Synthesis of lessons learned from completed evaluations 2012 to 2013
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Mention of company names and commercial products does not imply the endorsement of UNIDO.

The views and opinions of the team do not necessarily reflect the views of the Governments and of UNIDO.

This document has not been formally edited.
Contents

A) Introduction 1

B) Issues identified from selected lessons learned 2

Annexes

Annex 1: Overview on evaluations and related activities conducted by the UNIDO Evaluation Group 2012 to 2013 7

Annex 2: Lessons learned from evaluation report 14

Annex 3: Selected lessons learned 48
A) Introduction

Background
The present report provides a synthesis of lessons learned from independent evaluations conducted or finalized during 2012-2013. From a total of 68 evaluations which were considered, seven country evaluations, nine thematic evaluations, 12 GEF project evaluations, and 40 independent project evaluations, lessons learned were to be found in 34 evaluation reports. It must also be noted that at the time of this research (March 2014) some evaluation reports were still under stages of finalization, which means that some reports may also add additional lessons learned at their final version or that changes to existing lessons learned could be possible. The list of evaluations considered under this review can be found in annex 1. A document with all lessons learned extracted from the individual evaluation reports can be found in annex 2. This synthesis report was prepared by the independent consultant, Ms. Foteini Kanatsouli in collaboration with staff of the UNIDO Evaluation Group.

Methodology
At the beginning of this exercise the lessons learned from the evaluation reports were discerned and organized by defined criteria. Following that, the lessons learned with common themes/issues were identified, selected and grouped. The selected lessons learned, the clusters and a short summary for each cluster can be found in annex 3.

Key findings
An overview of the respective lessons learned shows that the majority of them refer to the way the projects are designed and executed and refer to the need for more effective monitoring and appraisal tools to be applied by project managers and to be integrated at the project’s initiation and design phases. The importance of the funding and resource mobilization is also highlighted.

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1 Annex 3: a) India: Consolidated project for SME development in India through establishment of mutual credit guarantee schemes, cluster twinning and foreign investment and technology promotion. TE/IND/04/001; b) Uganda: Establishment of two District Business Information Centers to promote Private Sector Development and Information and Communication Technologies. UE/UGA/09/003; c) Macedonia: Phasing-out PCBs and PCB-containing equipment in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (GF/MCD/08/002)

2 Annex 3 a) Support to agri-business and agro–industry development initiatives: Implementing the three frameworks. UE/GLO/10/016, TE/GLO/10/017, US/GLO/10/018; b) Evaluación de país. Cuba (2012)
B) Themes and issues identified from selected lessons learned

Collaboration with the private sector and other partners

In country evaluations, UNIDO’s collaboration with the private sector as well as with other partners (e.g., local NGOs, universities, industrial sector) was found to have enhanced the likelihood of success. The engagement with partners that are active in community work has raised the efficiency and effectiveness of projects. Well coordinated partnership relationships with industrial sector associations that have clarity as regards objectives, mutual investments and strong ownership have created a beneficial and rewarding environment for both parties.3

Similarly, lessons learned from project evaluations and programmes have shown that the participation and involvement of the private sector in the design and implementation of projects increased their success and long term impact. Representation of the counterparts in the Steering Committee and in the decision making process is something that should be encouraged as it promotes mutual accountability and allows both UNIDO and partners to focus on their particular strengths and to jointly contribute to the achievement of the project objectives.4

Post-crisis

Several projects and programmes belonging to the general field of post crisis industrial rehabilitation and reconstruction were evaluated as part of the thematic evaluation of UNIDO’s post-crisis interventions (Period covered: 2004-2012). Selected lessons learned from post crisis project evaluations have shown that, in some cases little or no improvement was noticed since the previous assessment in 2010 and some previous design weaknesses were repeated. An obvious example is found in the project of “Rehabilitation of training centers in vulnerable communities in Liberia. TF/LIR/11/001”. A relatively short project timeframe affected the ability to conduct proper feasibility studies as well as design of good project log-frames. The result was that the timeframe had to be extended.5

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5 Annex 3: Liberia: Rehabilitation of training centers in vulnerable communities in Liberia. TF/LIR/11/001
In complicated post-crisis development environments like this of Somalia, concentrating on value chains and a fair development across provinces and clans has been a successful approach as trading has the potential to go beyond clan and spatial divisions.

Also, the need for life skills training and complementary mentoring to increase the effectiveness of technical training was underlined.

Decentralized procurement of goods in post-crisis contexts proves to be a successful practice for UN programmes as this approach is seen as more relevant, efficient and effective and supports local businesses with all the benefits that this offers to the local market. It was also faster than international procurement.

**Agro-industry development**

Interventions in Agro-industry development, designed to create a conducive environment and capability of creating jobs need strong community participation and national ownership. However, the range of business skills training areas shouldn't be too wide, as there are not enough resources available and it has a negative impact on the full development of a value chain.

Projects benefit from a value chain analysis as it is a starting point to identify possible problems and /or opportunities for the development of sectors. Working with a cluster-owned technical vocational training institution (e.g., in cutlery and leather) to impart needed skills can provide customized solutions to clusters and is likely to create sustainability.

A link between skills’ trainings and job creation through a wise selection and organization of the trainings offered is useful. It was found that technical trainings, when well adapted to the target population, motivated trainees and also showed them the possibility to improve both their living and working conditions. On the other hand, in the case of the Congo project (Bringing support to the national reconstruction programme of DRC for livelihoods recovery and peace building, TF/ZAI/11/001), it was found that management trainings, despite being an

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6 Annex 3: Somalia: Integration and skills for displaced groups. TF/SOM/11/001  
7 Annex 3: South Sudan: Integration and progress through protection and empowerment of displaced groups in South Sudan. SAP ID: 110037. XX/SUD/11/X06 (44002). TF/SUD/12/001  
8 Annex 3: Somalia: Integration and skills for displaced groups. TF/SOM/11/001  
9 Annex 3: Indonesia: Realizing minimum living standards for disadvantaged communities through peace building and village based economic development. TF/INS/08/004  
important complement to prepare trainees for self-employment, were not always useful.  

Environment
Environmental projects, when of great relevance to their beneficiaries, are very successful. One example is the methyl bromide project, which belongs to the portfolio of the country evaluation Kenya. The same observation was made in Cambodia where the innovative nature of the Hot Spot methodology (developed by UNIDO, it assesses and prioritizes major polluting sites that are discharging industrial effluents into a river basin) and TEST (transfer of environmentally sound technologies) integrated approach in selected enterprises, achieved maximum impact by focusing on the major polluters within the country.

Gender
Gender equality and equal access to financial resources need to be considered by UNIDO projects and in both design and implementation.

Project design
Lessons learned from country evaluations related to project design and management indicate the importance of making a solid financial feasibility analysis during the preparatory phase of the project. Besides that, understanding the broader business environment and having a thorough approach to sector development including environmental sustainability, skills development, CRS and technology upgrading, were viewed positively.

Another observation, which refers to project design, implies that concentration of resources to fewer areas of activities and developing fast and efficient communication channels among them can, with certainty, have a better impact.

The role of the UNIDO Representative as coordinator is seen as very important. For this reason, it was highlighted that the necessary funding for this position should be secured. A factor that was also proven crucial in project design has been to take into consideration the general financial situation of the donor.

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11 Annex 3: Democratic Republic of the Congo. Bringing support to the national reconstruction programme of DRC for livelihoods recovery and peace building. TF/ZAI/11/001
13 Annex 3: Cambodia: Identification, assessment and prioritization of pollution “hot spots” and transfer environmentally sound technologies. TF/CMB/10/002
14 Annex 3: Global activities: Support to agri-business and agro–industry development initiatives: Implementing the three frameworks. UE/GLO/10/016, TE/GLO/10/017, US/GLO/10/018
15 Annex 3: Evaluación de país. Cuba (June 2012)
partner countries during the time the project is implemented. For example the financial crisis in Italy as found in the “Consolidated project for SME development in India through establishment of mutual credit guarantee schemes, cluster twinning and foreign investment and technology promotion. TE/IND/04/001” had as result that the Italian partners were not sufficiently interested, were hard to motivate and even resisted plans to strengthen potential competitors. In this case a more realistic, flexible and effective approach was needed.17

In countries with post-crisis circumstances, a vital project design should not ignore the need of the beneficiaries for basic necessities and incorporate the fulfilment of those needs in the design of a project.18 Using available information and pre-existing knowledge at the stage of project preparation, and using local service providers and implementing a decentralized decision making process, can also increase effectiveness and efficiency of quick impact projects.19

**Project Management**
A successful and efficient in-country Project Management Unit (PMU) under the direction of a Chief Technical Advisor is critical for the successful implementation of interventions in post–crisis countries. Other managerial factors that lead to positive results are: good commitment and cooperation with counterparts, accurate analysis of needs and a pragmatic approach to the beneficiary’s involvement through the introduction of a cost-sharing system.20

**Use of seed money**
For some projects, simplifying the procedures to gain access and make use of seed funding opportunities was seen as crucial.21 Lessons from country evaluations have shown that seed funding without a participatory mechanism that was defined in advance and by which its strategic use is decided, cannot contribute to the development of new, large-scale projects.22

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17 Annex 3: India: Consolidated project for SME development in India through establishment of mutual credit guarantee schemes, cluster twinning and foreign investment and technology promotion. TE/IND/04/001
18 Annex 3: Sierra Leone: Rehabilitation of training-cum-production centres in vulnerable communities of Koidu, Kpandebu and Pujehun in Sierra Leone. TF/SIL/11/002
19 Annex 3: South Sudan: Integration and progress through protection and empowerment of displaced groups in South Sudan. SAP ID: 110037. XX/SUD/11/X06 (44002), TF/SUD/12/00
20 Annex 3: Lebanon: Community Empowerment and Livelihoods Enhancement Project, TE/LEB/10/002
21 Annex 3: Global activities: Support to agri-business and agro–industry development initiatives: Implementing the three frameworks. UE/GLO/10/016, TE/GLO/10/017, US/GLO/10/018
Monitoring
Lessons learned showed that having an efficient monitoring system that allows assessing progress against objectives and targets improves results. Therefore, the required resources (allocation of special funds) for setting up and operating monitoring and reporting mechanisms must also be planned for.23

Ownership
Both, national and UNIDO ownership were found to be necessary for the effective funding and implementation of country programmes.24 In industry-related interventions it is clear that it is imperative that industry owns designs and drives the process of supplier development.25

Sustainability
Capacity-building of stakeholders by providing technological solutions without a good understanding of the dynamics and actual potential of the local social capital undermines the success and sustainability of projects. Real participation, community engagement and work are often required to ensure long-term project sustainability.26

Impact
Assessing the impact of some UNIDO projects with focus on poverty reduction and job creation hasn’t always been possible due to the lack of available data.27 Clustering projects that were not market demand driven or when the partner associations were not carefully chosen did not succeed in having a noticeable impact.28

23Annex 3: a) India: Consolidated project for SME development in India through establishment of mutual credit guarantee schemes, cluster twinning and foreign investment and technology promotion. TE/IND/04/001; b) Macedonia: Phasing-out PCBs and PCB-containing equipment in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. GF/MCD/08/002; c) Uganda: Establishment of two District Business Information Centers to promote Private Sector Development and Information and Communication Technologies. UE/UGA/09/003
25Annex 3: South Africa Automotive Component Supplier Development. SE/SAF/09/003
27Annex 3: Ethiopia. Technical assistance project for the upgrading of the Ethiopia Leather and Leather Products Industry. TE/ETH/08/008
28Annex 3: India: Consolidated project for SME development in India through establishment of mutual credit guarantee schemes, cluster twinning and foreign investment and technology promotion. TE/IND/04/001
Annex 1: Overview on evaluations and related activities conducted by the UNIDO Evaluation Group 2012 to 2013

The overview presents the evaluations conducted or managed by the Evaluation Group (ODG/EVA) 2012/13.

I. Country evaluations
   (incl. Integrated Programmes / Country Service Frameworks)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Type of programme covered by country evaluation</th>
<th>GEF Projects</th>
<th>MP Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Integrated Programme (IP)</td>
<td>Country Service Framework (CSF)</td>
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<td>Mexico LL found</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian Federation LL not found</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pakistan LL found</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Zambia (LL not found)</td>
<td>Country evaluation. ZAMBIA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq (LL not found)</td>
<td>Country Evaluation. IRAQ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kenya LL found</td>
<td>Country evaluation. KENYA</td>
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<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cuba LL found</td>
<td>Evaluación de país. CUBA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II. **Thematic evaluations**

The below evaluations were conducted or finalized during 2012/13. The thematic evaluation of UNIDO’s post-crisis interventions (period covered 2004-2012) is under finalization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO projects related to &quot;Industrial Upgrading&quot; (LL not found)</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO Field Office performance (LL not found)</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO’s contribution to the Millennium Development Goals (LL found)</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO’s work in the area of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) (LL not found)</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO’s contribution to One UN mechanisms (LL not found)</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO’s Public private partnerships (LL not found)</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO Trade Trust Fund (LL not found)</td>
<td>2012/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO Regional Programmes for Trade Capacity Building in West Africa (LL not found)</td>
<td>2012/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO’s Global Forum function (LL not found)</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO’s post-crisis interventions, period covered: 2004-2012 (LL not found)</td>
<td>2012-13/14</td>
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</table>
### III. Independent project evaluations conducted in 2012/13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project evaluations / title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Angola</strong></td>
<td>Technical Assistance for Angola’s Entrepreneurship Curricula in Secondary Schools Programme (ECP), XP/ANG/08003. US/ANG/08/002.US/ANG/08/001.TF/ANG/10/001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cambodia</strong></td>
<td>Identification, assessment and prioritization of pollution “hot spots” and transfer environmentally sound technologies TF/CMB/10/002/A02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cote d’Ivoire</strong></td>
<td>Youth training for post-conflict recovery and peace building. TF/IVC/10/004. Quality training – insertion of the Youth. TE/ICV/08/003. (project considered by above evaluation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democratic Republic of the Congo</strong></td>
<td>Bringing support to the national reconstruction programme of DRC for livelihoods recovery and peace building. TF/ZAI/11/001 Developing the agro-processing sector for livelihoods recovery, jobs diversification and peace building. SAP ID: 110043 XX/ZAI/11/X01 (44009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethiopia</strong></td>
<td>Technical assistance project for the upgrading of the Ethiopia Leather and Leather Products Industry. TE/ETH/08/008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global activities</strong></td>
<td>Strengthening the local production of essential generic drugs in developing countries through advisory and capacity-building support. TE/GLO/10/023 &amp; XP/GLO/11/007 (status: evaluation under finalization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global activities</strong></td>
<td>Support to agri- business and agro – industry development initiatives: Implementing the three frameworks UE/GLO/10/016, TE/GLO/10/017, US/GLO/10/018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>India</strong></td>
<td>Consolidated project for SME development in India through establishment of mutual credit guarantee schemes, cluster twinning and foreign investment and technology promotion. TE/IND/04/001. Investment and technology promotion component. TE/IND/04/001 TE/IND/04/B01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indonesia</strong></td>
<td>Realizing minimum living standards for disadvantaged communities through peace building and village based economic development. TF/INS/08/004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraq</strong></td>
<td>Enhancing investments to Iraq through industrial zone development. TE/IRQ/10/006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraq</strong></td>
<td>Rehabilitation of the Specialized Institute for Engineering Services. FB/IRQ/09/004, FBIRQ/09/A04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex 1: Overview on evaluations and related activities conducted by the UNIDO Evaluation Group 2012 to 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project evaluations / title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>IRAQ. Promotion of Micro-Industries for Accelerated and Sustainable Livelihood Recovery - Ninewa Governorate of Iraq (MISP V). TE/IRQ/09/008, TE/IRQ/09/A08, TE/IRQ/09/B08 and TE/IRQ/09/C08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Combined independent evaluation. Enterprise development through information and communication technology (EDICT). FB/IRQ/09/007; and Investment promotion for Iraq (IPI). TE/IRQ/09/010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of the Mosul Dairy Plant. FB/IRQ/10/001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Independent evaluation of micro enterprises for reintegration of Internally Displaced persons in Thi Qar Governorate. TE/IRQ/08/004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>GLOBAL. ITPO TOKYO. UNIDO Service in Japan for the promotion of industrial investment in developing countries (Investment and Technology Promotion Office). US/GLO/10/119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Crafting a green future - Bamboo in the curio and souvenir industry. TF/KEN/11/001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of training centres in vulnerable communities in Liberia. TF/LIR/11/001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Promoting peace building opportunities through multi-skills training. SAP ID: 110031. XX/LIR/11/X03 (43995)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Community empowerment and livelihood enhancement project. TE/LEB/10/002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Capacity Building for Aflatoxin Management and Control in Groundnuts in Malawi. TE/MLW/08/001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Entrepreneurship Development for Youth. TF/MOZ/07/003 (status: evaluation report under review – Donor eval.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Technology Transfer for “Recycling of Building Material Waste” a platform for Production of low-cost Construction Products. TE/PAL/05/001 (status: evaluation ongoing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Africa</td>
<td>Preparatory and first operational phase of Secretariat of the ECOWAS Regional Center for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ERC). UE/RAF/09/028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Africa</td>
<td>Survey of enterprises in selected ACP regions. EE/RAF/08/043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Project evaluations / title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Asia</td>
<td><strong>Annex 1: Overview on evaluations and related activities conducted by the UNIDO Evaluation Group 2012 to 2013</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>LL found</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>REGIONAL ASIA. SAARC - UNIDO projects in Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Maldives. UNIDO/NORAD project: Strengthening institutional and national capacities related to standards, metrology, testing and quality (SMTQ) – Phase II. UNIDO projects in Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Maldives. TE/RAS/07/001, TE/RAS/07/A01, TE/RAS/07/B01, TE/RAS/07/C01, TE/RAS/07/D01</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Latin America <em>LL found</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian Federation <em>LL not found</em></td>
<td>Identification, evaluation and prioritization of pollution hot-spots in the basins of trans-border reservoirs and transfer of environmentally sound technologies. US/RUS/10/003 (project was assessed as part of CE RUS in 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone <em>LL found</em></td>
<td>Rehabilitation of training-cum-production centres in vulnerable communities of Koindu, Kpandebu and Pujehun in Sierra Leone. TF/SIL/11/002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia <em>LL found</em></td>
<td>Integration and skills for displaced groups – TF/SOM/11/001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa <em>LL found</em></td>
<td>South Africa Automotive Component Supplier Development. SE/SAF/09/003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan <em>LL found</em></td>
<td>Recovery of coastal livelihoods in the Red Sea State of Sudan: The modernization of artisanal fisheries and creation of new market opportunities. TF/SUD/09/002 (status: evaluation under finalization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda <em>LL found</em></td>
<td>Establishment of two DBICs. UE/UGA/09/003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam <em>LL not found</em></td>
<td>VIET NAM. Technical Assistance to Business Registration Reform in Viet Nam 2008-2013. TF/VIE/08/001, XP/VIE/08/002 and FB/VIE/09/006, US/VIE/10/002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Viet Nam <em>LL found</em></td>
<td>SME Cluster development. TE/VIE/08/003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia <em>LL found</em></td>
<td>Joint UNIDO-WTO Trade Capacity Building Programme Framework for Zambia. TE/ZAM/09/001</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Renewable energy-based electricity generation for isolated mini grids in Zambia – Additional funding for setting up mini-hydropower plant as a part of the SHP Mini-grid at Shiwan’andu. SF/ZAM/10/001 (status: evaluation under finalization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka <em>LL found</em></td>
<td>Strengthening international certification capacity in Sri Lanka with particular reference to social accountability standard (SA 8000) and food safety (HACCP/ISO 22000) standard. TE/SRL/06/004</td>
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</table>
### IV. GEF project evaluations conducted during 2012/13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project evaluations / title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
(status: project extended to 2014; evaluation postponed)  
Strengthening Institutions, Regulations and Enforcement (SIRE) capacities for Effective and Efficient Implementation of the National Implementation Plan (NIP) in China. GF/CPR/07/009  
(status: project extended to 2014; evaluation postponed)  
Global activities  
LL found  
GLOBAL ENERGY ASSESSMENT: Developing Policy Tools for Jointly Reducing Energy Poverty and Greenhouse Gases (UNIDO SAP ID 103025, prev. GF/GLO/10/004; GEF ID: 3928), and Cooperation with Global Energy Assessment on the development of industrial sector energy end-use module (UNIDO SAP ID: 103026, prev. XP/GLO/09/002)  
Peru  
LL found  
Evaluación de medio término. Manejo y disposición ambientalmente racional de bifenilos policlorados. GF/PER/10/001, GF/PER/10/A01, XP/PER/11/001; GEF SEC project ID: 3709  
Global activities  
LL found  
Development of the Guidelines for Updating of National Implementation Plans (NIPs) under the Stockholm Convention taking into account the new POPs added to the Convention. GF/GLO/11/013; GEF Project No. 4410  
Armenia  
LL found  
(status: project extended to 2014/2015; evaluation postponed)  
Terminal Evaluation. Safe PCB Management Programme in Morocco, Pillar II. GF/MOR/09/  
(status: project extended to 2014/2015; evaluation postponed)  
Regional Africa  
LL not found  
Terminal Evaluation. Regional project to develop appropriate strategies for identifying sites contaminated by chemicals listed in annexes A, B and/or C of the Stockholm Convention. GF/RAF/07/024. TF/RAF/09/008  
(status: evaluation ongoing)  
China  
LL not found  
Terminal Evaluation. Environmentally Sound Management and Disposal of Obsolete POPs and Pesticides and other POPs Wastes. GF/CPR/09/006 |
### Annex 1: Overview on evaluations and related activities conducted by the UNIDO Evaluation Group 2012 to 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project evaluations / title</th>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Phasing-out PCBs and PCB-containing equipment in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. GF/MCD/08/002</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Terminal Evaluation. Integrated assessment and management of the gulf of Mexico large marine ecosystem (Mexico component of regional project). GF/MEX/09/001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2: Lessons learned from evaluation reports

COUNTRY EVALUATIONS

1. Evaluación de país: Mexico (S)
p.81

Lecciones aprendidas generales
La principal lección aprendida es la importancia de incorporar en la etapa de diseño, es decir, antes de la aprobación de los proyectos por las Partes, el análisis de los riesgos que podrían implicar las estructuras, los procesos de toma de decisión gubernamentales y los cambios de administración, especialmente en los gobiernos locales, a fin de identificar medidas preventivas adecuadas si tales riesgos ocurren durante la instrumentación y las primeras etapas de operación de los proyectos. The main lesson learned is the need to incorporate in the design stage, i.e., prior to project approval by the parties , the analysis of the risks that could involve structures, making processes of government decision and management changes, especially related to local governments, to identify proper precautions if such risks occur during the implementation and early operation of the projects.

Lecciones aprendidas específicas de proyectos evaluados
Servicio de la ONUDI en México para la promoción de la inversión industrial y tecnológica. Oficina para la Promoción de la Inversión y la Tecnología (OPIT) 39 (US/GLO/05/001). Lessons learned from specific projects evaluated UNIDO Service in Mexico to promote investment industrial and technological. Office for the Promotion of Investment and Technology (ITPO) 39 (US/GLO/05/001)

1. ONUDI debe asegurar el uso de la gestión basada en resultados de manera consistente en todos sus proyectos y visualizar esta gestión como un valor agregado para los gobiernos. Esta acción permitirá a la ONUDI evaluar y ajustar los proyectos a los cambios políticos, económicos y sociales del país huésped pero manteniendo consistencia con su mandato. UNIDO should ensure the use of RBM consistently in all projects and use this as a value added management for governments. This action will enable UNIDO to assess and adjust projects to political, economic and social changes of the host country while maintaining consistency with its mandate.

2. ONUDI debe ser consecuente con la decisión estratégica de mantener y expandir la red de OPITs y ejecutar esta decisión. Para ello, requiere definir las políticas y asignar los recursos necesarios que aseguren una cooperación más estrecha entre las OPITs y la Sede en Viena. Esta acción es de suma importancia ya que si las OPIT actúan bajo el nombre de ONUDI pero con escasa guía y control por parte de la sede se asume un riesgo considerable para la agencia. UNIDO should be consistent with the strategic decision to maintain and expand the network of OPITs and execute this decision. This requires defining the policies and allocates the necessary resources to ensure closer cooperation between OPITs and headquarters in Vienna. This action is important because if the ITPO act under the name of UNIDO but with little guidance and control from the headquarters a significant risk to the agency is assumed.
3. La vinculación de las OPIT con los otros programas de la UNIDO en particular los consorcios de exportación y emprendimientos debe darse de manera estructural desde el diseño del proyecto y no delegarla a una relación casual, no planificada. **The link between ITPO with other UNIDO programs in particularly export consortia and enterprises should be given to structural manner from the design of the project and not delegate it to a casual relationship.**

4. La UNIDO debe centrar sus esfuerzos de promoción y atraición de inversiones en los sectores y mercados donde pueda generar valor proponiendo a los gobiernos el desarrollo de políticas específicas. Esta acción es imprescindible si se reconoce que la mayoría de los países, incluyendo las economías emergentes, posee agencias gubernamentales especializadas en la atracción de inversiones que superan en recursos a las OPIT. **UNIDO should focus its efforts on promoting and attracting investments in sectors and markets where it can generate value, proposing to Governments the development of specific policies. This action is essential if it is recognized that most countries including emerging economies, have specialized government agencies in attracting investments that exceed resources to ITPO.**

5. La vinculación entre los resultados de las evaluaciones y la mejora de los proyectos debe sistematizarse incluyendo incentivos a los coordinadores de esos proyectos por realizar. Centro para el desarrollo de habilidades y tecnología de bambú en Veracruz. **The link between assessment results and improvement projects including incentives should be systematized to the coordinators of these projects done. Centre for development of skills and technology bamboo Veracruz.**

2. Country Evaluation: Pakistan  
P.92

**Lessons learned**
- Working with both the private and public sectors towards common objectives and with complementary resources fosters the achievement of outcomes and sustainability.
- Mainstreaming environmental sustainability in projects supporting industries can be a way to promote export and growth.
- A holistic approach to sector development (including environmental sustainability, skills development, export promotion and technology upgrading) was seen for the leather sector as a positive approach.
- Collaboration with universities (design and food safety, 3 universities have approved curricula for post graduate diploma) add value to interventions as a sustainable local partner and for access to additional funding and resources.
- Working with technical vocational training centres operated within clusters (cutlery, leather) provide customized solutions and training services, and have a good prospect for sustainability.

**Link:** http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media_upgrade/Resources/Evaluation/ebook kenya.pdf

**p. 63**

**Lessons learned**

The experiences provide some lessons for future UNIDO work in Kenya and more generally. Firstly, the experience of the KIPI and KIPII indicate that without country and UNIDO ownership of the country programme it cannot be effectively funded or implemented. Secondly, the project experiences show that where an appropriate balance is struck between capacity building for stakeholders and provision of hardware, underpinned by understanding of local and national context achieving results will be more likely. Simply installing hardware without attention to capacity is not sufficient to achieve sustainable results, particularly in UNIDOs chosen areas of focus in Kenya energy and agro-industry.

The Methyl Bromide project was largely successful because of its strong relevance for the flower farmers. The strong interest of farmers to find alternatives to MB was a major impact driver for the project, because market (customers demanding more eco-friendly products) and Government pressure allowed overcoming the technical difficulties encountered.

UNIDO’s projects are often focused on technological solutions. Limited community based work to ensure the sustainable uptake of technologies or new processes is often a weakness of such projects. The cooperation with local NGOs that engage in community work can be a very appropriate way of making UNIDO projects more effective and efficient.

The experience with the Community Power Centres (CPSs) showed, that unless you have a water tight and proven project approach (which was not the case here), UNIDO should not do too many CPCs; rather a few with higher power capacity with sufficient funds for participatory planning, support beyond the provision of equipment and follow up over a sufficient time period. The latter might best be done in cooperation with local NGOs.

4. Evaluación de país: Cuba

**Link:** http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/About_UNIDO/Evaluation/Country _Reports/ebook%20CUBA.pdf

**p. 75**

**Lessons learned**

A pesar de una apropiación alta por parte del Gobierno, el modelo del “Punto Focal” para la representación de ONUDI en el país da menos resultados que una oficina propia y estrechamente vinculada con el Sistema de las NNUU. **Despite the strong government ownership, the “focal point” model for the representation of UNIDO in the country produces less results than a field office, which can be more closely linked to the UN system.**

La existencia de estudios sólidos de factibilidad económica en la fase preparatoria de proyectos es un factor decisivo para el potencial de replicación y el impacto más amplio. **The availability of solid feasibility studies in the project preparatory phase is a key factor for its potential replication and broader impact.**
El uso de los fondos “semilla” de ONUDI no contribuye al desarrollo de nuevos proyectos de gran escala, si no existe un mecanismo participativo definido de antemano, a través del cual se decide la utilización estratégica. The use of UNIDO “seed” funds, doesn’t contribute to the development of bigger scale projects, if there isn’t a participatory mechanism previously defined.

Project evaluations conducted in 2012/13

p.35

Lessons Learned
The evidence collected and analysed in this evaluation suggests that the availability and the quality of the learners’ manuals and the training of teachers are important, yet these are not the only key variables for the effectiveness and sustainability of the programme. There are process dimensions and contextual factors that are as important as the timeliness and the quality of the outputs delivered.

Some of the contextual factors cannot be controlled by the programme, such as availability of human and financial resources to the secondary education system, or the local business environment. However there are dimensions of the implementation process to which greater attention could have been paid, although they may not be fully under control. More precisely, greater efforts could have been dedicated to establishing strategic partnerships with other State institutions at national and local level, so as to enhance synergies and possibly gain multiplying effects.

In this connection, it should be noted that the effective functioning of the institutional architecture of the Programme to support the partnerships with the private sector and to bridge the gaps between secondary education and the labour market was one of the key assumptions underpinning its approach and methodology. Yet, the establishment and consolidation of such architecture was taken as a point of departure: it was not explicitly considered as a line of activity and as a result to achieve in the implementation process, as evidenced by the programme’s budget and corresponding work plans. Similarly, this dimension of the implementation process was not discussed in the progress reports that mostly focused in reporting implementation of activities and delivery of outputs.

The practical implication of this lesson is that a results based approach to programme management should focus more on analysing the implementation process in relation to the assumptions made at the formulation stage of the project. Along this line of reasoning, the development of partnership strategies that may help to minimize risks and optimize opportunities for the effective and sustainable use of the outputs delivered should be given equal weight as to the timeliness and quality of the outputs themselves. While the fact that the Programme is firmly anchored to the Ministry of Education enhances its sustainability, other partners need to be involved in the design and implementation process to have a larger critical mass of institutions and individuals who are committed to its effective functioning and long term impact.
2. Cambodia: Identification, assessment and prioritization of pollution “hot spots” and transfer environmentally sound technologies (TEST) in the Cambodian Section of the Mekong river basin. TF/CMB/10/002

Lessons learned
The “Joint-Execution Modality” UNIDO applied in practice, is a suitable management model for technical capacity building projects. Its key feature, “joint decision making”, allows both UNIDO and counterparts to focus on their particular strengths, thus jointly contributing to the achievement of objectives. Joint responsibility in turn fosters joint accountability. Important characteristics of the management approach used were: efficient management that capitalized on locally available resources (project office, UNIDO Head of Operations, experts), UNIDO’s efforts to keep transaction costs comparatively low, responsiveness to changed needs of partners and joint-decision making on strategic issues within an outside the steering committee. This type of Joint-execution is a good way to respond to the “alignment objectives” of the Paris Declaration without compromising on aid effectiveness.

Staff selection is a crucial success factor for achieving results
Staff selection is a crucial success factor for achieving results. The identification and selection of the right staff, at both headquarter and project levels, was a crucial success factor. Besides interpersonal skills in a multicultural context, staff involved into the implementation of technical cooperation projects should have an entrepreneurial spirit, managerial skills and the ability to acquire technical competencies. In contrast, a relevant university degree and the number of years working within the UN-system seem to be much less important. UNIDO might revisit the selection criteria currently used to select its staff.

Combination of Hot Spot and TEST approach
The combination of the Hot Spot and TEST approach for a first project phase in the field of “resource efficient and clean production” is innovative and allows for systematically focusing on the major polluters within a country, in order to achieve a maximum impact.

3. Cote d’Ivoire: Youth training for post-conflict recovery and peace building. TF/IVC/10/004

Leçons apprises / Lessons learned
Le projet a démontré que:

Il est possible de faire acquérir à une personne en situation précaire, dans le cadre d’une formation qualifiante de trois mois, des compétences suffisantes pour entamer convenablement un stage de pré-insertion; **The project demonstrated that: It is possible to provide a person in a precarious situation, as part of a qualifying three-months training, with sufficient skills to properly start a pre-insertion internship;**
Dans un contexte de crise, la remise de kits d’outillage aux lauréats de la formation qualifiante favorise leur insertion auprès de petits artisans. **In a crisis context, the delivery of tool-kits to the passing candidates of the qualifying training favours their employment by small artisans.**

4. Democratic Republic of the Congo Bringing support to the national reconstruction programme of DRC for livelihoods recovery and peace building. 
TF/ZAI/11/001

p.24

Enseignements pouvant être tirés du déroulement du projet / Lessons learned

**Cohérence**

Une des qualités de ce projet vient de son intégration à la thématique générale de reconstruction du pays d’une part et à la mise en place d’un partenariat avec une ONG expérimentée, le CIVAK, dont les actions correspondaient à des besoins vitaux de populations vulnérables et étaient cohérentes avec le projet considéré. Par ailleurs, les résultats de cette ONG étaient déjà visibles sur le terrain.

**Consistency**

*One of the qualities of this project is its integration with the general theme of rebuilding the country on the one hand and the establishment of a partnership with an experienced NGO: the CIVAK, whose actions corresponded to vital needs of vulnerable populations and were consistent with the project. Besides, the results of this NGO were already visible on the ground.*

Complémentarité entre les différentes composantes La force du projet et ses chances de pérennité reposent sur la complémentarité qui était imaginée dès le départ du projet entre i) les résultats “invisibles” que sont ceux des formations ii) les résultats “visibles” constitués par l’unité-pilote et son laboratoire.

**Complementarity between the different components**

*The strength of the project and its chances of durability are based on the complementarity which was imagined at the beginning of the project between i) the “invisible” results of the trainings, ii) the “visible” results built by the pilot-unit and its laboratory.*

La présence définitive de l’unité-pilote que l’on cherchera à faire fonctionner dans des conditions de rentabilité réelle permettra par son rôle de démonstration de pérenniser, améliorer, voire diversifier les formations sources de progrès pour les bénéficiaires.

**Rôle de l’évaluation**

Les évaluateurs ont voulu étayer leur travail par une approche extérieure objective reposant sur des questionnaires à la fois simples –pour éviter les erreurs d’interprétation– et détaillés pour vérifier la conformité des recrutements avec les cibles des bénéficiaires ainsi que la qualité de la compréhension des contenus par ces mêmes bénéficiaires. Ce sont les résultats de ces questionnaires qui ont apporté le plus d’éléments objectifs pour l’appréciation de la qualité du projet.
Role of the evaluation

The evaluators wanted to support their work with an external objective approach based on questionnaires both simple - to avoid misinterpretation - and detailed to ensure the conformity of the recruitments to the target beneficiaries as well as the quality of understanding of the content by these beneficiaries. The results of these questionnaires provided the most objective elements for the appreciation of the project’s quality.

Sustainability of the project

Technical trainings, to the extent that they are well adapted to the target population, motivate students by showing them the possibility to improve their living conditions.

Management trainings are an essential complement to prepare the recipients to a new way of working (self-entrepreneurship). But this preparation for entrepreneurship is not enough to increase the value of the initial trainings received.

Indeed, in order to enable the beneficiaries of these formations to really access to a situation of economic autonomy, it seems necessary to add to the next phases or future similar projects, three additional components of training / information to tackle the future progress of the projected activities by the students and which will answer the following questions:

- How to finance the necessary equipments and eventually the need for initial working capital?
- How to identify and explore the targeted markets?
- How to organize among recipients if a collective tool is to be managed?
5. Ethiopia. Technical assistance project for the upgrading of the Ethiopia Leather and Leather Products Industry. TE/ETH/08/008
p.57

General conclusions and lessons learned

The decision to address the upgrading of the leather industry by a comprehensive and “systemic” approach is commendable since the sector requires multi-front interventions, including policy interventions, for improved competitiveness. The government adopted this comprehensive approach in its sector strategy, which calls for simultaneous interventions in different dimensions.

Accordingly, the project under evaluation decided broadening the focus of the earlier project. Instead of a limited focus on LiDI capacity building only it also included direct interventions in tanneries, shoe factories and leather goods industries.

According to its initial planning, the project would have been highly relevant for shoe manufacturers in the informal sector but this relevance was dramatically reduced when the government decided to redefine project priorities and refocus on the “modern” sector only. Relevance for informal sector players in “Merkato” was partially restored in 2012 when the project extended the scope of its activities to EIFCCOS.

The bulk of the Project has been aiming at improving the capacity of the sector by imparting skills, introducing new products, introducing quality assurance, creating exposure to international markets and improving the management and marketing operations of medium sized enterprises. This approach has been implemented by focusing on selected factories and the LiDI. The project has fielded numerous experts and attained skills transfer in different areas of operation.

This evaluation has ascertained that the project is well aligned with the government policy and is fully owned by stakeholders at the highest level. However, the project and its institutional partners encountered difficulties to translate the orientations of the Steering Committee into operational decisions, which affected ownership at institutional and company level.

At company level, the project provided different types of support that resulted in productivity gains in some companies, increased product collections and developed brands and promotional materials. In doing so the project envisaged to develop the capacity of companies and promote their image by providing lee way for e-commerce.

The marketing component aimed to install a more proactive marketing approach to international and national markets, which is a condition for increased bargaining power. Building on earlier experience under the “Taytu - Made in Ethiopia” project the 57 marketing experts of the programme developed brands and other promotional tools for a number of factories. Beneficiaries recognized the usefulness of the support but not all of these project inputs are actually used.

At the productivity front, the project decided to go beyond technical benchmarking and to promote innovative tools and methods for supply chain management. A pilot experience at one of the shoe factories tested a rather sophisticated Enterprise Resource Planning system (ERP) that is widely used in Italian shoe factories. The pilot experience showed, however, that this technology was inappropriate under the given circumstances. Up
scaling the experience to other companies was therefore not envisaged. The experience helped the project to change strategy and to use less sophisticated Open Source software that allows for a more step-by-step implementation approach. At the time of the evaluation these systems were being up-scaled and started to become operational in several enterprises.

Continuous capacity building of LIDI has been the second strand of the Project. The assistance to laboratory accreditation enabled LIDI to provide quality tests for the industry with the result of facilitating the international business. The project also built the capacity of the marketing department by transferring skills on how to make marketing studies. However, the department does not make full use of the developed capacity due to other priorities. The leather goods department has been party to UNIDO’s initiative to develop new products for purposes of participating in international fairs. This activity has however remained a one-time event and needs to be continued and diversified for lasting impacts. Since the institute has a leather goods product development center (PDC) such initiative should have been closely associated with building the capacity of such center as well.

Trainings in ERP for human resource and trainings in communication department have the potential to improve the management and communication capacity of the institute.

Overall, the Project did not reach all of its capacity building objectives. Interviews with stakeholders and partners of indicate that the institute has still deficiencies in technical skills and its ability to pioneer new technologies in the sector. Enterprise managers also indicated that they need to re-train graduates of LIDI to acquaint them with practical skills that are key to the trade. Despite efforts made to improve its industry linkages through restructuring and capacity building, the Institute still awaits more work in this regard. Partners of the sector see part of the problem in the high turn-over of professionals the Institute is suffering from. In turn, this high turnover is due to the weak incentive structure of the Institute. The Institute is supposed to cover its cost but to date there is no evidence to what degree this objective has been achieved.

At country level, the purpose of the project is to upgrade the leather and leather products industry by catalyzing changes in the sector. In this regard UNIDO introduced production benchmarking as a powerful method under an earlier project as part of the sector business plan. Benchmarking introduces the idea of international excellence standards and creates a positive attitude of competitiveness among producers.

Subsequently, the government decided to transfer the implementation of the benchmarking to improve production techniques at company level to CLRI with positive changes in the sector. The present project has expanded the benchmarking method to marketing though its implementation is still wanting.

The project has contributed directly or indirectly to the increase of leather and leather goods exports from USD67 million in 2004/05 to USD104 million in 2010/11. Such increase has of course resulted from a whole range of projects, policies and programs.

However, the contribution of UNIDO’s projects in general and the current project in particular is widely recognized. Another positive trend is the shift from raw material exports towards exports of finished leather, shoes and leather goods. The export of finished leather has been very much influenced by earlier UNIDO interventions at tannery level.
Under the current project, efforts to assist selected tanneries with improving their finishing techniques made additional contributions. For shoe exports, the focus on improving the technical capability of producing shoes in general and ladies shoe in particular is a contribution of the project.

Overall the project can claim to have made contributions to job creation and poverty reduction although there are no figures available to that effect. However, poverty effects will remain limited as long as the very low wage levels in the leather sector and in particular in the shoe industry continue to exist.

6. Global activities: Support to agri-business and agro–industry development initiatives: Implementing the three frameworks UE/GLO/10/016, TE/GLO/10/017, US/GLO/10/018


p.91

The following lessons were extracted from this review:

- A joint initiative implies joint and not unilateral decision making on the most strategic issues.
- Untied resources are important to ensure the required flexibility when investing in the research on and testing of new ideas and approaches and when being strategically involved and playing a catalytic role in activities that cannot be classified under “projects”; this does not mean that untied resources are not subject to procedures in terms of the types of activities that such resources can be spent on and also in terms of reporting (accountability).
- Speed and ease of procedures to obtain access to seed money resources for preparatory assistance is of utmost importance to demonstrate to clients/donors the efficiency of the organization’s service delivery capacity and also to be able to compete with other service providers. Harmonization of the procedures pertaining to different preparatory assistance funding windows in UNIDO would be justified to treat requests for their use in the same manner.
- Service branding requires consistency in the scope, quality and uniqueness of services and goes hand in hand with guidance to staff to ensure such consistency in brand-related communication for visibility and in service delivery. Selectivity in using the brand (3ADI label/logo) is called for, as putting the brand/logo on products/services that are not strictly speaking 3ADI may be counterproductive and weakens the brand’s meaning.
- Whereas it is recognized that UNIDO’s contribution to the 3ADI should not be reduced to the formulation and implementation of projects, and can also entail co-funding and even collaboration without any financial contribution of UNIDO or financial “gain” for UNIDO, it remains a challenge to downplay the importance of funds mobilization through project development/implementation, as project funding constitutes a key source of the organization’s “bread and butter”.
- Review of prior UNIDO-wide initiatives with innovative and catalytic ambition, such as the UNIDO Exchange platform, may provide insights into the key factors and preconditions determining the success of such ventures.
- It is difficult for a pan-African programme not to actively work with RECs and regional institutions (such as regional investment promotion bodies and regional business fora) that are also seen as key partners by many donors.
GC/IDB/PBC reporting on UNIDO-wide programmes should not be confounded with periodic in-house reporting on such programmes, as the “audience” is not the same; depending on the size and profile of the programme, in-house steering requires different reporting in terms of degree of detail and periodicity.

Setting preconditions to allow inclusion of a potential client country in a programme is a justified approach that clients will understand. It is considered to reflect a more robust selection process than receipt of an official request.

Gender equality and access to finance face the same problem: they are not systematically mainstreamed in project design and implementation.

7. India: Consolidated project for SME development in India through establishment of mutual credit guarantee schemes, cluster twinning and foreign investment and technology promotion. TE/IND/04/001


Main Lessons Learned
As mentioned several times, the project was not in a position to provide the evaluation mission with comprehensive information and hard data on its achievements related to the core project objectives and indicators, apart from output-related activity lists and success stories related to individual companies. The lesson to be learned is therefore that a project should not design elaborate intervention logic and then not set up a corresponding outcome monitoring system that allows assessing progress against objectives and targets. Naturally, the required resources for setting up and operating the monitoring system must also be planned for.

The present project was assessed as consisting, de facto, of several parallel rather than integrated projects (CT leather and footwear in Chennai; different ITP activities for auto components in Pune and Chennai; two separate activity lines in access to finance). The overall range of activities was remarkable; however, most activities were implemented independently from each other and few concrete synergies could be identified. The mission is of the opinion that this was a design flaw right from the start: while the ProDoc allocates the overall coordination function to the URO, the office could not play this role due to lack of operational resources. The CTA was crucial as coordinator but was not replaced later on the CT and ITP components were by and large aiming at the same goal of developing Indian companies and linking them with the international (Italian) markets). Both components pursued different paths based on different methodologies and catchwords. The CT component was cooperating closely with (bureaucratic) government institutions (CLRI, CFTI, MSME-DI), while the ITP component was more private sector oriented (foremost MCCIA but also AIEMA and ACMA). The mission's overall impression was that the components rather kept out of each other's way by focusing on different sectors, activities and (mostly) partners.

The general lesson to be learned from both above findings is that vesting the coordination function in the UR is not enough and sufficient resources and level of authority over project implementation is needed to overcome the centrifugal forces at play in a multi-disciplinary project.

To link the whole project basically with Italy constituted a risk. While focusing can have advantages, the present project has shown that being dependent on one country becomes a risk when that country is in crisis. A more flexible approach would have made the project more relevant for client companies to build upon existing business relations.
like, for example, on-going exports of merchandise to other countries, e.g. in the Asian region.

Based on extensive discussions with key resource persons, the mission identified the following issues as having been underestimated when the project was designed: (i) assumptions on mutuality of interests ("win-win" situations) between Indian and Italian companies and organizations were too optimistic; (ii) Indian companies were less willing to participate than assumed; (iii) partner associations were weaker and less motivated than projected; (iv) the relationship management of 'internal' stakeholders, i.e. foremost the GoI partners and Cooperazione Italiana proved to be more time consuming than anticipated.

Several major obstacles emerged during project implementation: Timing was clearly unfortunate with the crisis in Italy, and the Italian partners were not sufficiently interested or even resisted plans to strengthen potential competitors. The final selection of the sectors was not entirely potential-based and the selected partner associations were weak and hard to motivate. Whether these obstacles were caused by an unfortunate mix of unfavorable conditions (and thus something like force majeure) or rather the consequence of an overly optimistic and ambitious project design is open for discussion; however, it seems to be clear that an entire cluster or even sector cannot be developed by working with a few companies over a limited period of time.

Ultimately, given the comparatively modest budget and time frame, the project design was far too optimistic and the team had been given too wide a range of tasks; consequently, resources had to be spread too thinly over too many fields of activities. Less could certainly have been more.

8. Indonesia: Realizing minimum living standards for disadvantaged communities through peace building and village based economic development. TF/INS/08/004
p.60

Lessons Learned

Part of the purpose of the Maluku Pelagandong project evaluation is to feed into and help shape the approach for a wider thematic evaluation of multiple projects funded by the GOJ. The intention is to help UNIDO shape its overall strategy in post-crisis settings, to further identify UNIDO’s specific role and added value in supporting crisis-affected countries and to consider the potential for further dual-agency partnership approaches.

Based specifically on the findings of the Maluku Pelagandong project evaluation it is recommended the thematic assessment pays due consideration to the following factors. These factors relate particularly to initial project preparation and implementation methodologies.

- The Maluku Pelagandong project approach of focusing on value chains and equitable development across religious, ethnic and administrative boundaries contributed to peace building as income generation and trading had the potential to transcend community divisions. For post crisis interventions to be sustainable a detailed peace and conflict analysis would enable the root cause of crises to be identified together with their appropriate responses.
Regarding product selection and development, implementation with a focus on strong community participation of beneficiaries encourages national ownership. However, spreading the range of vocational skills training areas too widely with limited project resources detracts from (or poses an additional risk to) the fullest development of the value chain.

Involvement of the donor in project evaluations enhanced the donors understanding and lessons learned from project implementation.

9. Iraq: Combined independent evaluation. Enterprise development through information and communication technology (EDICT) (FB/IRQ/09/007) and Investment promotion for Iraq (IPI). TE/IRQ/09/010

Link: http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_mediaupgrade/Resources/Evaluation/EDICT_IPI_evaluation_FINAL.pdf

p.87

As EDICT and IPI were clearly designed as follow-on programmes to EDIP, a brief review of how lessons learned and recommendations from the EDIP evaluation were handled in these projects reveals minimal impact. The ProDoc for both EDICT and IPI includes a list of the four lessons learned that were said to have been taken into consideration when designing the new project. Figure 14 provides an analysis of the extent to which the evaluation revealed lessons were heeded.

EDIP Lesson/Recommendation / EDICT/IPI Observation

Lessons Learned

Constant Mentoring – PMU mentoring of counselors in the field and rigorous reporting systems lead to effective and efficient implementation The PMU in Amman did keep regular electronic contact with the three EDCs and provided consistent mentoring for counselors. More in-person mentoring was desired by EDC staff. Ad-hoc missions to Iraq bring more accountability to the operation. Ad-hoc missions were made, but primarily to one location – Erbil. The most active of the three EDCs, Thi Qar, did not receive any visits, and received only one due to travel restrictions set by UNAMI. While staff from Baghdad and Thi Qar did attend Erbil meetings, impact could have been improved with more on-site visits.

However, the overall UN security posture in Iraq will have to change in order for this to occur. Lack of SME credit facilities in Iraq inhibit the creation and growth of enterprises. Expectations of government grants also inhibits investment initiative on the part of business owners.

While the project had minimal impact on SME credit facilities other than the one-week training of 26 bankers; the GOI in 2012 has passed a new law that will provide interest-free loans of up to $17,000 to qualified SME owners. Phased implementation of project activities prevents overburdening of staff and prevents delivery failure. EDICT and IPI were implemented in a phased manner, however delays in several phases resulted in lack of delivery in the eLearning platform. Selected Recommendations from EDIP Evaluation UNIDO should strengthen logframe including inception phases, risk management and monitoring. EDICT and IPI brought new challenges in the execution of tasks including delays in completing IT components. Monitoring could be improved. UNIDO should consider assigning a gender focal point for project design. As of January 2013, the gender focal point had yet to be assigned. Following the release of the EDIP
evaluation in May 2012, EDICT and IPI did include a gender focal point in the new extended Basrah component of IPI.

Programme management staff in Vienna pointed to security constraints preventing visits by staff to Thi Qar and Baghdad. However, other programmes carried out by UNIDO in Iraq under the same security conditions have adjusted to the restrictions by hiring independent consultants who are able to travel into Iraq and provide advisory services.

UNIDO should institute an independent monitoring mechanism to compensate for lack of oversight on the ground. An independent monitoring mechanism had yet to be put in place due to the timing of the issuance of the EDIP evaluation and the progress on EDICT/IPI. Thus, control over data remains generally in the hands of UNIDO representatives in Thi Qar and Erbil, and the head of the Baghdad EDC. Independent verification of reported information found mixed quality of record keeping and optimistic reporting of outcomes.

The private sector should be represented in the Steering Committee. Private sector representation is currently maintained through the participation of the Nassariya Chamber of Commerce representative on the Steering Committee. UNIDO should include a comprehensive change management strategy and the GOI should actively promote organizational change. No discernible effort within EDICT or IPI to build in organizational change to the capacity building efforts with the GOI. Donors should accept an appropriate time frame in post-conflict environments. Donors were amenable to time extensions and were generally open to longer horizons.

Lessons Learned from EDICT/IPI of broader applicability to UNIDO:

Not having a permanent presence in Iraq due to security is already a significant hurdle. As with other UN entities, UNIDO compensates through its use of national staff. Not speaking their language compounds the issue. An embedded assumption for all future programmes should emphasize that the official languages of Iraq are Arabic and Kurdish. Thus, project materials, training efforts and engagement with stakeholders should be provided in Arabic. Furthermore, the extent to which programme management can incorporate Arabic, will greatly enhance the quality and flow of communications between the host government and UNIDO.

While the UN currently utilizes RBM methodology, it might be worthwhile to consider a simplified Capability Maturity Model (CMM) as an alternative approach to logframes, development of indicators and measurement of outcomes for programmes such as EDICT and IPI. A main intent of this programme was to build capacity at the EDCs. Measuring the number of courses to which trainers were sent will not provide information necessary to judge the continuum of progress on which these EDCs have been on for the past five years. CMM is a methodology first developed as a tool for software development. It has since been adapted in the international development community to measure outcomes for such programmes as economic and governance development.
10. Kenya: Crafting a green future - Bamboo in the curio and souvenir industry.  
TF/KEN/11/001  
(Cluster: TCB)  
p.52

Lessons learned

In initially selecting possible areas for UNIDO intervention, overall effectiveness and delivery of outputs was enhanced by basing a short-term post-crisis project on pre-existing longer-term projects. This has proven to be especially relevant for BamCraft where implementation mechanisms remained consistent with existing long-term and relevant institutional relationships established under the EABP (East Africa Bamboo Project).

UNIDO's centralized style of project management is not optimal when industrial relations issues arise at the country level. Provision of marketing outlets is important for the effectiveness and sustainability of craft skills development projects especially when the beneficiaries are vulnerable IDPs with inadequate direct access to markets.

TF/LIR/11/001 (covered by thematic evaluation of UNIDO Post crisis interventions –under finalization) Cluster: Poverty reduction through productive activities)

Lessons Learned

The evaluation of the UNIDO intervention in Liberia shows that basing a short-term post-crisis project on nationally recognized institutions (such as Youth Centres and a University) did in fact enhance overall effectiveness and delivery of outputs. However, since the last relevant evaluations in 2010 (Post-crisis project and Mano River Union project), many of the lessons learnt from the previous projects in Liberia are (unfortunately) still relevant to this latest intervention, a situation that should not occur if UNIDO is to improve its project delivery, especially in difficult post-conflict environments.

Chief amongst these are:

- Because of experience in extending the project timeframe twice, it needs to be debated whether 1-year, short-term funding suits medium-term livelihood creation activities (where UNIDO has its comparative advantage) that target the often difficult to reach youth sector especially in the more fragile communities that have witnessed conflict and crisis.

- The short timeframe affects the ability to conduct proper feasibility studies, needs and risk assessments as well as design of good project LogFrames, which hampers the local team when it comes to delivery in remote rural areas. For trainings conducted in Ganta the time frame was evaluated to be too short (e.g. welding and auto-mechanics need at least 9 months). Trainers should be involved in the whole process of design of the training and purchasing tools and materials.

- When dealing with post crisis situations, UNIDO needs to re-engineer its financial procedure and create a new, fast track finance strategy. The budget line used to pay salaries in the field seems to be not appropriate for this purpose; the Project Manager needed to continually find solutions to transfer payments for works and materials.
The combined effect of the long payment processing through the UN systems together with various inefficiencies in the construction of the Harper RSTI was estimated to have caused 60 - 90 days delay on the implementation of the project.

In the case of a construction project, it was found that UNIDO should award contracts to local service providers or other UN agencies, such as UNOPS, that are able to take on the whole contract, rather than UNIDO being the implementer itself.

UNIDO’s decentralization plan for the country level (by establishing a desk office in Liberia to handle all of UNIDO’s local administration and operations) will devolve much of the decision-making, budget authority and procurement processes to the field, thereby improving efficiency and enabling fast-track procedures that are required in post-crisis situation.

12. Lebanon: Community Empowerment and Livelihoods Enhancement project.

TE/LEB/10/002 (evaluation under finalization)  
(Cluster: Poverty reduction through productive activities)

Lessons Learned

The achievement of CELEP (Community Empowerment and Livelihoods Enhancement project)

- was satisfactory because it was based on:
  - a pragmatic analysis of needs through enquiries, visits and expertise,
  - a pragmatic approach of beneficiaries involvement through the introduction of a cost-sharing system,
  - a good commitment and cooperation of counterparts: MoI, MoA and Italian cooperation,
  - a simple and efficient management through PMU and PSC,
  - the quality of inputs chosen: equipment’s, civil works and trainings.

- The shortness of CELEP had two opposite effects:
  - one positive
  The short period allowed for launching and implementing the project imposed a very clear and detailed agenda which facilitated decision making and implementation.

  - one negative
  The achievement and related evaluation of typically mid-term goals such as job creation or women involvement in economic sectors traditionally managed by men couldn’t be reached three months only after the end of the project.

- The follow up of the project
  Even if the project has been designed to be short, when it can be considered as a “launching ramp”, it cannot be suddenly interrupted. An adapted follow up is necessary, especially for the three fields of Capacity building, Professional structuring and Financing in order to prepare the self-governance of the beneficiary sectors.
13. Malawi: Capacity Building for Aflatoxin Management and Control in Groundnuts in Malawi. TE/MLW/08/001
(Cluster: TCB)
Link:http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/About_UNIDO/Evaluation/Project_reports/Aflatoxin%20Malawi%20final%20evaluation%20report.pdf p.56

Lessons Learned
A well designed and adequately resourced project M&E system is essential in order to measure and demonstrate the project outcomes and the project impact, a matter of critical importance in justifying project performance and securing further funding from donors. Each project should translate the OVIs reflected in the logframe into a project M&E system at the project inception stage.

Short and often erratic contracts undermine commitment and ownership of a project, and are likely to encourage unnecessary changes in project personnel, thereby undermining project implementation in the long run.
If project activities warrant, UNIDO should offer national consultants or ‘in-country’ project implementation staff contracts that mirror project timeframes, so that project continuity is ensured. Consecutive short term contracts unnecessarily compromise commitment to the project and present consultants with bad incentives.

Contracts with consultants should include ‘probation periods’ in order to allow UNIDO to judge whether an individual is capable of undertaking the necessary work.

UNIDO should utilize performance management systems to manage performance on contracts, rather than merely issuing short contracts as a means to incentivize good performance.

The contract terms of international experts (not Chief Technical Advisors) are usually quite limited in period and this time should be focused on technical matters rather than expecting international consultants to offer project management support or logistical/organizational support to project managers who are geographically removed from the project.

Maintaining stakeholder interest and involvement requires, at the minimum, the demonstration of continued project momentum. This requires frequent communication to all local stakeholders about the status of project activities and developments, especially when the project manager is not present locally. A project mailing list with bi-monthly or monthly updates on the progress of ‘unseen’ activities like procurement and the transfer of funding from funders, could be a quick and effective means of keeping stakeholders engaged and allowing them to feel as if they still retained a measure of ‘control’ over activities from which they are effectively excluded by contractual arrangements.

In situations where counterpart organizations and government stakeholders have low capacity and high staff turnover, it is important for the project to formalize processes for handover of project activities for PSC members or members of any smaller group, like a Project Task Team. The national consultant could therefore assume co-responsibility for ‘induction’ of new members onto the project.

UE/RAF/09/028.

(Cluster: Energy and environment)


p.70

Lessons Learned

The relevance, support and sense of ownership for ECREEE was confirmed in all countries visited and through the first operational phase of the institution and the implementation of its initiatives and projects, it has contributed to raise the profile of RE and EE not only locally, but regionally. The ECREEE model is new and unique and part of the success of the institution derives from the ECOWAS Commission offloading part of its mandate to a newly created institution. Although this created some apprehension in the ECOWAS Commission, this was resolved by closely involving its high level representatives on board in the CS and EB. This contributed to strengthen a dedicated institution on one hand, and to secure the support of the Commission, on the other.

The positive results of the ECREEE model to date are based on a strong and clearly defined institutional linkage to ECOWAS, a solid regional institution with sufficient “absorptive capacity”, a clear political mandate from its member states to promote renewable energy and energy efficiency and, a budget to fund the ECREEE secretariat. It is this “patronage” of ECREEE that makes the technical support from UNIDO and donors effective and relevant. Without it, it is highly likely that the model would not work.

This said, a number of lessons learned should be kept in mind when developing similar institutions:

- Involve key stakeholders (e.g. ministries, utilities, electrification agencies, private sector, civil society) during the preparatory phase and operational phase; gather inputs for the design, the technical program and demanded services; create awareness and attract interest;

- Mainstream and encourage ownership and strong local identity throughout the design and operations of the centre. The ECREEE experience and other evaluations on the centres have highlighted the importance of local ownership and use of local procedures to ensure sustainability and long-term capacity strengthening. The host country should show high interest in the centre and see it as strategic investment;

- The budget of the center should reflect the needs, be realistic, ambitious and not be limited to the actual received funding commitments at the beginning. Fund mobilizations should be a core activity of the center and the Director. The expansion of the project portfolio should be a requirement for the expansion of staff and administrative costs. Form shall follow function. The mixture of co-funding from ECOWAS, international support and active fund raising of the centre is the basis for the financial sustainability of ECREEE. There are numerous examples of centres closed after the first phase due to the dependence on only one financing source and very limited budget scope. A clear funding gap shall be shown to interested donor partners;

- The early establishment of the network of National Focal Institutions (NFIs) is crucial for the functioning of the center. The network allows high level access to national policy makers and national support services (e.g. workshops, project monitoring, awareness creation and data collection); the experience of ECREEE has shown that the strengthening of the capacities of the NFIs is very important; The compensation of NFIs for provided services should be clarified;
The involvement of UNIDO as technical partner during the preparatory, establishment and first operational phase of the centers is key. UNIDO should act neutrally and provide technical backstopping. However, the UNIDO institution building involvement should be seen always as limited in time. The main objective being to establish a strong local institution and foment its gradual independence. UNIDO will gain credibility and win an implementing partner for projects;

The provision of highly qualified seconded experts recruited by international tender to the centers from UNIDO, AECID and other partners is crucial. In the best case such an expert shall combine technical-economic energy skills with management and development cooperation experience. Good relations and contacts with international donors are of high importance for fund raising and building of trust for the centers. The expert shall assist the Director of the center in the establishment and first operational phase (e.g. staffing, procurement, financial management, technical program, project cycle management) until the Centre is consolidated; in the beginning priority shall be given to the establishment of an effective office, as well as the creation of the internal rules, processes and templates;

The quality of the local staff and a clear management and staff strategy are a key success factors; it is important to the develop the organizational chart and TORs for administrative and technical staff; the center should start with a small base of staff and grow with increasing demands and project funds; staff should be employed under the rules and procedures of the regional economic community at least in the mid-term; the recruitment of a renowned Director with extensive knowledge on the energy sector and strong relationships with national governments, the regional economic community and donor partners is a key success factor; an alternate should be appointed to ensure the functioning of the office in the absence of the Director;

An efficient and effective institutional structure should be established in the Centre with high level of legitimacy in the regional economic community; clearly defined duties and roles of the Executive Board, Technical Committee, Secretariat, NFIs and Executive Director from the very beginning; strategic representation of countries, departments of the regional community (e.g. technical and administrative) and core donors in the governance structure;

The definition of the legal status (e.g. specialized agency) and scope of delegation of competencies from the regional organization to the Centre (e.g. signing of contracts, recruitment, procurement) from the very beginning is key. For efficiency purposes it is important that the center has its own legal identity but works in accordance with the rules of the regional organization. Any conflicts between the energy unit in the regional organization and the center shall be avoided. To ensure continued donor support the center has to show efficient implementation.

A long-term (4 to 5 years) and short-term (annual) planning, execution and monitoring framework including a set of performance indicators should be developed; this to allow the efficient monitoring of the progress by the donor partners and the Executive Board. To avoid double financing all activities and co-funding received by the center should be included in the annual work plans. The management of the center should take ownership in developing the Business Plan and work plans; The design of the project document should leave space for changes in accordance with the priorities of the Director and demands from the national focal institutions (flexibility clause);

The annual work plans should be developed in close coordination with the NFIs and other relevant market enablers. NFIs(National Focal Institutions) should carry out wider stakeholder consultations on the work plans;
• As soon as the structures are consolidated, development partners should start gradually subcontracting assignments to the center;
• The center shall act as facilitator and supporter rather than implementer of grass-root activities; it should avoid competition and overlapping of services provided by the private sector and other institutions (e.g. consultancies, audits, trainings); Calls for applicants, tenders and call for proposals should be used; emphasizing the added value of regional cooperation and exchange (e.g. train the trainers, RE&EE data collection, regional policy processes, research networks, dissemination of lessons learned); the center shall provide information and data for free, in order to ensure a strengthening of local capacities and knowledge management;
• Demonstrate added value on local and international levels with early start-up activities with high visibility factor (e.g. country visits, call for applicants and/or projects, tenders, regional key conferences and workshops, data provider, partner in project submissions); avoid the “dead valley impression” in the beginning (long development time of programs); establish website and newsletter cycle; the Director of the centre should attempt to be present at important international events and maintain donor relationships;
• Permanent pro-active fund raising for the technical program of the Centre should be a key performance indicator for staff; the center should participate in call for proposals and donor dialogues from the very beginning; the center should prepare high-quality project documents in cooperation with strong partners from the region and internationally; partners should involve the centre as executing partner for project in the early stage of development (e.g. SPWA);
• Well-designed long-term oriented flag-ship priority programs should be developed with the potential for up-scaling to be implemented during the first operational phase across all result areas (e.g. capacity and policy development, knowledge management, awareness raising, business and investment promotion); making use of innovative approaches and models with the potential for up-scaling and replication (e.g. train the trainer approaches, financing mechanisms); urban and rural areas focus;
• An informative website should be created, informing regularly on updates and the newsletter cycle of the Centre should be established; a contact database should be built up, making use of electronic social media features;
• A strong network of partnerships with local and int. institutions in the clean energy sector should be developed, seeking to develop common projects and win-win situations; The comparative advantage of the centre due to knowledge of the local environment should be sought;
• An internal quality, appraisal and management framework should be established for technical procurements and projects, as well as a technical appraisal framework for RE & EE projects and programs; templates should be developed for project appraisal, procurement and project cycle management; as well as standard project document templates to be used by the centre to co-fund and monitor projects.

The country and donor interests should be managed and balanced carefully by the Director of the Centre: The centre should seek to maintain its independence and cooperate with a wide range of local and international partners; it should coordinate donor activities and define the priorities for their assistance through the annual work plans and its business plan; The building up of numerous partnerships will strengthen the capacities of the centre and will make it easier to raise co-funding. The funding in some cases could be managed by another entity, but the centre, should receive credit and visibility.
15. Regional Africa Survey of enterprises in selected ACP regions - EE/RAF/08/043
p.65

Lessons Learned

Enterprise survey questionnaires that are lean, quick and non-intrusive in terms of financial data are more likely to be effective in gaining private sector cooperation.

Enterprise surveys of a significant volume require strong national awareness raising efforts at the launch stage with public and private sector support and proactive involvement.

Enterprises that participate in investor surveys expect UNIDO’s appropriate and timely follow-up through distribution and sharing of survey outcomes, as well as acknowledgement of partners’ participation.

Title of the report in Spanish: Evaluación de Medio Término. Observatorio de Energía Renovable Para América Latina y el Caribe
(Cluster: Energy and environment)

p.78

Lessons learned

De los hallazgos y conclusiones de este informe vale la pena destilar algunos puntos que pueden tomarse como lecciones aprendidas:

Es generalmente reconocido que proyectos regionales enfrentan grandes retos en términos de sostenibilidad económica e institucional29. En el caso del observatorio esto ha sido agravado por varios factores. Primero, no se ha desarrollado una estrategia sólida de sostenibilidad en la fase de planificación. Segundo, no se ha logrado una vinculación estrecha con organismos regionales. Tercero, no se cuenta con el apoyo de actores nacionales para formar y mantener una red institucional.

The main lesson learned is the importance of incorporating in the design stage, i.e., prior to project approval by the Parties, the analysis of the risks that could involve structures, making processes of government decision and changes management, especially in local government, in order to identify appropriate preventive measures if such risks occur during the implementation and early operation of the projects.

Cuando se implementa una asistencia preparatoria como primer paso hacia un programa de mayor alcance, como fue el caso de la primera asistencia preparatoria para los Observatorios Nacionales de Uruguay e Brasil, es

29Ver por ejemplo, “The development potential of regional programs”, World Bank, 2007
importante que se haga un análisis atento del proceso de implementación y de los resultados de esta primera fase y que éste análisis sea debidamente documentado. En este sentido, las asistencias preparatorias deberían abordarse como una fase inicial para validar las hipótesis de trabajo e informar así el diseño de las iniciativas que siguen, a la luz de una primera experiencia concreta. Este tipo de análisis no requiere necesariamente de una evaluación externa, sino puede ser fruto de una reflexión interna a la institución en diálogo con las contrapartes pertinentes.

El diseño de la arquitectura institucional para la gobernanza de Programas complejos, que involucren una diversidad de actores de distintos países, debería ser fruto de un proceso documentado de análisis participativo con las contrapartes, que analice su factibilidad. Asimismo, la concreción de dicha estructura debería ponerse explícitamente como uno de los resultados esperados, al cual deberían asignarse los recursos correspondientes en el presupuesto.

UNIDO should be consistent with the strategic decision to maintain and expand the network of OPITs and execute this decision. This requires defining the policies and allocating the necessary resources to ensure closer cooperation between OPITs and headquarters in Vienna. This action is important because if the ITPO act under the name of UNIDO but with little guidance and control headquarters by a significant risk to the agency assumed.

Tanto en el diseño, como en la implementación de programa y proyectos es necesario tomar en mayor consideración la heterogeneidad del contexto en que se opera y estar conscientes de que la eficiencia en la entrega de productos no implica necesariamente relevancia, efectividad o sostenibilidad. En este sentido es importante que los procesos que conducen a la entrega de los productos esperados se articulen en un esquema de alianzas estratégicas con actores nacionales e internacionales que operan en el mismo ámbito. Si bien, por un lado esto puede implicar ritmos más lentos de ejecución, por el otro puede contribuir a generar sinergias y a optimizar los recursos.

UNIDO should focus their efforts on promoting and attracting investments in sectors and markets where it can generate value, proposing to Governments the development of specific policies. This action is essential if it is recognized that most countries including emerging economies, government agencies has specialized in attracting investments that exceed resources to ITPO.

Finalmente, el seguimiento y análisis de los procesos resulta un punto clave para todos los proyectos y programas, tanto para la valoración de los logros alcanzados como para la identificación de debilidades y puntos a mejorar. Esto, por un lado asegura mayor flexibilidad para la adecuación del programa en la optimización de tiempos y recursos, y por otro provee de mayor fundamento para la toma de decisiones estratégicas, la consolidación de las propuestas, y el potencial intercambio de conocimientos y lecciones aprendidas en diversos contextos.

The link between assessment results and improvement projects including incentives should be systematized to the coordinators of these projects done. Centre for development of skills and technology bamboo Veracruz.
17. REGIONAL ASIA, SAARC - UNIDO projects in Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Maldives. UNIDO/NORAD project: Strengthening institutional and national capacities related to standards, metrology, testing and quality (SMTQ) – Phase II. UNIDO projects in Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Maldives. TE/RAS/07/001, TE/RAS/07/A01, TE/RAS/07/B01, TE/RAS/07/C01, TE/RAS/07/D01
(Cluster: TCB)
p.86

Lessons learned

A. Design for Impact

Good project formulation and design within a logical framework can increase project effectiveness. Designing for impact by using the forecast potential impact of targeted outcomes as key criteria for the inclusion, prioritization and sequencing of activities, outputs and outcomes could increase the benefits to the stakeholders and beneficiaries as only outcomes with strong potential impacts would be included.

Potential outcomes with lower levels of priority could be sequenced for inclusion in further phases of the project. This could increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the project. Some examples of areas based on the findings of Chapter 3.3 where this is relevant are:

a) Support to production certification in Bangladesh and Nepal. Support for certification to national standards delivered benefits to food producers as it strengthened the quality of domestic food products and the national quality environment. However support for certification to international product standards would have been more beneficial to exporters as it would have facilitated intra SAARC trade in the short term and contributed more to the achievement of the overall objective. This represents an opportunity cost to exporters as they must continue to seek these services overseas at a higher cost. If the inclusion of outcomes in the project design was based on potential impact on exports then it is likely that support to developing capacity for certification to international standards would have been prioritized over support for certification to national standards.

b) Support to Standardization in Bhutan and the Maldives. Given the limited resources available rather than provide support to standardization in Bhutan and the Maldives the intervention could have focused solely on the development of the food testing laboratories and conformity assessment services for the agri-business sector. Support for standardization could have been scheduled at later date in a follow-up phase. Targeted trade related outcomes could then have arguably been achieved earlier with the additional resources. A later time frame for accreditation of the laboratories and certification of enterprises to ISO 22000 represents an opportunity cost to the exporters and to the laboratories.

c) Inclusion of once off workshops on quality management, WRAP, SA 8000 and OHSAS 18000. As noted in Chapter 6 the sustainability of once off workshops is questionable. If the inclusion of the activities was assessed on the basis of their potential impact and contribution to the overall objective it is probable they would have not have been included in the project design. Since these resources could have been used elsewhere they represent an opportunity cost to the other beneficiaries. Designing for impact would require at least a qualitative assessment (or ideally a quantitative assessment of the potential impact of the targeted at the design stage of the project. This would form part of problem analysis and stakeholder analysis workshops in which all the
stakeholders and beneficiaries would participate. For example an estimation of the impact.

Outcome 1 on Product Certification in Bangladesh would require a qualitative or quantitative estimate of:

- Demand for product certification services by product or sector;
- Capacity to provide product certification services by product or sector;
- Local cost of the service;
- Cost of outsourcing overseas;
- Importance as a variable in the competitiveness of exporters;

B. Industry or sector analysis

As noted above quantitative data is preferable than qualitative estimates. However getting precise data is likely to be very difficult and consensus qualitative estimates of potential impact by public and private sector stakeholders are preferable to no data at all. Designing for impact would also reduce the cost of a post intervention impact assessment as it would establish a benchmark for the evaluation.

18. Somalia: Integration and progress through skills and employment for displaced groups in Somalia. TF/SOM/11/001


In a complex development context like Somalia’s, UNIDO’s approach of focusing on value chains and equitable development across provinces and clans can lead to conflict reduction as trading has the potential to transcend clan and spatial divisions. Smaller scale traditional inputs (such as the Nuba Hoe) that represent a small step forward in use of technology are the preferred option in long-term conflict contexts like Somaliland.

The project’s emphasis on local (decentralized) procurement of goods in Somalia constitutes a best practice for UN programmes in crisis contexts, as the approach is more relevant (supporting local enterprises), efficient (faster than international procurement) and effective (supporting local economic recovery through a greater engagement of aid resources with the local economy)


Lessons learned

In the course of the independent final evaluation a number of lessons and relevant questions have emerged, which can be of interest for the future interventions of UNIDO in Sierra Leone as well as elsewhere in post-crisis situations. It needs to be debated, for example, whether 1-year, short-term funding suits medium-term livelihood creation
activities (where UNIDO has its comparative advantage) targeting youth in remote and vulnerable communities that have witnessed conflict and crisis.

Basing a short-term post-crisis project on pre-existing national institutions enhances overall project effectiveness. In insecure, post-conflict settings where many people live hand-to-mouth and day-to-day for their basic necessities, providing wages and/or food have to be a part of the reconstruction or training work, particularly for the most vulnerable beneficiaries.

In general, decentralization in decision-making process, budget authority, and procurement procedures to the field would improve efficiency and timely delivery, as fast-track procedures are essential for successful interventions in post-crisis situations.

20. South Africa Automotive Component Supplier Development SE/SAF/09/003 (Cluster: TCB)


p.55

Lessons learned

Industry ownership of supplier development programmes and other development interventions is crucial for the long term success of these interventions: The future of the Tirisano programme, in terms of the future subsidization of services, has been compromised by a lack of ownership by the programme by NAACAM and NAAMSA.

Even though NAACAM and NAAMSA were members of the Steering Committee for the ACSDP, they patently did not feel a sense of ownership for the programme. Discussions with the industry associations indicate that this might be due to the fact that these organizations saw the Steering Committee as a platform for feeding back information, but did not feel that they could make substantive changes to the programme.

The experience of the ACSDP indicates that it is imperative that industry owns, designs and drives the process of supplier development and industry support interventions. Hopefully, the National Steering Committee process that is currently underway will engender the necessary degree of industry ownership of the new automotive development strategy for South Africa. Adequate time for reflection and programme adjustments is necessary between a testing phase and the roll-out phase of a programme: Many development programmes, especially those that are new to a sector, an organization or a country, include a pilot phase as a learning mechanism. The pilot phase offers the opportunity to test the suitability of a programme intervention model before committing a large amount of resources to the programme.

In theory, the experience of a pilot phase offers stakeholders the opportunity to abort an intervention before full-scale implementation if it proves to be ineffective during the pilot. However, in practice, a substantial amount of inertia is built into the delivery of a programme, making it difficult for implementing agencies as well as the project funders to abort an intervention after stakeholder expectations have been raised and multiple agencies have planned and/or geared up for its implementation. It is therefore imperative that the initial planning of the programme build in sufficient time to evaluate the performance of a pilot, to reflect on the outcomes of the evaluation process and to make the necessary adjustments to the programme in order to improve the implementation and the results of the roll-out phase.
The original project implementation plan for the ACSDP did not allow sufficient time for this review, reflection and revision period after the testing phase, which further delayed the implementation of a programme that had already fallen behind schedule due to the difficulties in recruiting participant companies in the testing phase. Project planning documents should articulate the assumptions on which programme design is based and think through the implications of assumptions not holding: The largest delays in the implementation of the ACSDP were due primarily to the difficulty experienced in enlisting companies on to the programme. The original project time frame was based on the assumption that the 15 companies for the testing phase and the 50 companies for the roll-out phase of the programme would be identified and 'lined up' to begin implementation at the same time.

In practice, the difficulties in enlisting companies and resource limitations meant that some companies started implementation later than others. Therefore, even though the intervention period within a company was only 12 months, treatment of the 15 companies in the testing phase extended over a period of 27 months, from April 2009 until June 2011. Treatment of the 50 companies in the roll-out phase extended over a 23 month period, with the first companies coming on line in February 2011 and the last companies officially ending their programme interventions at the end of December 2012. Consequently, the ACSDP, which was supposed to have ended in April 2012, was delayed by nine months. Such delays are quite common within the development sector, given the complexities of implementing programmes that involve multiple stakeholders.

However, in the second half of 2012, the dti indicated that the implementation of the programme would have to end by December 2012 and that no companies could be serviced beyond this date. This meant that the intervention period for a number of companies in Phase 2, Part 2 had to be abbreviated. It is understood that the dti’s urgency in concluding the programme arose from concerns regarding their budgetary commitments within the current financial year. This pressure and the consequent reduction in the intervention period for a number of companies could have been avoided if the original project document made explicit the assumptions on which the project’s time frame was based and tested the validity of this assumption.

The use of resident technical capacity within participant companies proved highly effective: The Tirisano Programme introduced the provision of “resident industrial engineers” as a tool to improve the innovation and continuing improvement capacities of manufacturing firms. While the acceptance and results of this tool during the first phase of the programme were modest, it developed into a principal asset during its second phase. This was due to a stronger emphasis on recruiting only high quality resident engineers and to the fact that companies’ acceptance and appreciation (absorptive capacity) took some time to develop. Using the concept of resident industrial engineers is a valuable tool for longer:

- Term manufacturing support programmes, with a potential to increase the innovation and process;
- Development capacities of participating firms.
21. South Sudan: Integration and progress through protection and empowerment of displaced groups in South Sudan. SAP ID: 110037. XX/SUD/11/X06 (44002), TF/SUD/12/001


Part of the purpose of the South Sudan project evaluation is to feed into and help shape the approach for a wider thematic evaluation of multiple projects funded by the GOJ (Government of Japan). The intention is to help UNIDO shape its overall strategy in post-crisis settings, to further identify UNIDO’s specific role and added value in supporting crisis-affected countries. Based specifically on the findings of the South Sudan project evaluation it is recommended the thematic assessment pay due consideration to the following factors. These factors relate particularly to initial project preparation and effectiveness of implementation.

- To increase the effectiveness of technical training, there is a need for complementary mentoring and social life skills training in post-conflict contexts. The Forcier study indicated many employers reported problems regarding punctuality, reliability and attitude of newly recruited staff.
- Leverage and use of pre-existing institutional relationships, available information and previous implementation experience in project preparation increases effectiveness and efficiency of implementation of quick impact projects (QIPs) in post-conflict settings.
- The preparation and use of findings from baseline studies enhance the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of project interventions as well as contributing to the likelihood of sustainability.
- An in-country Project Management Unit (PMU) under the consistent direction of a single CTA that cooperates very closely with responsible training providers is critical to the successful implementation of a QIP under post-crisis conditions.

22. Uganda: Establishment of two District Business Information Centers to promote Private Sector Development and Information and Communication Technologies. UE/UGA/09/003


There are two main lessons that can be distilled from the findings of this evaluation.

1. Any project of international cooperation carries a “political capital” for country stakeholders thus requiring careful negotiations to select partners and beneficiaries. These negotiations can be complex and time consuming particularly at the local level, where the relative weight of the project might be heavier. Therefore, the time absorbed by the start up phase to set up the institutional architecture of the project as well as to select beneficiaries and bring on board relevant partners cannot be considered as an unexpected incident. On the contrary, it should be assumed from the outset as part of the complexity of development processes and factored in at the planning stage. Particularly when defining the duration of a project. By not considering these variables at the planning stage, transaction costs are raised. In fact, although projects can be extended during implementation, each extension requires time and energy from the project managers and
the administrative unit at HQ, and may generate hiccups in the implementation of activities on the ground.

2. In the wider process of transition towards a results-based administrative and management system it is important to make sure that it does not result simply in a new bureaucratic requirement. Such transition should imply substantive changes in the perspective from an input driven to a result-based project cycle and these changes should be reflected in the type and quality of information that is reported, not just in the format of progress reports. In this connection, it is important to allocate adequate resources to ensure that results-based monitoring and reporting can be effectively implemented. In those countries where there is a critical mass of projects that can justify it, it might be worth considering the possibility of pooling funds to ensure that there are dedicated professionals to develop and implement results-based M&E systems.

23. Viet Nam SME Cluster development. TE/VIE/08/003
(Cluster: TCB)
(p.35)

Main recommendations and lessons learned

The mission was informed that a similar UNIDO project in Tunisia was active in one single sector (garment and textile) and had more time and a larger budget at its disposal. The inception period for trust building and to develop an action plan was nine months in Viet Nam, but 15 months in Tunisia. The thinly spread resources of the Viet Nam project were a major barrier to effectiveness and impact. Consequently, future project designs should learn from this experience and be less ambitious. Dissipation of energies and resources over several sectors does not bring additional benefits of scale; instead the focus should be on one or at least a very limited number of sectors. Best would be to select a single sector and concentrate resources in order to be able to go ‘deep and wide’.

As alternative future project concept, the focus could also be firmly placed on achieving systemic (instead of punctual) change in selected sectors and clusters. This would mean investing in the long-term build-up of local capacities for technical support and general BDS, and in particular also for developing the required institutional framework for SME oriented research, vocational education and finance. The underlying frame conditions need to be clarified before a project is designed. It is surprising that in the present project, despite it being a follow-up to a predecessor project, very basic information on selected industries and existing clusters (or rather spatial concentrations) had to be collected first in a time-consuming process.

Also, the core conceptual elements of any project should be agreed before start of the project; in this case it refers to the discussions required to arrive at a common understanding of what a cluster is (assuming this understanding has now been reached, of which the mission is not totally convinced). It is furthermore essential that a sound pre-project assessment is made on the actual demand and interest for twinning in the developed country; to this end, funding has to be sought for project preparation activities. Mistakes in predicting interest and commitment by the developed partners can become a killer assumption for any twinning efforts. Finally, UNIDO, as a multilateral agency, should avoid implementing projects that are tied to a donor country’s industries, associations and consultants.
(Cluster: TCB)
p.50

Lessons Learned

Probably the most relevant lesson learned during the programme is that the success of a first generation quality programme largely depends on a rapid implementation of the national quality policy. Following the experience in Zambia, UNIDO adopted a similar approach in other projects such as in Malawi, Myanmar and Nepal.

A lesson on ownership comes from the activities realized in ZWMA in the area of organizational upgrading. The programme was able to achieve important outcomes in partnership with the beneficiary organization in the area of legal metrology (both at organizational and technical levels). The success derived from the fact that the programme was able to find its place in alignment with the strategic vision of the organization.

The lack of a UNIDO office or a UNIDO coordinator in Zambia resulted in the project office operating in isolation and with inadequate visibility or synergy with other stakeholders’ programmes. Referring to the Country Evaluation report, it appears that the same concern emerged also in other UNIDO projects in Zambia.

It seems therefore that without a UNIDO field presence, UNIDO projects are likely to suffer inefficiencies (e.g. lack of familiarity with UNDP procedures) with inadequate synergies and low levels of donor and partner recognition.

25. Sri Lanka: Strengthening international certification capacity in Sri Lanka with particular reference to social accountability standard (SA 8000) and food safety (HACCP/ISO 22000) standard.  TE/SRL/06/004
(Cluster: TCB)
p.30

Lessons learned

On the strengthening of service providers embedded in enterprise associations:
Assisting enterprise associations to offer business development services on a commercial basis but with non-profit orientation is a good approach to ensure access of companies to high quality support services at affordable prices. Ideally, the services are relevant for the associations’ members and promoted through the association. At the design or inception stage, it is essential is to conduct (a) an organizational assessment of the host institution and (b) draft a clear, full-fledged business plan, including a thorough analysis of demand and supply (market study). Capacity building should combine well-tailored institutional with technical strengthening, identified based on the gap analysis of the organizational assessment. Type of support and experts should be selected in close coordination with the beneficiary institution. Service providers should from the outset operate as
independent commercial entities with own governance and management structure, rather than partially as a UNIDO project operation. Initial financial support to the service provider, if needed, should be provided in the form of subcontracting services (project activities), which is gradually phased out, rather than through directly subsidizing costs.

**On quality schemes:**
Quality schemes and certification marks should only receive support based on (a) a careful selection of a host institution (b) and organizational assessment of the host institution and (c) a business plan for the scheme/mark, including assessment of potential demand for the scheme/mark based on a market survey. Host institutions should be selected on the basis whether they are able to promote the scheme/mark to a large number of members (e.g. a national hotel association). Certification criteria should not duplicate those of mandatory standards. The business plan should provide clear evidence that, based on a realistic estimate on costs applicants are willing to pay and the potential demand for the scheme/mark, revenues fully cover costs. Rather than operating the quality scheme under a project, UNIDO should provide on a demand basis specific, well-tailored support to the host institutions in developing the scheme/mark.

**GEF project evaluations conducted during 2012/13**


   p.37

The key lessons identified in the project, which are useful for the design of similar future initiatives, are:

- **Technical:** Addressing multiple issues simultaneously provides as a way of identifying the linkages between the issues, and it generates economies of scale in funding the research of multiple topics, as described in section 3.c.

- **Stakeholder Engagement:** While liaising with multiple stakeholders is a complex process which strengthens the quality of the scientific products, differences in opinions should not compromise the quality of the outputs as described in section 3. f. Also, communicating openly to all parties facilitates stakeholder management. While the situation that arose in this project execution (of a key technical stakeholder pulling out) is uncommon, it demonstrates that engagement is a key factor for project success.

- **Project Management:** Aligning the work plan to the changing realities in a project requires consensus building and flexibility.

Lecciones aprendidas / Lessons learned

El Prodoc debe ser adecuadamente consensuado por las partes interesadas para facilitar el empoderamiento y compromiso con la ejecución de las actividades planteadas por parte del país y de los actores clave. The Prodoc must be properly agreed by stakeholders to facilitate empowerment and commitment to the implementation of the activities planned by the country and key actors.

Las nominaciones de las contrapartes tienen que ser oficiales y, en caso de cambio de gobierno, estas tienen que ser reconfirmadas para asegurar la continuidad del proyecto y/o permitir que se tomen las medidas necesarias para capacitar a los nuevos directivos a la brevedad posible.

La ONUDI no debería iniciar la implementación de un proyecto antes de que se cumplan las obligaciones y prerequisitos previos del GEF. Nominations of counterparties must be official and in case of change of government, they have to be reconfirmed to ensure continuity of the project and / or permit required action to train the new officers as soon as possible. UNIDO should not start implementing a project before prior obligations and prerequisites are met GEF.

Las lecciones aprendidas del proyecto deberían ser compartidas con otros países de la región, para lo cual por ejemplo sería necesario planificar un Taller Regional. Este se podría organizar al verse satisfactoriamente concluida la etapa de análisis de muestras. The lessons learned from the project should be shared with other countries in the region, which for example would need to plan a Regional Workshop. This could be organized to be satisfactory completion of the analysis phase samples.


Lessons learned

This project successfully negotiated changing circumstances and time constraints in order to meet prioritized objectives. However, project decisions and priorities were not always recorded and shared, thereby undermining a shared understanding of project status and direction. For example, the SSC reported that they made a management decision to focus on delivering high quality guidance documents, rather than Outcome 2 the delivery of training material and capacity building. This decision was not recorded in any project
documents or minutes and was not reflected in an amendment to the project results framework. Moreover, the project did not generate any annual reports or quarterly reports to report on project progress and therefore did not record this decision in these progress reports. The failure to record management decisions means that the project is unfavorably evaluated against the original project document and project results framework, rather than a more relevant updated document that reflects amendments to the project deliverables.

Given the fact that this was a medium sized project with three Components that are easily tracked, a complex monitoring and evaluation system was not necessary. The implementation of the project therefore did not suffer greatly by the failure of the IA to establish an M&E system. However, a more conscious use of the Project Results Framework as a means to track the project’s progress in delivering planned outputs and outcomes, would have enabled more conscious decision making that was clear and transparent to all stakeholders, i.e. UNIDO would have been more consciously tracking the delivery of outputs by UNITAR and the SSC and would have made enquiries that would have resulted in SSC sharing their ‘management decision’ regarding the prioritization of Outcome 1 above Outcome 2.

The delays reported at the beginning of project implementation were attributed by stakeholders to a lack of understanding about roles and responsibilities, of organizations and individuals. Clarification of the roles and expectations of the different project partners at project outset might therefore have improved project delivery. It is interesting to note that the project document indicates that these very same issues would be clarified at the ‘project inception workshop’. This did not occur and a project that was already very time-constrained was delayed further. It is therefore essential that these basic elements of good project management be properly observed rather than lightly included in documents tailored to please potential funders.

This lack of clarity about the roles of respective project partners manifested at the end of the project in confusion about the branding and formatting of the guidance documents produced. An agreement at the beginning of project on who ‘owned’ the guidance documents, on whose branding and whose stylistic and formatting needs took precedence would have avoided much reworking of documents.

p.22

Lessons learned

Within UNIDO’s projects, implementation revealed that a credit facility to operate successfully requires a reservoir of potential Business ideas, which in turn, require entrepreneurial people. In less economically advantaged areas such as the rural communities of the Gegharkunik Marz generation of business ideas in manufacturing will require time to develop. Of 21 loans disbursed. In that Marz, only three were related to establishment of new businesses in manufacturing (slippers, animal feed milling, bread production).
In addition, the project has also revealed that entrepreneurship exists at all levels, irrespective of gender and age. But, women and young adults are less likely to pursue this career path. Only one young woman and two young men accessed credit to start up new businesses, which compares with 15 middle-aged women and men (between 40 and 55 Years of age). However, cultural factors may also be influencing negatively the propenssity of young people to start businesses.

During the first round of implementation it was clear that bio-gas plant in Pambak is possible to establish only at family/sub-community level due to infrastructural difficulties of collecting the manure, and also low interest from the whole community towards this technology. Geghamasar community was in favor for the community-based biogas plant, however, the management model of the plant, including collection of the manure, technical maintenance and post project sustainability are critical to be addressed before the construction of the plant.

5. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Phasing-out PCBs and PCB-containing equipment in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
GF/MCD/08/002
p.40

Lessons learned

The on-time choosing of the proper decontamination technology – the best available technique (BAT) is one of the main and time-consuming components of this project. The delay of two years of this project is due to major delays in selecting and procuring adequate technology for decontamination of PCB-containing equipment, as well as the unrealistic time frame of one year foreseen in the Project Document for realization of the disposal activities when setting the milestones in the work plans. It should be noted that the process for preparation of the ToR, selection of the technology and signing the contract should have been calculated with six months, the installation of the equipment with six month, and finally the treatment of the transformers with approximately ten to twelve months, which means all together for all the disposal activities from twenty-two to twenty-four months compared to the twelve months foreseen in the Project Document. A specific lesson learned from this particular project is that the ToR for choosing a certain technology has to be thoroughly pre-defined by the NEA and UNIDO. All relevant criteria such as size, volume, contamination grade etc. have to be taken into consideration well in advance in order to have a successful tender procedure.

Another important lesson for GEF and UNIDO is that a well-structured and independent Mid-Term Evaluation is very important for stating issues in the middle of the project implementation (in our example the issue of irrelevance of NGOs for this project), so that there will be sufficient time to implement the proposed corrective actions until the end of the project or make considerate changes in the Project Document.

A further notable lesson learned is that the implementation of this project has emphasized the fundamental value of a properly formulated M&E framework to ensure the possibility for adaptive management and to help mitigate identified risks for project implementation, especially delays. This project is an example of how much the M&E framework and its implementation, especially the development of SMART (especially measurable) project objectives and Key Impact Indicators are crucial for project success in the project design phase, because almost all aspects of the project weakly rated can be directly or indirectly
tied back to the M&E framework. Especially, delays for over almost two years for choosing and acquiring the equipment for PCB decontamination could have been minimized if the M&E framework had been more clear and operational. The revision of all logical framework indicators and applications to applying SMART criteria by UNIDO, GEF and MoEPP would be recommended for future projects in order to enable proper M&E design and implementation.
Annex 3: Selected lessons learned

Collaboration with the private sector and other partners

Country Evaluation: Pakistan
Working with both the private and public sectors towards common objectives and with complementary resources fosters the achievement of outcomes and sustainability.

Collaboration with universities (design and food safety, 3 universities have approved curricula for post graduate diploma) add value to interventions as a sustainable local partner and for access to additional funding and resources.

Country Evaluation: Kenya
The cooperation with local NGOs that engage in community work can be a very appropriate way of making UNIDO projects more effective and efficient.

Summary: In both country evaluations it has been noticed that the collaboration with the private sector, local NGOs, universities and other partners enhanced the efficiency and effectiveness of the projects, created a win-win environment and raised the chances for successful interventions.

XP/ANG/08003, US/ANG/08/002, US/ANG/08/001, TF/ANG/10/001
In this connection, it should be noted that the effective functioning of the institutional architecture of the Programme to support the partnerships with the private sector and to bridge the gaps between secondary education and the labour market was one of the key assumptions underpinning its approach and methodology. Yet, the establishment and consolidation of such architecture was taken as a point of departure: it was not explicitly considered as a line of activity and as a result to achieve in the implementation process, as evidenced by the programme’s budget and corresponding work plans. Similarly, this dimension of the implementation process was not discussed in the progress reports that mostly focused in reporting implementation of activities and delivery of outputs.
The Programme is firmly anchored to the Ministry of Education enhances its sustainability, other partners need to be involved in the design and implementation process to have a larger critical mass of institutions and individuals who are committed to its effective functioning and long term impact.

**Cambodia: Identification, assessment and prioritization of pollution “hot spots” and transfer environmentally sound technologies (TEST) in the Cambodian Section of the Mekong river basin. TF/CMB/10/002**

The “Joint-Execution Modality” UNIDO applied in practice, is a suitable management model for technical capacity building projects. Its key feature, “joint decision making”, allows both UNIDO and counterparts to focus on their particular strengths, thus jointly contributing to the achievement of objectives. Joint responsibility in turn fosters joint accountability.

**Iraq: Combined independent evaluation. Enterprise development through information and communication technology (EDICT) (FB/IRQ/09/007) and Investment promotion for Iraq (IPI). TE/IRQ/09/010**

The private sector should be represented in the Steering Committee. Private sector representation is currently maintained through the participation of the Nassariya Chamber of Commerce representative on the Steering Committee. UNIDO should include a comprehensive change management strategy and the GOI should actively promote organizational change. Donors should accept an appropriate time frame in post-conflict environments. Donors were amenable to time extensions and were generally open to longer horizons.

Learning mechanism. The pilot phase offers the opportunity to test the suitability of a programme intervention model before committing a large amount of resources to the programme.

**Summary: Lessons learned from project evaluations have shown that the participation and involvement of the private sector and other partners in the design and implementation of the projects increase their success and long term impact. Representation of the counterparts in the Steering Committee and in the decision making process encourages mutual accountability. The pilot phase of the project can be used as a learning mechanism for assessing the suitability of an intervention before moving forward to full implementation of the programme.**
Annex 3: Selected lessons learned

**Post-crisis**

**Liberia: Rehabilitation of training centres in vulnerable communities in Liberia. TF/LIR/11/001. (covered by thematic evaluation of Post crisis projects – evaluation under finalization)**

The evaluation of the UNIDO intervention in Liberia shows that basing a short-term post-crisis project on nationally recognized institutions (such as Youth Centres and a University) did in fact enhance overall effectiveness and delivery of outputs. However, since the last relevant evaluations in 2010 (Post-crisis project and Mano River Union project), many of the lessons learnt from the previous projects in Liberia are (unfortunately) still relevant to this latest intervention, a situation that should not occur if UNIDO is to improve its project delivery, especially in difficult post-conflict environments.

Chief amongst these are: Because of experience in extending the project timeframe twice, it needs to be debated whether 1-year, short-term funding suits medium-term livelihood creation activities (where UNIDO has its comparative advantage) that target the often difficult to reach youth sector especially in the more fragile communities that have witnessed conflict and crisis.

The short timeframe affects the ability to conduct proper feasibility studies, needs and risk assessments as well as design of good project LogFrames, which hampers the local team when it comes to delivery in remote rural areas. For trainings conducted in Ganta the time frame was evaluated to be too short (e.g. welding and auto-mechanics need at least 9 months). Trainers should be involved in the whole process of design of the training and purchasing tools and materials.

**Somalia: Integration and skills for displaced groups. TF/SOM/11/001**

In a complex development context like Somalia’s, UNIDO’s approach of focusing on value chains and equitable development across provinces and clans can lead to conflict reduction as trading has the potential to transcend clan and spatial divisions.

**South Sudan: Integration and progress through protection and empowerment of displaced groups in South Sudan. SAP ID: 110037. XX/SUD/11/X06 (44002). TF/SUD/12/001**

To increase the effectiveness of technical training, there is a need for complementary mentoring and social life skills training in post-conflict contexts.
The Forcier study indicated many employers reported problems regarding punctuality, reliability and attitude of newly recruited staff.

Summary: In the case of Liberia the fact that the project was based in nationally recognized institutions (Youth Centers and a University) did improve the overall effectiveness and delivery of outputs but the overall timeframe of the project was assessed as too short. A project design with a longer timeframe needs to be taken into consideration. In Somalia focusing on value chains and trading showed the potential to transcend clan and spatial divisions.

Procurement

Somalia: Integration and skills for displaced groups. TF/SOM/11/001
The project’s emphasis on local (decentralized) procurement of goods in Somalia constitutes a best practice for UN programmes in crisis contexts, as the approach is more relevant (supporting local enterprises), efficient (faster than international procurement) and effective (supporting local economic recovery through a greater engagement of aid resources with the local economy).

Summary: Local procurement of goods in post crisis projects proves to be a good practice for UN programmes as it supports local businesses with all the benefits that this offers for the local market and it is faster than international procurement.

Agro-industry development

Country Evaluation: Pakistan
Working with technical vocational training centres operated within clusters (cutlery, leather) provide customized solutions and training services, and have a good prospect for sustainability

Cote d’Ivoire: Youth training for post-conflict recovery and peace building. TF/IVC/10/004
Le projet a démontré que : Il est possible de faire acquérir à une personne en situation précaire, dans le cadre d’une formation qualifiante de trois mois, des compétences suffisantes pour entamer convenablement un stage de pré insertion ; Dans un contexte de crise, la remise de kits d’outillage aux lauréats de la formation qualifiante favorise leur insertion auprès de petits artisans.

The project demonstrated that: it is possible to acquire a person in a precarious situation, as part of a qualifying three month training, sufficient
**to properly start an internship pre insertion skills; in a crisis, the delivery of equipment to the winners of the qualifying training promotes their insertion skills from small artisans.**

**Indonesia: Realizing minimum living standards for disadvantaged communities through peace building and village based economic development. TF/INS/08/004**

The Maluku Pelagandong project approach of focusing on value chains and equitable development across religious, ethnic and administrative boundaries contributed to peace building as income generation and trading had the potential to transcend community divisions. For post crisis interventions to be sustainable a detailed peace and conflict analysis would enable the root cause of crises to be identified together with their appropriate responses.

Regarding product selection and development, implementation with a focus on strong community participation of beneficiaries encourages national ownership. However, spreading the range of vocational skills training areas too widely with limited project resources detracts from (or poses an additional risk to) the fullest development of the value chain.

**Lebanon: Community Empowerment and Livelihoods Enhancement Project. TE/LEB/10/002**

- The shortness of CELEP had two opposite effects:
  - one positive
  - one negative

The short period allowed for launching and implementing the project imposed a very clear and detailed agenda which facilitated decision making and implementation.

The achievement and related evaluation of typically mid-term goals such as job creation or women involvement in economic sectors traditionally managed by men couldn't be reached three months only after the end of the project.

- The follow up of the project

Even if the project has been designed to be short, when it can be considered as a "launching ramp", it cannot be suddenly interrupted. An adapted follow up is necessary, especially for the three fields of Capacity building, Professional structuring and Financing in order to prepare the self-governance of the beneficiary sectors.

Basing a short-term post-crisis project on pre-existing national institutions enhances overall project effectiveness. In insecure, post-conflict settings where
many people live hand-to-mouth and day-to-day for their basic necessities, providing wages and/or food have to be a part of the reconstruction or training work, particularly for the most vulnerable beneficiaries.

Democratic Republic of the Congo: Bringing support to the national reconstruction programme of DRC for livelihoods recovery and peace building. TF/ZAI/11/001

Pérennité du projet
Les formations techniques, dans la mesure où elles sont bien adaptées au publicible, motivent les stagiaires en leur montrant la possibilité d'améliorer leurs conditions de vie.

Sustainability of the project
Technical trainings, to the extent that they are well adapted to the target population, motivate students by showing them the possibility to improve their living conditions.

Les formations en matière de gestion représentent un complément fondamental pour préparer les bénéficiaires à une nouvelle manière de fonctionner (auto-entrepreneuriat). Management trainings are an essential complement to prepare the recipients to a new way of working (self-entrepreneurship). But this preparation for entrepreneurship is not enough to increase the value of the initial trainings received.

Summary: Lessons learned from agro–industry development evaluations have shown that a solid value chain analysis as part of the project design is a point to identify possible problems and project opportunities for the development of sectors. Technical trainings, when they are well adapted to the target population, motivate trainees by showing them the possibility to improve their living conditions. Management trainings are an essential complement to prepare the recipients to a new way of working (self-entrepreneurship). But this preparation for entrepreneurship is not enough to increase the value of the initial trainings received.

Project design

Country Evaluation: Pakistan
A holistic approach to sector development (including environmental sustainability, skills development, export promotion and technology upgrading) was seen for the
leather sector as a positive approach. Mainstreaming environmental sustainability in projects supporting industries can be a way to promote export and growth.

Evaluación de país: Cuba
La existencia de estudios sólidos de factibilidad económica en la fase preparatoria de proyectos es un factor decisivo para el potencial de replicación y el impacto más amplio. The existence of solid economic feasibility studies on the Project preparatory phase is crucial to the potential for replication and wider impact factor. The availability of solid feasibility studies in the project preparatory phase is a key factor for its potential replication and broader impact.

Ethiopia: Technical assistance project for the upgrading of the Ethiopia Leather and Leather Products Industry. TE/ETH/08/008
The decision to address the upgrading of the leather industry by a comprehensive and “systemic” approach is commendable since the sector requires multi-front interventions, including policy interventions, for improved competitiveness. The government adopted this comprehensive approach in its sector strategy, which calls for simultaneous interventions in different dimensions.

India: Consolidated project for SME development in India through establishment of mutual credit guarantee schemes, cluster twinning and foreign investment and technology promotion. TE/IND/04/001
The present project was assessed as consisting, de facto, of several parallel rather than integrated projects (CT leather and footwear in Chennai; different ITP activities for auto components in Pune and Chennai; two separate activity lines in access to finance). The overall range of activities was remarkable; however, most activities were implemented independently from each other and few concrete synergies could be identified. The mission is of the opinion that this was a design flaw right from the start: while the ProDoc allots the overall coordination function to the URO, the office could not play this role due to lack of operational resources. The CTA was crucial as coordinator but was not replaced later on the CT and ITP components were by and large aiming at the same goal of developing Indian companies and linking them with the international (Italian) markets). Both components pursued different paths based on different methodologies and catchwords. The CT component was cooperating closely with (bureaucratic) government institutions (CLRI, CFTI, MSME-DI), while the ITP component was more private sector oriented (foremost MCCIA but also AIEMA and ACMA). The mission's overall impression was that the components rather kept out of each other's way by focusing on different sectors, activities and (mostly) partners.
The general lesson to be learned from both above findings is that vesting the coordination function in the UR is not enough and sufficient resources and level of authority over project implementation is needed to overcome the centrifugal forces at play in a multi-disciplinary project.

To link the whole project basically with Italy constituted a risk. While focusing can have advantages, the present project has shown that being dependent on one country becomes a risk when that country is in crisis. A more flexible approach would have made the project more relevant for client companies to build upon existing business relations like, for example, on-going exports of merchandise to other countries, e.g. in the Asian region.

Based on extensive discussions with key resource persons, the mission identified the following issues as having been underestimated when the project was designed: (i) assumptions on mutuality of interests ("win-win" situations) between Indian and Italian companies and organizations were too optimistic; (ii) Indian companies were less willing to participate than assumed; (iii) partner associations were weaker and less motivated than projected; (iv) the relationship management of 'internal' stakeholders, i.e. foremost the GoI partners and Cooperazione Italiana proved to be more time consuming than anticipated.

Several major obstacles emerged during project implementation: Timing was clearly unfortunate with the crisis in Italy, and the Italian partners were not sufficiently interested or even resisted plans to strengthen potential competitors. The final selection of the sectors was not entirely potential-based and the selected partner associations were weak and hard to motivate. Whether these obstacles were caused by an unfortunate mix of unfavorable conditions (and thus something like force majeure) or rather the consequence of an overly optimistic and ambitious project design is open for discussion; however, it seems to be clear that an entire cluster or even sector cannot be developed by working with a few companies over a limited period of time.

Ultimately, given the comparatively modest budget and time frame, the project design was far too optimistic and the team had been given too wide a range of tasks; consequently, resources had to be spread too thinly over too many fields of activities. Less could certainly have been more.
**Liberia: Rehabilitation of training centres in vulnerable communities in Liberia. TF/LIR/11/001.** *(status: covered by thematic evaluation of Post crisis interventions – under finalization)*

In the case of a construction project, it was found that UNIDO should award contracts to local service providers or other UN agencies, such as UNOPS, that are able to take on the whole contract, rather than UNIDO being the implementer itself.

UNIDO’s decentralization plan for the country level (by establishing a desk office in Liberia to handle all of UNIDO’s local administration and operations) will devolve much of the decision-making, budget authority and procurement processes to the field, thereby improving efficiency and enabling fast-track procedures that are required in post-crisis situation.

In general, decentralization in decision-making process, budget authority, and procurement procedures to the field would improve efficiency and timely delivery, as fast-track procedures are essential for successful interventions in post-crisis situations.

**Sierra Leone: Rehabilitation of training-cum-production centres in vulnerable communities of Koidu, Kpandebu and Pujehun in Sierra Leone. TF/SIL/11/002.** *(Cluster: Poverty reduction)*

Basing a short-term post-crisis project on pre-existing national institutions enhances overall project effectiveness. In insecure, post-conflict settings where many people live hand-to-mouth and day-to-day for their basic necessities, providing wages and/or food have to be a part of the reconstruction or training work, particularly for the most vulnerable beneficiaries.

**South Sudan: Integration and progress through protection and empowerment of displaced groups in South Sudan. SAP ID: 110037. XX/SUD/11/X06 (44002). TF/SUD/12/001**

Leverage and use of pre-existing institutional relationships, available information and previous implementation experience in project preparation increases effectiveness and efficiency of implementation of quick impact projects (QIPs) in post-conflict settings.

The preparation and use of findings from baseline studies enhance the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of project interventions as well as contributing to the likelihood of sustainability.
Summary: In terms of project design, the lessons learned have assessed that in the cases of the two country evaluations Cuba and Pakistan, the existence of solid economic feasibility studies on the preparatory phase of the projects and a comprehensive approach to sector development can lead to positive results.

The Cluster Twinning Project in India has shown that the Project should concentrate to less areas of activities and less tasks with the same resource in order to make a better impact. It also should be more flexible and not entirely bound to one country. In the post crisis context the Project design should take into consideration the need of the beneficiaries for basic necessities and incorporate the fulfilment of those needs in the design of the Project.

The post crisis projects in Liberia and South Sudan have shown how important it is to use available information and pre-existing knowledge in Project preparation as well as trusting local service providers and implement a decentralization in decision making process.

Ownership

Country Evaluation: Kenya
The experiences provide some lessons for future UNIDO work in Kenya and more generally. Firstly, the experience of the KIPI and KIPII indicate that without country and UNIDO ownership of the country programme it cannot be effectively funded or implemented.

South Africa: South Africa Automotive Component Supplier Development. SE/Saf/09/003
Even though NAACAM and NAAMSA were members of the Steering Committee for the ACSDP, they patently did not feel a sense of ownership for the programme. Discussions with the industry associations indicate that this might be due to the fact that these organizations saw the Steering Committee as a platform for feeding back information, but did not feel that they could make substantive changes to the programme. The experience of the ACSDP indicates that it is imperative that industry owns, designs and drives the process of supplier development and industry support interventions. Hopefully, the National Steering Committee process that is currently underway will engender the necessary degree of industry ownership of the new automotive development strategy for South Africa. Adequate time for reflection and programme adjustments is necessary between a testing phase and the roll-out phase of a programme.
Summary: The lessons learned from the Country evaluation Kenya show that without country and UNIDO ownership the programme can’t be effectively implemented. The South Africa Automotive Component Supplier Development showed that industry ownership in design and process of supplier development is necessary for industry support interventions.

Environment

Country Evaluation: Kenya
The Methyl Bromide project was largely successful because of its strong relevance for the flower farmers. The strong interest of farmers to find alternatives to MB was a major impact driver for the project, because market (customers demanding more eco-friendly products) and Government pressure allowed overcoming the technical difficulties encountered.

Cambodia: Identification, assessment and prioritization of pollution “hot spots” and transfer environmentally sound technologies (TEST) in the Cambodian Section of the Mekong river basin. TF/CMB/10/002
Combination of Hot Spot and TEST approach: The combination of the Hot Spot and TEST approach for a first project phase in the field of “resource efficient and clean production” is innovative and allows for systematically focusing on the major polluters within a country, in order to achieve a maximum impact.

Summary: The high relevance of environmental projects for the beneficiaries in the case of Methyl Bromide project as part of the country evaluation Kenya made it very successful. In Cambodia the innovative nature of the Hot Spot and TEST approach has allowed it to achieve maximum impact by focusing on the major polluters within a country.

Sustainability

Country Evaluation: Kenya
Secondly, the project experiences show that where an appropriate balance is stuck between capacity building for stakeholders and provision of hardware, underpinned by understanding of local and national context achieving results will be more likely. Simply installing hardware without attention to capacity is not sufficient to achieve sustainable results, particularly in UNIDOs chosen areas of focus in Kenya energy and agro-industry.
UNIDO’s projects are often focused on technological solutions. Limited community based work to ensure the sustainable uptake of technologies or new processes is often a weakness.

**Summary:** *UNIDO projects can be more sustainable if a good balance between technological solutions and community based work is achieved.*

**Impact**

Ethiopia: Technical assistance project for the upgrading of the Ethiopia Leather and Leather Products Industry. TE/ETH/08/008

Overall the project can claim to have made contributions to job creation and poverty reduction although there are no figures available to that effect. However, poverty effects will remain limited as long as the very low wage levels in the leather sector and in particular in the shoe industry continue to exist.

India: Consolidated project for SME development in India through establishment of mutual credit guarantee schemes, cluster twinning and foreign investment and technology promotion. TE/IND/04/001

Several major obstacles emerged during project implementation: Timing was clearly unfortunate with the crisis in Italy, and the Italian partners were not sufficiently interested or even resisted plans to strengthen potential competitors. The final selection of the sectors was not entirely potential-based and the selected partner associations were weak and hard to motivate. Whether these obstacles were caused by an unfortunate mix of unfavorable conditions (and thus something like force majeure) or rather the consequence of an overly optimistic and ambitious project design is open for discussion; however, it seems to be clear that an entire cluster or even sector cannot be developed by working with a few companies over a limited period of time.

**Summary:** *The impact of UNIDO projects in poverty reduction and job creation in the Ethiopia project for the upgrading of the Ethiopia Leather and Leather Products Industry was not easy to be measured as there haven’t been available data to that effect. In the case of the cluster twinning project in India obstacles that undermined the impact of the project were the general negative financial climate in the donor/partner country Italy which made them not want to strengthen potential competitors and the wrong selection of the selected partner associations. For this reason the impact of the project was assessed as ambiguous.*
Annex 3: Selected lessons learned

Use of seed money

Global activities: Support to agri-business and agro–industry development initiatives: Implementing the three frameworks. UE/GLO/10/016, TE/GLO/10/017, US/GLO/10/018

Speed and ease of procedures to obtain access to seed money resources for preparatory assistance is of utmost importance to demonstrate to clients/donors the efficiency of the organization’s service delivery capacity and also to be able to compete with other service providers. Harmonization of the procedures pertaining to different preparatory assistance funding windows in UNIDO would be justified to treat requests for their use in the same manner.

Evaluación de país: Cuba

El uso de los fondos “semilla” de ONUDI no contribuye al desarrollo de nuevos proyecto de gran escala, si no existe un mecanismo participativo definido de antemano, a través del cual se decide la utilización estratégica. The use of “seed funds” UNIDO does not contribute to the development of new large–scale project, if there is not a participatory mechanism defined in advance, through which the strategic use is decided.

Summary: For the 3ADI project simplifying the procedures to obtain access to seed money resources in order to compete with other service providers and exhibit the efficiency of the organization’s service delivery capacity has been considered essential. For the country evaluation of Cuba the use of seed funds was not important as it didn’t contribute to the development of new large–scale projects.

Gender

Global activities: Support to agri-business and agro–industry development initiatives: Implementing the three frameworks. UE/GLO/10/016, TE/GLO/10/017, US/GLO/10/018

Gender equality and access to finance face the same problem: they are not systematically mainstreamed in project design and implementation.

In addition, the project has also revealed that entrepreneurship exists at all levels, irrespective of gender and age. But, women and young adults are less likely to pursue this career path. Only one young woman and two young men accessed credit to start up new businesses, which compares with 15 middle-aged women and men (between 40 and 55 Years of age). However, cultural factors may also be influencing negatively the propensity of young people to start businesses.

Summary: Gender equality and equal access to finance remains always an issue either because it is not part of the project design and implementation (3ADI project) or it shows that women and young adults are less likely to become entrepreneurs even though they are skilled enough (in the Sustainable Livelihood for Socially Vulnerable Refugees, Internally Displaced and Local Families in Armenia project).

Monitoring

India: Consolidated project for SME development in India through establishment of mutual credit guarantee schemes, cluster twinning and foreign investment and technology promotion. TE/IND/04/001

As mentioned several times, the project was not in a position to provide the evaluation mission with comprehensive information and hard data on its achievements related to the core project objectives and indicators, apart from output-related activity lists and success stories related to individual companies. The lesson to be learned is therefore that a project should not design elaborate intervention logic and then not set up a corresponding outcome monitoring system that allows assessing progress against objectives and targets. Naturally, the required resources for setting up and operating the monitoring system must also be planned for.

Uganda: Establishment of two District Business Information Centers to promote Private Sector Development and Information and Communication Technologies. UE/UGA/09/003

In the wider process of transition towards a results based administrative and management system it is important to make sure that it does not result simply in a new bureaucratic requirement. Such transition should imply substantive changes in the perspective from an input driven to a result based project cycle and these changes should be reflected in the type and quality of information that is reported, not just in the format of progress reports. In this connection, it is important to allocate adequate resources to ensure that results based monitoring
and reporting can be effectively implemented. In those countries where there is a critical mass of projects that can justify it, it might be worth considering the possibility of pooling funds to ensure that there are dedicated professionals to develop and implement results based M&E systems.

**Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Phasing-out PCBs and PCB-containing equipment in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. GF/MCD/08/002**

A further notable lesson learned is that the implementation of this project has emphasized the fundamental value of a properly formulated M&E framework to ensure the possibility for adaptive management and to help mitigate identified risks for project implementation, especially delays. This project is an example of how much the M&E framework and its implementation, especially the development of SMART (especially measurable) project objectives and Key Impact Indicators are crucial for project success in the project design phase, because almost all aspects of the project weakly rated can be directly or indirectly tied back to the M&E framework.

**Summary:** One of the important lessons learned from the project evaluations are that a monitoring system and must be part of the project design. In the cases of Uganda and Macedonia the lessons to be learned are that special funds should be allocated and results based monitoring and evaluating systems should be developed and implemented.

**Management**

**Lebanon: Community Empowerment and Livelihoods Enhancement Project. TE/LEB/10/002**

The achievement of the Community Empowerment and Livelihoods Enhancement Project (CELEP)

- was satisfactory because it was based on:
  - a pragmatic analysis of needs through enquiries, visits and expertise,
  - a pragmatic approach of beneficiaries involvement through the introduction of a cost-sharing system,
  - a good commitment and cooperation of counterparts: MoI, MoA and Italian cooperation,
  - a simple and efficient management through PMU and PSC,
  - the quality of inputs chosen: equipment’s, civil works and trainings.
South Sudan: Integration and progress through protection and empowerment of displaced groups in South Sudan. SAP ID: 110037. XX/SUD/11/X06 (44002). TF/SUD/12/001

An in-country Project Management Unit (PMU) under the consistent direction of a single CTA that cooperates very closely with responsible training providers is critical to the successful implementation of a QIP under post-crisis conditions.

Summary: A successful and efficient in-country Project Management Unit (PMU) under the direction of a single Chief Technical Advisor is critical for the successful implementation of interventions in post-crisis countries. Other managerial factors that lead to positive results are also: good commitment and cooperation of the counterparts, accurate analysis of needs and a pragmatic approach of the beneficiary’s involvement through the introduction of a cost-sharing system.