UNDP engaged in a personalised style of advocacy, with individual officials across competing ministries. The process does not appear transparent to all counterparts. Within this dynamic, the UNDP also appears to be a personality in its own right rather than an impartial outside
party. There was evidence that stakeholder perception of the UNDP’s impartially is eroding, and at least one recent incident was a key counterpart has temporarily frozen its relationship with the UNDP as a result.

Future Mine Action programming does not appear to have a source of funding. Donor interest has declined in recent years, tracking an overall decline in donor confidence with Iraqi Mine Action. The DoS terminated its funding to the UNDP at the end of 2011, and transferred its support to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. The DoS advised that its choice is based on the need for “a new approach in Iraq”. While expressing its overall satisfaction with the UNDP, the DoS has also expressed its concern to the UNDP, over the past several years, that the UNDP Mine Action portfolio does not have a stronger international presence inside Iraq, and that the programme lacks senior management support.

The GICHD will be retained for many of the same advocacy and institutional roles that the UNDP is currently playing, in addition to an increased focus on clearance operations. It is unclear how the DoS understood the respective roles of the UNDP and the GICHD. Regardless, the DoS choice to switch its support to a non-governmental entity working in what should be the UNDP’s areas of core competence. With the DoS exit, AusAID remains the only active donor for UNDP programmes. Neither the national Mine Action effort nor the UNDP, therefore, have a clear source of international support for the future.

Effectiveness of Management Arrangements and Efficiency of Resource Use (3)

The overall effectiveness of the management and resource use has been satisfactory. Projects have been generally well managed, albeit with limited resources. Most projects have been subject to “no cost extensions”. However, implementation delays do not appear to be a significant performance factor, in part because they often relate to slow progress in Government itself. While there is a concern for the loss of investment in the RDO and the UNDP’s role in the initial decisions, it acted in a timely manner to terminate the relationship.

Overall effectiveness has been undermined by two factors. First is the lack of peer review and Senior Management oversight. Projects do not have governance structures bring together UNDP and stakeholders. UNDP oversight of substantive, advocacy and programme matters is limited and driven by the programme team itself. The affect is to isolate the projects within the larger Outcome 5 portfolio.

The second is an erosion of donor confidence results in decline of donor resources available. Trend means that international funding and support to Mine Action is not sustainable. Operational improvements at this point may not be sufficient to restore confidence and funding, given overall decline in assistance to Iraq. Also, two donors expressed concern about the limited amount of communication coming from the programme.

Result Orientation and Sustainability (4)

The direction of change for the Victim Assistance projects in the Kurdish governorates is positive, and the portfolio outcomes will likely be met. Government is committed to strengthening services, and either integrating them into the public health portfolio or otherwise supporting NGOs. Related commitments are integrated into policy, and the UNDP’s long term role in strengthening Mine Action is highly appreciated. The programme offers a positive example of UNDP provided well targeted support, and eventually withdrawing as government and national NGOs assume full responsibility. There is also the possibility for continuing donor support, as the current donor expresses satisfaction with results and a commitment for the future.

The direction of change for the remaining component of the Mine Action programme appears negative. Outcomes have not been met, and there was no indication of significant changes in the position or performance of national counterparts. In particular, core issues related to inter-Ministerial tensions have not been effectively addressed, and concerns over the lack of effective capacity in the DMA remain. While structures are in place, there is a requirement for political action on the legal and institutional framework that does not appear forthcoming. At the same time, there was no indication of future donor support to UNDP for future work, at the institutional level or for work with DDG to support the creation of an NGO in the South. Some trends may be negative, as clearance activities undertaken by private contractors are conducted outside of international standards, verification, reporting, coordination or oversight.
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UNDP’s role is highly appreciated by all counterparts, as an advocate of Mine Action and provider of technical assistance and knowledge on international standards and processes. However, these have not resulted in the required changes in policy or the institutional framework, and have not resulted in the outcome of clearance or improving the conditions for economic growth. The current advocacy strategy has also reached its limits. As such, indirect results for the Iraqi population are also limited. The UNDP’s current position in Mine Action is becoming untenable, and has reached the point where a strategic reassessment of the programme is required.

Mine Action Project Output to Outcome Linkage

The linkage between project outputs and mine action outcomes is modest. The commensurate actions have not significantly reduced the threat to human security or constraints on economic development. The exception is in the Kurdish Governorates, where an effective mine action programme has been developed over two decades. Primary responsibility for mine action rests with GoI. To date, the Government has not taken the necessary steps to consolidate the Iraq’s institutional framework, beginning with approval of a legislative and regulatory framework and clarifying arrangements between the different institutional stakeholders. In this context, clearance activities are being done with limited or no Government oversight, adequate reporting, or to comply with international humanitarian standards.

UNDP has provided significant number of outputs related to mine action since 2004. These were delivered within a unified strategy, and are considered to be of good quality. However, the basic framework conditions needed to translate project outputs into improved national mine action outcomes do not exist. Outputs related to institutional development have not been effectively used by Government, or by a civil society organisation in Basra. Accordingly, the project is not able to compensate for the absence of effective Iraqi institutional arrangements and capacity.

UNDP’s internal capacity to improve mine action outcomes is undermined by limited corporate support for advocacy work. The main problem constraining progress is political uncertainty. Without consistent engagement at the corporate level, including the possibility of channelling a broader group of international stakeholders, advocacy has limited possibility for changing political dynamics.

The situation for Mine Action is becoming untenable for UNDP. Cooperation is increasingly difficult to justify, especially when the Government does not improve its performance. Also, donor support will continue to erode, as institutional constraints remain unresolved. In this regard, the institutional component of the Mine Action programme is reaching a critical moment. The lack of progress at the national level, accompanied by increased risk and declining donor interest requires that UNDP urgently reassess its strategy for Mine Action.

Recommendations

The UNDP should conduct a review of its Mine Action programme, on an urgent basis. The purpose of the review should be to: (i) identify whether the conditions exist for future UNDP engagement with Mine Action in Iraq; and (ii) based on the findings, propose strategic options for continued support or withdrawal.

The review will serve as the basis for any future programme or withdrawal plan, and requires full support and engagement from Senior Management. It should be supported by independent experts, in research and facilitation roles. So far, the portfolio has generally not had sufficient peer review, and requires a knowledgeable but independent perspective. Mine Action stakeholders from the Government, civil society and the international community could be invited to participate as appropriate. Also, the UNDP Mine Action portfolio 2004 to 2011 should be subject to an independent evaluation during 2012, consistent with UNDP policy and procedures. While the review and evaluation may be mutually reinforcing, they should be conducted as separate exercises.
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2.5 Electricity Infrastructure

Introduction

Two CPAP Outcome 5 projects were implemented in the power sector. Rehabilitation of the Mussaiab Thermal Power Station (TPS) near Baghdad was approved in late 2004, and funded through the UNDG ITF for completion by 2007. The Mussaiab project was one of 18 early UNDP interventions in the power sector, with an approximate value of US$190 million funded either by bilateral donors or the UNDG ITF.

Projects had the overall objective of responding to the immediate crisis resulting from the collapse of the power system in 2003. The second project was approved in 2009, in the framework of the Loan Management programme. The project was implemented in the Kurdish Governorate, after the grid had been stabilised and government was making a significant investment in rehabilitating power infrastructure and expanding generation capacity. The two projects, therefore, were different in their objectives and the role played by the UNDP.

The Electrical Power Sector Outcome

The overall trend in the electrical power sector is for improvement; of generating capacity, the stability of the power grid and transmission systems. The trend is based on significant investments made into the sector during recent years, from Government and increasingly private sector investment. The positive trend is most pronounced in the Kurdish governorate. Nevertheless, production met only about 40 to 50 percent of the estimated demand in 2011, with real supressed demand not known. Power supply remains a significant constraint to Iraq’s economic development, and a source of political sensitivity and social tension.

Iraq’s electrical power system was in crisis at the start of 2003, the result of long-term degradation of infrastructure, conflict-related damage, looting and the lack of institutional capacity and resources to maintain the grid. The UN/World Bank Iraq Joint Needs Assessment estimated that, in 1990, the total generating capacity was about 9,295 megawatts (MW) servicing a peak demand of about 5,100 MW. Approximately 87 percent of the population had full time access to electricity.

During the 1991 Gulf War, the generation stations were damaged and generation capacity was reduced to 2,325 MW. The transmission system also suffered significant damage. Problems were compounded by lack of basic maintenance during the sanctions period. Generation capacity had declined to approximately 4,500 MW, just prior to the May 2003 military action. When the UN/World Bank Iraq Joint Needs Assessment was conducted in October 2003, capacity had fallen to about 3,300 MW or half the total potential load of 6,500-7,000 MW and one third of pre-1991 generation capacity. Billing and revenue collection for electricity had also ceased (UN and World Bank 2003: 28-30).

Since 2004, the trend has been for a gradual recovery in generating capacity and rehabilitation of the transmission system, with improved stability in the grid. Generation recovered to pre-2003 levels of 5,000 MW by 2007, and increased to over 8,500 MW by 2011. Generation capacity, therefore, approximately doubled between 2003 and 2011. An estimated 7,000 MW from contracts signed in between 2008 and 2010 is scheduled to be on-grid by 2013, almost doubling again the current capacity. Iraq’s Electricity Masterplan 2010-2030 further calls for a tripling of generation capacity over the next 20 years.\(^\text{24}\)

A similar situation existed in the three northern Kurdish governorates. The project document reports a decreasingly power supply, from 700 MW in 1991, to 300 MW in 1998 and approximately 400 MW in 2006. RMEK estimated that about 25 percent of household demand was being met in 2007, resulting in lengthy power interruptions. Much of the population depended on private generators. As of 2011, the Kurdish Regional Authority stated that generating capacity had reached 1,700 MW of generating capacity, with

\(^{24}\) According to Iraq’s Electricity Master Plan, by 2030 power demand in Iraq will total 46GW in a high end scenario, about 32GW in a base case and roughly 22GW in a low end scenario. About US$29 billion of investment will be necessary between 2015 and 2030, from public and private sources. [http://admin.iraqupdates.net/p_articles.php/article/84503](http://admin.iraqupdates.net/p_articles.php/article/84503)
opening of the 500 MW gas power station at Kwashi during 2011-12. Together with rehabilitation and expansion of the transmission system, the grid provided households with an average of 20 hours of electricity a day in 2011. The KRG has set a target of uninterrupted coverage by 2015.25

Improvements to the system are based on allocation of significant public resources, and private sector investments. The current National Development Plan 2010-2014 identifies electricity as “the primary infrastructure for development in the production and service sectors”. The NDP allocates an investment of 18.6 billion over the five years, or ten percent of the plan's total investment (2010: 18).

Yet, Iraq's current demand for electricity is roughly double the generating capacity, and this gap is widening as Iraq’s economy and population grow. Unmet demand has remained between 40 and 50 percent of generated power since 2004, with demand of up to 15000MW estimated against supply of 8500 MW by 2011 (IAU 2010). Demand, therefore, has increased by 75 percent since 2004. Suppressed demand is not known; the amount of electricity that could be consumed if it was available. The real extent of unmet demand, therefore, is likely understated. The supply-demand gap is forecast to extend beyond 2015 (IAU 2010).

There is no official data on the economic impact of the supply-demand gap. However, one private sector analyst put the cost to the Iraqi economy of unmet electrical demand at US$40 billion in 201126 (40 percent of Iraq’s estimated GDP of US$ 98 billion for 2011; IMF 2011: 16).

As a result of the supply-demand gap, most Iraqis receive an average of six to eight hours a day of electricity from the public grid (IAU 2010). The situation in the Kurdish Governorates is better, with the RMEK reporting an average daily coverage of 20 hours in 2011. The majority of Iraqis purchase electricity for home use from expensive neighbourhood generating systems or use private generators. A 2011 Government and UN survey found that, on average households’ receive 14.6 hours of electricity per day through a combination of the public network or private generators.27 Still, an estimated 25 percent of Iraqis have no access to electricity from a source other than the public grid (IAU 2010). The gap has produced social protest, and resulted in the quality of electrical service becoming a sensitive and high priority political area.

Public opinion polls show a high and consistent level of public discontent with the quality of electricity service. IAU 2010 reporting cites an improvement in public opinion over the quality of electricity supply, from 8 percent approval in 2006 to 38 approval at the end of 2007 (2010). The IAU attributed improvements to increased supply (2010). However, public opinion polls since then indicate no improvement beyond the 20 to 30 percent range, with regional variations:

- A 2012 national poll done by Oxford Research International found that 64 percent of Iraqis had a negative view of the supply of electricity.28
- A 2011 survey done jointly by the GoI and the UN found that: 35 percent of households believe that electricity should be the top priority for improvement – a higher proportion than any other service, and; 79 percent of households’ rate electricity service as “bad” or “very bad”. 90 percent of households supplement the public network with private generators.29
- An earlier 2010 national poll from the International Republican Institute concluded 66 percent of Iraqis believed poor public service delivery, including electricity, was the most serious problem facing the country. Nationally, 60 percent of respondents stated the situation had gotten worse, compared to only

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27 http://abcnews go.com/sections/world/GoodMorningAmerica/Iraq_anniversary_poll_040314.html
28 The IKN is part of a Socio-Economic Monitoring System being developed by the Government of Iraq jointly with the United Nations. The survey of socio-economic statistics was collected in 2011 from around 29,000 households at the district level in all 18 governorates of Iraq. http://www.iauiqra.org/ikn
29
18 percent who believed the situation was better and 22 percent who said it was the same. Perception varied by region, with the Ninewa Governorate showing 80 percent dissatisfaction.  

- Public opinion was most positive in the Kurdish region, where the 2010 IRI poll found 60 percent of respondents believed electricity service had improved over the previous year, nine percent said it was the same, 20 percent somewhat worse and only 12 percent responded that the situation was much worse. Numbers reflect fast recovery of the power grid, and greater progress towards uninterrupted coverage.

The polls show a growing concern with economic issues, corruption, employment and the delivery of public goods and services as security conditions improved after 2009. Electricity emerged as an issue of high political sensitivity, including in the large-scale protests that occurred in Iraq during mid-2010 through to February 2011. Promises to improve service and achieve uninterrupted electricity supply to homes and business was a core commitment outlined in the Strategic Government Plan 2010-2014, presented as the Government’s response to growing public pressure.

Project Overview: Emergency Rehabilitation of Mussaiab Power Station- Stage II

Mussaiab Thermal Power Station was built in 1987 by Hyundai Engineering and designed by Hitachi of Japan. The station is one of the largest in Iraq, and considered one of the most important because of its location near the capital city of Baghdad. It supplies the capital and the centre of Iraq, and is essential to the stability of the overall national grid.

The station has four units, each with an original capacity exceeding 300 MW. It suffered from rocket attack during the 1990 conflict, which caused it to be shut down for seven years. The station was restarted in 1997. However, the shortage of spare parts and lack of proper scheduled maintenance during the sanction years resulted in further degradation. The Mussaiab project results matrix included the following elements.

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**Mussaiab Thermal Power Station Results Matrix**

The original development objective of the Mussaiab project was “respond to the immediate humanitarian needs of war-affected Iraqi people through ensuring reliable and safe electricity supply to all consumer categories, in particular key humanitarian essential services.” (2005)

**Outcome 1:** The generating capacity, reliability, availability, and efficiency of Unit No.1 (now Unit No. 4) of Mussaiab Thermal Power Station increased. (Unit 1 changed to Unit 4 as of Q2 2010).

**Outcome 2:** Plant staff able to conduct complete maintenance and full repairs of thermal units utilizing latest available technology, modern tools, and state-of-art software for unit maintenance and overhauls.

**Outcome 3:** Core team of MoE staff specialized in

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30 2009 polling by the IRI found that 23 percent of Iraqis believed that poor basic service delivery was the most important problem facing Iraq, climbing to 66 percent by 2010. At the same time, 43 percent cited security as the main concern in 2009, declining to 24 percent in 2010.  
Polling numbers fluctuate, depending on security conditions. For example, security concerns spiked again during the 2010 elections.  

the overall condition assessment of thermal units trained in the application of state-of-art maintenance management software for monitoring, recording, reporting and planning future maintenance of thermal units in the MoE Fleet.  

The Mussaiab project was implemented over two stages. This evaluation focused on Stage II, although the output from Stage I was considered as material to the performance of the second stage. Total budget for Stage II of the project was US$33 million. An additional US$15 million was allocated to Stage I, for a total value of US$48 million. The UNDP project was part of a larger rehabilitation plan that is ongoing. The project was to focus on Unit 1 of the four units. It is the first unit operational in the station and management believed that Unit 1 was in the most urgent need of repairs. Rehabilitation of other three units was to follow, from different funding sources.

The Mussaiab project has experienced significant implementation delays. Stage I was approved in late 2004, with start-up in 2005. The combined duration of Stage I (assessment, ordering of parts, and training of personnel) and Stage II (training and installation) was set at two years. The project was ongoing as of December 2011. Final Stage II works are scheduled for completion by mid-2012. This evaluation verified that the remaining installation contracts have been signed and completion is probable. Final project duration by the closing date, therefore, will be approximately eight years for completion of both components. Stage II duration will reach four to five years.

Some project components have been completed, and made operational during 2009-10. They are already contributing to the stability of power generation and station maintenance. In this regard, it is not accurate to focus on final implementation as the sole indicator of project results. However, with the exception of early training, even the components made operational were either subject to significant delays, or resulted from changes in scope.

The project was approved within the early UNDP cooperation framework, and the UN Assistance Strategy. While the spirit of the original outputs remains valid, there have been changes in the scope of the project and its outputs. These responded either to emergency requirements as they have emerged, or implementation bottlenecks.

The Mussaiab Power Station Outputs

**Overall Assessment**

Emergency Rehabilitation of Mussaiab Power Station- Stage II will be finalized in 2012, and will achieve its revised output objectives. The project will contribute to the restoration of the power generation capacity at the Mussaiab Power Station, and improve reliability through reduced shutdowns. As a result, overall stability of the power grid will be enhanced. This statement is made noting that the project will influence only a portion of the station’s overall capacity; one of four boiler units.

However, the value of final outputs is diminished by lengthy implementation delays, which saw the project extend to eight years rather than the originally planned two years (Stage I and Stage II combined). The project was effectively dormant during a critical period, at the height of Iraq’s energy crisis. As such, the project has contributed to the medium term stabilisation of the grid, but was delivered after the emergency period that it was originally intended to address. The overall inability of Government and international entities to improve performance of the grid during this period had an effect on political stability, and humanitarian, recovery and development efforts. Difficult field conditions were a factor. However, the main cause of delays appears to be flaws embedded in the project design, aggravated by limited UNDP engagement during the critical 2007 to 2009 period.

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32 There have been various formulations of the project level outcome and output statements, responding to changes in project scope. This formulation is taken from project reporting after 2010, during the current CPAP period.
As a result, the project did not achieve its indicator of improving public perception of power service delivery. Public perception has worsened over the project’s implementation life. This reflects growing public frustration over slow progress delivering improvements to the grid, and the effect of extended power outages in the daily lives of citizens. In this regard, the Mussaiab Power Station project was a small part of the overall problem. The indicator itself was inappropriate and beyond the scope of the project’s influence, given that the project was to restore 60-80 MW to a power grid that was functioning between 5000 and 8000 MW during the project period. As such, the project had limited ability to improve public opinion.

**Evaluation Ratings**

**Aggregate [3]**

The Mussaiab project is assessed as being Moderately Satisfactory (3). Relevance and Strategic Fit were assessed as Moderately Satisfactory (3), as was Achievements. Concern over the Validity of Design and Management Arrangements resulted in a rating of Moderately Unsatisfactory (4). However, Outcome Orientation and Sustainability were positive, and assessed at Satisfactory (2).

**Relevance and Strategic Fit [3]**

The project had high relevance to the Iraqi context. Power shortages remain a binding constraint on Iraq’s development. Shortages are also the focus of social discontent, and have high political sensitivity. The sector has received significant investment from the donor community, and increasingly from the Government of Iraq. It is identified in the *National Development Strategy* (2007) and the *National Development Plan* (2101) as a priority sector, and central to Iraq’s economic infrastructure. The government’s Strategic Programme 2011-2014 commits to “uninterrupted provision of electricity” to business and homes.

The choice of the Mussaiab Power Station was also strategic. The station is one of the largest in the country and located near Iraq’s largest population centre. Its output is essential to the overall stability of the national grid.

The project had good relevance to early UN and UNDP country planning. However, relevance declines under the current planning framework. The CPAP Outcome of “enabling policy and frameworks for rapid economic recovery” now focuses on upstream contributions rather than the actual provision of physical infrastructure. The Mussaiab project supported institutional development its initial training component, support to procurement and technical assistance. Declining relevance was the result of implementation delays, which moved the Mussaiab Power Station into the CPAP portfolio as a legacy project.

Relevance to the UNDP’s core institutional competence was low. There was strong demand for the UNDP to become involved in the power sector during 2004 to 2006, including from donors funding through the UNDG ITF. UNDP subsequently managed a total of five projects worth US$ 180 million, over a broad geographic area. It appears to have built sector competence over time. However, UNDP did not have a global institutional capacity and qualified personnel to draw on early in Stage I, affecting UNDP’s management performance.

**Validity of Design/Re-design [4]**

Important flaws were embedded into the design of the project. Design played a central role in implementation delays, including in the transition from Stage I to Stage II and during the period 2007-09 when the project was effectively dormant. UNDP project management and oversight during this period appeared inadequate, and unable to provide the level of leadership and engagement needed to resolve implementation bottlenecks. Regardless, UNDP, the donor and Mussaiab station management negotiated a revision the project scope and implementation arrangements in 2010, which enabled completion.

**Achievements (Implementation of Development Effectiveness) [3]**

The project will make a contribution to restoring the Mussaiab’s generating capacity, stabilizing the power grid and improving reliability of generation. Final project outputs will not be consistent with the original design. However, the outputs will be consistent with the spirit of the original project and are still relevant. Changes to the scope of work responded to an urgent need; the collapse of Unit 4 and the loss of 110 MW of generation capacity into the national grid. The changes were assessed by the evaluation engineer as
being the correct response under the circumstances. While restoring capacity, the project will not “add” 60 to 80 MW of new generation capacity to the grid, as foreseen in the results matrix. among the outputs achieved:

a. Thirty four station personnel were trained, in a timely manner. The training was conducted overseas by a qualified provider, to appropriately qualified personnel. It was considered by station officials and beneficiaries to be of high quality and relevance. The new technical capacity has been used extensively by the station, for both the UNDP project and in general operations. The site visit verified the majority of the personnel are still with the station four to five years later.

b. Parts order during Stage I and Stage II arrived during 2008 and 2009, after prolonged delays. The parts were verified as being in good condition and either installed, pending installation and in reserve and being stored under appropriate conditions. However, delays and the need to order parts in two trances resulted in a reduction of resources available for the purchases. Also there were gaps in the first ordering that required a second order, prolonging implementation.

c. The scope of works shifted in 2010, from Unit 1 to Unit 4. The project restored 110 MW of capacity, after production dropped down from 200 MW to 90 MW due to a problem with the economizer. Replacement of the economizer was accomplished by station personnel in a cost effective manner, well below the external contract price and using project parts. The boiler is operational, and is more reliable now than before. The percentage of stoppage was reduced from 53 percent to 38 percent due to the replacement of the economizer tubes.

d. Unit 4 replaced Unit 1 for boiler repair up to a height of 25 metres, subsequent to the collapse. The repair is forecast to extend the operational life of the unit for another 5 to 10 years, also reducing unit tripping and number of outages.

e. The change of Unit 1 boiler local control system improved the reliability of the boiler operation significantly and reduced the stoppage hours of the unit through better control and operating system. This output was not originally foreseen, and was accomplished by station personnel.

f. The tender to repair the boiler of No. 4 Unit was put into international bidding, after prolonged delays. A Russian Company has been contracted to overhaul the unit at a cost of US$6.5 million, significantly below the estimated quote of US$38 million from Hitachi. Rehabilitation will begin by end of 2011, with six months contracted for completion. With finalisation of works, the project will reach operational closure.

The project, therefore, will reach a successful conclusion. However, the value of the outputs is undermined by significant delays. There was a four to six year period where little was delivered, and money was expended on administration. During this period, there was no improvement in the power output of the station. Delays indirectly contributed to instability in the overall grid during the peak years of electricity shortage, and also indirectly to social discontent over ineffective power delivery. In this regard, the CPAP Indicator of “change in national level perception of improved electricity supply” has not been met.

Effectiveness of Management Arrangements and Efficiency of Resource Use [4]

The project has an eight year history, beginning with Stage I in 2004-5. UNDP, donor and Ministry of Electricity personnel have changed on numerous occasions. Only personnel at the power station have been constant since the beginning. There are important gaps in the institutional memory prior to 2009, therefore, and the actual rationale for approach and decisions was not always clear. In particular, there were gaps related to the Stage I assessment and parts procurement, which contributed to downstream implementation delays between 2007 and 2009.

Project implementation shows a significant improvement after 2009, in part resulting from a change in UNDP project management and the implementation modality. UNDP worked effectively with Iraqi officials and the donor to resolve implementation bottlenecks, and complete procurement for the final output. The process was complex, and UNDP project management showed robust engagement, innovation and a high

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33 The evaluation notes that wording of the results matrix may have changed over time.
degree of technical competence. UNDP’s role during this phase was highly appreciated by Iraqi and donor officials.

Before 2009 implementation delays were, in part, the result of prevailing conditions. Extreme security conditions were a hindrance, as was political instability and factors such as transport. However, delays appeared to primarily result from design, and the management and commercial arrangements embedded in the project. As key elements:

a. There were planning gaps in Stage I that resulted in a second round of ordering being required. Also, UNDP under-estimated the amount of time it would take to procure, order and receive the custom parts for a thermal generating system. Delivery took up to two years for some items. According to the evaluation engineer’s assessment “the allocation of the money for Stage I should have included the order of all the material required for the rehabilitation work for both Stages.” As a result, little progress was made between 2006 and 2009, while waiting for the parts to arrive.

b. The original design and allocated of ear-marked Japanese funds through the Iraq Trust Fund assigned supervision responsibility for rehabilitation works to Hitachi, which was one of the original suppliers to construction during the 1980s. The Ministry advised it would not be able to complete the works, and asked for a change in the implementation modality allowing transfer of all works to Hitachi. In turn, Hitachi was not able to establish a presence in Iraq due to security conditions. Its quotes for parts and installation for repairs to Unit 4 were higher than the total project budget, resulting in the Mussaiab management needed to procure through other sources. Negotiations with Japan to untie the assistance and open to an international tender took one year, and additional time was lost through re-tendering.

c. During this period between 2007 and 2009, UNDP engagement in the project appeared limited. Government was highly dissatisfied with the quality and extent of support, and with apparent delays in response from UNDP. In particular, there appeared to be limited engagement to resolve implementation bottlenecks and to consolidate forward planning.

Result Orientation and Sustainability [2]

The result orientation of the project is good, and works are likely to be sustained. Project outputs have either been completed, or can reasonably be expected for completion in the near future. The quality of works is good, and power station authorities have demonstrated the capacity to maintain them. In this regard, the project made an important contribution to training personnel that is showing in general maintenance operations. Power generation is a national priority, and state investment is increasing. There are also large internationally funded works being undertaken at the Mussaiab Power Station, with several other units being rehabilitated. Significant delays notwithstanding, the project will contribute to restoring original generation capacity and improved reliability.

Project Overview: Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project in Kurdistan Region (Stage II)

The Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project (Stage II) in the Kurdistan Region was based on the following results matrix:

| UNDAF 2.1: People in Iraq have improved access to equal job and income opportunities in a diversified and competitive market economy |

The project does document does include an outcome statement. There are four original outputs:

Output 1: Testing equipment delivered and commissioned
Output 2: Mobile substations delivered and commissioned
Output 3: Materials and Equipment for
Rehabilitation of the Distribution system completed

**Output 4**: Substation constructed and operation initiated

The project was based on a cost-sharing agreement between the RMEK and the UNDP, and the first project implemented within the JICA Loan Management portfolio. It had high visibility, therefore, for all stakeholders. The UNDP was contracted by the RMEK as the Implementing Agency, using the DEX modality. UNDP provides technical assistance and project management support. The Donor is the Government of Japan, through the Loan Management Agreement. In this regard, the project budget is an allocation from the larger Loan Project of USD 150 million.

Total approved budget for the UNDP component of the project was US$ 6.4 million. The project benefited from appreciation of the Japanese Yen against the US dollar. Additional revenue was reinvested in the project, increasing the total number of outputs from four to seven. The project was ongoing and nearing completion, within the approximate time frame of the original plan. The primary deliverables were installed and operational, and the additional outputs are under implementation.

Performance has been enhanced by the combination of strong Government ownership and investment, and by project governance, oversight, and quality assurance system. UNDP, the donor and Government are fully engaged in the process. These create good enabling conditions for project success.

Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project in Kurdistan Region Outputs

**Evaluation Ratings**

**Aggregate [2]**

The Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project in Kurdistan Region is assessed as being Satisfactory (2). Strategic Fit and Relevance, Validity of Design, Achievements, Efficiency of Resource Use and Outcome Orientation and Sustainability are all assessed as either Satisfactory or Highly Satisfactory. Overall performance, therefore, is robust.

**Relevance and Strategic Fit [2]**

The relevance of the project is satisfactory, to the priorities established in the Iraqi National Development Plan, and by the Kurdish Regional Government. Relevance to the requirements of the Government of Japan as the donor entity is also satisfactory, as the UNDP is providing a management service that is consistent with the requirements of Japanese assistance. In particular, the UNDP has provided an effective support working with the RMEK to apply Japanese procurement and management standards, which are a condition of disbursing funds.

Relevance to the strategic orientation of the CPAP portfolio is also good. The project falls within the framework of the Loan Management Agreement, and an emerging UNDP competence in the area of fiduciary management and oversight. In this regard, it is consistent with the UNDP’s upstream orientation. The UNDP is not implementing physical works, but providing project management support, procurement and technical assistance and financial management advice to RMEK. The UNDP placed in the field a competent technical and administration team, which is respected by the RMEK and the donor for its performance.

**Validity of Design/Re-design [1]**

The project is NEX implemented. The evaluation did not have a mandate to conduct a technical review of the design, as it did in the case of the Mussaiab project. Rather, the evaluation focused on arrangements related to the UNDP component and role.

The project is national owned, and the RMEK has demonstrated a high level of commitment and engagement. The project is being implemented within a comprehensive KRG power sector plan, with an estimated budget of US$800 million for 2011. It was designed according to Government specifications and
priorities. Government assumes responsibility for the soft loan, for funding other components of the system and operations and maintenance. Government, therefore, is highly invested in the success of the project.

Project design included robust national and international oversight, before approval and release of funds by the donor. All design and implementation components were subject to technical support by the UNDP and were vetted by the Donor, within the Loan Management framework. Technical and fiduciary governance, therefore, appear good and contribute to quality.

The UNDP has played high quality advisory, technical and implementation roles, within the scope of its current operational competence. In additional oversight of physical implementation, UNDP has provided important support to the RMEK in the area of procurement. Government emphasised UNDP support with understanding and meeting Japanese procurement standards has contributed to timely implementation, and strengthened the RMEK’s capacity. The UNDP contribution in this area has contributed to reducing procedural delays.

The Project Document has a good risk identification and management component, in contrast to many of the other CPAP legacy projects. The project has also benefited from lower risk levels than in other parts of the Iraq, and a more stable institutional environment.

Achievements (Implementation of Development Effectiveness) [2]

Implemented has occurred within the scope and spirit of the original plan. The project has not suffered significant delays or cost over-runs. Several outputs have been added, resulting from savings and earnings from favourable exchange rates. The scope of work, therefore, has expanded and the project will exceed its original design specifications.

Primary works are in place, operational and/or pending handover in the near future. RMEK officials advise that that works are already adding to the reliability of the grid, as per specifications. Government and the donor expressed strong satisfaction with the quality and level of the UNDP’s engagement, in its advisory, technical, administrative and implementation dimensions. Neither identified a significant performance shortcoming.

Through the Loan Management Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Iraq, the UNDP is demonstrating a competence in the strategic role as a fiduciary agent. These roles have often been allocated to multilateral financial institutions, but represent an important future opportunity as both international aid architectures changes to favour pooled modalities, and cooperation with Iraq moves from grants to soft loans and technical assistance.

At the same time, the UNDP has successfully competed in the market place as an implementer. While the KRG may have been obligated to accept the UNDP as a fiduciary agent, it has no such obligation to use the UNDP as a technical advisor or in implementing roles. Government officials stated that UNDP has provided a high quality and cost effective service, with a level of reliability and commitment that meets or exceeds private contractors currently implementing other projects. In this regard, the UNDP is earning its role in a competitive and market-based environment.

Effectiveness of Management Arrangements and Efficiency of Resource Use [2]

Government’s sole concern was that the UNDP does not have a permanent presence in Erbil, responsible for project management. The lack of permanent field presence in Erbil has hindered effective communication and contributed to delays, on occasions where daily interaction is needed. UNDP has one national distribution engineer since 2010 and dispatched one international substation engineer to lead a subproject, in 2010. The UNDP is considering having a permanent project management capacity in Erbil, but does not currently have one.

Result Orientation and Sustainability [1]

The result orientation of the project is Highly Satisfactory. The UNDP implemented components have been handed over to Government, or are pending handover, and are part of the regional power grid. Government has made a significant investment in the power sector (estimated US$800 million in the 2011 budget), and both generation and reliability have improved. RMEK officials advised that the grid is currently supplying up to 22 hours of power a day and meeting a greater portion of demand. The works delivered by
UNDP add reliability and stability. Government capacity is growing, and there was material evidence that Government is able to sustain the works provided.

Power Sector Projects Output to Outcome Linkages

Scope of Contribution from Legacy Projects

UNDP’s contribution to outcomes in the electricity should be placed in the context of the sector’s overall scope, of 18 early projects and works within the Loan Management portfolio. These expenditures were targeted for the period 2004 to 2007, although many projects were granted extensions. The UNDP estimates that projects restored 350 MW to the grid as of August 2010, in addition to development of policy, planning and training. Whatever their value, these contributions were modest compared to the overall scope of investment and power generation:

a. An estimated US$8.8 billion was invested in stabilising and rehabilitating the grid during the critical period between 2003 and 2007, relative to the US$ 190 million channelled through UNDP projects.

b. UNDP estimates that the GoI invested an additional US$22.7 billion into the electricity sector between 2006 and 2010 (42 percent recurrent and 48 percent capital expenditure), supplemented by further international support.

c. Overall production ranged from a low of 4,000 MW in 2004, to approximately 8500 MW by 2011, relative to the UNDP contribution to generating capacity of 350 MW. The value of the Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project in Kurdistan Region was US$6.5 million, for repair of transmission infrastructure.

The possibility of UNDP projects to influence outcomes, therefore, was modest. Regardless, the 2009 UNDP Outcome Evaluation concluded that “… the supply increase [from UNDP projects] helped to avert an even greater crisis” (2009: 7). In this context the UNDP’s “unique contribution has been to contain the damage which might otherwise have been more severe.” The projects were also intended to focus on strategic sites, to leverage the impact of the investment. According to the evaluation, “the work has provided early on emergency power generation with a focus on hospital and water pumping stations and recovered power generation from the past by providing respectable output of old units which has assisted in the population in accessing electricity earlier” (2009: 32).

Mussaiab Power Station Project Output to Outcome Linkage

Sector outcomes show a mixed trend of expanding capacity and investment, but with improvements lagging behind the growth in demand and increasing public discontent with the quality of service. The Outcome 5 portfolio had the possibility of interacting with both aspects of the trend.

There is no linkage between the sector-level outcomes of expanded generation capacity and the Mussaiab project, prior to 2009-10. The project did not start contributing power to the grid prior to 2009-10, and the linkage will not be completed until mid-2012 when works are finalised. Contributions are still valued by the Government. However, project outputs are coming on-grid well after the critical 2003 to 2007 period, at a time when the power supply was already improving. In this regard, there was also no linkage between the final outputs, the project’s original objective of “respond[ing] to the immediate humanitarian needs of war-affected Iraqi people” or the 2009 evaluation finding that UNDP projects mitigated the worst impacts of the electricity crisis.

There was a potential negative linkage between the Mussaiab project and public discontent with electricity supplies. The project could not contribute to the improved public perception reported by IAU up to 2007. However, long implementation delays, for which Government, UNDP, and the donor share responsibility, would have indirectly contributed to the public discontent shown in polling numbers after 2008, when a majority of Iraqis perceived that the quality of service was getting worse. As it was not producing, it could not contribute to improving opinion, or otherwise mitigate public discontent. Rather, long implementation delays, the shared responsibility of Government, UNDP, and the donor, would be more likely to aggravate public scepticism of Government performance.

Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project in Kurdistan Region
There was a direct and positive linkage between the Kurdistan project and sector outcomes for both aspects of the trend. The project has been delivered in a timely manner, and is contributing to stability of the power grid and the transmission systems. To the extent that improved hours and reliability of serve has resulted in positive public opinion, the project has also made progress towards Outcome 5 indicator, albeit at a regional and not national level. UNDP’s strong performance also opens the possibility for future roles in the management of similar projects.

Recommendation

This evaluation understands that the UNDP will not be involved in future direct implementation projects for rehabilitation of the electrical power infrastructure, consistent with the Mussaiab model. Accordingly, no recommendation is made.

The Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project in Kurdistan Region and the UNDP’s role in the Loan Management project were based on a new model, where the UNDP provides effective fiduciary and operational management for Government and Donors. UNDP’s performance and core institutional capacity indicate that the model has high strategic relevance in the Iraq context, and can be scaled up in other sectors.

2.6 Master Planning and Capacity Development for the Iraq Civil Aviation Sector

The Civil Aviation Outcome

Iraq’s civil aviation infrastructure was built in the 1970s and 1980s. Iraq now has six international airports, in Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Najaf, with a combined potential capacity of 16.4 million passengers a year. Work is in progress to renovate and modernize the Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra airports. A modernisation strategy was outlined in the NDP 2010-2014, including rehabilitation and development of airports, “a civil aviation strategy and preparation of a comprehensive plan to organize services and future activities...” (2010: 89).

The overall trend in civil aviation is for expansion of the civil aviation sector, tracking growth in Iraq’s economy. There was a modest improvement in the sector prior to the project, with the NDP reporting an increase in the number of air passengers from 426,520 in 2002 to 585,967 in 2008. The NDP 2010-2014 set a target of 1,072,748 arriving passengers and 964,928 departures for 2011 (2010: 102). The evaluation did not find further government data on the growth in civil aviation. However, international industry sources note:

a. An estimated eight international carriers now fly to the country, with international civilian flights resuming in 2006.
b. Growth in passenger travel for pilgrims through Najaf, and passenger and cargo transport the Erbil airport.
c. In 2011, 621,870 passengers used Erbil’s new International Airport, a 37% increase on the previous year, whilst cargo tonnage also increased dramatically, with a 67% increase to 17,769 tonnes per annum.34

Industry sources also note the Iraq’s 2011 Iraq Aviation Plan, which involves investing billions of dollars in new airports, logistics centres, cargo and warehousing facilities, as well as upgrading existing airports over the next 10 years. The plan estimates total annual passenger traffic in Iraq is forecast to reach 22.5 million

34 http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/
by 2016 and rise to more than 25 million passengers by 2022. By this point, freight was predicted to reach 900,000 tonnes of cargo a year.\(^{35}\)

The binding constraint on development of the aviation sector remains Iraq’s outdated legislative and regulatory framework. Iraq is a member of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, but is not compliant with the organisation’s standards. Legislative reform was foreseen as part of the handover process, from MNF-I to Iraqi civilian authority. However, so reform has been enacted. The sector remains governed by the Iraqi Civil Aviation Law No 148 for the Year 1974, which does not meet ICAO standards. Drafts prepared in 2005, 2008 and 2009 did not include all the needed provisions for regulating civil aviation activities. The revised draft Civil Aviation Act 2009 has not been approved. The NDP 2010-2014 does not reference reforms to legislation, or the civil aviation regulatory framework.

Civil Aviation Project Overview

The Civil Aviation project was based on the following results matrix:

The Civil Aviation project was approved under the United Nations Assistance Strategy for Iraq (2008-2010). The stated Development Goal was “to maximize accessibility of the country to trade flows through reliable and efficient air routes, airports, waterways and sea ports, ensuring the prompt delivery of goods needed for Iraq’s recovery and development”.

CPAP Outcome was “GoI is better able to implement national civil aviation and ports regulatory frameworks in compliance with international standards.”

Outcome 1: Support the preparation and adoption by the Government of Iraq of a ten year Civil Aviation Plan and strategy for the phased reform of the civil aviation sector, leading to the implementation of sound civil aviation policies, laws and regulations... fully compliant with IACO Standards and Recommended Practices.

Outcome 2: Provide assistance to the mobilisation of public/private resources and partnerships to support implementation of the Civil Aviation Master Plan, and detailed Action Plan for the modernization, rehabilitation and strengthening of capacity of the air transport and civil aviation sector.

Outcome 3: To establish the national capacities to regulate Iraqi airspace and manage air traffic to standards set by International Convention (ICAO).

The project had eight supporting outputs, of which the two core outputs were: drafting of a ten year CAMP, prepared and adopted by the GoI, and; a comprehensive package of training and capacity building initiatives for ICAA. Subsequent documentation also identifies drafting of civil aviation legislation as an output, although it was not identified in the project document. By the end of the project, Iraq was to attain the capability to carry out full certification, support, and regulatory functions to oversee all international and local public and private airports, air carriers and have ICAO compliant procedures in place.

\(^{35}\)http://www.thenational.ae/business/aviation/iraqi-aviation-free-for-take-off. There were industry references to the plan. However, an original copy of the plan could not be found from Government sources.
The total approved budget was US$3.3 million. The training component of the project was cost-shared with the Government. Government covered travel and per diem for training participants, to the amount of approximately USD 700,000.

The project is operationally closed, with the Final Narrative Report submitted to USAID in September 2011. Project inception was in April 2008, with a planned duration of one year. There were two “no cost extension”, requests in December 2009 and December 2010. In both cases, the UNDP cited incomplete results and delays resulting from personnel changes and the political context. Final training activities were delivered in June 2010, with the operational duration of the project being approximately three years. The sole donor was the DoS. The Government counterpart was the ICAA, within the Ministry of Transport. Technical support was contracted through ICAO.

The Civil Aviation Project Outputs

Overall Assessment

The Civil Aviation project had major shortcomings in achieving its objectives, at both the outcome and output levels. The positive result of the training component notwithstanding, there is little or no material evidence that the project contributed to:

a. CPAP Outcome of strengthening Iraq’s ability to administer civil aviation and ports regulatory frameworks, in compliance with international standards.

b. Improved trade flows or economic development, or otherwise contributed to improved management and regulation of Iraqi airspace and air traffic.

c. The introduction of international standards or that Iraq is closer to use of such standards.

Major shortcomings to the project were the direct result of five factors, all of which were influenced by design concerns the UNDP’s lack of core competence:

a. Limited UNDP core competence to work within the civil aviation sector, combined with a lack of UNDP personnel with relevant qualifications to manage design and implementation.

b. Weak GoI and ICAA ownership and support of the project. The project was initiated by the DoS and designed by the DoS and the UNDP, with minimal Government (MoT and ICAA) involvement beyond an initially supportive Director General.

c. Overly ambitious design that was inappropriate to the project environment. The project proposed a comprehensive reform to Iraq’s Civil Aviation sector, in its legislative, regulatory and institutional dimensions. However, the design was based on insufficient resources and time, and did not take into consideration significant risk in the programme environment; the pending transition from US Military to ICAA, weak legal, regulatory and institutional framework, and high levels of security and political instability.

d. Poor performance on the CAMP report, which undermined the UNDP’s credibility with the DoS and the ICAA Senior Management. Government never re-engaged after the initial CAMP presentation, and was reported to be “disillusioned” with UNDP; and

e. Institutional instability and low capacity inside of the ICAA and the MoT. The ICAA had four changes in the DG during the life of the project, with other frequent changes in positions above and below. Each successive DG had different priorities, and level of commitment to the project. However, the level of that commitment declined after the transfer of the first DG. As a result, the level of support in other parts of the ICAA also varied.

At closure, the project showed no progress towards embedding CAMP results in Iraq’s legal or regulatory regime. Only four of the nine outputs were actually delivered. There is also a pattern of producing outputs that are neither owned, valued or used by the GoI/ICAA. These include the CAMP report itself and work on sector strategy. Poor performance resulted in reputational damage for the UNDP, in its relationship with the DoS and the ICAA. These were somewhat offset by the good performance of the final training component.
The performance exception was training to ICAA personnel. The training was significantly delayed, and only delivered right before the closure of the project. However, it was considered to be of good quality and valued by the ICAA and the DoS. The UNDP provided important management, technical and administrative support, which were essential to implementation. Sustainability of the training is unclear, as it was implemented outside of an institutional plan.

Otherwise, UNDP lacked core institutional competence in the aviation sector and relied on externally contracted expertise. Project management oversight was limited during the initial implementation phase, although it strengthened and was an important component of the successful training component. UNDP had already been programming in Iraq for four years by 2008, and was fully aware of the situation and risks in the programme environment. However, the project design did not include effective measures to mitigate risks, many of which had emerged repeatedly in other UNDP-supported projects. Other incentives in the programme environment also played a factor, including donor pressure to expend and show results quickly.

Evaluation Ratings
Aggregate [4]

The Civil Aviation Project is assessed to be Moderately Unsatisfactory (4) overall. The dimension of Relevance and Strategic Fit was assessed as Moderately Satisfactory (3), while the Validity of Design and Impact Orientation were Unsatisfactory (5). Achievements and Effectiveness were also assessed as Moderately Unsatisfactory (4). Impact Orientation and Sustainability is considered Unsatisfactory (5).

Relevance and Strategic Fit [3]

The relevance of the project to the context was good. Civil Aviation is a critical element of Iraqi’s economic and transport infrastructure, which has been in decline since the Iran-Iraq war. Aviation was managed by the US military after 2003. By 2007, Iraqi and American officials were in discussion over the transition from US to Iraqi authority, and from military to civilian jurisdiction. DoS allocated funding for the Civil Aviation project to support regulatory and institutional reforms as part of the transition process. There was specific concern for the legal and regulatory framework, and institutional arrangements and capacity.

Project relevance to CPAP Outcome 5 was good, including with the project’s focus on institution building. However, relevance to the core competence of the UNDP was weak. The UNDP did not have previous Civil Aviation experience in Iraq, and its global competence in the sector was limited. DoS subsequently expressed strong dissatisfaction with the UNDP’s lack of institutional competence, which it considered a key variable leading to poor performance. Funding for the Civil Aviation project was approved by the DoS on the basis of “a very slick” presentation made by the UNDP, and its assurance that the UNDP had the required competence. Key UNDP officials advised aid to Iraq was growing during this period. There was a strong incentive and desire to grow to capture resources, and pressure from donors to move into non-core programme areas and for fast implementation.

The relevance of the project to Iraqi development priorities was mixed. There appears to have been some initial support at the senior management level within the ICAA, through the Director General. However, civil aviation reform was not a priority within the Ministry of Transport or the Cabinet. The project lacked political support, and institutional knowledge or support in at the operational levels below the Director General.

National ownership was undermined by the dominant role of the DoS. Motivated by the imminent transfer from American to Iraqi authority and building on the results of a 2006 ICAO mission and report, DoS initiated the project and played the determining role in strategy and content. Initial DoS activity was supported by the Director General.

The ICAA signalled its support of the project, in a letter to the UNDP dated April 2008. However, the Government did not initiate the project, nor did it play a substantive role in the design. Consultation with Iraqi authorities was limited and occurred outside of a political-level decision to reform the sector. There also appears to have been limited down-ward consultation, into the Aviation Authority below the Director General. Rather, the institutional linkage into Government appeared to be through an individual manager. The UNDP did not act to expand the consultations, or to strengthen ownership.
Validity of Design/Re-design [5]

The Civil Aviation project was over ambitious and unrealistic, for the context, resources and the UNDP’s core competence. The project proposed fundamental reform to Iraq’s civil aviation sector, to be accomplished within one year and with a budget of only US$3.4 million. This would occur during a period of high security, political and institutional instability and at the point of transition from US military to Iraqi civilian authority.

In addition to the two core activities of drafting the CAMP and providing training, the project had a repertoire of six or seven other outputs, ranging from simple to substantial, and no visible capacity to accomplish them. Design was effectively beyond the capacity of the ICAA to absorb and the UNDP to manage. It also lacked Iraqi political and institutional commitment, beyond the ICAA Director General. As specific design concerns:

a. UNDP played a role in project design, with specifications provided by the DoS. However, UNDP did not have qualified personnel (with previous Civil Aviation experience) to lead the task. Design was not based on a realistic assessment, and the UNDP did not develop or propose options for a gradual reform process, with achievable steps taking into account the difficult conditions.

b. The project did not consider the significant implementation risks, related to security, political volatility and existing institutional capacity. UNDP did not plan or act to mitigate these risks, and there was no “mid-term” correction to the project when implementation problems emerged.

c. UNDP was not in a position to lobby and advocate for the implementation of the CAMP, as it does not have an established and high level relationship with the MoT on aviation issues.

d. Technical competence contracted through the ICAO appeared inadequate. While acknowledging the difficult conditions, the ICAO consultants had limited experience in fragile situations. They appeared to lack appreciation of the context, needs and possible sequencing of activities. ICAO had limited broad sector and institutional understanding, which was still developing. This made it difficult for them to clearly identify and address constraints.

Achievements (Implementation of Development Effectiveness) [4]

The Civil Aviation project delivered a well-developed and organised training programme. The training was based at the Queen Noor Academy in Jordan, and was considered by all stakeholders (ICAA, beneficiaries, the Queen Noor Academy, and DoS) to be of high quality and relevance. This was the first large-scale ICAA training activity in 20 years. The beneficiary training targets were met in full, albeit with significant delays, and after course evaluations were positive. The UNDP played the key role in organising the training, from procurement to design of the course offering, selection of participants and logistics. There was anecdotal evidence that the training is being used, and has improved the operational effectiveness of the ICAA.

Training was based on a cost-sharing agreement with the Ministry of Transport. The arrangement helped established the principle of cost sharing, and was used as a model for other projects. It also represented a direct investment by Government in the professional development of ICAA personnel.

In addition, the UNDP placed a qualified technical advisor into the ICAA, beginning in 2009 and after a recruitment delay. The specialist was embedded in the ICAA, and located permanently at the BIAP facility. The original intention was to provide mentoring support to ICAA Senior Management. However, there was no demand for mentoring and the advisor played a series of line and advisory functions. These were valued by the ICAA, and included support to successful negotiations with the first European commercial carrier granted landing rights to BIAP. Effectiveness of the advisor was undermined by the lack of UNDP management oversight, and qualified supervision. This was particularly the case during the first five months after his arrival, when the project had no UNDP manager and the advisor effectively his lead from the DoS.

Otherwise, the project delivered only four of the eight outputs foreseen in the Project Document. Of the outputs, only the training and advisor have been used effectively by the Government. Most important, the Civil Aviation Master Plan was delivered but not implemented. The draft CAMP report was presented in March 2009. In its original form, the report was 450 pages. Government and the DoS requested UNDP prepare an 80 page Executive Summary, which was delivered in Sept 2009. However, the ICAA has never
officially acknowledged receipt of either the report or the Executive Summary. No action has been taken by the ICAA or MoT to implement the report, in whole or in part. None of the recommendations have been implemented, and there was no evidence that the report is other being used in any way. The investment in the CAMP, therefore, is effectively lost.

There are two different versions of why the report has not been used. Most UNDP sources (reporting and informants) advise that the report was delivered, but never implemented because of the institutional instability in the ICAA. There were four Director Generals during the life of the project, and only the first was supportive. UNDP, therefore, places responsibility on with conditions and the Government.

In contrast, the ICAA, DoS, and some UNDP sources indicate that the problem originated with the UNDP performance and the poor quality of the CAMP report. In particular:

a. UNDP did not have sector qualifications to manage delivery a credible product.

b. The ICAO consultants were not well suited to the Iraqi context. The DoS was particularly critical of the UNDP’s recruitment choices.

c. ICAA and the DoS expressed their “extreme unhappiness” with the poor quality of the report and its late delivery. The DoS found the text long and unmanageable, with finding not presented in an orderly sequencing of priorities. On this basis, the DoS requested an Executive Summary.

d. ICAA Senior Management was “extremely disappointed” with the UNDP’s performance, and did not re-engage with the process after presentation of the CAMP draft.

Lack of ownership after the delivery of the CAMP, therefore, related to poor UNDP performance and low credibility. The situation was subsequently compounded by the frequent changes in with Senior Management. Evidence generally supports the latter interpretation. However, the sector plan was never used or implemented. The UNDP incurred reputation damage with DoS and the ICAA. The damage was partially offset by strong performance with the training component, although the UNDP’s lack of credibility hindered performance here as well.

The other deliverables foreseen in the original project document were never implemented, in part because the depended on CAMP implementation as the basis but also for lack of planning and capacity. Efforts to mobilise resources, public private partnerships or implementation of plan to address emergency needs were never acted on. Legislation was drafted in 2009 by government and the ICAO. UNDP’s role in the drafting was unclear. However, the legislation had not been ratified as of mid-2011. There were reports that revisions to the draft replace key CAMP recommendations with aspects of the 1974 legislation, which do not meet ICAO specifications. There was been no change or improvement, therefore, in the legal framework.

Effectiveness of Management Arrangements and Efficiency of Resource Use [4]

The quality and consistency of project management oversight was mixed, improving significantly after 2010 during implementation of the training programme. However, there were important management gaps during the design and early implementation phases, including a five month gap after of delivery of the CAMP while a new manager was being recruited. There were significant implementation delays throughout, resulting after the CAMP from institutional instability within the ICAA.

The project had no governance structure. There was no project steering committee or other structured and predictable mechanism for management and dialogue with Government and the donor. Relations with the MoT and the ICAA were limited throughout, though strengthening took place with the presence of a technical advisor embedded in the ICAA. Otherwise, the UNDP did not have established senior contacts within the Ministry and contact appeared irregular.

Result Orientation and Sustainability [5]

There is no material evidence that the project-level outcome has been achieved, or that the project will contribute to future reforms. There is no discernible impact on legislation, regulation or policy. The CAMP report was the main instrument to achieve the project outcome. Two years after delivery the report has not been acknowledged by government and will not be implemented. The remaining outputs, such as strategic planning and resource mobilization, were not delivered.
The outputs of the training programme were delivered and are contributing to improved capacity within the ICAA. However, sustainability is unclear. The training was delivered outside of a sector reform framework, and the ICAA has not developed an on-going training programme. While effective, therefore, the training appears to be a one-time occurrence. There have been some indirect benefits to the ICAA of the UNDP secondment being in the BIAP, close to the ICAA. However, the advisor worked in line functions or with programme, and mentoring activities intended to build and sustain capacity were limited.

Civil Aviation Project Output to Outcome Linkage

The outcome trend for civil aviation is for expansion of the sector. There is a positive linkage between the Civil Aviation project and the trend, through the training of ICAA personnel and providing and international technical expert. There was evidence that related contributions have improved the capacity of the ICAA. Regardless, the sector remains constrained by Iraq’s legislative and regulatory framework, which is not compliant with ICAO and international standards. The CAMP was not approved nor implemented. The project did not otherwise contribute to reforms needed to comply with ICAO standards. As such, the project did not achieve progress towards indicator of “Iraqi airspace and air traffic regulated and managed in line with international standards”. Rather, it represents a lost opportunity to promote reform to a key part of Iraq’s economic infrastructure, during the period of transition in both the Iraqi context and the UNDP CPAP orientation to focus on upstream contributions.

Recommendation

The evaluation team understands that no further interventions of this nature are planned in the Civil Aviation sector. Accordingly, no recommendation is made.

2.7 Sustainable System of Navigation Aid for Approach Channel- Umm Qasr and Az Zubayr Ports

The Maritime Transport Outcome

The outcome trend for development of the Iraqi port system appeared positive. The evaluation did not find reliable data on maritime traffic through the port system, consistent with the original outcome of “maximizing access to trade flows, through reliable and efficient waterways and seaports.” The original 2003 assessment of port facilities done for USAID found it working at 40 percent efficiency, with degradation of facilities.36 Port rehabilitation has received significant financial and technical support from the international community, including through an initial UNDP implemented dredging project (2004). Industry sources now report an increase in ships received to the Umm Qasr facility of 15 percent between September 2010 and 2011.

The National Development Plan (2010-2014) calls for further investment in the port facilities, to increase capacity from the current 7.5 million tons annually to 9.5 million tons. The plan also notes a significant difference between the overall design capacities of Iraqi ports —about 15 million tons annually—and the projected demand of Iraq's future imports and exports of 53 million tons by 2018, and commits to further investment. The primary concern for future development was heavy competition from other ports in the region, in part as alternative transport routes into Iraq developed after the 2003 conflict.

Navaid Project Overview

The Navaid project was designed with the following results matrix:

The Navaid project was designed under the previous UN Assistance Strategy for Iraq, with the stated Outcome of “maximized accessibility of the country to trade flows through reliable and efficient waterways and sea ports ensuring prompt delivery of goods for the country's recovery and development”.

Navaid is not specifically identified in the Outcome 5 results matrix, and no project-specific CPAP indicator was assigned. Regardless, the project document had three outputs:

**Output 1:** Access to Umm Qasr Port improved through provision of effective visual Navaid system.

**Output 2:** Sustainability of assets supported through staff training and provision of facilities for repair.

**Output 3:** Institutional and management capacity developed for effective management of the port access issue.

The Navaid project was on-going as of 31 December 2011. The project document was signed in December 2008, with closure planned for November 2009. Original duration was to be one year, with the final closure now anticipated 31 December 2013. Field inspection verified that works are likely to be complete by that time. Final duration of the project, therefore, will be five years.

The total final budget was US$3.2 million. The original value of the project was US$2.3 million. However, the project scope was expanded in 2010, with two amendments valued at approximately US$900,000. These were included at the request of Government and the donor, facilitated by the UNDP, and account for the project extensions. The final budget managed by UNDP, therefore, was approximately 25 percent larger than the original. The sole donor was the Government of Denmark, and the Iraqi counterpart is the General Company for Ports Iraq (GCPI) of the Ministry of Transport.

**Navaid Project Outputs**

**Overall Assessment**

The Navaid project was on track to improve movement of shipping out of the Um Qasr port. The exact extent of the contribution is unclear, as the project was not operational and there is no estimate on the resulting increase to shipping traffic. Also, interviewees advised that many companies have found alternative routes to Um Qasr, given the disrepair of facilities. Nonetheless, GCPI authorities believe the navigational aids will permit increased night time traffic and reduce navigation risk, including of striking collision and striking submerged objects. Bringing visual and electronic navigation equipment up to international standards also increases the attractiveness of using the Um Qasr facility. The aids are valued by the GCPI, which played the lead role in design and implementation.

**Evaluation Ratings**

**Aggregate [3]**

The Navaid project is assessed to be Moderately Satisfactory (3) overall, with the same rating for Effectiveness of Management Arrangements. The dimensions of Relevance and Strategic Fit, Achievement and Outcome Orientation and Sustainability were assessed at Satisfactory (2). Validity of Design is considered Moderately Unsatisfactory (3).

**Relevance and Strategic Fit [2]**

Relevance to the context was good. Um Qasr is Iraq’s only deep water port, and essential to maritime trade. Data from the Ministry of Transport indicates that the number of shipping entering the port increased from 500 in 2005, to an estimated 8000 in 2010, and further expansion planned as Iraq’s petroleum industry grows. At the same time, port facilities were damaged by successive conflict, and have deteriorated for lack of maintenance. A 2005 assessment found that up to 33 percent of the buoys were missing. Navigation systems date from 1975 and were in poor operating condition. As a result, the port still operates at reduced effectiveness.

Relevance to national priorities was good. The General Company for Ports Iraq has been closely involved in all phases of the project, and considers Navaid to be a priority activity. Ownership was strengthened by using national systems to manage and implement project works. Relevance was enhanced by the addition
of Automatic Identification System (AIS), an automatic tracking system used on ships and by Vessel traffic services (VTS) systems and training, in late 2009.

Initial relevance to the former UN Country Assistance Strategy and to the UNDP’s previous experience was good. Rehabilitation of port facilities is outside of the UNDP’s core competence. However, there was a demand from Government and Donors for the UNDP to play management and oversight roles. UNDP was involved in an earlier initiative to dredge the port of silt, and is acting as the Fiduciary Agent on a US$235 million Japanese rehabilitation loan. It had, therefore, some institutional knowledge on the facilities and conditions.

The relevance of the project to current UNDAF and CPAP Outcome declines with time. The CPAP Outcome of “enabling policy and frameworks for rapid economic recovery” focuses on upstream contributions. The Navaid project introduces equipment and procedures that are up to international standards, but reflects an earlier focus on delivery physical infrastructure. Declining relevance is the result of implementation delays, which moved the Navaid into the CPAP portfolio as a legacy project.

Validity of Design/Re-design [3]

Inaccurate design specifications contributed to early project delays. The procurement of buoys had to be re-tendered, resulting in significant implementation delays during 2009 and a reduction in project scope. Revisions were required as the scope of works being tendered was beyond the available budget. Project managers within the UNDP and the GCPI appeared to lack the required design knowledge, and revisions had to be accomplished through re-tendering. Similarly, there were significant delays on procuring equipment for the port authority maintenance vessel, which had to be re-tendered. Initial design problems were offset by expansion of the project scope to include electronic navigation equipment and training.

Achievements (Implementation of Development Effectiveness) [2]

The project was still under implementation at the time of the evaluation, and works were not fully operational. There were no available estimates on how becoming operational will contribute to increased shipping, noting that Iraqi official placed more emphasis on risk reduction. The introduction of an AIS/VTS navigation systems and training will be of greater relevance to improved traffic management. Significant implementation delays notwithstanding, the main project outputs were delivered and of good quality:

a. The navigation buoys had been delivered at the time of the evaluation, and were being prepared and deployed to the shipping channel. The buoys were not operational, but Port officials verified they would be fully deployed and operational by the end of 2011, or early 2012.

b. The original project design focused on the deficiency of proper visual navigation aids to meet international standards. Improving visual aids will improve overall safety, which contributes to unnecessary delays. Officials cited this as a reason some shippers avoid Umm Qasr facility.

c. Reductions in scope from the original design specifications were address by inclusion of additional buoys donated by the United States. The project showed initiative in acquiring and deploying the equipment.

d. Preparatory work and training for the AIS/VTS systems was at or near completion, expanded the original project scope and introducing new electronic navigation technology to an international standard. The project showed good initiative and flexibility in both acquiring and managing the expansion, in response to both government and the donor.

e. All works related to maintenance of the buoys was completed, of good quality and being used by the port authority. These included the workshop for conducting maintenance work and the refitting of a vessel to deploy and recover the buoys, and for on-site maintenance.

Effectiveness of Management Arrangements and Efficiency of Resource Use [3]

Effectiveness was undermined by initial design deficiencies and procurement delays, for the buoys and maintenance equipment. The delays meant that inadequate visual equipment was deployed for an additional year, and continued to hinder shipping. The situation had both an economic (reduced traffic and safety) and reputation (unnecessary delays and risk for using the facility result in shippers searching alternative routes for their goods) consequences.
The GCPI played the lead role in managing procurement and installation, through their systems. Delays can be attributed, in part, to the lack of national procurement capacity and experience. At the same time, UNDP management oversight and technical assistance was limited during the initial design and procurement phases. UNDP appears to have provided insufficient support to ensure timely implementation. There was also a gap in UNDP management during 2009, given a change in personnel.

Project performance improved significantly during early 2010, with the appointment of a new UNDP project manager and more robust UNDP engagement in the technical aspects of procurement. The UNDP played a direct role in the tendering of parts for the service vessel, which had been delayed for over a year within the GCPI systems. The UNDP also offered solutions to address implementation bottlenecks, and was able to absorb additional responsibilities related to the electronic navigation systems. Its role during this phase was appreciated by Iraqi officials and the donor.

Result Orientation and Sustainability [2]

The overall direction of change resulting from the project is positive. Installation of visual and electronic navigation systems are likely to improve management of maritime traffic, and contribute to safety. These factors may also improve the attractiveness of the Um Qasr and Faw facilities to shippers, and facilitate growth of oil exports. The probability of sustainability is good. The project is valued by the Port Authority, which has been directly involved in all phases of implementation. Training and completion of maintenance facilities strengthen capacity, and provide the infrastructure and technical competence to maintain the equipment. There was also evidence that the Port Authority’s capacity to managing the tendering process has been strengthen, in part through experience gained during the project but also through UNDP technical assistance.

Navaid Project Output to Outcome Linkage

There was a positive linkage between Navaid outputs and improved outcomes at the Umm Qasr Port facility. Some project works were still under implementation during the evaluation, and outputs have not yet been fully achieved. However, installations of navigation aids are improving access to the port. In particular, the system will expand capacity by allowing for improved navigation at night. Project documentation does not include any estimate on the extent of such expansion. Navigation and management of shipping is further improved by installation of AIS/VTS operating systems. Both the navigation aids and the AIS/VTS operating systems bring port facilities into closer compliance with international standards, making the port more attractive to shippers and investors.

Recommendation

The Navaid project will be brought to a successful conclusion and the evaluation understand that the UNDP does not foresee continuing with direct implementation projects in this sector. Accordingly, no recommendation is made.

2.8 Strengthening the Capacity of the Housing Sector Bridging Fund

The Housing Sector Outcome

There was no data available linking outcome in the housing sector to the availability of housing finance, or financing institutions. The current National Housing Policy states “a housing finance system must be rebuilt as a matter of urgency” (2010: 10). A commitment towards developing the mechanisms for housing finance, therefore, is integrated into Iraq’s policy. However, progress towards establishing such institutions have been limited.

The 2003 UN/World Bank Joint Needs Assessment concluded that “housing finance … is significantly under-developed and handicapped despite being at the forefront in the region in the 1970s … The country also lacks a well-developed financial service industry and systems for savings and loans. It lacks proper laws and procedures for private banks to operate mortgage finance instruments. Also absent … are
special lending products for low-income populations that do not meet the conditions of conventional lending.”

UN Habitat’s *Country Programme for 2009-2011* observed that Iraq did not have a market-oriented housing finance system as of 2009, when the current UNDP CPAP was being developed. A commitment to develop related systems is integrated into Iraq’s current housing policy, including for home purchase and construction. The policy shifts the Government’s emphasis from direct provision of housing to enabling private sector delivery, and identifies the lack of financing as a key constraint on expansion of the sector. In this context, the Bridging Project was intended to identify the potential to establish a commercial housing finance market in Iraq, in line with wider reforms of the Banking Sector.

**Housing Project Overview**

The UNDP component of the Housing Sector Bridging Fund was based on the following results matrix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNDAF 2.1: People in Iraq have improved access to equal job and income opportunities in a diversified and competitive market economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The intended outcome was consolidation of the project’s Phase II, through four outputs. Of these, one output was to be provided by the UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 4: The GoI has improved knowledge of the potential to establish a commercial housing finance market in Iraq in line with Banking Sector Reform processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UNDP was to prepare an assessment of 5-8 commercial banks to ascertain their position to engage in Housing Finance, and conduct a scoping study of the potential for the National Housing Fund to support commercial housing finance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The UNDP component of the Housing Sector Bridging Fund project was on-going at the end of the evaluation field mission in November 2011. Total value of the project was US$ 750,000, of which the UNDP component was US$ 285,000.

The project is a joint initiative. UN Habitat served at the lead agency in collaboration with the Ministry of Housing and Construction. The project start date was September 2010, for a 15 month duration and completion in December 2011. The UNDP component was being delivered in November 2011, behind the originally planned schedule.

**Housing Sector Project Outputs**

**Overall Assessment**

The project falls outside of the strategic framework of the CPAP, and outside of the UNDP’s mandate and institutional core competence. The evaluation was advised that the overall housing project benefited from the UNDP’s field capacity. Otherwise, the UNDP does not bring a specific value-added to the study of housing sector financing arrangements over the existing competence of UN Habitat. UNDP’s position that it brings a comparative advantage in private sector development did not appear relevant, given the specific nature of the housing finance sector and the lack of any apparent synergy with the PSDI, or other private sector initiative.

In the absence of clear relevance to the CPAP or UNDP competence, the management arrangement appears to divert resources away from project implementation and institutional capacity away from the CPAP. The project did not appear to receive a robust peer review during the original approval, and its relevance was only questioned by the LPAC, five months after approval.

**Evaluation Ratings**

**Aggregate [4]**

Strengthening the Capacity of the Housing Sector was assigned an aggregate rating of Unsatisfactory (4). There was insufficient information to assess Achievement or Outcome Orientation. The timing of the
evaluation was not appropriate to assess the outcome of the project, and the outputs were only partially delivered. As such, there was no output information from the workshop, or supporting documentation UNDP work related to Output #4 that should have fed into the workshop related to “… knowledge of the potential to establish a commercial housing finance market in Iraq in line with Banking Sector Reform processes”. Regardless, the evaluation’s main concern was the relevance to UNDP’s overall strategy, competence and design.

Relevance and Strategic Fit [5]

The strategic fit of the overall project to the Iraqi context is good. Reform to the housing sector is a development priority under the current National Development Plan, and the Strategic Government Program (2011-2014). The project falls clearly within the core mandate and competence of UN Habitat, which supported Phase I and Phase II and will be involved in the proposed third phase. The bridging component appears to consolidate the results of Phase II, reflecting changing conditions inside Iraq and the Government’s general priority of strengthening the private sector.

The project has no apparent relevance to either the strategic orientation of the UNDP CPAP, or the mandate and core competence of the UNDP. The rationale for UNDP involvement was poorly explained in the project document, and concerns over the rationale behind the UNDP’s involvement were expressed in the November 2010 LPAC meeting. However, this occurred well after the project was approved and under implementation. The LPAC recommended a full assessment of any future UNDP involvement, after the bridging phase.

It is unclear how the UNDP would add value to the core competence of UN Habitat in the housing sector, and in housing finance arrangements. Synergies with UNDP involvement in other aspects of public and private sector reform were cited in the document, but without clarity how they would become operational. The exception appears to be with the use of the UNDP’s field operation capacity, with was cited by the UNDP project manager.

Validity of Design/Re-design of the UNDP Component [NA]

The evaluation had insufficient information on the workshop process or supporting studies to make an assessment of design effectiveness. Regardless, the rationale for UNDP involvement was based on exploiting synergies with other public and private sector reform initiatives, from elsewhere in the CPAP portfolio. These were not developed, and the project appeared isolated in the portfolio.

Achievements (Implementation of Development Effectiveness) [NA]

No ranking is assigned for achievement. The UNDP-supported workshop took place in November 2102, during the final days of the evaluation’s field mission. The outputs of the workshop were not available, and there were no prior deliverables on which probable performance could be assessed. Government officials had only become familiar with the UNDP component during the workshop, and did have an opinion on the UNDP’s contribution or performance. The UN Habitat representative interviewed was not able to comment on the relevance, quality, or results of UNDP contribution, the quality of UN Habitat’s partnership with UNDP, or the UNDP’s value added.

Effectiveness of Management Arrangements and Efficiency of Resource Use [5]

The management arrangement allocates resources to UNDP personnel and administration, in addition to operations. This is a duplication of overhead costs that could have absorbed by UN Habitat, without an apparent value being added to the final project outcome. Also, the project diverted UNDP capacity away from activities that fall within the core CPAP strategic orientation.

There was insufficient information to make an assessment of the UNDP’s resource use at the operational level, as the UNDP component was still under implementation. UNDP representatives advised that the organization’s role was based, in part, on contributing field capacity that UN Habitat did not possess. However, capacity could have been contributed without the UNDP being assigned a project component, and adding to overhead costs.

Result Orientation and Sustainability [NA]
UNDP CPAP Outcome 5 Evaluation

The evaluation was not in a position to assess the outcome orientation of the overall project, given the lead role of UN Habitat. There was also insufficient information on the UNDP component to assess orientation. As the project falls outside of the CPAP’s strategic orientation and the UNDP’s core competence, the sustainability of the UNDP’s involvement is low. The November 2010 LPAC concluded that a UNDP role in Phase III of the project would have to be subject to a strategic review of the project’s relevance.

Housing Sector Output to Outcome Linkage

Overall progress towards establishing a housing finance system is modest. While the Ministry of Housing has made a policy commitment, progress towards establishing financing institutions is limited. The project did not have any outputs at the time of evaluation. As such, it was not possible to identify a linkage between outputs and outcomes. The CPAP did not have an output or indicator statement for housing against which benchmark progress.

Recommendation

The Housing Sector project is outside of the UNDP’s area of core competence, and the UNDP’s value added is unclear. On completion of the project, the UNDP should terminate its involvement, and not enter Phase III unless relevance to the UNDP’s mandate and competence and value added can be demonstrated.

2.9 Restoration of Al-Askari Shrine in Samarra City, and Rehabilitation of other Damaged Religious Sites throughout Iraq

The project was consistent with CPAP, and the GoI/provincial authorities expressed considerable interest in the restoration of damaged shrine, and to lower sectarian violence in the area through participatory community development in Samarra City.

Project Details

(a) Project Description: Restoration of Al-Askari Shrine in Samarra City, and Rehabilitation of Other Damaged Religious Sites throughout Iraq (Project ID: 55601)

(b) Sub-sector: Economic Recovery (Infrastructure)

(c) UNDAF and CP Outcome: UNDAF 2.1: Country Programme: Enabling policy and frameworks for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private sector development.

(d) Total Budget: US$ 2.6 million

(e) Status: On-going (but in operational closure phase)

(f) Intended outputs as stated in the project document:

Output 1.1: Urgent intervention works on Al-Askari Shrine in Samara completed; site protected and cleaned; materials classified; and structure reinforced (UNESCO)

Output 1.2: Prepare works for the restoration project of the Al-Askari Shrine in Samara completed (UNESCO)

Output 1.3: Personnel of State Board of Antiquities and Heritage (SBAH) in technical areas related to restoration and preservation trained. (UNESCO)
UNDP CPAP Outcome 5 Evaluation

Output 2.1: Highest-priority damaged rehabilitated (UNDP)

Output 2.2: Contribute toward reconciliation, restoration of stability and security, consensus, and peace building. (UNDP)

Output 3.1: Implement sub-projects related to the Samara Shrine completed (UNDP)

Output 3.2: Community ownership through involvement in sub-project identification and implementation promoted (UNDP)

Output 3.3: Generation of temporary short- and medium-term employment opportunities (UNDP, UNESCO)

Al-Askari Shrine Restoration, and Rehabilitation of Other Damaged Religious Sites Project Outcome

The project is rated Satisfactory (2) in all its evaluation dimensions. Still, it should be noted that the stated development objectives were: “rehabilitation of “nation-wide” religious sites”; in other words, the wording of the project documentation was far more ambitious than what was really intended. Overall, this project was an important intervention in the reconstruction efforts and the revival of regional economic activities—apart from historic preservation of historical and religious heritage.

Because of well-defined objectives of the Shrine project, the achievements to date to have been solid. Further, there have been spill-over benefits (namely, progress toward achieving communal harmony). UNDP made significant contributions through the remote management of community priority projects including: rehabilitation of schools, mosques, hospital facility, and Samarra water system

A notable feature of this project has been the active solicitation of the beneficiaries and non-state actors at all stages—from rehabilitation design to the provision of auxiliary facilities which were developed through a consultative process.

Al-Askari Shrine Restoration, and Rehabilitation of Other Damaged Religious Sites Project Output

Evaluation Ratings

Aggregate [2]

Relevance and Strategic Fit [2]

The project was relevant and timely to the prevailing regional conditions, and was consistent with CPAP, and the GoI/provincial authorities expressed considerable interest in the restoration of damaged shrine.

Validity of Design/Re-design [3]

The objectives were clear for the Samarra (shrine) project, but (understandably at the inception) not so much for the participatory approach toward a community-based programme.

Achievements (Implementation of Development Effectiveness) [2]

The immediate goals for Samara project (and restoring one church in Baghdad) have been achieved. Some of the spin-off outcomes (e.g., reduction in sectarian strife) require longer gestation to materialize.

Effectiveness of Management Arrangements and Efficiency of Resource Use [2]

UNESCO took the lead in the rehabilitation works, and UNDP aimed at priority social services and essential infrastructure.
**Result Orientation and Sustainability [2]**

The restoration project will have a lasting impact; albeit security and communal strife will remain a concern.

**Al-Askari Shrine Restoration, and Rehabilitation of Other Damaged Religious Sites: Output to Outcome Linkage**

The community ownership of the project needs to be further strengthened by continuous engagement of the UN agencies and fostering relationships with the local representatives.

**Recommendation**

The project approval documents should be modest and precise in the project document regarding the statement of objectives: cf: “rehabilitation of “nation-wide” religious sites”.
3. Cross-cutting Issue of Empowerment of Women

3.1 Gender

Gender Outcomes

The gender related indicators for the CPAP were:

- % increase in employment in the private sector disaggregated by gender and age (2008: 22%, 2014: 35%)
- % of female professional and technical workers (2008: 61.8%; 2014: 72%)

The CPAP Outcome 5 portfolio is still under implementation, with two years remaining to reach targets. However, progress towards the indicator appears modest. At 16 percent, women’s participation in the workforce remains among the lowest in the MENA region and does not show significant increase in recent years. Unemployment for women seeking to enter the workforce is high, at 32 percent throughout the CPAP period and again not showing improvement. Of working women, 60 percent are employed in the public sector, where the major growth in job creation has occurred and position are more secure.37 There also does not appear to have been an expansion of the kinds of work available to women, and deemed culturally acceptable.

Strengthening Gender Programme Mechanisms

Projects designed within current CPAP framework (PSDP-I and Loan Management Support) show a strong possibility for gender-related outcomes. Achievement will be based on strengthening of Government’s commitment and development planning, and the corresponding strengthening of UNDP’s internal processes. But, there are few definable gender-specific outcomes among the legacy projects. There appeared to be an overriding assumption, sometimes explicitly stated, that delivery of public goods and services would be of equal benefit to men and women. The results matrices of legacy projects show few definable gender outcome or outputs, and limited or no resource allocation in budgets. Projects were generally not designed to have gender-specific economic impact in the lives of women, to promote equal opportunity or otherwise advance women’s status and decision making power, or otherwise produce changes in gender relations. Monitoring does not demonstrate gender-disaggregated results. The exception was with the Mine Action portfolio, particularly with the Victim Assistance projects. However, gender-related outcomes among the Mine Action projects were undermined by implementation difficulties.

Overview of Gender in the Portfolio

The Outcome 5 portfolio pre-dates the current CPAP. The gender component of portfolio design, therefore, spans the evolution of gender concepts and priorities over two strategic planning cycles; first through the National Development Strategy (2007-2010) and accompanying United Nations Assistance Strategy (2008-2010) and then into the current cycle framed by the National Development Plan, UNDAF (2011-2014) and the CPAP (2010-2014).

There are marked differences in the gender component over the two planning cycles, in both the Government and UNDP planning frameworks:

- Gender is mainstreamed into the analysis and priorities of planning both cycles. However, mainstreaming in the current planning cycle is more robust and comprehensive. The scope of priorities being subject to analysis and mainstreaming is broader and supported by more comprehensive data, contextual analysis and planning tools.
- Changes relate to the strengthening of Government’s commitment to gender mainstreaming, and overall improvements in the programme environment. Government is playing the lead role by

37 Data is summarised from the 2011 IKN survey, [http://www.iauiiraq.org/ikn](http://www.iauiiraq.org/ikn)
expanding gender mainstreaming into its development priorities. The overall programme environment is more permissive, with improved security conditions allowing for more focus on development rather than humanitarian priorities.

c. There is a shift in the focus for mainstreaming. Earlier planning focused on mainstreaming into humanitarian, protection, and service delivery, including expanding access to health and education. Current Government planning identifies the gender equality gap across the Government's development priorities. Current Government planning has a more clearly defined strategy for integration of women and youth into the economic recovery process. Analysis includes addressing the gender gaps in human capital formation that affect economic opportunity. There are also measures to increase women’s economic participation in the labour force and livelihood activities. Related outcomes in the current National Development Plan include:

d. Addressing inequalities in the labour force structure based on their sectoral and gender distribution.

e. Sustainable jobs and income generation, especially among youth and women.

f. Creating opportunities for the development and enabling women to expand the choices available to them and build their capacities.

**Gender in the Outcome 5 Portfolio; First Generation Projects**

The CPAP Outcome 5 portfolio reflects a shift in priorities between the planning cycles, and more robust gender mainstreaming. There are two distinct generations of projects. The first is comprised of the infrastructure, mine action and reconstruction projects designed between 2004 and 2008. These did generally not include gender outcomes. Some outputs were defined in the Mine Action portfolio, but there are few gender-related outputs in other sectors. None of the projects was based on gender-specific analytical work to support design.

The infrastructure projects were related to delivery of public goods on a large scale. A gender-specific result was not conceptualized in service delivery at this level. Equality was not considered as a potential outcome, on the assumption that all citizens would benefit equally from improved service delivery. The exception was training components in the Civil Aviation, intended to improve opportunities for women in the workplace. Generally, infrastructure projects have no gender-based situation analysis, outcomes, outputs, indicators or activities. There is also no gender-desegregated reporting. The assumption in some documentation was that delivery of public goods and services, such as electricity, benefits all members of society equally.

Some Mine Action and reconstruction projects had gender-related situation analysis and outcome statements, but nothing no gender related-outputs or resources in the results framework, and but little or no reporting. In the case of Mine Action, individual projects intended to mainstream gender into the national institutional framework and local clearance and community development generally did not meet their targets. Low achievement was the result performance difficulties with the projects, as much as shortcomings in design. The exception has been with Victim Assistance, which included specific measures to strengthen economic opportunity for women. Documentation shows meaningful progress towards related outputs.

The projects reflect the lack of emphasis on gender in national development priorities, targeted at women’s economic empowerment. UNDP had an institutional responsibility at this time to promote mainstreaming. Part of the explanation for poor results rests within UNDP standards and systems. Prior to 2010, effective standards and systems for gender mainstreaming either did not exist or were not enforced. UN staff noted that gender-specific content was often “outsourced” to UNIFEM/UNWomen, and was considered separated from the project. UNIFEM/UNWomen appeared to have limited field capacity at the time, and were focused on awareness training rather than the operational dimensions of projects. Their role, therefore, did not appear well integrated into portfolio design.

**Post-2009 Priorities**

The overall planning framework began to change in 2009, with the pending closure of the UNDG ITF and introduction in 2009-2010 of more robust planning and programme development systems. Specifically:
a. The CPAP includes a more robust outcomes and indicators as a framework for addressing women's economic empowerment.

b. Gender expectations and standards were made explicit, and there is an enforced requirement to include gender mainstreaming in project design. This includes an emerging standard on gender-related expenditures as part of the total budget for each project.

c. A gender review system was included in the LPAC and peer review process. If projects do not have a gender component, they are not approved or funded. There was evidence that projects that do not meet standards have been returned for revision.

d. Gender planning tools have been improved and UN personnel are better trained to use the tools.

e. The general quality of data and analysis is improving, as Government and agencies invest in studies to support policy. As one example, the UNDP has supported its own research initiatives on options for supporting women's economic participation.

f. There are fewer tendencies to “outsource” gender to other UN agencies, in part because UNDP capacity is improving and in part as UNDP is dissatisfied with the past performance of those agencies.

Within this framework, second generation show greater possibility for gender-related outcomes. The PSDP-I and Loan Management Support reflect progress towards mainstreaming gender into project results matrices. Specifically, the overall strategic framework for planning is more robust, and gender is integrated in outcomes, results matrix and activities. For PSDP-I, a comprehensive situation analysis was underway and there is more effective research now being funded on women's role in the private sector especially for access to microfinance by the small businesswomen. There is also evidence that the Loan Management Support portfolio is working to strengthen its inclusion of the gender component, mainly through training and peer review processes.
4. Lessons Learned and Guidance for Future Programming

4.1 Lessons Learned

The UNDP has a clearly defined strategic focus and areas of institutional competence. However, the Organisation has to constantly reconcile internal and external pressures to migrate outside of these boundaries, including when donors create funding opportunities dictated by their own bilateral priorities. However, the UNDP tends to underperform when it works outside of its core strategic areas and competence. These become false “opportunities” with inherent performance and reputation risk. Conversely, in the Iraqi context, it can be legitimately argued that the GoI had established its priorities, and in the absence of other key players in the field, UNDP was left with no choice but to embark on activities such as energy, civil aviation, and housing during the timeframe covered by this evaluation.

Conflict sensitivity (i.e., sectarian clashes, internal tensions within a nascent democracy, and unresolved border disputes) cannot be considered in isolation to the development efforts and not as a worthy stand-alone goal.

Although all 19 projects had some degree of capacity development component, yet, the concept of institution building has not been internalized in the programme/project design and adequately monitored at the implementation stage [Exceptions to this observation are the PSDP-I support of PMAC and the strengthening of fiduciary capacity under the aegis of Japanese Government].

The experience of legacy projects provides some guidance for future programmes, in a context of gradual improvement and focus on economic diversification, but also marked by continuing volatility and declining international resources. The experience of Generation One projects also instructs the UNDP to focus on realistic design with robust Government commitment, two factors that are closely inter-related. The design component is facilitated by improved data and UNDP internal programme development and review/approval procedures. However, political volatility, which extends down to the operational level in many Ministries, will challenge the UNDP to conduct on-going political economy analysis, at the strategic level and with individual projects. Where Government commitment is unclear, the UNDP should provide clarity and decline to participate where clarity and commitment cannot be achieved or fostered over time.

The UNDP has shown greater strategic vision in the design of Generation Two projects. It has identified several areas of develop and political priority for Iraq, where the agency is also able to draw on its core global competence. At the same time, the agency has demonstrated progress in adapting this competence to the Iraqi context, and developing new programme offerings that are relevant and competitive. For example, the Loan Management portfolio combines the UNDP’s global fiduciary and operational management capacities with technical assistance that enables the relationship between the donor and Government, and improves overall effectiveness.

4.2 Guidance for Future Programming

With the expected future reduction of UNAMI’s mission and the progressive phasing out of certain UN agencies, UNDP is likely to assume additional responsibilities in the coming years—which is full of both challenges and opportunities. Its ability to play its mandated role will be contingent upon resources it can muster and thereby prioritize and maximize its assistance through augmented presence in the field.

Whereas UNDP is committed to a greater presence in Iraq in the coming years, greater and targeted resources will be required in the face of declining donor resources. This would necessitate—beside enhanced resource mobilization efforts—a greater degree of cost-sharing agreement with the GoI accompanied by a move to NEX. Similarly, dialogue needs to be vigorously undertaken to encourage CSR for activities at the local level. More important, development initiatives in Iraq are bound to fail without a meaningful dialogue and involvement of the CSOs.

UNDP, being a global player in capacity building and human resources development, should internalize these aspects in all future interventions. In the Outcome 5 cohort, all 19 projects had some degree of
UNDP CPAP Outcome 5 Evaluation

capacity development component. Yet, limited efforts for pursuing this objective were evident in the vast majority of cases. Besides, UNDP is the apex UN agency to monitor the progress toward meeting the MDGs, which in itself warrants both developing its own capacity and the competencies of the GoI for developing responsive and accountable institutions (including inter-provincial coordination) for the delivery of essential public services.

Simultaneously, enhanced attention should be paid to conflict sensitivity, governance, and equity considerations. To emphasize: the quality and delivery of essential public services continues to deteriorate, the country faces (for the first time in its long history) a serious water shortage problem, a burgeoning population of disaffected youth, and a widening of rural-urban income disparities. More important, the GoI’s Anti-Corruption strategy is largely ineffective. These are complex issues, but will require considerable innovative advocacy approaches: institutionalization of the agenda within ERPAP of the Country Office, utilization of UNDP’s regional and global expertise, and strengthening the voice and participation of the indigenous CSOs.

Within the new programming framework, it would be critical to augment the functions of the Programme Management Support Unit in the Country Office for conducting enhanced quality control and quality assurance functions, including M&E, to support the Programmes/projects on the following issues: (a) developing and use of robust data collection systems; (b) cross-agency and cross-programme comparisons; (b) agreement up-front on monitorable indicators; and (c) greater resource allocation to facilitate the incorporation of evaluation lessons in formulating all new programmes. These functions, in turn, require a rigorous risk assessment and mid-term self-evaluation by the concerned programme managers.
5. Conclusions

The Evaluation Team commends the UNDP's Iraq Country Office for having taken the initiative and maximised its presence in the field in difficult and trying mid-conflict circumstances. Still, going forward, the UNDP will have to take a much more selective and focused view of its technical assistance—especially from a socio-economic perspective with a heavy emphasis on prioritizing the interventions with the assistance of CSOs across the board.

In particular, and to date, nearly all these activities (especially PSDP-I) are dominated by individual champions within the UNDP and the GoI rather than undertaken as a corporate responsibility of the Organisation. Therefore, and especially for “downstream” activities, it would be essential that the economic reform process is “internalized” at the central level before new activities are initiated at the governorate levels (as requested in the case of “no-cost/budget extension” of UN’s allocations. Further, donor activities are driven by the competition for scarce funds rather than assignment of responsibilities for the programmes. On its part, the UNDP's Iraq Country Office, its senior management, and programme managers must be more proactive in carrying out the necessary advocacy work with the counterparts—especially within the GoI’s line ministries, project staff, CSOs, and with the external development partners.

Going forward, the UNDP is presented with constraints and opportunities. Notwithstanding the less than satisfactory achievements of the Outcome # 5 portfolio, these implementation progress of individual programmes and projects represents the pitfalls that can be avoided in the design of future interventions which, needlessly to emphasise, should be Iraq-specific.

Notable among the proposed directions are: (a) selectivity of assistance; (b) realism of objectives; (a) a candid assessment of the inherent risks together with identification of risk-management efforts; and (b) focus on the cross-cutting themes (including poverty alleviation, equity, gender, conflict management, and environment). Last but not least, with the new opportunities to be availed, technical assistance would be much more productive if UNDP staff is seconded to work directly—in their respective areas of competence—with their counterparts in the ministries and line agencies of the GoI.
Annex A: Terms of Reference

A. BACKGROUND
UNDP’s corporate policy is to evaluate its development cooperation with the host government on a regular basis in order to assess whether and how UNDP-funded interventions contribute to the achievement of agreed outcomes, i.e. changes in the development situation and ultimately in people’s lives. Under the results-based management (RBM) framework - UNDP’s core management philosophy- there has been a shift from traditional project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) to results-oriented M&E, in particular outcome monitoring and evaluation that cover a set of related projects, programmes and partnership strategies intended to achieve a higher level outcome. An outcome evaluation assesses how and why an outcome is or is not being achieved in a given country context and the role UNDP has played. It is also intended to clarify underlying factors affecting the development situation, identify unintended consequences (positive and negative), generate lessons learned and recommend actions to improve performance in future programming and partnership development.

Outcome to be evaluated
In the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP 2011-2014) of UNDP Iraq there are five development outcomes to which UNDP is expected to contribute.\(^{38}\) One of these outcomes, reflecting the efforts of restoring the foundations for development in the areas of post-crisis socio-economic infrastructure, employment generation, economy revival, have been selected for evaluation during 2011.\(^{39}\) It will take stock of UNDP’s efforts in achieving the development outcome so far and propose measures in order to increase the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of UNDP cooperation in the outcome areas. A results framework for the selected outcome for evaluation is summarized in Table 1 below.

Brief national context related to the Country Programme outcomes
Iraq has witnessed wide-spread violence and political instability at national and sub-national levels over the last few years and remains susceptible to further insecurity until the fundamental causes of vulnerability to conflict are holistically addressed. Although the country is blessed with significant natural resources, it remains challenged in harnessing its human and natural resources to accelerate much needed reconstruction and recovery efforts.

Since 2005, two parliamentary and provincial elections have been held in Iraq. Successive governments initiated reforms to better perform core state functions but due to general insecurity and institutional capacity needs these efforts have had limited impact. The Government, therefore, still faces major challenges in ensuring adequate basic services including electricity, water supplies and health services. Inadequate security continues to disproportionately affect the most vulnerable groups, in particular women, children and persons with disabilities. Iraq ranks low in human development indicators. There is high income poverty (23 per cent of Iraqi families live below the national poverty line), growing illiteracy (women in particular), and high unemployment (+18 per cent) especially among women and youth. Gender based violence has emerged as an issue of concern.

The delay in forming a new Government after parliamentary elections in March 2010 and the withdrawal of the USF-I in August 2010 have created additional uncertainties. While the federal structure of the State has been established, and decentralization has begun, challenges remain including addressing government capacity needs and improving the coordination between the Central Government, the Kurdistan Regional Government and provincial administrations.

\(^{38}\) This year marks the beginning of UNDP’s Country Programme Action Plan (2011-2014). All regular cooperation frameworks such as a UNDP Country Programme and a CCA/UNDAF now exist in Iraq hence its recent strategic interventions is fully aligned with the International Compact with Iraq (ICI, 2007) and the National Development Plan (NDP, 2010-2014).

\(^{39}\) According to UNDP Iraq’s Evaluation Plan, associated with the CPAP, three additional outcomes relating to Governance and MDG achievement will be evaluated during the CPAP cycle.
The GoI still faces challenges in its efforts to enhance the role of all stakeholders, including women, in the democratic process, and in building a solid social contract. The Government is committed to reform of the public sector and addressing corruption, including more inclusive institution-building and modernization of the state at the national and sub-national levels.

Institutional challenges continue to pose major constraints on economic reforms and significantly affect the country’s efforts to diversify the economy and promote private sector investment. Multiple issues have caused over 20,000 private companies in Iraq to close. The Government allocated over US$ 1 billion for lending to facilitate private sector growth but this action did not generate the intended expansion with investors and emerging entrepreneurs. Issues impeding the private sector appear to be the absence of the financial and non-financial support services and legal frameworks.

Approximately 1,730 square kilometers of land is contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war, blocking access to agricultural areas, slowing recovery efforts and constraining the development of new oil and gas fields. It is important to recognize that landmines and explosive remnants of war have differential impacts on men, women and children.

Table 1: Results Framework for Outcome 5, UNDP Iraq

| Intended Outcome (#5): Enabling policy and frameworks for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private sector development. |
| Outcome Indicators (Baselines 2010 and Targets 2014): |
| 1. Iraqi airspace and air traffic regulated and managed in line with international standards (2010: no; 2014: yes) |
| 2. Volume (US $) of growth related and bankable projects developed across infrastructure sectors (2009: below 1 billion; 2014: 2 billion) |
| 3. Change in national level perception of improved electricity supply (2009: 40%; 2014: 70%) |
| 4. Number of State-owned enterprises restructured with adequate social mitigation measures (2010: 0; 2014: 2) |
| 5. % increase in employment in the private sector disaggregated by gender and age (2008: 22%, 2014: 35%) |
| 6. % of female professional and technical workers (2008: 61.8%; 2014: 72%) |

Source: UNDP Iraq CPAP (2011-2014)

UNDP Outcome areas of support
The proposed outcome “Enabling policy and frameworks for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private sector development” reflects UNDP’s interventions on sustainable recovery in post-crisis settings like Iraq that requires the restoration of security and a revival of the local economy. This provides the conditions in which livelihoods can be rebuilt and the social fabric repaired. Furthermore, Iraq needs rapid economic growth. Increased oil production is one part of this equation and will help on the income side, but it will do little for jobs.

The other part and the key to jobs is a growing private sector that requires creating the necessary institutional foundations to facilitate and promote investment and markets, provide pressure points for reform, and facilitate the development of key building blocks of the financial sector – including development of financial institutions, effective property rights, and essential telecommunications infrastructure – among other priorities. The state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector, a large agriculture sector, and the public sector account for the majority of employment in the country.
The private sector is characterized by a few large companies, a number of small-medium enterprises (SMEs) and a larger number of micro-enterprises that represents 90 percent of the private sector. With most large enterprises in the state sector, there is very little in the way of exports and the services sector is very weak. Revitalizing the private sector; stimulating public-private partnerships, updating existing commercial legislation and building adequate institutional architecture to stimulate private sector participation in socially and environmentally responsible economic growth, will be key to restoring the foundations for development in Iraq.

According to the National Development Plan Iraq’s rate of unemployment currently stands at 15 percent (not including those working part-time but seeking full-time employment) with a disproportionately high rate among youth at 30 percent and among women at 32.5 percent. To date, foreign investment has flowed to the oil sector and to the cement industry that has had limited impact on youth employment. Large numbers of young people are trying to enter into the labour force, where 24 percent presently do not have high school education. It is unlikely that Iraq will be competitive in many other non-oil production processes over the short-term; therefore, it is vital that new policies and opportunities for youth are created, especially in the private sector, to produce goods and services in support of the economy.

Within this context, UNDP explores the links between private sector development, local economic growth and decentralized planning and implementation processes. At the macro level the support will focus primarily on legislative revisions, state-owned enterprise restructuring, small and medium enterprise development, investment policy, tax policy, and land reform. At the downstream level, micro-credit lending plans will be developed to help stimulate markets and provided credit to local business interests. UNDP’s global experience shows that the informal sector tends to expand to sustain people while economic policies slowly reap the fruits of growth and inclusion in the formal public and private sectors. Therefore, UNDP paid attention early on to the issue of legally empowering those working in the informal sector with robust labour legislation, business sustainability policies, property security, as well as social protection coverage. As the lead agency of the private sector development programme, UNDP continues to assist in developing sound policy, legal, regulatory and institutional capacities to enable the emergence of a socially, environmentally and corporately responsible private sector in Iraq.

The need to rehabilitate the damage done to Iraq’s infrastructure is massive and requires significant government and private sector involvement. UNDP will transition from its current work on physical reconstruction projects to upstream policy and capacity development work in electricity and transport sectors to help attract critical private sector investment to help stimulate Iraq’s economic recovery. The initiatives will involve sector-specific projects to help strengthen electricity and transport master planning as well as regulatory capacities. In support of these initiatives, UNDP will promote public-private partnerships for development.

UNDP, in partnership with FAO, ILO, UNIDO, UNWOMEN and UN-HABITAT, supported the formulation of a private sector development strategy. UNDP brought its global technical knowledge and considerable country experience to help the Government to prevent and/or respond to any unforeseen crises or natural disasters that could emerge during the lifecycle of the CPAP. Both the Government and UNDP have identified the removal of landmines and explosive remnants of war as an important area of recovery work. The lack of freedom of movement and access to land in many economically important areas represents a key blockage in the reconstruction and development process. UNDP assist in the formulation of a national mine action regulatory framework and capacity building of an apex institution, along with necessary attendant national legislation, to ensure that all removal and destruction is based on the humanitarian and development priorities of the Government and conduced according to Iraqi standards and national law.

Through the pre-existing Loan Management Programme (ODA loans to Government), the Ministries of Planning and Finance received support from UNDP to improve their monitoring and oversight functions and enhance their knowledge of procurement and financial management in-line with internationally accepted norms and standards. This include the provision of technical assistance in the area of general project management and the gradual introduction of UNDP’s corporate ‘National Implementation’ (NIM) modality which will see the Government assume greater responsibility for co-financed projects during the four-year period covered by the CPAP.
Annex 1 provides detailed information about on-going and completed UNDP supported projects that are associated with the outcome. Contribution to the outcome was also made through various non-project (soft assistance) activities.

The total budget covered by the projects associated with the outcome is approximately US$ 113,158,111.00 that represents around 35% of UNDP’s total resource mobilization from beginning of 2009 until Dec 2010 (i.e. US$ 324,100,000.00). This information is based on available figures.

B. OBJECTIVES & SCOPE

The overall objective of this outcome evaluation is to assess results, achievements and constraints of the outcome, particularly in relation to the UNDP contribution to the outcome through project activities and soft assistance from 2009 onwards. The evaluation will take into account the impact of the on-going crisis on the UNDP Programme for Iraq, and the modalities of implementation and execution (i.e. Direct Execution or DEX). It shall undertake the assessment through (i) outcome analysis - what and how much progress has been made towards the achievement of the outcome, including contributing factors and constraints; (ii) output analysis - the relevance of and progress made in terms of the UNDP outputs, including an analysis of soft-assistance activities; and (iii) output-outcome link - what contribution UNDP has made/is making to the progress towards the achievement of the outcome, including an analysis of the partnership strategy.

While taking stock of the past, the evaluation should also be a tool for the future. Thus, the scope of the evaluation should include - where relevant - forward-looking analyses in relation to the outcome, including contribution of the outcome to the UNDAF and the National Development Plan and evolving partnerships with other UN agencies and partners working at the national level. It is important to bear in mind that within the outcome delineated above; the UNDP-supported projects are in different phases of implementation:

1. In some cases new projects have just taken off, such as the Operational Capacity Development under the Mine Action, which are in early stages of implementation. Here the focus of the evaluation should be limited to assessing the potential future contributions to the outcomes and possible challenges that need to be addressed through the adoption of corrective measures.
2. In a number of projects implementation is well on their way and it is therefore possible to better assess the likelihood of contribution to the outcome.
3. Finally, some projects (e.g. Private Sector Development Programme) have reached a stage of maturity, which allows a meaningful evaluation of results.

Specifically, the evaluation is expected to undertake an outcome level analysis based on the following.

Outcome analysis

- What is the current situation and possible trend in the near future with regard to the outcome?
- Whether sufficient progress has been achieved vis-à-vis the outcome as measured by the outcome indicators?
- To what degree UNDP’s projects have incorporated the cross-cutting themes i.e. gender?
- To what degree UNDP assistance has resulted in the development of national capacity, including assessment of performance monitoring and evaluation mechanisms?
- What are the main factors (positive and negative) that affect the achievement of the outcome?
- Whether the outcome indicators chosen are sufficient to measure the outcome?
- To what extent are synergies in programming such as partnerships, including among various UNDP programmes, related to the relevant outcome?
- Relevance of the outcomes, taking into account the changes in environment and other situational (including policy) factors.

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40 For UNDP, soft assistance activities include advocacy, policy advice/dialogue, and facilitation/brokerage of information and partnerships.
41 The evaluation will be further guided by additional core evaluation questions in Annex 3.
42 Further gender specific evaluation questions in Annex 3.
Output analysis

- Are the UNDP outputs still relevant to the outcome?
- Has sufficient progress been made in relation to the UNDP outputs?
- What are the factors (positive and negative) that affect the accomplishment of the outputs?
- Assess whether and how human development and human security concerns have been considered in the national development planning.
- Assess UNDP’s ability to advocate best practices and desired goals, including its role and participation in national debate and ability to influence national policies on promoting recovery and development.

Output-outcome link

- Whether UNDP’s outputs or other interventions can be credibly linked to the achievement of the outcome (including the key outputs, projects and assistance soft and hard that contributed to the outcome);
- What are the key contributions that UNDP has made/is making to the outcome (e.g. piloting new technologies, developing pricing schemes, drafting energy efficiency standards)?
- What has been the role of UNDP soft-assistance activities in helping achieve the outcome?
- With the current planned interventions in partnership with other actors and stakeholders, will UNDP be able to achieve the outcome within the set timeframe and inputs – or whether additional resources are required and new or changed interventions are needed?
- Whether UNDP’s partnership strategy has been appropriate and effective. Has UNDP been able to bring together various partners across social, ethnic and sectoral lines to address human development and human security concerns in a holistic manner?
- Assess UNDP’s ability to develop national capacity in a sustainable manner (through exposure to best practices in other crisis-affected countries, south-south cooperation, holistic and participatory approaches). Has UNDP been able to respond to changing circumstances and requirements in capacity development?
- What is the prospect of the sustainability of UNDP interventions related to the two outcomes? Can it be ensured that the outcomes will be reached and maintained even after the UNDP interventions?

In addressing the above questions the evaluation team is also expected to examine the interventions in terms of the following:

- **Project management and implementation issues:**
  - Whether the current project management structure and staffing is effective and efficient;
  - To identify failures and successes in strategy and tactics in the planning and Implementation stages;
  - Identification of possible obstacles to effective implementation in the future.
- **Analysis of underlying factors:**
  - Identification of factors beyond UNDP’s control that influence the environment and the outcome;
  - Coordination between agencies;
  - Risk analysis (short, medium and long term).
- **UNDP contribution to development results:**
  - Whether or not UNDP’s outputs and other interventions can be credibly linked to achievement of the outcome (including the outputs, programmes, projects, and soft and hard assistance that contributed to the outcome).
- **Partnership strategy:**
  - Whether UNDP’s partnership strategy has been appropriate and effective;
  - The level of participation of stakeholders/partners in the achievement of the outcome, as well as the effectiveness of such participation.
  - Sustainability and exit strategy.
- **Key lessons:**
  - The key lessons to emerge in terms of country ownership and state and/or district level cooperation in connection with the outcome.
C. EXPECTED PRODUCTS

The key product expected from the outcome evaluation is an evaluation report with two comprehensive analytical sections – one for the economic recovery and growth portfolio, the other for the mine action portfolio. The evaluation report shall be submitted in hard copy and electronic form, and shall include the following contents:

- Executive summary (1-2 pages)
- Introduction (1 page)
- Description of the evaluation methodology (6 pages)
- An analysis of the situation with regard to the outcome, the outputs, and the partnership strategies (10-12 pages)
- Analysis of salient opportunities to provide guidance for future programming in relation to the outcome (5-6 pages)
- Key findings, including lessons learned and best practice (3-4 pages)
- Conclusions and recommendations (2-3 pages)
- Annexes: ToR, charts, field visits, people consulted, documents reviewed, etc.

The tentative page numbers serve only as a guide for the Evaluation Team. However, it is expected that the report will not exceed 50 pages, including annexes.

Methodology

An overall guidance on outcome evaluation methodology can be found in the UNDP Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Results and the UNDP Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators. In addition, UNDP’s Evaluation Policy provides information about the role and use of outcome evaluation within the M&E architecture of the organization. The evaluators should come up with a suitable methodology for this outcome evaluation based on the guidance given in these three documents.

During the outcome evaluation, the evaluators are expected to apply the following approaches for data collection and analysis:

- Desk review of relevant documents and database sites (project documents with amendments made, progress reports review reports – mid-term, final, donor-specific, audit and financial);
- Discussions with Senior Management and relevant programme staff of UNDP Iraq;
- Consultations with relevant central and other government representatives/implementing partners involved with the UNDP projects and all other relevant initiatives at national level;
- Consultations with all relevant donors, UN agencies and national and international non-governmental organizations engaged in development work in Iraq;
- Field visits to selected project sites and discussions with government officials at district level;
- Interviews/focus group discussion with and participation of partners and beneficiaries, including women’s groups and other stakeholders;
- Use of interviews, field visits, focus group discussion, questionnaires and meetings to validate information about the status of the outcome, including local sources of knowledge about factors influencing the outcome;
- Debriefing consultations and stakeholder workshop (i.e. with national and international partners).

Evaluation Team

The evaluation team will comprise four consultants: two international consultants, one specialized economist and the other specialized in mine action (one of these will be Team Leader and the other Team Specialist) and two national consultants. The international consultants should have an advanced university degree and at least ten years of work experience with evaluation of development issues in crisis-affected countries.

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The Team Leader is expected to be a professional ‘evaluator’ with substantive knowledge about results-based management (RBM) and results-oriented monitoring and evaluation. S/he will take the overall responsibility for the quality and timely submission of the evaluation report to the UNDP Country Office.

Specifically, the Team Leader will perform the following tasks:

- Lead and manage the evaluation mission;
- Design the detailed evaluation scope and methodology (including the methods for data collection and analysis) for the two outcomes;
- Decide the division of labour within the evaluation team;
- Conduct analyses of the outcomes, outputs and partnership strategies for the two outcomes;
- Draft related parts of the evaluation report; and
- Finalize the whole evaluation report.

The Team Specialist will provide substantive support to the Team Leader to achieve the above as well as assume a lead role in the evaluative analysis of at least one or more practice area (e.g. Mine Action and/or Economic Recovery) covered by the evaluation. The national consultants should have advanced university degrees and at least eight years work experience—preferably in the areas of poverty reduction and community based development—and should have sound knowledge and understanding of private sector development in Iraq, and have experience in conducting evaluation, performing the following tasks respectively:

- Review documents;
- Act as ‘translator’ (Arabic to English and vice versa) for the international consultants, as necessary;
- Participate and contribute to the design of the evaluation methodology;
- Undertake field visits in UNDP Iraq project areas in the north, central and south of the country;
- Undertake observation and other evaluative activities as required by the agreed evaluation methodology;
- Conduct an analysis of the outcome, outputs and partnership strategy (as per the scope of the evaluation described above);
- Draft related parts of the evaluation report under the guidance of Team Leader; and
- Assist Team Leader in finalizing the evaluation report through incorporating suggestions received on draft related to his/her assigned sections.

**Implementation Arrangements**

To facilitate the outcome evaluation process the M&E Unit will assist in connecting the evaluation team with the relevant UNDP programme units, senior management, and key stakeholders. It will provide both substantive and logistical support to the evaluation team and ensure a participatory evaluation process. Prior to the evaluation mission to Amman/Iraq, it will help identify the key partners for interviews/consultations by the evaluation team. It will also provide guidance to help the evaluation team to identify the most strategic areas to visit in Iraq by the evaluation team. However, the evaluation will retain its full integrity and flexibility to determine the best approach to collection and analyzing data for the evaluation.

In addition, UNDP Iraq will set up an Evaluation Advisory Group that will consist of relevant UNDP programme staff, whose main function will be to provide relevant inputs on strategic issues. The Team Leader (and other members of the evaluation team) is expected to liaise with the Advisory Group in terms of updating progress against agreed workplan during the different phases of the evaluation process. At the end of the mission period, the draft evaluation report will be submitted to the Advisory Group that will review the draft report and provide comments prior to sharing a revised draft within UNDP Iraq, the relevant government ministries and departments and other key stakeholders for comments.

**D. TIMEFRAME & DELIVERY OF REPORT**

Evaluation Process Schedule (not chronological):
### Activities by Evaluation Team

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desk review of existing documents</td>
<td>13 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalize evaluation design, work-plan and endorsed Inception report</td>
<td>4 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field visits, interviews with partners and other key stakeholders (Amman/Iraq)</td>
<td>15 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drafting of the evaluation report</td>
<td>10 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debriefing with UNDP</td>
<td>1 day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debriefing with partners</td>
<td>1 day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalization of the evaluation report – incorporating comments received on first draft</td>
<td>6 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of days</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A total of 50 working days spread over June to October 2011 required for each of the two international consultants and the two national consultants.

The finalization of the evaluation design indicated above should be based on an *Inception Note* to be submitted to UNDP that will include: a) an assessment of the evaluability of results from the identified UNDP Iraq outcome over the last 2-3 years, and b) the proposed approach and methodology and work-plan for the outcome evaluation.

The evaluation report should be finalized and submitted to UNDP Iraq by **30 October 2011** for final review and approval by UNDP Iraq. See attached tentative work-plan in Annex 1.

Evaluators will be paid in installments for their services and the final payment will be made only after the submission and approval of the evaluation report by UNDP Iraq.

### Specific responsibilities

**Country Office** – to provide logistical support; facilitate meetings and interactions with relevant stakeholders; comment on the final draft report; approve final report and follow up on recommendations/management response.

**Advisory Group** – to ensure quality standards of evaluation process; connect the evaluation team with Programme Units, Senior Management and key stakeholders; monitor progress of evaluation mission(s) and follow-up activities against agreed work-plan; and provide substantive comments on the zero draft.

**Government counterpart** – to participate in meetings/consultations and presentation of findings as per these terms of reference and mission schedule; provide needed information and document related to the outcome evaluation; and comment on the draft report.

**Partners/Key stakeholders** – to participate in meetings/consultations and presentation of findings as per these terms of reference and mission schedule; provide needed information and documents related to the outcome evaluation; and comment on the draft report.

### Key documents to be reviewed by the Evaluators

The evaluators will need to study the following documents in addition to project documents, project monitoring reports, project evaluation reports, programme evaluation reports, audit reports and annual work-plans etc.:

- UNDP Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Results
- UNDP Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators
- UNDP Results-Based Management: Technical Note
- The International Compact with Iraq, 2007
- The National Development Plan (2010-2014)
- UNDP Country Programme Document (CPD) for Iraq (2011-2014)
- UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) for Iraq (2011-2014)
- The Common Country Assessment 2009 & the Iraq UNDAF 2011-14
Other national policies, strategies and plans related to the outcome
Annex B: List of Outcome 5 Projects

### List of UNDP Projects under Outcome 5 with Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Id</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>TOTAL Budget</th>
<th>Effective Date</th>
<th>Status Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00036872</td>
<td>Mine Action Support-NMAA (ITA)</td>
<td>6,741,154.00</td>
<td>12/28/2010</td>
<td>Financially Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00038023</td>
<td>Mine Action Support-NMAA (EC)</td>
<td>2,492,562.00</td>
<td>12/28/2010</td>
<td>Financially Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00051159</td>
<td>Rehab. Mussayab TPS Unit-1/Sta</td>
<td>33,000,000.00</td>
<td>5/4/2006</td>
<td>On Going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00053400</td>
<td>Mine Action Support-JPN</td>
<td>537,093.00</td>
<td>5/13/2009</td>
<td>Financially Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00055106</td>
<td>MA NGO 1 Development</td>
<td>3,195,797.00</td>
<td>12/28/2010</td>
<td>Financially Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00055601</td>
<td>Restoration of Al-Askari Shrin</td>
<td>2,600,000.00</td>
<td>2/28/2007</td>
<td>On Going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00056365</td>
<td>UNDP Conflict VA-North</td>
<td>2,926,000.00</td>
<td>2/29/2008</td>
<td>On Going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00056366</td>
<td>WHO Conflict VA-North</td>
<td>1,400,000.00</td>
<td>4/30/2007</td>
<td>On Going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00057538</td>
<td>Nat. Mine Action Org.-South IR</td>
<td>3,664,230.00</td>
<td>3/12/2008</td>
<td>On Going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00058811</td>
<td>Partnership SVCs-JBIC_Kurdista</td>
<td>739,000.00</td>
<td>11/1/2007</td>
<td>Operationally Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00060584</td>
<td>MA Sup. Rural. Dev. Saf. Env.</td>
<td>3,231,751.00</td>
<td>8/31/2010</td>
<td>Operationally Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00061592</td>
<td>Support to Civil Aviation MP</td>
<td>3,330,000.00</td>
<td>11/13/2008</td>
<td>On Going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00063929</td>
<td>Navaids for Umm Qasr &amp; Az Zuba</td>
<td>2,795,299.00</td>
<td>1/1/2009</td>
<td>On Going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00064108</td>
<td>Private Sector Development</td>
<td>32,850,000.00</td>
<td>12/23/2008</td>
<td>On Going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00069415</td>
<td>Electricity Sector Reconstruct</td>
<td>6,457,394.00</td>
<td>1/1/2009</td>
<td>On Going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00072135</td>
<td>Partnership Services for FMA i</td>
<td>1,985,281.00</td>
<td>8/23/2009</td>
<td>On Going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00076422</td>
<td>Housing Phase 3 Bridging Fund</td>
<td>600,000.00</td>
<td>10/31/2011</td>
<td>On Going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00075309</td>
<td>Operational Capacity Development</td>
<td>1,624,795.00</td>
<td>5/1/2010</td>
<td>On Going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>113,158,111.00</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

### List of UNDP projects under Outcome 5 with Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project ID</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00036872</td>
<td>Mine Action Support-NMAA (ITA)</td>
<td>Strengthened regulatory frameworks, institutions and processes in place for accountable, transparent and participatory governance at national and local levels. And to provide comprehensive management and technical support to NMAA in the establishment and implementation of indigenous and sustainable mine action programme in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00038023</td>
<td>Mine Action Support-NMAA (EC)</td>
<td>Strengthened regulatory frameworks, institutions and processes in place for accountable, transparent and participatory governance at national and local levels. And to provide comprehensive management and technical support to NMAA in the establishment and implementation of indigenous and sustainable mine action programme in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00051159</td>
<td>Rehab. Mussayab TPS Unit-1/Sta</td>
<td>The project aims to rehabilitate a unit necessary to ensure a steady increase of supply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00053400</td>
<td>Mine Action Support-JPN</td>
<td>The Project aims at building coordination and capacity development within relevant areas of the Iraq mine action programme in order to: effectively respond to the threat posed by the Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) to the local population and humanitarian organizations; to free land for productive use by local communities; and for reconstruction and development purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00055106</td>
<td>MA NGO 1 Development</td>
<td>To address the lack of national capacity in clearance of explosive remnants of war through the continued support of a local Non-governmental Organization (NGO), already established within the existing Iraqi legal framework and operating in cooperation with the National Mine Action Authority. To ensure the NGO to be independent, fully equipped and operational and capable of serving Iraq in its reconstruction efforts through mine action activities in accordance with International Mine Action Standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00055601</td>
<td>Restoration of Al-Askari Shrin</td>
<td>The project will promote national reconciliation through community-level initiatives, with restoration/reconstruction of religious sites as the entry point to respond to six key areas. These key areas include: increasing access to potable water in urban areas, increasing sewage treatment and access to urban sewerage systems, increase solid waste collection and disposal, access to potable water and sanitation in rural areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00056365</td>
<td>UNDP Conflict VA-North</td>
<td>The project supports the Government and NGOs to establish sustainable and comprehensive victim assistance service provisions in Erbil, Dahuk and Sulaymaniya Governorates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00056366</td>
<td>WHO Conflict VA-North</td>
<td>To support the government’s ability to provide victim assistance service provisions in Erbil, Dahuk, and Sulaimaniyah Governorates. This includes 1) strengthening of the emergency response and 2) psychological, physical and social rehabilitation of people with disabilities through the provision of training at rehabilitation centers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00057538</td>
<td>Nat. Mine Action Org.-South IR</td>
<td>The project supports rural development and environmental improvement through mine action activities in accordance with international mine action standards (IMAS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00057541</td>
<td>Instit. Dev. Supp.-NMAA IRQ</td>
<td>The overall goal of this project is to develop a sustainable institutional and operational capacity to address the mine and ERW in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00058811</td>
<td>Partnership SVCs-JBIC_Kurdistan</td>
<td>To contribute to the recovery of the electricity network in the KRG through providing procurement advisory services to RMEK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00060584</td>
<td>MA Sup. Rural. Dev. Saf. Env.</td>
<td>Support sustainable rural development by removing the threats to human security and livelihood through the increased capacity of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and the organizations and NGOs falling under its mandate, including the Regional Mine Action Centre (RMAC) based in Basra Governorate. It will be done by supporting a national humanitarian mine action NGO that serves and works with the local community, promoting rural development in Basra, and the provision of support to RMAC to carry out technical quality Assurance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00061592</td>
<td>Support to Civil Aviation MP</td>
<td>The Project aims at providing managerial and technical assistance in upgrading the Iraq civil aviation infrastructure &amp; operations, particularly with regards to regulatory aspects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00063929</td>
<td>Navaids for Umm Qasr &amp; Az Zuba</td>
<td>The project consists in the Delivery and installation of visual navigation aids to meet international standards along with the implementation of Automatic Identification System / Vessel Tracking System (AIS/VTS) based on AIS/VTS strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00064108</td>
<td>Private Sector Development</td>
<td>The programme works towards achieving sustainable and increased employment opportunities, poverty reduction, as well as the enhancement of the legal and regulatory framework necessary to ensure a rational and coherent economic environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00069415</td>
<td>Electricity Sector Reconstruct</td>
<td>The project provides project management support to the Regional Ministry of Electricity in Kurdistan (RMEK) for the smooth implementation of their JICA loan funded project. This is to be used to recover the electricity network in the Kurdistan region, through the provision of necessary equipment and machinery as well as the rehabilitation of transmission and distribution systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00072135</td>
<td>Partnership Services for FMA</td>
<td>The Project aims to support and strengthen the monitoring capacity and activities of the Monitoring Committee, particularly with regards to procurement and financial management. Also aims to assist GoI and implementing line ministries and agencies by strengthening their capacity to adopt international procurement and financial management standards and to execute the project budgets as planned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00075309</td>
<td>Operational Capacity Development</td>
<td>The project is intended to better prepare and equip the Ministry of Construction and Housing’s needs in the housing sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0007622</td>
<td>Housing Phase 3 Bridging Fund</td>
<td>The project aims to develop and enhance national operational capacity of clearance; mine risk education/community liaison and victim assistance in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex C: Summary of Field Visits

August, 2011, Amman
Sulaiman Wasty, David Gairdner, Abbas Balasem, Ban Mahmood conducted preparatory discussions with UNDP-Iraq, and country offices of various UN agencies.

September 2011, Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil
Abbas Balasem, Ban Mahmood conducted site visits to interview stakeholders for Mine Action, PSDP, and other Infrastructure projects.

September-October 2011, Baghdad and Erbil
Sulaiman Wasty, David Gairdner, Abbas Balasem, Ban Mahmood held meetings with GoI officials, PSDP Steering Committee, Implementing Agencies, Governorate authorities, and external development partners.

Mussaiab Thermal Power Generating Station
Abbas Balasem and Riad Al-Allaf, Interviews and site inspection of Mussaiab project.

Amman
Sulaiman Wasty: Debriefing with UNDP-Iraq Management based in Jordan.

November 2011, Baghdad and Erbil
David Gairdner, Abbas Balasem (two visits to Baghdad). Continuation of meetings held during September-October 2011.

Amman
David Gairdner, Abbas Balasem, Ban Mahmood, Continuation of meetings held during September-October 2011.
### Annex D: List of Persons Interviewed

**Government of Iraq**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Department</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ali Ismail Allak</td>
<td>Secretary General, COMSEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thamir Ghabdan</td>
<td>Chairman, PMAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Sindi</td>
<td>Minister of Planning, KRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zagros Siwaily</td>
<td>Deputy Minister of Planning, KRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huda Al Ani</td>
<td>Member, PMAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaras Qader Khoshnaw</td>
<td>Researches and Studies Centre, Erbil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbas Al-Maliky</td>
<td>Project Manager, GCPI, Basra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Karim Al-Saddi</td>
<td>Chairman, Legislation WG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Karim Saaid</td>
<td>Unit of Training, Mussaiab Thermal Power Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Munem Khayoon Lazim</td>
<td>PMT Director, IQ-P9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdulhussain M. A. Al-Anbaki</td>
<td>Advisor, PMAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ako Aziz</td>
<td>Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali K. Ibrahim</td>
<td>Director, Air Traffic Services, ICAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amer Abul Adil</td>
<td>Director, Mussaiab Thermal Power Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammer Salman Abdulhussain</td>
<td>Head, Agriculture Department, Basra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asaad Abdullah Mohammed</td>
<td>D.G. Planning, MoE, KRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assad Ahmad Assad</td>
<td>Planning Manager, Erbil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashdar Ahmed Habeeb</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance, Erbil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chanar Muhammed Ahmed</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, KRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiman Mahmoud</td>
<td>Director of Rehabilitation, Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faiq Abdul Hassan</td>
<td>Head of Victim Assistance, Regional Mine Action Centre- South, Basra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faiq Hana Polos</td>
<td>Investment Board, Erbil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadi Athab</td>
<td>Director, Military Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa Rafiq Mustafa</td>
<td>Head of Planning department, Transmission, MoE, KRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haikel Shakir</td>
<td>Department of Warehouses, Mussaiab Thermal Power Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitham Fatah</td>
<td>Head of Quality Assurance /Quality Control, Regional Mine Action Centre- South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamza Sharif</td>
<td>Director General, National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayder Abbas</td>
<td>Head, Dept. of Warehouses Mussaiab Thermal Power Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hushiar Tahseen Aziz</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning, Erbil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismael Uthman Hamad</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Erbil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamal Latif</td>
<td>Deputy Minister of Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalid Rashad</td>
<td>Acting Deputy Director, Directorate for Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kocher Said Mustaffa</td>
<td>Head of Technical department, MoE, KRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latif Areef Lagtif</td>
<td>Dept. Registration of Companies, Erbil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Layth Abdulridha Shaban</td>
<td>Project Manager, GCPI, Basra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmood Taan Najim</td>
<td>Head, Steering Committee, Member of PC, Basra</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Majed Muzan  
Member of the Board, Chamber of Commerce, Basra

Makki H. A. Al-Mwaamen  
Dean, Technical Institute, Basra

Muhamad Salman Muhamad  
University of Salah Al-Deen

Mungith Al-Baker  
Adviser, Ministry of Industry, Vice-chairman, SOE Committee

Nadhera I. Ibrahim  
Member, GSC, Erbil

Nadhira Ismael  
Erbil Governorate

Nahlah Omar Abdulrahman  
Department of Planning, ICAA

Naji Mohamed  
Electricity Distribution Department, Basra

Nibras Fakhir  
Director, Regional Mine Action Centre- South

Qasim Aziz Rasool  
Provincial Council, Erbil

Raheem Al Shafeay  
Project Manager, Mussaiab Thermal Power Station

Rawaa Ahmed Salim  
Airworthiness Inspector, ICAA

Saaed Zibari  
Ministry of Trade, Erbil

Salah Al-Deen U. Abu-Bakir  
University of Salah Al-Deen, Erbil

Samya Salah Hussain  
Former Director, Contracting Department , ICAA

Shilan Jamil Naama  
Researches and Studies Centre

Silvana Zaki Yousif  
PMT Director, IQ-P6, State Company of Fertilizers, Basra

Siraj Barzani  
Head of IKMAA

Soran Hakim Majeed  
General Directorate for Mine Action

Suzan A. Ismael  
Member, GSC, Erbil

Tahir A. Osman  
Deputy Governor, Chairman, GSE, Erbil

Wafi Mohammad Menadi  
D.G., Mid Euphrates Electricity Generating Directorate, MoE

Civil Society Organisations

Abbas Saedy  
Labour Union, Erbil

Abdul-Saheb S. Al Juwaiber  
Deputy Chairman, Iraqi Businessmen Union, Basra

Adnan Najim  
International Mercy Corps

Aryan Hashim  
Director of PLCD

Clinton Smith  
Acting Programme Manager, Danish De-mining Group

Darra Al-Khayat  
President, Erbil Chamber of Commerce

Ed Rowe  
Technical Advisor- RMAC-S, Norwegian People’s Aid

Fedaa Al-Deen M. Ameen  
Chamber of Commerce, Erbil

Hein Truter  
Programme Manager, Norwegian People’s Aid

Majid Ahmed  
Director of DPLC

Moafaq Alkhafaji  
Iraqi Alliance for Disability

Mohamed Mahmoud Rasoul  
Director of Rehabilitation, KORD

Mohammed Q. Al- Maliki  
N.D. Programme Manager, Danish Demining Group

Peter Herbst  
Senior Advisor- RMAC-S, Norwegian People’s Aid
Ralf Erbel  
Resident Representative, Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty

Sabeer Uthman Ali  
Al-Thiqa Organisation (Microfinance), Erbil

Ali Khalil  
Basra Development Service (BDS)

Hatim Al-Bachari  
Representative of Local Private Sector, Basra

**International Development Partners**

Alan Hendry  
Senior Aviation Advisor at the US Embassy Iraq

Anton Stemberger  
Attache/Programme Manager, EU delegation to Iraq

Dennis F. Hadrick  
Programme Manager, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

Tomofumi Nishinaga  
Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

Shotara Ono  
Representative, JICA Iraq office

**United Nations Agencies in Iraq**

Christine McNab  
DSRSG/RC/HC UNAMI, Resident Representative UNDP Iraq

Basem Juma Hussein  
Fish Project Advisor, FAO

Cristiano Pasini  
OiC Head, UNIDO

Darbaz Hawizi  
National Project Officer, UN-HABITAT

Dijana Dubocanac  
Operations Specialist, UNOPS

Elias Diab  
Project Manager, UNICEF-Iraq

Haydaer Adnan Al Shuwaliy  
Basra Local Economic Recovery Officer, UNOPS

Hilal Mohammed  
CTA Project Manager, FAO

Jacoubs Nieuwoudt  
Head of Programme, UNOPS

Jarl Hansstien  
Project Manager, ILO

Manhal Halasa  
WHO-Iraq

Maria Vardis  
Policy and Public Information, United Nations Mine Action Services, NY

Mourad Zmit  
Project Manager, UNESCO-Iraq

Nakd Khamis  
Project Manager, ILO

Nigar Muhammed  
CTA/Team Leader, PSDP, ILO

Salam Abi Samra  
CTA/Water Resources Management, FOA

Suroush Javadi  
CTA/Team Leader, PSDP, ILO

Usman Akram  
Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor, Office of the Resident Coordinator

**UNDP**

Peter Batchelor  
Country Director

Abdi Hassan  
Project Manager

Cezar Drautan  
CTA, PSDP

Haitham Alrubae  
National Technical Advisor, Mine Action
Ibrahim Baba- Ali  Programme Specialist – MVA Project Manager
Jane Brouillette  Strategic Planning Specialist
Kent Paulusson  Senior Mine Action Advisor
Lionel Laurens  Programme Management Advisor
Natsuko Yukawa  Programme Specialist
Nimal Vijaindu  Technical Specialist
Pirita I. Vuorinen  Programme Specialist PSDP
Rami Samain  Coordinator, Erbil
Ramses Vargas  Specialist PSDP
Richard Cox  Governance Advisor
Shigeru Handa  Team Leader, Loan Management
Simona Marinescu  Senior Economist, Director PSDP
Sudipto Mukerjee  Head of ERPAP
Annex E: List of Documents Consulted

**General Reference**


Cordesman, Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke and Vivek Kocharlakota, *Iraq after the Election: Meeting the Challenges of 2010*, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, July 2010


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Mine Action

**General Mine Action Documentation**


UNICEF the UNDP, *Overview of Landmine and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq*, 2008


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UNDP, *Note to File: AusAid funding received by Mine Action in April 2010, 8 June 2010*

UNDP, *Meeting of the LPAC, Amman, 18 May 2010*


UNDP, *Project 75309: Summary sheet, Indicators and target and related activities*, (undated)

UNDP CPAP Outcome 5 Evaluation

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**Project 60548**

Rafidain Demining Organisation, Support for Rural Development and Safer Environment through Mine Action Activities, June 2008


UNDG, Project Document; Support for Rural Development and Safer Environment through Mine Action, 04 October 2007

UNDP, Annex C: RDO Iraq LOG FRAME - 01 July 08 to 30 June 09 (undated)

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**Project 57541**

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UNDG, Memorandum of Understanding; Development of National Institutional Capacity and Enhancement of Effectiveness of Mine Action Operations and Coordination, February 2011

UNDP, Technical Proposal: Assistance to Develop the Iraq Mine Action Authority, September 2010

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UNDP CPAP Outcome 5 Evaluation

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Project 57538


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