Independent Thematic Evaluation

UNIDO’s Post-Crisis Interventions
Independent Thematic Evaluation

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Contents

Acronyms and abbreviations ............................................................................................................. v
Glossary of evaluation terms .......................................................................................................... vii
Executive summary ......................................................................................................................... viii

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 1

2. Evaluation background ......................................................................................................................... 3

2.1 Mandate and objective ....................................................................................................................... 3

2.2 Scope and coverage ............................................................................................................................ 3

2.3 Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 4

2.4 Limitations ..................................................................................................................................... 6

3. The global context ............................................................................................................................... 7

3.1 International response to crises ...................................................................................................... 7

3.2 The current engagement of UN Agencies in post-crisis work ......................................................... 8

4. UNIDO’s policy and institutional framework for post-crisis engagement ........................................ 10

4.1 Definitions and approach to post-crisis programming .................................................................. 10

4.2 The policy framework ....................................................................................................................... 11

4.3 The institutional framework ............................................................................................................. 13

5. Portfolio review ................................................................................................................................... 14

5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 14

5.2 Overall portfolio ............................................................................................................................... 14

5.3 Post-crisis projects as a share of total UNIDO technical cooperation ............................................. 16

5.4 Total post-crisis allotments by region and country ........................................................................... 17

5.5 Focus areas of projects in crisis-affected countries ........................................................................ 18

5.6 Main donors of post-crisis interventions ......................................................................................... 19
6. Meta-evaluation of selected projects and country programmes .............. 20
6.1 Overview of projects and country programmes .................................. 20
6.2 Programme/project design .................................................................. 22
6.3 Relevance ........................................................................................... 24
6.4 Efficiency ............................................................................................ 27
6.5 Effectiveness ....................................................................................... 29
6.6 Impact .................................................................................................. 31
6.7 Sustainability ....................................................................................... 32
6.8 Gender .................................................................................................. 34
6.9 Environment .......................................................................................... 35

7. Conclusions and recommendations ....................................................... 36
7.1 Conclusions .......................................................................................... 36
7.2 Recommendations ................................................................................ 36

8. Lessons .................................................................................................. 38

Annex A: Terms of Reference .................................................................... 39
Annex B: Bibliography ................................................................................ 60
Annex C: List of persons consulted by the evaluation team ...................... 62
### Acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABD</td>
<td>Agri-Business Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIT</td>
<td>Agro-Industries and Technology Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>Programme Approval and Monitoring Committee</td>
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<td>BDS</td>
<td>Business Development Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Country Cooperation Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Community Development Committees</td>
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<tr>
<td>CELEP</td>
<td>Community Empowerment and Livelihoods Enhancement Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLARIS</td>
<td>Community Livelihood and Rural Industry Support Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPID</td>
<td>Combating Marginalization and Poverty through Industrial Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRED</td>
<td>Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Country Service Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGB</td>
<td>Director-General's Bulletin</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDIP</td>
<td>Enterprise Development and Investment Promotion</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERSG</td>
<td>Executive Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>FCE</td>
<td>Foundation for Community Encouragement</td>
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<td>FFP</td>
<td>The Fund for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTS</td>
<td>Financial Tracking System</td>
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<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>General Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Global Environment Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOJ</td>
<td>Government of Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communications Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Industrial Development Board (UNIDO)</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Integrated Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPCC</td>
<td>International Panel on Climate Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>KEFRI</td>
<td>Kenya Forestry Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAISER</td>
<td>Lebanese Agro-Industry Support and Economic Recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>LED</td>
<td>Local Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Trust Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISP</td>
<td>Micro-Industry Support Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSMES</td>
<td>Micro, Small &amp; Medium Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPESR</td>
<td>Post-crisis and Post-conflict Electronic Support Resource</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Private Sector Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTC</td>
<td>Programme Development and Technical Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>QIP</td>
<td>Quick Impact Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Red Sea State, Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERIES</td>
<td>Supporting economic revitalization through income generation and employment creation in Somaliland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMTQ</td>
<td>Standards, Metrology, Testing and Quality</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPL</td>
<td>Special Programmes and LDC unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>Special Programmes group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Technical Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCB</td>
<td>Trade Capacity Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToT</td>
<td>Training of Trainers</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDG</td>
<td>United Nations Development Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTFHS</td>
<td>United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>Vocational Training Centres</td>
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<tr>
<td>YED</td>
<td>Youth Entrepreneurship Development</td>
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# Glossary of evaluation terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>The situation, prior to an intervention, against which progress can be assessed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>Intended or unintended change due directly or indirectly to an intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>The extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>Positive and negative, intended and non-intended, directly and indirectly, long term effects produced by a development intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Quantitative or qualitative factors that provide a means to measure the changes caused by an intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessons learned</td>
<td>Generalizations based on evaluation experiences that abstract from the specific circumstances to broader situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logframe (logical framework approach)</td>
<td>Management tool used to facilitate the planning, implementation and evaluation of an intervention. It involves identifying strategic elements (activities, outputs, outcome, impact) and their causal relationships, indicators, and assumptions that may affect success or failure. Based on RBM (results based management) principles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>The likely or achieved (short-term and/or medium-term) effects of an intervention’s outputs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outputs</td>
<td>The products, capital goods and services which result from an intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>The extent to which the objectives of an intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donor’s policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risks</td>
<td>Factors, normally outside the scope of an intervention, which may affect the achievement of an intervention’s objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>The continuation of benefits from an intervention, after the development assistance has been completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target groups</td>
<td>The specific individuals or organizations for whose benefit an intervention is undertaken.</td>
</tr>
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Executive summary

Introduction and background

The present thematic evaluation of UNIDO’s post-crisis interventions was mandated by the UNIDO Executive Board as part of the organization’s accountability and learning process. In line with the UNIDO policy on Thematic Evaluations, the overall objective of this evaluation is to provide strategic recommendations on policy-making and organizational effectiveness as regards UNIDO’s role and approach to post-crisis interventions.

The core question that the evaluation sought to answer was as follows: How has UNIDO performed its role in post-crisis settings and to what extent is the organization attuned to working in post-crisis settings?

The definition of post-crisis used in this report covers disasters (natural and man-made) which cause widespread destruction of human life, livelihoods and infrastructure. Post-conflict is a sub-set of the post-crisis concept, referring to the consequences of a war or other forms of political or military conflict. In turn, post-crisis is a subset of the wider concept human security (which refers to freedom from want and freedom from fear).

The evaluation was conducted over the period 2012-2014 by a team led by Massoud Hedeshi, Evaluation Officer of the UNIDO Office for Independent Evaluation and including a number of evaluation consultants: Leila Salehiravesh, Rahat Chekirova, Andrew Young, Simon Taylor, and Michael von der Schulenburg. The final editing of the report was done by an evaluation consultant, Leny van Oyen.

Evaluation approach and methodology

This thematic evaluation has been conducted in accordance with UNIDO’s evaluation policy and the UN Evaluation Group norms and standards. It is built on and complements an earlier thematic evaluation (2010) that covered a sample of 10 post-crisis projects. The present evaluation was conducted on the basis of the following:

- a portfolio review of past and ongoing UNIDO interventions in 25 crisis-affected countries over the period 2004-2012 (following the December 2003 General Conference (GC) resolution GC.10/Res.6 recommending the continuation of UNIDO involvement in industrial development projects in countries emerging from crisis situations);

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1 UNIDO Office for Independent Evaluation, Thematic evaluation of UNIDO post-crisis projects, September 2010
• a total of 9 in-depth and independent project evaluations, 4 project desk reviews, and review of 2 self-evaluations;
• a meta-evaluation, synthesizing the findings, recommendations and lessons found in 19 project and programmatic evaluation reports;
• analysis of (i) the conceptual, strategic and institutional frameworks guiding UNIDO’s post-crisis engagement, (ii) the mandate and role of UNIDO in the UN system and (iii) the wider global practice and issues pertaining to post-crisis interventions and their relevance to UNIDO.

The approach covered document review and regular consultations with relevant UNIDO staff through group discussions, interviews and correspondence, as well as consultations with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) that coordinates humanitarian crisis related assistance and ILO counterparts in Geneva.

The main limitation of this thematic evaluation was the fact that UNIDO does not have an acknowledged post-crisis strategy or targets against which the work of the organization in post-conflict settings can be evaluated.

The global context

It is estimated that natural disasters and armed conflicts together created 16 million refugees and 41 million internally displaced people with a large majority of the affected people living on an income of less than two dollars per capita and per day (2012). 2

According to Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), financial and in-kind resources mobilized for natural and environmental disasters reached US$18 billion in 2012. Of this amount, the share for UN and its agencies was US$ 5.5 billion, or about 30%. There are no aggregate (country) figures with respect to resources mobilized for fragile and conflict ridden countries.

Main evaluation findings

UNIDO’s project portfolio in post-crisis countries has grown considerably since the 2003 General Conference decision to expand the organization’s involvement in this area. The evaluation identified 25 countries that have suffered from disasters and/or conflicts over the period 2004-2012 in which UNIDO has implemented post-crisis projects.

Iraq and Sudan constituted UNIDO’s largest recipients of post-crisis support by a long way, together amounting to $111.5 million or 66% of all post-crisis projects of UNIDO for the period. Iraq had the single biggest country programme for UNIDO globally for some years, encompassing close to 50% of all of UNIDO’s

post-crisis project funding and one-third of all post-crisis UNIDO projects over the period.

The average size of a post-crisis project stood at $1.6 million, which was close to three times higher than the average size of a UNIDO project ($0.6 million) over the same period. In terms of their number, UNIDO post-crisis related projects have steadily increased in the period under review. As a share of total technical cooperation (TC), the volume of post-crisis projects peaked in 2007 and 2009, constituting 33% and 38% of all UNIDO projects respectively. The average annual share of post-crisis projects for the entire period 2004-2012 was approximately 13%. The projects covered primarily post-conflict situations, the share of disaster related projects remaining close to 1% or less for the period.

According to the evaluations of individual projects, the application of conflict-sensitive principles and guidelines was particularly found to be evident in project implementation. This was not always the case in project design that was reported to frequently also have weaknesses in terms of the underlying logical framework, market assessments and private sector involvement.

There was a positive rating of the relevance of UNIDO’s projects in post-crisis settings. The main challenges related to the degree of private sector involvement, policy level support regarding industrial rehabilitation and scaling up income-generating activities to provincial or national levels.

Efficiency in implementation was often hampered by delays (as against original implementation schedules). The majority of the reports highlighted the merit of local procurement, also as a means to support local economic development.

Overall, in terms of effectiveness, projects were successful in achieving intended immediate results. The effectiveness of “quick impact projects” was in several cases facilitated by building on previous capacity building support and in-country partnerships.

Immediate (short-term) impact was evident across the board with respect to UNIDO’s income-generating support, resulting in earnings by targeted beneficiaries in selected areas hosting large numbers of internally displaced people and refugees.

However, sustainability remained a big issue, which would be expected in many complex conflict contexts and for projects with a short duration. A common sustainability issue related to a lack of financial services for trainees and entrepreneurs in the follow-up phase after training, together with inadequate local government commitment to pursue funding of activities beyond the project cycle in some cases.

As regards cross-cutting issues, with respect to gender equality, most reports gave a fairly positive assessment of UNIDO’s efforts, but only at a micro level. In some cases, a lack of participation by women at the time of selection of training
courses was assessed as having contributed to lower participation by women in training. Environmental issues were scantly addressed in the reports. However, a number of projects were reported to have directly contributed to establishing renewable energy sources for productive use (growth centres in Liberia and Sierra Leone).

At the institutional level, UNIDO established a Post-Crisis Unit in 2003. The unit was replaced in 2006 by a post-crisis coordination unit named Special Programmes Group (SPP). The SPP was closed in 2010 but post-crisis interventions continued to be implemented by the technical branches (primarily the Agro-Industry Branch).

Main conclusion

Overall, UNIDO has performed its post-crisis role well. While a number of projects have been relatively small targeting a limited number of beneficiaries and without systematically engaging in scaling up efforts, UNIDO has also implemented much larger post-crisis interventions that covered policy level inputs and reflected a strong engagement of the organization with the UN system at large including participation in the pooled funding mechanism.

Main recommendations

1. UNIDO needs a strategy and related guidelines for its post-crisis work.

2. UNIDO should enhance its post-crisis policy role through the provision of advice on sustainable and inclusive industrial rehabilitation options for countries emerging from armed conflicts and disasters.

3. UNIDO’s livelihoods projects in post-crisis settings should have a wider scope beyond community level ‘human security’ work, and should aim to upscale such small scale livelihoods projects to the provincial or national level.

4. Conflict sensitivity analysis, do no harm principles, results orientation (quality LogFrames) and market assessments should be mainstreamed in UNIDO’s post-crisis project formulation.

5. UNIDO should develop flexible and speedy procedures for procurement in post-crisis contexts with an emphasis on local procurement where feasible.

6. The design of projects with a short duration and limited budget should be improved in order to ensure that outcomes and outputs are achievable within the given project duration and budget. The possibility to link up with Government interventions and/or other UNIDO projects or activities of the private sector should be explored, for increased efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.
7. UNIDO should leverage its unique private sector development mandate and its network of private sector partners in post-crisis settings.

**Key lessons**

For UNIDO to succeed in complex post-conflict environments, it is important for the UNIDO field office to play an active role in the UN country team.

UNIDO can build bridges between rehabilitation and development activities through a combination of quick interventions and longer-term support.

Funding opportunities will be lost if the approach is to ‘wait for the reconstruction phase to intervene’.
1. Introduction

This report constitutes the result of a thematic evaluation of UNIDO’s post-crisis interventions. The definition of post-crisis used in this report covers disasters (natural and man-made) which cause widespread destruction of human life, livelihoods and infrastructure. Post-conflict is a sub-set of the post-crisis concept, referring to the consequences of a war or other forms of political or military conflict. In turn, post-crisis is a subset of the wider concept human security which refers to freedom from want and freedom from fear.

As per the terms of reference (attached as Annex A), the core question that this evaluation sought to answer was:

How has UNIDO performed its role in post-crisis settings and to what extent is the organization attuned to working in post-crisis settings?

The above question leads to a large set of sub-questions, the details of which are outlined under Chapter 2 of this report (Evaluation background) that encompasses the purpose and scope of this evaluation, the methodology used and also lists some limitations of the exercise. A quick review of the global context with respect to post-crisis interventions (macro level) is provided in Chapter 3, followed by an overview of the policy and institutional framework (meso level) for post-crisis engagement within UNIDO (Chapter 4). A portfolio review of UNIDO’s post-crisis project interventions (micro level) is included as Chapter 5, providing a detailed account of UNIDO’s post-crisis project portfolio over the period 2004-2012, disaggregated into post-disaster and post-conflict projects. This is in turn followed by a meta-evaluation of over 20 project and programme evaluations (including 4 country programmes) and also of project reviews (Chapter 6), forming the basis for the evaluation’s conclusions and recommendations (Chapter 7) and lessons (Chapter 8).

The core evaluation team was led by Massoud Hedeshi (UNIDO Office for Independent Evaluation) supported by a group of consultants: Leila Salehiravesh and Rahat Chekirova (supporting the team leader); a livelihoods/post-crisis evaluation consultant (Andrew Young); a renewable energy evaluation consultant

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UNIDO Evaluation Policy:
“Thematic evaluations provide strategic information to UNIDO management on policy-making and organizational effectiveness. Thematic evaluations may cover regional, corporate or organizational issues...They may involve panels of independent evaluation or technical experts from other UN organizations or sources outside the UN system.”

UNIDO/DGB (M).98
22 May 2006

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3 Throughout this evaluation the terms “post-crisis” and “post-conflict” will be used because these are generally also used in UN reports. However, both terms are somewhat misleading: crisis/conflicts are rarely over when the UN intervenes; in some cases the country can even still be in the middle of a civil war (e.g. Iraq).
(Simon Taylor); and a senior advisor with extensive experience in the UN's crisis and post-crisis context work at the Special Representative of the Secretary General level (Michael von der Schulenburg). The final report was edited by an evaluation consultant (Leny van Oyen).
2. Evaluation background

2.1 Mandate and objective

In line with UNIDO policy on thematic evaluations, the overall objective of this thematic evaluation is to provide strategic recommendations for UNIDO senior management in matters related to UNIDO’s interventions in post-crisis contexts.

In terms of the background of UNIDO’s post-crisis interventions, particular reference is made to the initiative launched by UNIDO and the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 2010 to support a number of African countries in their recovery efforts from crises. With a total budget of $9.8 million through the Supplementary Fund of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan were designated as partner countries. An agreement was reached for UNIDO to design and implement a series of quick impact projects of around one year in duration under the umbrella title “Response to humanitarian crisis in Africa” (cf. Annex A-3, Note Verbale of December 2010).

The evaluation of these quick impact projects was mandated as part of UNIDO’s accountability and learning process by the decision of the Programme Approval and Monitoring Committee (AMC) meeting on 15 December 2010, approved by the UNIDO Executive Board. The AMC decision stated:

“In view of synergies and the potential for organizational learning, the five post-conflict interventions in Sudan, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia and Democratic Republic of Congo should be subject to a combined evaluation; the modality of this evaluation and the necessary funding should be discussed between PTC/AGR/AIT and ODG/EVA. The same should be considered for the projects in Liberia and Sierra Leone as these two are very similar in concept and approach.”

The combined evaluation of these projects was upgraded by a decision of the Executive Board to a full thematic evaluation of UNIDO’s post-crisis interventions and included in the ODG/EVA work programme for 2012-13 (i.e., the current evaluation). This exercise was launched in 2012 with a series of stand-alone project evaluations funded by the projects. Following the approval of the Executive Board, an additional €30,000 was allocated for the thematic/synthesis work in 2013, with an expanded scope that went beyond the initial 7 projects.

2.2 Scope and coverage

The current evaluation was designed to build on an earlier exercise entitled “Thematic evaluation of UNIDO’s post-crisis projects” conducted in 2009-10 which covered a sample of 10 post-crisis projects on the basis of document review (independent evaluation reports, self-evaluation reports and progress
reports). The current evaluation is wider in scope to the extent it covered itself 9 independent project evaluations, a portfolio review and a meta-evaluation.

In line with the terms of reference of the current evaluation (cf. Annex A), the overriding criterion for the classification of relevant post-crisis projects was country relevance (in terms of post-crisis context). As the UNIDO project classification system does not necessarily reflect whether projects belong to the post-crisis category, the aim was for this thematic evaluation to focus on interventions in post-crisis countries rather than projects described as crisis-specific by the ones who developed the projects. Moreover, only programmes and projects specifically implemented in conflict or disaster affected areas were included in the evaluation. Thus, country relevance and project type were the criteria for selecting projects.

However, some difficulties were experienced in the choice of countries and projects to be included within the scope of the evaluation covering the period 2004-2012. This was most pronounced in the preparation of the portfolio review, and exacerbated by a lack of formal definitions for identifying what UNIDO classifies as its post-crisis projects. The Arab Spring, for example, created a group of countries that could be categorized without any explicit elements that would put them in such a category.

In sum, this thematic evaluation is based on the findings of 9 independent project evaluations, 4 project desk reviews, 2 self-evaluations, as well as a meta-evaluation of over 20 existing evaluation reports of relevance for this thematic evaluation (including also the 2009/10 thematic post-crisis evaluation), and a set of six programmatic evaluations covering Indonesia, Iraq, Sierra Leone and Sudan.

Basic information about the specific projects and relevant reports serving as inputs to this evaluation is provided in Tables 1 & 2 within the evaluation ToR (Annex A).

2.3 Methodology

In order to answer the evaluation’s core question and provide strategic information to UNIDO management, a multi-pronged approach (micro, meso and macro) was adopted. First, the standard criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact were used to assess UNIDO’s post-crisis projects (micro). The evaluation parameters also included cross-cutting themes, in particular gender equality and environmental issues.

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4 Cf. Tables 2 and 3
5 Cf. Table 4
Interview guidelines were developed for various categories of respondents and interviews were held with relevant project managers and decision-makers at HQ and in the field including UNIDO Representatives as well as UNIDO project experts in the field, as well as with a number of key stakeholders outside UNIDO.

The project evaluations were conducted over 2012 and 2013 as standard project evaluations, but with specific thematic questions included. The first few of these project evaluations were used as guides that informed the ToR of this thematic evaluation (starting with the Kenya bamboo – Bamcraft - project evaluation launched in March 2012).

The assessment of the performance of UNIDO’s post-crisis ‘role’ required a clear understanding what this role is understood to be, as defined by the decisions of its policy-making organs (meso). Moreover, the evaluation needed to consider the wider context of post-crisis support in order to assess whether UNIDO’s policy and practice are attuned to working in such contexts. This required a brief review of the wider development and humanitarian contexts within which UNIDO must operate (macro). To this end, a set of guidance documents as well as relevant evaluation reports pertaining to post-crisis operations and challenges in effecting a transition from relief to development were reviewed.\(^6\)

Findings were triangulated against all previous post-crisis evaluation findings and recommendations along standard UNIDO evaluation criteria.

In brief, the thematic evaluation exercise has:

- Conducted a portfolio review of past and ongoing UNIDO interventions in post-crisis settings over the period 2004-12;
- Used the findings of 9 in-depth independent project evaluations, 4 project desk reviews, and 2 self-evaluations conducted in the context of this evaluation;
- Synthesized the findings, recommendations and lessons found in 19 available project and programmatic evaluation reports (meta-evaluation);
- Analyzed the conceptual, strategic and institutional frameworks of UNIDO’s post-crisis engagement, including its positioning in this regard in the UN system at large;
- Provided a brief overview of the wider global practice and issues pertaining to post-crisis context interventions and their relevance to UNIDO.

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\(^6\) Cf. Annex B (Bibliography)
2.4 Limitations

The main limitation imposed on the thematic evaluation was the fact that UNIDO does not have a formally adopted post-crisis strategy or targets against which it can be evaluated.

The 9 project evaluations managed by the Office for Independent Evaluation were designed so as to facilitate the thematic evaluation. However, the nature of these projects as quick-impact, one-year projects sets them apart as rather ‘unusual’ types that do not necessarily match the bulk of UNIDO’s post-crisis portfolio. Furthermore, given their short-term nature, the effectiveness, sustainability and impact of these projects could not be assessed fully. This limitation was compensated for by the inclusion of several programmatic evaluation reports that cover a much wider range of programmes in countries like Indonesia, Sudan and Iraq.
3. The global context

3.1 International response to crises

Every year, hundreds of millions of people around the world are impacted by natural disasters and man-made disasters related to wars and civil unrest. According to the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), at least 106 million people in 115 countries were affected by natural disasters in 2012. The same year saw also over 200 violent conflicts in which about 38,000 people were killed. Natural disasters and armed conflicts have resulted in vast groups of refugees and internally displaced people with a large majority of the affected people living on an income of less than two dollars per day.

There are indications that both natural/man-made disasters including civil conflicts are likely to increase over the next years. In its latest report, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that global temperatures will climb even faster than previously predicted, which would endanger coastal populations, and jeopardize food production. Also the number of fragile states is on the rise. The Fund for Peace (FFP) classified about 50% of the 178 countries it surveyed as either highly fragile or fragile.

The amount of resources the international community spends every year on fragile and (post-) conflict-ridden countries is difficult to estimate as there is no central coordinating body for post-conflict interventions similar to OCHA for humanitarian assistance. However, as illustrations, the OECD/DAC’s Global Humanitarian Assistance report estimates that between 2002 and 2012, total assistance for Afghanistan reached US$42 billion and that for Iraq US$38.5 billion. More recently, in December 2013, the UN announced an appeal of over US$6 billion for Syria.

Crisis/post-crisis interventions by the UN vary widely in terms of contextual character, mandate, duration, and management arrangements. In the case of natural disasters, the emergency phase normally lasts only a few weeks, and the transition to recovery can take a few months. Decisions on the allocation of UN funding for recovery projects are centralized through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in Geneva and a Flash/Consolidated Appeals process that is launched within days of the onset of a disaster. The humanitarian coordinator in the field has limited say over the allocation of UN resources in such a context.

In the case of armed conflicts, the UN’s response mechanism can be much lengthier in duration (decades long in some cases), and is dominated by the Security Council. It is the Special/Executive Representative of the Secretary

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7 Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Data on Armed Conflict, 2013
8 IPCC, Fifth Assessment Report, 2013
9 FFP, Failed States Index, 2013
General (SRSG/ERSG) in the field who leads the UN country team (UNCT) and has a strong say in the allocation of funding among UNCT members, primarily under a political mandate. This strong field orientation is further accentuated by typically large UN trust funds in countries with civil/political crises.

Analysis of the UN crisis response mechanisms leads to a number of general observations (reflected in Table 1 below) considered of relevance for UN Agencies (including UNIDO) as regards their (potential) involvement in post-crisis responses, distinguishing between post-disaster and post-conflict situations.

### Table 1: Implications of the UN crisis response systems for post-crisis interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-disaster response</th>
<th>Post-conflict response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any UN (development or humanitarian) agency wishing to play a role in post-disaster responses would have to engage with the UN’s central coordination and funding mechanisms in Geneva.</td>
<td>A strong field level engagement with the UNCT and the SRSG is essential for any agency wishing to make a contribution to post-conflict recovery and peace building efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in the Flash Appeal process within a week of the onset of a disaster is essential regardless of the type of intervention planned, as Consolidated Appeals are updated versions of the Flash Appeals.</td>
<td>Funding opportunities for post-crisis recovery efforts are more readily accessible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This participation requires a set of standardized ‘emergency phase’ project proposals that can be submitted to the IASC within days of the onset of a sudden disaster. Most ‘recovery phase’ projects are also included in the Flash Appeal.</td>
<td>Development agencies such as UNIDO can be engaged in interventions from the start of the peace building phase.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 The current engagement of UN Agencies in post-crisis work

Support to disaster-prone, fragile and conflict-ridden countries has become an important field of work for several UN agencies. UNDP estimates that over 70% of its assistance is now devoted to crisis-affected countries; for FAO the figure stands at around 30%. UNIDO’s share of post-crisis related funds (2012) as a proportion of its total technical cooperation (TC) was 11%.\(^\text{10}\)

\(^\text{10}\) Covering US$ 20 million out of a total volume of TC of $180 million for the year 2012
To gain a better idea of how UNIDO compares with other Specialized UN agencies in terms of international post-crisis responses, it may be useful to take a brief look at how FAO, ILO and UNESCO deal with the challenge of post-crisis work.

- **FAO** is most advanced in assisting countries following disasters and armed conflicts and has made it one of the organization’s five strategic objectives to assist in increasing “local resilience of livelihoods in disasters”. For this purpose, FAO set up a special organizational group: the Emergency and Rehabilitation Division. It estimates that about 32% of all its assistance is now channeled to help post-crisis countries (amounting to US$ 378 million in 2012). As such, FAO’s crisis-related portfolio alone is more than twice as large as UNIDO’s total technical cooperation portfolio.

- **ILO** has a small core group at headquarters for crisis-related issues. In addition, each of its departments and regional offices has a designated crisis focal point. The role of the core group is to ensure a coherent ILO response to post-crisis situations and develop post-crisis tools and partnerships. The priority areas of ILO interventions in post-crisis appear very similar to UNIDO’s mandate: employment and income creation support to small and micro enterprises, and training in business skills. ILO estimated that over the period 2004 to 2007 it mobilized $59.247 million. ILO developed a series of training materials and guidelines for post-crisis programming and fundraising by its field offices. In this context it is of relevance to mention the UN Policy for Post-conflict, Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration prepared under the leadership of UNDP and ILO and issued in 2009. UNIDO is not mentioned in this policy.

- **UNESCO** has what it calls an “inter-sectoral platform for countries in post-conflict and post-disaster situations” that coordinates the organization’s operational assistance to crisis-affected member states. This platform has no permanent office but consists of a cross-departmental membership; meeting regularly in order to organize the contributions from UNESCO’s various technical departments. The work of the platform is essentially operational and does not set corporate polices. It was not possible to obtain figures that indicate the share of UNESCO’s portfolio in post-crisis countries of its regular programme.

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12 UNIDO Evaluation Group, Thematic evaluation, UNIDO post-crisis projects, 2010
4. UNIDO’s policy and institutional framework for post-crisis engagement

4.1 Definitions and approach to post-crisis programming

UNIDO uses different terms for its post-crisis interventions, the ones most frequently used for describing the framework for post-crisis related work being ‘human security’, ‘vulnerability’ and ‘resilience’, often in tandem with ‘livelihood recovery’ and ‘skills development’.

In a 2009 pamphlet entitled ‘UNIDO’s Contribution to Human Security’, the organization’s approach is described as follows:

“Human security is a concept that addresses both the protection of well-being from chronic threats and vulnerabilities that are structurally embedded in the people’s lives, such as poverty, precarious livelihoods, unemployment, diseases, handicaps, and environmental degradation, and from sudden external shocks, usually called crises, such as pandemics, financial and economic downturns, natural disasters and most wars”.

The document goes on to add a ‘resilience’ element into the analysis as follows:

“No human life is free from downside risks, but with higher resilience and reduced vulnerability people are better able to cope with future downside risks, and will recover faster.”

The document further describes UNIDO’s approach as one that “strengthens the ability of individuals and groups of people to reduce risks and vulnerabilities, ensuring that there is no interruption in livelihoods and productive activities. It also integrates energy, health and environmental security concerns that affect people’s productive capacities into its projects.”

Thus, ‘Human Security’ in UNIDO terminology is best understood as supporting resilience at the individual and community (micro) levels in the face of vulnerability to shocks such as disasters or conflicts. UNIDO projects therefore often target specific communities and groups in areas such as border towns or other regions that host relatively large populations of displaced people.

The implication of UNIDO’s human security discourse is the micro-level approach that it represents. The great majority of UNIDO’s post-conflict ‘human security’ or

‘peace building’ interventions are localized livelihoods development projects aimed at specific communities and/or a few hundred individuals.

4.2 The policy framework

UNIDO’s Constitution of 1979 states in its Article 2 (functions of the Organization) paragraph (i):

“Devote particular attention to the adoption of special measures aimed at assisting the least-developed, land-locked, and island developing countries, as well as those developing countries most seriously affected by economic crises and natural calamities, without losing sight of the interest of the other developing countries.”

The language in 1979 may have been different, but the Constitution gives UNIDO a clear mandate to assist countries hit by natural disasters. Written in 1979, the Constitution of UNIDO does not refer to post-conflict issues.

In December 2003, the General Conference of UNIDO adopted a resolution (GC.10/Res.6\textsuperscript{14}), which stated:

“Noting the ongoing development of UNIDO’s thematic initiative on post-crisis industrial rehabilitation and reconstruction and the round table that took place on this issue during the tenth session of the General Conference of UNIDO in December 2003,

Also noting the Secretariat’s proposal in the issue paper for the above round table that UNIDO’s post-crisis initiative should be based on three basic principles: sound diagnosis, tailor-made responses, and close donor coordination and inter-agency collaboration…

Requests the Director-General to take into account the need for an integrated approach that strikes the appropriate balance between humanitarian relief efforts and the restoration of productive capacities when planning post-crisis interventions…

Requests the Director-General to submit a short progress report on the developments and steps taken in this regard to the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth sessions of the Industrial Development Board.”\textsuperscript{15}

Presentations to the 28\textsuperscript{th} session of the IDB included a succinct description of UNIDO’s parameters for engagement in post-crisis scenarios as:

- short lapse since end of crisis,
- focus of the international community, and
- strong possibility for funding.

\textsuperscript{14} http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/import/20527_gc10_inf4e.pdf
\textsuperscript{15} 9th plenary meeting, 5 December 2003
A strategy paper on post-crisis was submitted to the 29th session of the IDB in November 2004, entitled “UNIDO activities in countries emerging from crisis situations - Strategy paper on post-crisis industrial rehabilitation and reconstruction”. In the report of the Director-General to the 29th session of the IDB, the strategy paper was introduced as such:

“In addition to the addendum, a strategy paper on post-crisis activities will be issued as a conference room paper. That strategy paper represents the finalization of the round table discussion paper circulated informally during the tenth session of the General Conference in December 2003, and takes into account feedback from Member States on the UNIDO approach.”

On its cover page, the said Conference Room Paper states: 16

“In compliance with resolution GC.10/Res.6, complements the information provided in document IDB.28/5, and presents UNIDO’s strategy on post-crisis industrial rehabilitation and reconstruction.”

The strategy document was reviewed by the IDB, and in its report to the November 2005 General Conference, Item B, paragraph 20 states:

“…the Board had before it a progress report by the Director-General on UNIDO activities in countries emerging from crisis situations (IDB./29/11) and a note by the Secretariat entitled “Strategy paper on post-crisis industrial rehabilitation and reconstruction” (IDB.29/CPR.6), as well as a note by the Secretariat on status of activities as of October 2004 (IDB.29/CRP.7). At the proposal of the President, the Board took note of the documentation provided.”

The strategy document highlighted the need for focusing on “the capacities on the ground that have survived the crisis and are still functioning”. UNIDO’s corporate approach to post-crisis situations was further developed in the Strategic Long-Term Vision Statement of May 2005: 17

“The mix of competencies and services available in UNIDO will be used to address special problems of the societies emerging from crisis situations resulting from natural or man-made disasters. Human security is a vital element in these situations and this will guide the Organization’s activities in this area. Basically, in the phase of rehabilitation and reconstruction, UNIDO will provide services for enterprise rehabilitation in key industrial areas, promoting income-generating activities for specific groups of affected people, supporting institutional capacity-building and contributing to the rehabilitation of industrial infrastructure.”

The same document describes “Emphasis on the human security concept through activities for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of industrial

16 IDB.29/CRP.6
infrastructure in post-crisis societies" under ‘cross-cutting approaches’, and as part of UNIDO’s ‘areas of focus’.

4.3 The institutional framework

Prior to the 2003 General Conference (GC), a small Post-Crisis Unit was set up within the Programme Development and Technical Cooperation (PTC) Division yet under the leadership of the Managing Director of Administration. It played a central role in supporting the aforementioned meetings and in gaining the GC’s endorsement of an expansion of UNIDO’s work in this area. In addition to the 2004 post-crisis strategy paper, the Unit also produced interesting concepts such as a UNIDO ‘Post-crisis and Post-conflict Electronic Support Resource’ (PPESR). The latter was planned to become an on-line repository of relevant data, aimed at becoming a global resource for retrieving information and a forum for exchanging the latest information on issues related to post-crisis and post-conflict assistance.

In 2006, UNIDO replaced the Post-Crisis Unit with the Special Programmes Group (SPP). SPP’s post-crisis and human security functions included:\footnote{DGB (O) 95.Add.4, pp.25-26}

- to develop an organizational policy and strategy for UNIDO’s human security and post-crisis initiatives;
- to identify and propose to UNIDO management the areas and countries in which UNIDO interventions would be required in response to natural or man-made crises;
- to institutionalize and maintain contact at Headquarters and Field levels with partners in the post-crisis and emergency relief arena from within the UN system and with non-governmental organizations in the humanitarian field that could augment UNIDO’s delivery capacities.

In 2010, SPP was moved to the Programme Development and Technical Cooperation (PTC) Division of UNIDO with all its post-crisis functions removed and with a new name: Special Programmes and LDC Group (SPL).\footnote{UNIDO/DGB/(O).95/Add.7, 26 February 2010. See page 13 and Annex 1.} Even though this group was discontinued later, various branches continued the implementation of post-crisis projects. The PTC Units that have most intimately involved with post-conflict interventions are the Rural Entrepreneurship and Human Security (RES) unit, the Agri-Business Development (ABD) unit, and the Agro-Industries Technology (AIT) unit - all within the Agri-Business Branch. The RES Unit developed its own first working paper ‘Livelihood Recovery: Stepping-Stone to Community Empowerment and Sustainable Development’ (in draft form at the time of the evaluation).
5. Portfolio review

5.1 Introduction

UNIDO’s portfolio of post-crisis interventions has grown considerably since the 2003 GC decision to expand its work in this area, particularly in post-conflict contexts. In terms of the sample selection, the evaluation team identified a total of 25 countries that have suffered from disasters and/or conflicts over the period 2004-2012, and in which UNIDO has implemented programmes and projects. All UNIDO projects in these countries were reviewed in order to identify which ones could be classified as a post-crisis type.20

It was recognized that within most of these countries, not all UNIDO programmes/projects are not exclusively of the post-crisis category. However, working in highly insecure and fragile contexts necessarily impacts all projects, especially in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and the Sudan, particularly in terms of logistics and procurement. Nevertheless, other than in the case of Iraq due to its ‘in-conflict’ status, “non-post-crisis” projects have not been included in the review.

5.2 Overall portfolio

The evaluation disaggregated the post-crisis projects into two sub-categories, namely ‘post-conflict’ and ‘post-disaster’ projects. The results of this categorization are outlined in Table 2 below for all 25 crisis-affected countries over the period 2004-2012, covering:

- Total allotments (number and their amounts)21
- Number of post-crisis projects, in turn further divided into:
  - Number of post-conflict projects and their allotments
  - Number of post-disaster projects and their allotments

The list reflects countries in which crises have occurred over the period 2004-2012. For example, Egypt is included due to the political turmoil since 2011. However, there are no post crisis-specific UNIDO projects in the country.

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20 The selection criteria for this classification have been outlined under Section II (Methodology).
21 Allotment refers to the budget allocated to a project manager; one project can have several sub-allocations (allotments)
Table 2: UNIDO post-crisis portfolio for the period 2004-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total number of Allotments</th>
<th>Total allotments in crisis-affected countries (USD)</th>
<th>Number of post-crisis projects</th>
<th>Total post-conflict project allotments (USD)</th>
<th>No. of post-disaster project allotments (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>$4,231,695</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>$3,932,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>$17,906,107</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>$15,167,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. P. R. Korea</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>$7,423,703</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Rep. of Congo</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>$3,010,344</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$2,271,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>$11,740,550</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>$1,555,656</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>$8,164,251</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>$5,879,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$1,270,331</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>$12,551,003</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$2,489,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>$83,797,462</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>$83,670,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>$7,216,726</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$2,212,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>$11,818,261</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$7,487,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>$6,672,573</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$4,409,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$2,403,103</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$1,532,950</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>$10,322,302</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>$28,988,691</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$3,495,272</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$3,152,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>$10,087,309</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>$3,395,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$2,648,255</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$2,389,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>$9,456,682</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$1,846,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>$34,249,603</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>$27,826,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>$5,569,037</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>$5,005,827</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$2,647,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>$1,706,989</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>$292,824,682</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>$168,777,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average size of allotment</td>
<td></td>
<td>All projects</td>
<td>$613,888</td>
<td>Post-conflict project allotments (USD)</td>
<td>$1,638,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Post-disaster project allotments (USD)</td>
<td>$228,937</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from the table, Iraq and Sudan formed UNIDO’s largest post-crisis portfolios by a long way, together amounting to $111.5 million or 66% of all UNIDO post-crisis projects for the period. Moreover, it is to be noted that Iraq had the single biggest country programme for UNIDO globally for some years.

Furthermore, the figures show that the average size of a post-crisis allotment was close to 3 times higher than that for all projects in crisis-affected countries:
Average allotment size in crisis-affected countries: $613,888
Average allotment size for post-conflict projects: $1,638,618
Average allotment size for post-disaster projects: $228,937

The estimated average size of a UNIDO project over the same period gives a figure of $614,000, which is roughly one third of the average size of a post-conflict project.

5.3 Post-crisis projects as a share of total UNIDO technical cooperation

As illustrated in Figure 1 below, post-crisis country projects as a share of total technical cooperation (TC) peaked in 2007 and 2009, constituting respectively 33% and 38% of all UNIDO projects. As regards the subset of post-conflict projects, its share peaked in 2007 comprising no less than 26% of all UNIDO projects, closely followed in 2009 when the proportion of post-conflict projects reached 25% of the total. The average annual share of post-conflict projects for the period 2004-2014 was approximately 13%. The proportion of disaster related projects of all UNIDO projects remained low, i.e., close to 1% or less for the period 2004-2014.

Figure 1: Crisis-country, conflict and disaster allotments as a share of total TC 2004-2012
5.4 Total post-crisis allotments by region and country

In terms of the regional distribution of post-crisis allotments in the period under review, the largest concentration is in West Asia (in particular Iraq, Lebanon and Syria), constituting 36% of the total (Cf. Figure 2). There is a fairly even distribution of the UNIDO post-crisis project allotments over Africa and the rest of Asia (around 19-23%). There have been close to no post-crisis allotments in the Americas, save for a single post-disaster project in Haiti.

Figure 2: Total UNIDO post-crisis project allotments by region

As shown in Figure 3, Iraq and Sudan clearly have taken the lion’s share of post-crisis funding in UNIDO.

Figure 3: Post-crisis project allotments by country
5.5 Focus areas of projects in crisis-affected countries

In terms of focus area, as shown in Figure 4 below, 56% of all post-crisis country projects are related to agro-industry development, including vocational skills training in this field. Private sector development constitutes 17% of all such projects, followed by in particular trade capacity building (12%), investment promotion (9%) and environmental management (6%).

**Figure 4: Distribution of projects in crisis-affected countries by theme**

This is also clear from the sector/thematic distribution of post-crisis allocations over the period 2004-2012 presented in Figure 5.

**Figure 5: Total post-crisis allotments over 2004-2012**
5.6 Main donors of post-crisis interventions

Regarding the donors funding UNIDO’s post-crisis work, it is to be noted that the Japanese Human Security Trust Fund set up end 2010 with a total budget of $9.8 million has been strategic for UNIDO in terms of its catalytic role to support a total of seven crisis-affected African countries in the form of quick impact projects under the umbrella title “Response to humanitarian crisis in Africa”.

In terms of the size of funding, the UNDG Iraq Trust Fund constituted the largest donor of post-crisis UNIDO support, funding projects in six thematic areas: micro-enterprise support, agro-industry development, trade capacity building, private sector development, policy advice and the implementation of a Montreal Protocol programme. Figure 6 below gives the relative distribution of funding of UNIDO’s post-crisis work of the largest donors.

In general, UNIDO has a large portfolio of Montreal Protocol projects as well as GEF-funded ones in post-crisis countries. Quite surprisingly, Canada is the seventh largest post-crisis donor to UNIDO thanks to 3 projects in Sudan (with more funding expected in the pipeline), and also USAID has recently funded a UNIDO project in Tunisia. Neither country is a member state of UNIDO. As such, membership of UNIDO thus does not appear to be a deciding factor for a donor in the allocation of funding to the post-crisis work of the organization.

Figure 6: Main donors of UNIDO’s post-crisis work 2004-12
6. Meta-evaluation of selected projects and country programmes

6.1 Overview of projects and country programmes

This chapter provides an overview of the findings and lessons from:

- a set of 15 projects that were evaluated (9) and desk reviewed (6) as part of this thematic evaluation (cf. Table 3)
- a set of 6 existing programme or country evaluations in 4 crisis-affected countries: Indonesia, Iraq, Sierra Leone and Sudan (cf. Table 4). 22

Table 3: List of projects evaluated or reviewed as part of this thematic evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project Code &amp; funding source</th>
<th>Project Summary</th>
<th>Allotment</th>
<th>Thematic Evaluation Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>TF/AFG/11/001 Japan – (SB)</td>
<td>Social reintegration of vulnerable groups through skill development and income generation</td>
<td>$752,212</td>
<td>Desk review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>TF/ZAI/11/001 Japan – (SB)</td>
<td>National reconstruction for livelihoods recovery and peace building</td>
<td>$1,150,443</td>
<td>Independent evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>TF/ZAI/12/001 Japan – (SB)</td>
<td>Agro processing for livelihoods recovery, jobs diversification and peace building</td>
<td>$1,150,443</td>
<td>Self-evaluation &amp; desk review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>TF/GUI/12/003 Japan</td>
<td>Job training for youth in Guinea</td>
<td>$2,849,488</td>
<td>Desk review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>TF/INS/08/004; TF/INS/08/A04 UNTFHS</td>
<td>Peace-building and village-based economic development</td>
<td>$1,806,647</td>
<td>Independent evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>TF/KEN/11/001 Japan – (SB)</td>
<td>Crafting a green future – bamboo in the curio and souvenir industry of Kenya</td>
<td>$1,327,434</td>
<td>Independent evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>TE/LEB/10/002 (Italy MoFA)</td>
<td>Community Empowerment and Livelihoods Enhancement (CELEP)</td>
<td>€1,384,000</td>
<td>Independent evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>TF/LIR/11/001 Japan – (SB)</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of training centres in vulnerable communities in Liberia</td>
<td>$1,369,912</td>
<td>Independent evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>TF/SIL/11/002</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of training-cum-</td>
<td>$1,167,412</td>
<td>Independent evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22 Including Integrated Programme and Country Service Framework evaluation reports
Table 4: List of existing country or programmatic evaluation reports reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date of issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>CSF Indonesia</td>
<td>May 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Country evaluation report</td>
<td>Nov. 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>IP Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Oct. 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Enhancing the Capacity of Khartoum State in the Delivery of Pro-poor Vocational Training Services</td>
<td>Jan. 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>IP Sudan - Industrial agenda for poverty relief and transition to sustainable development</td>
<td>Sept. 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Community Livelihood and Rural Industry Support Programme</td>
<td>May 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The two tables above represent distinct categories that are combined in this thematic evaluation in order to provide a more balanced and useful analysis. Namely, Table 3 outlines the projects that were directly evaluated (9) or desk reviewed (6) as part of this thematic evaluation. The original list included a project in Eritrea, which is excluded here as it was not launched due to a Government instruction to suspend the extension of the UNDAF and of most UN agency operations beyond 2011.

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Letter of 26 January 2011 from Mr. Berhane Abrehe, Minister of Finance, to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, Mr. Mamadou Diallo
Most of the projects listed under Table 3 are quick impact, post-conflict projects that focused on vocational skills training mainly in agro-industry subsectors, with an emphasis on low skilled food processing or light manufacturing. The majority were stand-alone projects, planned to be implemented over a short timeframe (one year) and funded primarily through grants provided by the Government of Japan (GOJ) under a ‘humanitarian, post-crisis’ umbrella and through a supplementary budget allocated to UNIDO by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). Of these projects, 7 were independently evaluated, and 2 (follow-up projects) were self-evaluated. They are also largely similar to the 7 projects included under an earlier thematic post-crisis evaluation conducted over 2009-2010.

A second, smaller category of 5 projects included in Table 3 above includes stand-alone projects of longer duration including the Red Sea State (RSS) fisheries project funded by the Government of Canada; the peace-building and village-based economic development project in Indonesia funded by the UN Trust Fund for Human Security; the Community Empowerment and Livelihoods Enhancement project in Lebanon funded by Italy; and the Job Training for Youth project in Guinea funded by Japan.

The 6 country and programme evaluation reports listed under Table 4 are a range of interventions in 4 crisis affected countries (Indonesia; Iraq; Sierra Leone; and Sudan) and allow drawing on wider issues of pertinence to UNIDO’s post-crisis programming and lessons arising.

6.2 Programme/project design

The group of one-year quick impact projects (QIPs) funded by Japan were supply driven, designed and launched within 3 months after the launching of the initiative in December 2010 by UNIDO and the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Their design was similar across the 7 countries involved with a focus on institution building for vocational training centres, provision of equipment, including start-up tools for trainees and training of trainers.

Their logical frameworks were generally considered to be weak by the evaluations. Overall objectives and outcome indicators were at times absent or not quantifiable and a clear theory of change was not articulated in the project documents. Specifically, the role of the private sector in economic revitalization and development was not sufficiently incorporated into the logical frameworks, and in many cases was not mentioned in the specific outputs and activities of the project (Sierra Leone, Liberia and Kenya).

None of the QIPs considered measures for scaling up to the national level, as wider peace building considerations were absent from project design. In the case of the peace building project in Indonesia there was collaboration with ILO. The project in Guinea, by virtue of its earlier phases’ engagement within the UN framework and funding from the Peace building Fund, had a steady involvement
in the country dating back to 2005 when it started as a quick impact project for refugee zones funded by the UNTFHS. Despite several previous evaluation recommendations that projects should always include a risk analysis, few of the 15 projects examined had undertaken a specific conflict or risk assessment prior to the implementation of activities. Clear exceptions to this were Afghanistan and Iraq where security constraints were factored into project design. In Afghanistan, the deteriorating security situation was assessed as adversely affecting project operations, mainly in terms of recruitment and mobility of staff and project experts, as well as planning of project activities.

In practice, however, projects were broadly implementing activities in a conflict sensitive manner by focusing on equal beneficiary numbers across religion and geography (Indonesia) and ethnicity (Somalia). Furthermore, by targeting youth unemployment in conflict-affected areas, the projects in both Guinea and Sierra Leone were evaluated to be addressing a major security challenge faced by the country.

Projects were frequently based on previous in-country UNIDO experience and in some cases such as for example Kenya, Sudan (CLARIS) and Indonesia, the projects built on ongoing UNIDO cooperation. In all cases, direct project beneficiaries were selected in-country and local partners such as the government, training institutes, NGOs and community based organizations were involved in beneficiary selection.

Donor priorities and the expectation of quick delivery had an impact on project design. Due to the short duration of many of the projects, the collection and use of baseline data was not systematic. Project feasibility, needs and baseline assessments were undertaken in the case of some of the projects, but not all. For example, in Liberia the short duration of the project was considered the reason for no feasibility, needs or risk assessments having been undertaken. As regards the Sudan Red Sea State project, planning missions were undertaken by UNIDO as part of an inception mission after the actual commencement of the project.

Evaluations also consistently pointed to the need for market needs assessments prior to the commencement of activities, as efficiency, effectiveness and ultimately the impact of the projects were largely dependent on existing local demand for goods and services. Market needs assessments were undertaken sparingly by the projects, though the one year project in South Sudan undertook a particularly comprehensive market needs assessment. This was seen as a tool to enable the project to better focus its training budget on the appropriate type and number of products and services.

Of particular note, the UN Policy for post-conflict employment creation, income generation and reintegration (2009; cf. section III) is relevant to UNIDO’s livelihood programming, but was generally not considered (or even mentioned) in the formulation of projects or their evaluations. The exceptions were Indonesia (Maluku) and Sudan (the Youth Entrepreneurship Programme - YED) where projects partnered with the ILO.
In Iraq, project designs were rated positively on the whole, even though attention was drawn to lack of coherence and synergies in the country programme. In general, strong baseline assessments during the planning phase were a positive factor in the Iraqi portfolio. However, risk analyses with corresponding measures for mitigation were not adequately embedded in project design. The Micro-Industry Support Project (MISP) (vocational training) and PSD projects received the best project design ratings, while agro-industry projects related to the dairy and date sectors had weak initial assessments.

Government involvement in the initial design (and also implementation) was strong for the great majority of the projects in Iraq. Project design was influenced also by the requirements of the Iraq Trust Fund, which “supported recovery-oriented projects only, and imposed an 18 to 24 month implementation deadline”. Such short timeframes were assessed as “ambitious for the context”, and this was seen as a major cause of delays in both individual UNIDO projects and joint programmes with other agencies.

Integrated Programme (IP) formulation in Sierra Leone enjoyed a good level of government involvement, but this did not carry over into the implementation phase. Ownership of the UNIDO programme was hampered by a high turnover of staff and team leaders, and with too many project managers being involved in a small set of relatively minor projects. The programme, however, suffered in the main from a lack of funding.

The design of the Sudan Integrated Programme (IP) “was basically accorded with the main counterpart, the Ministry of Industry, and based on donor priorities and UNIDO supply capacities. Stakeholders like private sector associations, state and local Governments or final target groups (e.g. community based organizations) did not participate in the design of the IP”. The inclusion of a ‘social stabilization’ component brought the UNIDO IP closer to the actual post-crisis situation of the country as compared to earlier designs, and made it more compatible with donor priorities on aid for recovery. A thorough conflict analysis was however not included in the IP document and no mention was made of the guiding principles (“do no harm”, conflict sensitivity, etc.).

6.3 Relevance

UNIDO’s mandate relating to employment and income generation as well as industrial policy and private sector development are highly relevant to most crisis contexts, and this has been clearly validated by the meta-evaluation. Of the interventions selected, all counterpart organizations, direct beneficiaries, governments and UN partners stressed the relevance of the UNIDO activities. Relevance was enhanced by UNIDO building on previous projects (with the exception of the project in Somalia that was a new country intervention).

UN development strategies and frameworks were sufficiently broad for all the projects to fit into one or more UN pillars or strategic foci and in line with an identified need by UN strategies for skills training coupled with income generation
and government priorities for the development of vocational training, stabilization and peace building.

Taking the case of vocational training, there was a medium term perspective, as vocational training partners (both public and private) were provided with the means to continue training beyond the life of the projects. Such support was provided through training of trainers, the provision of equipment and rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, including the provision of renewable energy sources in cases such as Sierra Leone and Liberia.

The support to vocational training partners differed significantly in scale. In Kenya it covered the upgrading of the Kenya Forestry Research Institute (KEFRI) to provide bamboo research and training capacities throughout East Africa. In the Red Sea State of Sudan, the provision of landing sites for fisheries was the first intervention of its kind and elicited further international donor interest. In South Sudan and Somalia the infrastructure and equipment provision was relatively small in scale, and the focus was on Training of Trainers (ToT) for vulnerable beneficiaries.

The social stabilization component of the redesigned IP for Sudan was assessed as clearly relevant to UNIDO. Its two core approaches - (i) support to rural livelihoods through improved farming technologies (through the Community Livelihood and Rural Industry Support Programme/CLARIS) and (ii) stimulation of income generation through youth entrepreneurship (YED) -, were highly relevant to achieve the expected peace dividends envisaged in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Also target group relevance was good for CLARIS (with some exceptions) and for YED, which aimed at making vocational training centres more accessible and useful for unemployed youth and potential entrepreneurs.

The Indonesia report describes the UNIDO framework in the country and most of the projects implemented as broadly or highly relevant, but questions the relevance of 2 post-tsunami disaster projects: a) a post-disaster ICT project in Nias (as ICT focus was seen as unnecessary in a post-disaster context), and b) skills training and rehabilitation in Aceh (as the proposal was considered ‘unrealistic’ in the Flash Appeal context, though it was also described as ‘relevant to the needs of the affected communities and in line with the Government’s priorities’). The report’s more positive assessment of the post-conflict project in Maluku is also validated by the aforementioned independent evaluation of the project in the earlier part of this chapter.

The Iraq country evaluation report gives a positive assessment of the relevance of UNIDO’s work - pertaining to the Government, donors and beneficiaries - in a country that has been at war or low-level conflict for the entire period since 2003. This was assessed as being supported by “the consolidation of UN and Government planning frameworks [that] enabled UNIDO to focus its contribution”, particularly “between 2008 and 2011, as Donors and Iraqi counterparts focused on recovery-oriented priorities and began the shift to a development orientation”. However, the lack of a UNIDO country strategy left UNIDO with limited capacity
to adapt its Iraq portfolio to changing conditions after 2010: “The agency, therefore, had difficulty translating potential relevance into opportunity.”

In the case of Sierra Leone, relevance was hampered by lack of funding, and despite good programme alignment with government priorities and policies (particularly in promoting public-private dialogue, private sector development and a focus on production centres) as well as the UNDAF, some relevance issues were raised. Certain components such as food sector technology transfer (involving Njala University) and fisheries development are described as less relevant to the post-conflict context in the report. The report also draws attention to limited focus on the policy framework and business environment: “in a post-conflict situation with loss of institutional memory, statistical data were outdated and there was an absence of a national industrial strategy to guide the development of the sector”. Also the need for a capacity building needs assessment for UNIDO’s counterpart ministry in the post-conflict setting is highlighted.

The evaluation of UNIDO’s Integrated Programme (IP) in Sudan concluded that the CLARIS and youth entrepreneurship development (YED) projects of UNIDO were highly relevant for the achievement of peace dividends in the country under the programmatic umbrella of ‘social stabilization’. The relevance of the projects related to the multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) framework was questioned as the (required) split into ‘emergency’ and ‘recovery and development’ phases lead to project fragmentation, administrative inefficiencies and lower level of funding against original requests. Relevance to national poverty reduction goals was high, but relevance to UNIDO’s industrial development mandate was assessed as low.

The Sudan IP evaluation report appears to favour short-term low-level vocational training initiatives rather than a longer-term and system approach in this area, stating: “In the YED Khartoum project the short-term training approach has proven to be more effective than the formal vocational training centres (VTC) approach. This is not to say that YED projects should not include VTC components. But if the goal is to generate immediate peace dividends, the short term, community based training is definitely more promising.”

A similar approach is evident in the report’s assessment of industrial governance support to the Government of South Sudan: “UNIDO support to industrial governance in Southern Sudan was less relevant, due to the post-conflict environment in the area….”. 
6.4 Efficiency

With regard to efficiency, evaluation findings placed their analysis within the context of implementation in post-conflict environments. Security was a notable constraint in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and parts of Sudan, while poor infrastructure and limited capacities of national counterparts was a common theme faced by all projects.

Of the 15 projects included in Table 3, fifty per cent did not disburse their entire budget by the planned end date of the project and used remaining funds for a no-cost extension. No cost extensions were usually for 6 months but in some cases they were longer, as in the case of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Indonesia and two of the three projects evaluated in Sudan.

Evaluations indicated that these extensions were frequently being used not only to complete outstanding training (as with South Sudan and Afghanistan), but to anchor the project more firmly with national counterparts (Sudan and Somalia). This was assessed as the result of both unrealistic planning and the very short timeframes sometimes imposed by the donor. Inefficiencies were not assessed as resulting from in-country or headquarter staff, other than in the case of Sierra Leone.

Based on information obtained from beneficiaries and other project partners, evaluations assessed the quality of training and equipment provided for both beneficiaries and training centres to be high. However, equipment was often procured relatively late in the project. This had a negative reported effect on training schedules in 7 evaluations.

Another issue reported in evaluations was the difficulty some projects had in clearing equipment through local customs, though the cause of this varied across projects. In Kenya, for example, this was caused by non-registration of the project with the appropriate authority when the project was launched.

A common reported problem was that equipment could not be procured locally due to issues of poor quality and in some cases prices quotations that were higher than that for externally procured equipment. This potentially limited local economic development (LED).

Eight of the 15 independent project evaluations emphasized the importance of decentralized decision-making processes (including local partners), budget authority, and procurement procedures in the field for successful interventions in post-crisis situations. This was seen as a matter of efficiency and timely delivery when fast-track procedures were essential.

In Indonesia, CSF implementation was hampered by the impact of the tsunami disaster on the country. The conflict resolution related projects in Maluku were rated as efficient, however, while the post-disaster projects in Nias (hydropower and ICT) were assessed as modestly efficient. The Aceh skills development
project suffered from theft of equipment and mismanagement by the local project coordinator, and took 2 years instead of the planned 3 months to implement. Delay factors were also process related: “time and effort required for financial and administrative authorization and settlements of payments increased substantially from Vienna to Jakarta, and then from Jakarta to remote project sites in Nias, Aceh or Maluku. The remote control approach from the UNIDO HQ also incurred substantial transaction costs, which would be hard to justify for small projects.”

In Iraq, efficiency was highest among the vocational training (MISP) projects, while the agro-industry projects (e.g. dairy products) had most efficiency problems. Exogenous factors (war situation, complex inter-agency procedures, counterpart capacities etc.) were described as detrimental to the majority of the projects. However, “UNIDO’s institutional arrangements and systems were assessed as generally not ‘fit for purpose’ in Iraq”. They were found to be the most important cause of inefficiencies within the portfolio. Moreover, the lack of a basic cooperation agreement is reported as having contributed to long procurement and transportation delays, especially as UNIDO did not enjoy customs or tax exemptions.

Another efficiency dimension relates to the fact that “implementation of the Iraq portfolio relied mainly on national personnel, hired on a contract basis. UNIDO Iraqi personnel took constant security measures to ensure their safety, and had the agency’s full support in this regard. UNIDO had limited financial liability and did not incur significant security-related costs for their movement.”

In Sierra Leone, there were significant efficiency issues, largely related to the lack of funding, coupled with questionable decision making by UNIDO management, such as having three UNIDO project managers from 2 different divisions based in Vienna, managing three small projects in the country with no country based staff based.

In Sudan, poor road infrastructure and the UN’s security regulations were among factors that hampered efficiency, and which were insufficiently considered at the design stage. Similar to other reports, questions were raised regarding UNIDO’s centralized and slow management and procurement arrangements. The report also highlights the fact that the Sudan IP was the fourth biggest one of UNIDO globally, yet the UNIDO field office in Khartoum remained smaller than others offices with smaller programmes.

Looking at the portfolio from a wider perspective, Figure 7 below provides a comparative picture of the projects with most delays in the 25 crisis-affected countries by project focus area. Most projects show delays of around 40%-100% in most crisis contexts, with some outliers. Interestingly, Iraq shows relatively good efficiency performance on a comparative level, particularly with regard to PSD and investment promotion projects. Agro-industry projects tend to be less efficient in most contexts, with TCB and investment promotion projects in Palestine and Haiti having most efficiency related issues in the portfolio reviewed.
6.5 Effectiveness

UNIDO interventions were overall effective according to the findings of every independent evaluation. With the exception of the initial project in Somalia, which was a renewed entry for UNIDO after 22 years, all projects were based on prior UNIDO experience in the countries. Effectiveness of the short-term post-crisis projects was enhanced by basing projects on pre-existing national institutional relationships and experience of implementation. As indicated in the independent evaluation for the Kenya project, using pre-existing institutional relationships enhanced quick impact and longer term deliverables as well as sustainability.

With respect to restoring livelihoods, evaluation findings indicated that beneficiaries consistently expressed satisfaction with the training they received, though nearly all expressed a desire for further training either at a more advanced level or in complementary technical areas. In Indonesia and the DRC, for example, beneficiaries were already producing goods after the training, but wanted additional training to diversify production activities. Beneficiaries in, for example, Kenya, Indonesia and the Red Sea State of Sudan, referred to access to markets and the low prices paid for goods as ongoing constraints to improved income generation.

Regarding efforts to restore the capacities of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMES), evaluations consistently reported a clear improvement in productivity due to and the associated training equipment provided by the project. Similarly, cooperatives that were beneficiaries of UNIDO projects indicated improvements in terms of productivity, management and value-addition, particularly in rural areas.
From the independent evaluation of the IP for Sudan, approaches under YED and CLARIS using short-term, informal training were assessed to be effective, even though having a rather limited scale and without a clear long-term perspective for sustainability and wider impact. In the YED Khartoum project the short-term training approach was assessed to be more effective than the formal VTC approach. “If the goal was to generate immediate peace dividends”, the short-term, community based training was considered as a more promising approach.

The projects rehabilitated training institutions and supported business development services (mainly through training) and community level structures (mainly productive MSMEs and associations). Although most activities revolved around small scale industrial production, manufacturing or processing, national private sector organizations were rarely a project partner.

In Indonesia, the peace building projects in Maluku were effective and exceeded expected results with increased incomes for the beneficiaries, greater awareness of SME development among local leaders, and improvements in stability. The results of the post-disaster projects were not available at the time of the evaluation though the potential for impact was rated as high. The Aceh skills development project was assessed as relatively ineffective.

In Iraq, “most projects demonstrated concrete results of tangible benefit to the Government and Iraqi society”. The vocational training and private sector development components were rated as the most effective among all programmes. Material assistance to the rehabilitation of training facilities, the provision of training equipment, curriculum development and training of vocational instructors were generally assessed as being of good quality. A good number of beneficiaries found new opportunities and/or increased their incomes. Women beneficiaries showed the lowest performance, both in terms of finding job opportunities and increasing their incomes. Support to strengthening existing SMEs was an area of good performance within the portfolio, often exceeding output targets and contributing to economic diversification. In contrast, support to the formation of new SMEs and micro-enterprises was less successful. An important factor was lack of enabling support for business development, which was outside the scope of the MISP projects. The PSD portfolio had both a recovery and development orientation, and advanced the Government’s National Development Strategy priority of private sector growth, and UNIDO’s objective of enabling a transition from humanitarian assistance to long-term economic-development initiatives. The institutional change brought about as a result of these projects was found to “have a good probability of contributing to the growth of Iraq’s emerging private sector”.

The agro-industry projects received the lowest rating in the Iraq portfolio. The Food Safety project however showed good performance and met its output targets. The project was evaluated as contributing to improvements to Iraq’s food safety system, which was out of date and not functioning. However, the portfolio showed a consistent pattern of performance deficiencies, and project objectives were often only partially met and of limited use to Iraqi stakeholders. The seven
Montreal Protocol projects made limited progress towards their objectives, hampered by procurement and customs complexities. The evaluation of the CLARIS project in Sudan informs that project was implemented between 2004 and 2007 with a total amount of 1,221,608 USD in 40 villages of South Kordofan State after the conclusion of the peace agreement. The project supported the establishment of Community Development Committees (CDCs), the dissemination of oxen driven cultivation technology (nuba hoes), and led to CLARIS II, which replicated the same approach in some other areas of the country with income generating potential, despite lower relevance of the nuba hoe to their soil conditions.

The YED project results in Sudan were more mixed with greater success in the provision of informal training and local capacity building in marginalized communities as against meeting targets set within the formal training system, which did not enjoy adequate government funding commitment and suffered from poor infrastructure.

6.6 Impact

Independent evaluations did consider the immediate or short term impact, particularly on income and these were reported as positive. Budgets were not available for longer term impact assessments with the exception of those projects that were included in later country evaluations for Iraq and Sudan.

Overall, the impact of restoring and upgrading livelihood and productive capacities of individuals and communities was evaluated as high. At the local community level and for relatively small numbers of beneficiaries this impact was evident in the increase of incomes for new or existing small scale productive activities. Incomes were reported as increasing by about 50 per cent. In Indonesia, for example, it was reported that additional incomes were being reinvested in education.

With regard to support to MSMEs, project outputs resulted in a wide range of small businesses ranging from primary agricultural production to small scale agro processing, private sector trading, and service provision. Beneficiaries had often grouped together to form associations or cooperatives with the support of the UNIDO project. However, the need for further financial inputs, diversified training and additional equipment provision were commonly highlighted by beneficiaries.

Despite the relatively short duration of many of the projects, the impact of rehabilitation and strengthening of institutions and structures supporting economic revitalization and development can be evaluated as high (at least in the short term). This was being done through the provision of equipment to nationally recognize training centres and the up scaling of their training capacities through Training of Trainers (ToT). In many cases projects were also supporting the development of new facilities. Best case examples include the construction of landing sites in the Red Sea sate which was being considered nationally as a best practice for future national fisheries development and the support provided.
to KEFRI in Kenya, which had created a “centre of excellence” for sustainable forestry resource management in East Africa.

The extent to which projects had a broader positive or negative impact (e.g., through local market distortions) was not considered in the evaluations and would be difficult to evaluate without a separate ex-post impact evaluation.

Given the small size of the projects, the speed in which they were formulated, limited coverage (both geographically and in terms of target population covered) and limited scaling up, it is unlikely that the post-conflict projects have had any discernible impact on peace building in the countries covered.

6.7 Sustainability

There was a lack of sustainability analysis in the UNIDO projects. The final evaluation of the multi-agency “Opportunities for youth employment in South Sudan” recommended “A rigorous sustainability analysis is needed at the time of formulation of a project or a programme. Such an analysis which is to be followed up by development of a sustainability strategy will assist in incorporating the elements of sustainability, right at the design stage of a project.”

When independently evaluated, sustainability of project outcomes differed between the individual who received training and toolkits, the organization/institute which received upgrading in equipment and international ToT, and the contribution to the government’s priorities of stability, peace building and economic development (considered separately below).

For the individual beneficiary, sustainability was consistently evaluated as likely. This was the result of complementary technical and non-technical training and the provision of toolkits. Beneficiaries were reporting they were economically empowered (especially women) and were more aware of both the potential value of products and the importance of quality (e.g. Kenya, Sudan and South Sudan, Indonesia, Somalia and Sierra Leone). Beneficiaries overwhelmingly reported they were earning more income and could continue to do so as they had been trained with new or enhanced technical skills.

Regarding sustainability, an issue facing the beneficiaries in multiple projects was the continued lack of access to finance. This was specifically outlined by beneficiaries as an issue of access to microfinance institutions in the projects in Kenya, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Lebanon, Liberia, and in Sudan. Similarly the creation of business plans to ensure sustainability of VTC training was highlighted as a priority in 5 of the evaluations.

For the facilities that received rehabilitation and upgrading support, sustainability remains highly determined by ‘external’ factors such as government or private sector budgets. Evaluations recommended the development of business plans for vocational training centres (Kenya, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Guinea), which were especially needed due to the lack of available public sector financing. In some
cases sustainability seemed however ensured by national partners. For example, the authorities in the Red Sea State of Sudan and Indonesia were already contributing to sustaining projects outcomes.

The Maluku projects in Indonesia are assessed as likely to be sustainable, while the Nias post-disaster projects' sustainability remained contingent on local ownership and funding commitments. The Aceh skills development project is unlikely to be sustainable, as it lacked linkages with local initiatives and existing services. Overall in the portfolio, “no project adequately focused on sustainability, either at design or during implementation phase”. The evaluation did not cover impact, but discussed potential impact, particularly for the Maluku livelihoods project and the small hydropower in Nias, both of which would require local funding and commitment for the intended impact to materialize.

In the case of Iraq, sustainability was rated relatively highly for 9 out of 14 projects assessed, though the portfolio as a whole (or the role of UNIDO in Iraq) was not sustained beyond life of the UNDG Trust Fund for Iraq, which ended in 2010. UNIDO’s sustainability in Iraq is related to both UNIDO’s presence in the country and the quality of its programmes, which were largely rated positive in this regard. The report attests to a sustainable improvement in vocational training institutional capacity. On the other hand, support to production groups established in the country and to potentially new SMEs to be established was deemed to be less sustainable.

The growth centres in Sierra Leone were largely assessed as having an uncertain sustainability potential. Infrastructure deficiencies, lack of proficient staff, remoteness of the centres, and local land ownership challenges were among the reasons given for a lack of certainty in terms of commercial viability for the centres. These concerns were validated by the Sierra Leone and Liberia project evaluations reviewed earlier in the chapter.

In Sudan, the CLARIS II project’s sustainability prospects were assessed as low. However, impact of the nuba hoe was high with a 450% increase in agricultural production for beneficiaries. A significant reduction of chronically food insecure households was however assessed as being ‘rather unlikely’. CLARIS led to a host of other projects, including the fisheries project in the Red Sea State of Sudan, covered in the earlier part of this chapter.

Concerning the youth entrepreneurship (YED) component, a high level of government ownership contributed to chances for sustainability. The project displayed a short-term approach that was commended by the report for its ‘peace dividend’. However, a major risk to sustainability in the Sudan context was identified as a lack - or inadequacy - of counterpart resources to continue to build on UNIDO interventions.

Among the lessons listed for CLARIS, the report states: “Working in the scope of emergency requires a flexible organizational set-up, which might be difficult to ensure by UNIDO within its mandate and its existing management rules"
6.8 Gender

With the exception of the fisheries project in the Red Sea State of Sudan, projects did not include a specific gender analysis. There was however involvement of women beneficiaries in all 15 projects evaluated, specifically in agricultural food processing, tailoring and handicrafts. Women were also included in multiple non-technical trainings such as entrepreneurship, accessing microcredit and marketing. As can be noted from Table 5 covering 9 projects, close to 50% of all beneficiary trainees were females.

With regards to training interventions, evaluation of all the post crisis projects indicated training was often focused on traditionally urban or semi-urban male dominated trades such as construction, wood and metal working, carpentry and masonry. Some women, however, participated in non-traditional activities such as auto mechanics in both South Sudan and Sierra Leone, but these were few in number. The projects in Afghanistan and the DRC trained more females than males by focusing on home-based food processing and traditional handicraft and embroidery. In Indonesia, on the other hand, it was a shift away from some agro-processing training that was evaluated as the reason why only about 35 per cent of the trainees were women. Additionally there were local constraints to the training and employment of women in many of the countries, notably in Sudan, Somalia and in some parts of Indonesia and Iraq.

In Iraq, UNIDO’s performance on gender was ‘mixed’. The MISP projects and TARGET were the only projects with specific gender targets, ranging between 30 and 50 per cent of beneficiaries. These projects tended to either meet or exceed their activity targets related to gender, and resulted in some improvement in terms of both income and livelihood opportunities. Other programme streams either did not have clearly developed gender objectives or activities, or did not allocate resources against those objectives. Gender considerations, therefore, were not mainstreamed into the portfolio beyond the MISP projects.
### Table 5: Number of training beneficiaries by country and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Project</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
<th>% female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan: TF/AFG/11/001</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC: TF/ZAI/11/001, TF/ZAI/12/001</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>1286</td>
<td>1530</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia: TF/INS/08/004</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1073</td>
<td>3041</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon: TE/LEB/10/002</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia: TF/SOM/11/001, TF/SOM/12/001</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>1144</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan: TF/SUD/12/001</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan: TF/SUD/09/002</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>1351</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>4828</strong></td>
<td><strong>4206</strong></td>
<td><strong>9034</strong></td>
<td><strong>47%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Independent project evaluations*

In **Sierra Leone**, youth and women were singled out as particularly vulnerable groups to be prioritized. As much as 52 per cent of the farmers targeted were women and the programme was thus successful in developing activities that specifically targeted women. The report, however, does not cover gender issues, data or targets. Similarly, the **Sudan** report does not discuss gender issues to any extent, and provides no gender disaggregated data. UNIDO’s experience in Indonesia, Somalia and Sudan points to the need for the inclusion of women at the point at which vocational training courses are selected.

There appears to be a strong demand for training by women in post-crisis settings. Several of the reports highlighted the need for close collaboration with the central authorities responsible for gender equality issues (such as Ministries of Women) at the project design stage.

### 6.9 Environment

Environmental issues were scantly addressed in various reports. However, a number of projects directly contributed to establishing renewable energy sources for productive use (Liberia and Sierra Leone growth centres). None of the post-conflict projects covered by the evaluation reports reviewed addressed issues related to environmental damage caused by conflict that could require industry-related interventions.
7. Conclusions and recommendations

7.1 Conclusions

The current evaluation sought to answer the question how UNIDO has performed its role in post-crisis settings and to what extent the organization is attuned to working in post-conflict settings.

The evaluation findings lead to the following conclusions:

1. The post-crisis role of UNIDO is not clearly defined and the organization has performed its industrial rehabilitation role in post-crisis settings in an ad hoc manner and often without a clear strategy guiding the interventions.

2. Its interventions in post-conflict contexts are dual in character, covering

   a. on the one hand support that follows a micro 'human security' approach, bringing immediate and highly welcome relief to a limited number of target beneficiaries, but (in the absence of scaling up) with little impact on the rehabilitation or peace building needs of a war-torn country that has lost much of its institutional capacity and infrastructure;

   b. on the other hand, larger type of interventions (programmes) in post-conflict countries with policy level inputs and strong engagement with wider UN system efforts including pooled funding mechanisms.

3. Fundraising has been facilitated by active participation in UN Country Teams in post-conflict countries.

4. The organization has shown that it is capable of performing a larger role in post-crisis settings with demonstrated effectiveness and adequate efficiency, when led and supported by a strong team in the field.

7.2 Recommendations

1. Given the rather ad hoc nature of UNIDO’s engagement in crisis-related work with its concomitant risks and opportunities, UNIDO senior management should make a clear decision on the organization’s commitment to providing support in post-crisis situations. In this regard the organization should have a strategy for its post-crisis work and related guidelines.
2. UNIDO should enhance its post-crisis policy role through the provision of advice on sustainable and inclusive industrial rehabilitation options for countries emerging from armed conflicts and disasters.

3. In keeping with the organization’s sustainable and inclusive industrial development mandate, UNIDO’s livelihoods projects in post-crisis settings should have a wider scope beyond community level ‘human security’ work, and should aim to upscale such small scale livelihoods projects to the provincial or national level through collaboration with central vocational training institutes and decision makers in industrial policy and private sector development as well as financial institutions.

4. Conflict sensitivity analysis; do no harm principles, results orientation (quality Log Frames) and market assessments should become mainstreamed in UNIDO’s post-crisis project formulation.

5. UNIDO should develop flexible and speedy procedures for procurement in post-crisis contexts with an emphasis on local procurement where feasible.

6. The design of projects with a short duration and limited budget should be improved in order to ensure that outcomes and outputs are achievable within the given project duration and budget. The possibility to link up with Government interventions and/or other UNIDO projects or activities of the private sector should be explored, for increased efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.

7. UNIDO should leverage its unique private sector development mandate and its network of private sector partners in post-crisis settings.
For UNIDO to succeed in complex post-conflict environments, it is important for the UNIDO field office to play an active role in the UN country team.

UNIDO can build bridges between rehabilitation and development activities through a combination of quick interventions and longer-term support. To illustrate, in the case of vocational training this implies short-term training and related income generation activities together with medium- and long-term capacity building of vocational training centres (VTCs) and system wide efforts (upgrading of the vocational training system at the country level).

Funding opportunities will be lost if the approach is to ‘wait for the reconstruction phase to intervene’. Interventions in post-conflict situations need faster and simpler modalities, with more decentralization to the field offices combined with adequate oversight.

Projects that involve women when deciding on the focus of training courses—particularly in the field of food processing and handicraft— are more likely to attract female trainees.
Annex A: Terms of Reference

Thematic Evaluation of UNIDO’s Post-Crisis Interventions

Period covered: 2004-2012

Abbreviated version

I. Introduction, approach & methodology

i. Objectives

This document outlines the rationale and approach as well as the methodology for a formative thematic evaluation of UNIDO’s post-crisis interventions, and builds on a similar exercise carried out by UNIDO’s Office for Independent Evaluation (EVA) in 2009.

According to the Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, a “thematic evaluation” is an evaluation of a selection of development interventions, all of which address a specific development priority that cuts across countries, regions, and sectors.24

To help inform the future direction of UNIDO post-crisis interventions, the overall objective of this thematic evaluation is to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency of implementation, development impact and long-term sustainability of UNIDO interventions in post-crisis setting taking into account:

- The special contexts, needs and priorities of post-crisis interventions;
- Experience from past and ongoing UNIDO interventions in post-crisis contexts;
- Relevant strategic and policy guidance documents from UNIDO;
- The global architecture of post crisis-related aid within which UNIDO operates; and
- Experience and good practices from other development agencies and NGOs.

The above evaluation criteria will also be applied to cross-cutting themes of UNIDO such as gender, South-South Cooperation and environmental sustainability.

ii. Evaluation background, mandate and scope

In year 2010, UNIDO and the Japanese Foreign Ministry launched an initiative with a total budget of $9.8 million through the Supplementary Fund of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to support a number of African countries in their recovery efforts from crises. A Note Verbale was issued on 2 December 2010 to this effect and included the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somali and Sudan. An agreement was reached for UNIDO to design and implement a series of quick impact projects with duration of around one year under the umbrella title of “Response to humanitarian crisis in Africa”.

The evaluation was mandated as part of UNIDO’s accountability and learning process by the decision of the Programme Approval and Monitoring Committee (AMC) meeting on 15 December 2010, and approved by the UNIDO Executive Board. The AMC decision stated:

“In view of synergies and the potential for organizational learning, the five post-conflict interventions in Sudan, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia and Democratic Republic of Congo should be subject to a combined evaluation; the modality of this evaluation and the necessary funding should be discussed between PTC/AGR/AIT and ODG/EVA. The same should be considered for the projects in Liberia and Sierra Leone as these two are very similar in concept and approach.”

On 20 February 2012, a second Note Verbale was issued by Government of Japan with an allocation of around $7.3 million from the Supplementary Fund, this time under the overall title of “Vocational Training in Africa”. The list of countries included was identical with the earlier list, save for Eritrea that was excluded due to the situation in the country, and with South Sudan replacing Sudan in the list. These projects are therefore also included in the scope of this thematic evaluation due to their similar characteristics.

Added to this list (and to the evaluation) are some other standalone UNIDO projects that fit within the post-crisis category and are due for evaluation (e.g. in Indonesia and Sudan) per UNIDO rules, or are of particular relevance to the thematic evaluation. These are covered by full-fledged project evaluations, self-evaluations or desk reviews, depending on their size and evaluation requirement.

Also of relevance to this thematic evaluation are:

a) A similar post-crisis evaluation conducted by ODG/EVA in 2009, and
b) All UNIDO project evaluations conducted since 2009 in post-crisis contexts such as Iraq and the Manu River Union sub-region and including the country evaluation of Iraq.

The criterion for selection of relevant projects and regions is driven by country relevance (as post-crisis contexts) and not simply by project descriptions. Thus, some of the existing reports are included because they relate to projects and programmes implemented in post-crisis contexts rather than being crisis-specific projects in themselves.

Basic information about the projects and relevant reports serving as inputs to the evaluation is provided in Tables 1 & 2 below.

The thematic evaluation was included in the EVA work programme for 2012-13. The exercise was launched in 2012 with a series of stand-alone project evaluations funded by the projects. Following the approval of the Executive Board an additional €30,000 was allocated for the thematic/synthesis work in 2013.

Table 1 below contains the initial list of project evaluations and desk reviews included under the thematic evaluation. Table 2 outlines existing evaluation reports that will be covered by the thematic evaluation.

25 See Annex A - 2 for copies of both Notes Verbales
Table 1: Initial list of project evaluations and desk reviews to be conducted as part of the thematic evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project Code</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Allotment</th>
<th>Expected end of project</th>
<th>Project manager</th>
<th>Evaluation type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Afghans.</td>
<td>TF/AFG/11/001</td>
<td>Social reintegration of vulnerable groups in flood-affected areas in Nangarhar through skill development and income generation</td>
<td>$752,212</td>
<td>25.06.2012</td>
<td>Namal Samarakoon</td>
<td>Desk review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dem. Republic of Congo</td>
<td>TF/ZAI/11/001</td>
<td>Bringing support to the national reconstruction programme of DRC for livelihoods recovery and peace building</td>
<td>$1,150,443</td>
<td>31.08.2012</td>
<td>Chakib Jenane</td>
<td>Independent evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>TF/ZAI/12/001</td>
<td>Developing the agro processing sector for livelihoods recovery, jobs diversification and peace building</td>
<td>$1,150,443</td>
<td>31.9.13</td>
<td>Chakib Jenane</td>
<td>Self-evaluation &amp; desk review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>TF/ERI/11/001</td>
<td>Community livelihoods and micro-industry support project for communities affected by natural disasters in the northern Red Sea region</td>
<td>$877,754</td>
<td>Not implemented</td>
<td>Namal Samarakoon</td>
<td>Desk review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>TF/GUI/12/003</td>
<td>Supporting job training for youth in Guinea</td>
<td>$2,849,488</td>
<td>30.04.2014</td>
<td>Gabriel Ott</td>
<td>Desk review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>TF/INS/08/004; TF/INS/08/A04</td>
<td>Realizing minimum living standards for disadvantaged communities through peace-building and village-based economic development</td>
<td>$1,806,647</td>
<td>Dec 2012</td>
<td>Noriko Takahashi</td>
<td>Independent evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>TF/KEN/11/001</td>
<td>Crafting a green future – bamboo in the curio and souvenir industry of Kenya</td>
<td>$1,327,434</td>
<td>31.03.2012</td>
<td>Frank Hartwich</td>
<td>Independent evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>TE/LEB/10/002</td>
<td>Community Empowerment and Livelihoods Enhancement (CELEP)</td>
<td>€1,384,000</td>
<td>20.12. 2012</td>
<td>Chakib Jenane</td>
<td>Independent evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>TF/LIR/11/001</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of training centres in vulnerable communities in Liberia</td>
<td>$1,369,912</td>
<td>31.10. 2012</td>
<td>Sei Hisakawa</td>
<td>Independent evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>TF/SIL/11/002</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of training-cum-production centres in vulnerable communities of Koindu, Kpandebu and</td>
<td>$1,167,412</td>
<td>30.08.2012</td>
<td>Sei Hisakawa</td>
<td>Independent evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Project Code</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Allotment</td>
<td>Expected end of project</td>
<td>Project manager</td>
<td>Evaluation type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>TF/SOM/11/001</td>
<td>Integration and progress through skill and employment for displaced groups in Somalia</td>
<td>$1,061,947</td>
<td>30.06.2012</td>
<td>Ivan Kral</td>
<td>Independent evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>TF/SOM/12/001</td>
<td>Supporting economic revitalization through income generation and employment creation in Somaliland (SERIES)</td>
<td>$1,327,434</td>
<td>30.09.2013</td>
<td>Ivan Kral</td>
<td>Self-evaluation &amp; desk review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>TF/SUD/12/001</td>
<td>Integration and progress through protection and empowerment of displaced groups in Southern Sudan</td>
<td>$1,327,434</td>
<td>30/9/2013</td>
<td>Virpi Stucki</td>
<td>Independent evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>TF/SUD/11/001</td>
<td>CLARIS – Skills for peace and income</td>
<td>$707,965</td>
<td>29.02.2012</td>
<td>Aurelia Calabro</td>
<td>Onsite project review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>TF/SUD/09/002</td>
<td>Recovery of coastal livelihoods in the red sea state of Sudan through the modernization of artisanal fisheries and creation of new market opportunities</td>
<td>$4,990,978</td>
<td>31/12/2013</td>
<td>Dejene Tezera</td>
<td>Independent evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>FM/SUD/08/007</td>
<td>Creating opportunities for youth employment in Sudan</td>
<td>$1,312,765</td>
<td>Unclear, but closed already according to PM.</td>
<td>Inez Wijngaarde</td>
<td>Desk review</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2: List of existing evaluation reports to be used by the thematic evaluation (web links included)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Project code</th>
<th>Date of issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>IP Burkina Faso, phase II</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>Trade capacity building in agro-industry products for the establishment and proof of compliance with international market requirements in the East African Community (EAC)</td>
<td>TE/RAF/06/014</td>
<td>Feb 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>CSF Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of the date palm sector in Iraq</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/07/A03</td>
<td>Feb 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Enterprise Development and Investment Promotion (EDIP)</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/07/004</td>
<td>Feb 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support for job creation and self-employment through promotion of micro industries in Ninewa Governorate of Iraq (MISP IV)</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/07/005</td>
<td>Aug 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>Job creation through cottage and micro-industries promotion in Al-Qadessiya (MISP III)</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/07/001</td>
<td>Aug 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>Independent evaluation. Pilot project for the rehabilitation of the dairy sector in Iraq</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/04/003</td>
<td>Dec 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>Community Livelihoods and Micro-Industry Support Project in Rural and Urban Areas of Northern IRAQ (MISP II)</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/06/002</td>
<td>May 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>Country evaluation report</td>
<td></td>
<td>March 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Strategic Research Project COMPID. Combating Marginalization and Poverty through Industrial Development (COMPID)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNIDO's contribution to One UN mechanisms</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNIDO post-crisis projects</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sept. 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNIDO Agri-business/Agro-industry Development Interventions</td>
<td></td>
<td>July 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNIDO Projects in the area of Standards, Metrology, Testing and Quality (SMTQ)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sept 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>What has UNIDO done to reduce poverty – Evidence from UNIDO evaluations 2008 and 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex A: Terms of Reference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Project code</th>
<th>Date of issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Increase Access to Export Markets for Lebanese Products and Improvement of its Quality Infrastructure to increase TBT/SPS Compliance (MACLE)</td>
<td>US/LEB/06/002</td>
<td>May 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support for livelihoods and economic recovery in war-affected areas of Lebanon. Lebanese Agro-Industry Support and Economic Recovery (LAISER)</td>
<td>FB/LEB/07/001</td>
<td>Jan 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>IP Palestine</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td>Revised technology transfer for recycling of building material waste, Gaza. Support to the marble and stone industry in the West Bank</td>
<td>TF/PAL/05/001 and TE/PAL/05/001</td>
<td>Mar 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Country evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sept 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>IP Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Support for the Sustainable livelihood recovery among the conflict-affected population in the North and East regions through improved agricultural productivity and community-based entrepreneurship</td>
<td>TF/SRL/06/005</td>
<td>April 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td>Impact of UNIDO SMTQ projects in Sri Lanka</td>
<td>XP/SRL/99/049</td>
<td>June 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Enhancing the Capacity of Khartoum State in the Delivery of Pro-poor Vocational Training Services</td>
<td>EE/SUD/07/004</td>
<td>Jan 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td>IP Sudan - Industrial agenda for poverty relief and transition to sustainable development</td>
<td>TF/SUD/03/001, TE/SUD/07/005 and FB/SUD/07/006</td>
<td>Sept 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td>Community Livelihood and Rural Industry Support Programme</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### I. UNIDO’s post-crisis approach

Opinion is divided on the nature of the potential role – if any – of UNIDO in crisis and post-crisis contexts. Following deliberations in the December 2003 General Conference (GC.10/Res.626), which mandated UNIDO to increase its support to countries emerging from crisis situations, the agency’s (post) crisis-situation portfolio has increased in recent

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UNIDO’s corporate approach to post-crisis situations is given in the Strategic Long-Term Vision Statement of May 2005:

“The mix of competencies and services available in UNIDO will be used to address special problems of the societies emerging from crisis situations resulting from natural or man-made disasters. Human security is a vital element in these situations and this will guide the Organization’s activities in this area. Basically, in the phase of rehabilitation and reconstruction, UNIDO will provide services for enterprise rehabilitation in key industrial areas, promoting income-generating activities for specific groups of affected people, supporting institutional capacity-building and contributing to the rehabilitation of industrial infrastructure.”

The same document describes “Emphasis on the human security concept through activities for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of industrial infrastructure in post-crisis societies” under ‘cross-cutting approaches’, and as part of UNIDO’s ‘areas of focus’.

II. Key evaluation questions arising

The core question that this evaluation exercise seeks to answer is:

*How has UNIDO performed its role in post-crisis settings and to what extent is the organization attuned to working in post-conflict settings?*

From the above considerations, the following key questions arise:

1. **UNIDO’s post-crisis management structures, policies and programmes**

   - What are the strengths and weaknesses of UNIDO’s current ‘Human Security’ approach in post-crisis contexts?
   - Is UNIDO’s Human Security approach clear and understood among project managers and higher levels of management?
   - The extent to which UNIDO has a clear strategy and guidance documents for its work in post-crisis contexts.
   - To what extent has UNIDO’s ‘Human Security’ approach in post-crisis settings is reflected in project implementation practice.
   - Is UNIDO’s emphasis on ‘rural agribusiness development’ in post-crisis settings relevant to the needs of affected countries and/or target populations?
   - What other services of UNIDO have potential for impact in post-crisis settings?
   - The extent to which UNIDO’s project approval and procurement processes are relevant, efficient and effective in response to post-crisis exigencies.
   - To what extent have the recommendations of the 2009 post-crisis report (such as ‘do no harm’, fund-pooling mechanisms and greater decentralization of decision-making to the field) been accepted and implemented?

ii. **The global relief-to-development architecture of aid and UNIDO’s place**

- Is UNIDO a relevant partner in the relief-to-development continuum in post-crisis settings?
- How do the specialized agencies of the UN such as UNIDO (or ILO) fit into the global post-crisis rehabilitation aid architecture\(^ {28} \)?
  - Is there a clearly definable role for such agencies?
  - Can they be a part of the solution to identified gaps? If so, how?
- Are there any identifiable trends in private sector contributions and engagement in post-crisis relief to development operations of the UN/UNIDO?
- In terms of enhancing their global engagement in post-crisis settings, are there any examples of success stories among specialised agencies in post-crisis settings (e.g. ILO or HABITAT), and what lessons can be derived from them for UNIDO?
- Are there any cross-cutting trends or lessons of relevance to UNIDO emerging from the latest analyses on the gender, environmental and South-South aspects of post-crisis development cooperation?

iii. **Portfolio and Project level issues**

**Project identification and formulation**

- The extent to which a participatory project identification process including all main stakeholder groups was instrumental in selecting problem areas and counterparts requiring technical cooperation support.
- The extent to which lessons from UNIDO’s earlier thematic and project evaluations in crisis-contexts were taken on board in the formulation process including lessons and recommendations given in past evaluation reports;
- The extent to which factors of vulnerability and resilience were taken into account in the formulation process
- Clarity and realism of the project’s broader and immediate objectives, including specification of baselines and targets, identification of beneficiaries, and prospects for sustainability in a crisis context
- Appropriateness of the value chain segments (if any) selected, and their relevance to enhancing resilience (at micro, meso or macro levels)
- The appropriateness of the project’s criteria for the selection of beneficiaries and trainees for achieving stated post-crisis aims
- Did the project formulation process benefit from any specific guidelines or templates for post-crisis settings? If so, how relevant were these for the planned results?
- Did the post-crisis project design include ‘do no harm’ and ‘conflict assessment’ considerations?
- Did the project design focus on direct assistance to beneficiaries or intervening at the meso level through enhancing and building on existing capacities or establishing new ones?

\(^ {28} \) For example as described in *UN Policy for Post-conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration* approved in June 2009.
• To what extend is cooperation with the private sector included in the project design, including in skills training (ToT) and strengthening business development services (BDS) as well as mentoring and marketing?
• To what extent if any were standardized formats used for post-crisis projects in different contexts?
  o To what extent did such standard projects fit the needs and priorities of the local context?

Project relevance
• Relevance of the project design to the country’s crisis-to-development transition priorities, strategies, programmes and needs
• Relevance of the project design to
  o the beneficiaries’ needs
  o UNIDO’s mandate and competencies
  o Donors strategies and priorities

Project ownership
• Was the project design based on a needs assessment?
• Is the local ownership of the project ensured at the level of counterparts and/or beneficiaries?
• Were local counterparts and stakeholders involved in project decision-making and implementation?
• To what extent were cases of standardized project formats shared with and approved by local counterparts?

Project coordination and management
• Was an assessment of crisis context-specific measures conducted and put in place by UNIDO and the project managers;
• The extent to which changes in planning documents during implementation have been approved and documented;
• Was coordination envisaged with any other internal or external development cooperation programme in the country, and was this realized and benefits achieved?
• The effect of and lessons from the institutional set-up on the project’s performance in a crisis context.

Efficiency of Implementation
• The extent to which the quantity and quality of UNIDO inputs and services (expertise, training, methodologies, etc.) was as planned and led to the production of outputs.
• Assessment of whether the project approach represented the best use of given resources for achieving the planned objectives in a post-crisis context.
• Assessment of the efficiency of UNIDO’s project implementation and management arrangements in post-crisis settings, with special focus on HR, finance and procurement.
• In cases where standardized project templates were evident – if any – how efficient was the use of such templates?
• Assessment of the transaction costs caused by MOSS compliance and other security-related costs exacted on project resources.
Effectiveness and Project Results

- The extent to which Outputs were produced and how the target beneficiaries use the outputs;
- The extent to which Outcomes are achieved or are likely to be realized through utilization of outputs.
- The extent to which local (community, enterprise or institutional) resilience and recovery in targeted regions (assessed against the project’s stated results) were enhanced.

Cross-cutting themes

Gender

- If the project/programme promotes gender equality and/or women’s empowerment, was gender equality reflected in its objective/s?
- Did project monitoring and self-evaluation collect and analyze gender disaggregated data? Were decisions and recommendations based on the analyses? If so, how?
- Were gender concerns reflected in the criteria to select beneficiaries? If so, how?
- Have women and men benefited equally from the project’s interventions? Do the results affect women and men differently? If so, why and how? How are the results likely to affect gender relations (e.g., division of labour, decision making authority)?
- Are the any discernable gender-related trends and lessons from UNIDO’s post-crisis interventions?

Prospects for achieving the expected impact and sustainability

- Is the project likely to have the intended impact?
- Was ‘peace-building’ supported and likely to be helped by projects that included this aim, and how?
- Is the project likely to contribute toward greater resilience to crises at the enterprise, community or wider institutional levels?
- Particular attention will be paid to the financial viability of established institutions or services and the existence or development of medium term business plans for beneficiaries (e.g. VTCs or enterprises).
- Which long term developmental changes (economic, environmental, social) have occurred or are likely to occur as a result of the intervention and are these sustainable.
- Was the project replicated/had a multiplying effect.
- Was any sustainability strategy formulated?
- What is the prospect for technical, organizational and financial sustainability?

iv. Evaluation methodology

The thematic evaluation will in the first instance rely on a set of individual post-crisis project evaluations as mandated by the AMC. The project evaluations were conducted over 2012 and 2013 as standard project evaluations, but with specific thematic questions included. The first few of these project evaluations were used as guides that informed the formation of this TOR.

In parallel, a meta evaluation will be conducted to extract related findings, recommendations and lessons from all the above project evaluations and desk reviews (per Table 1 above). Moreover, existing reports listed in Table 2 above will be duly
analyzed. In addition, a set of strategic documents and guidance documents as well as key relevant international evaluation reports pertaining to post-crisis operations and the relief-to-development continuum will be reviewed.

Findings will be triangulated against all previous post-crisis evaluation findings and recommendations along standard UNIDO evaluation criteria.

In addition, interview guidelines will be developed for various categories of respondents and interviews and a survey will be conducted among relevant project managers and decision-makers at HQ and the field including UNIDO Representatives as well as chief technical advisers and other UNIDO practitioners in the field.

The methodology will also include desk reviews of projects and evaluation reports included in Tables 1 & 2 above, portfolio analysis as well as focused group discussions with project managers and decision-makers in UNIDO HQ, identification of key ‘relief-to-development’ institutions and individuals within the UN system, and use of direct and telephone interviews and surveys as necessary, to be detailed during the inception phase, with an emphasis on Geneva-based UN partners.

The evaluation exercise is expected to:

- Conduct a portfolio review of past, ongoing and pipeline UNIDO interventions in post-crisis settings since year 2004 (following the December 2003 General Conference resolution GC.10/Res.6), and identify trends and relevant findings;
- Synthesize the findings, recommendations and lessons found in a wide range of evaluation reports since 2009;
- Identify UNIDO’s strengths and weaknesses in post-crisis interventions within its mandate and vision;
- Provide a brief overview of the wider issues pertaining to the relief-to-development continuum and its relevance to UNIDO;
- Identify UNIDO’s actual and potential role and effective engagement in post-crisis operations (national and UN –managed);
- Develop recommendations and lessons for UNIDO pertaining to the above

v. Evaluation team & responsibilities

The evaluation team for the totality of the exercise (9 project evaluations and 34 evaluation report reviews) will be composed of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Team member title</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Livelihoods &amp; renewable energy evaluation consultants</td>
<td>Project evaluations; synthesis of related renewable energy findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Evaluation consultants</td>
<td>Support the team leader in all aspects of the exercise including in some desk reviews and portfolio analysis work; conducting surveys; report writing; project evaluations (as part of a team) etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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29 See Annex B for a preliminary list of these
Annex A: Terms of Reference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Post-crisis expert/advisor</th>
<th>Contribute to the team on various substantive aspects of the thematic evaluation; review reports and provide feedback; Consultations with partner agencies and decision-makers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Team leader (UNIDO ODG/EVA)</td>
<td>Overall responsibility for designing and managing the exercise; conduct desk reviews and portfolio analysis; principal author of the Thematic Evaluation Report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Preliminary job descriptions for the evaluation team are included under Annex 1 below.

The livelihoods and renewable energy areas are chosen on the basis of the existing post-crisis portfolio of UNIDO as well as the centrality of food and energy security in vulnerability or resilience of countries and communities.

A post-crisis expert/practitioner with several years of senior level reconstruction and recovery work in the UN system has been identified to provide advice and contribute to the exercise on all substantive aspects of the work.

Each project evaluation will be followed by a presentation at UNIDO HQ before finalizing individual project evaluation reports and subject to an evaluation report. In addition, at least one presentation/meeting will be organized with the relevant project managers and other UNIDO HQ staff for consultations on the thematic evaluation report’s preliminary findings and recommendations.

The cost of the project evaluations is to be covered by the budget of the projects concerned. It should also be mentioned that the project list could grow, as a number of other similar projects in post-conflict contexts may be identified and added during the inception phase.

In addition to the project evaluation funds, a budget of €30,000 has been allocated for the thematic evaluation in 2013.

Draft project reports submitted to UNIDO Office for Independent Evaluation have and will be shared with the corresponding Programme or Project Officer(s) for initial review and consultation. They may provide feedback on any errors of fact and may highlight the significance of such errors in any conclusions. The consultation also seeks agreement on the findings and recommendations. The evaluators will take the comments into consideration in preparing the final version of the report. This procedure will also be adhered to when it comes to the thematic evaluation report.

The evaluation will be subject to quality assessments by UNIDO Office for Independent Evaluation. These apply evaluation quality assessment criteria and are used as a tool for providing structured feedback. The quality of the evaluation report will be assessed and rated against the criteria set forth in the Checklist (see Annex 6) on evaluation report quality.

v. **Time schedule and deliverables**

Given the 1-year duration of most of the Japanese-funded projects, the first of the project evaluations was launched in March 2012 with Kenya as the first, followed by Somaliland, D. R. Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Indonesia.
As the second batch of the Japanese-funded projects is likely to be completed by September 2013 (rather than their original target of March 2013 – includes projects in DRC, Somalia and Sudan), the draft thematic evaluation report is expected by the end of the same year.

For each of the above project evaluations, a specific TOR has been or will be prepared. A team of 4 evaluators who are expected to complete all the above project evaluations by mid-2013, in accordance with the above schedule, has been established.

vi. Deliverables

For every project evaluation, the following deliverables are expected in electronic format over the course of 2013, and in line with the schedule outlined for each in Table 1 above:

1. Inception report including details of methodology
2. completed survey questionnaires
3. Draft survey questionnaire(s)
4. Draft evaluation report
5. Initial and final survey reports
6. Final evaluation report

It is not intended to include all the above deliverables in the thematic evaluation report. The deliverables for the thematic evaluation will be:

- Inception report with evaluation matrix
- Survey questionnaires and interview guidelines
- Draft report
- Final report

A draft of the Thematic Post-Crisis Evaluation Report is expected in December 2013. Given the schedule of project evaluations outlined in Table 1 above, it is estimated that the final thematic evaluation report will be ready by the end of February 2014.

vii. Evaluation budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Thematic evaluation budget</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thematic post-crisis evaluation budget</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BL</td>
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<tr>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1101</td>
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<tr>
<td>1102</td>
</tr>
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<td>16</td>
</tr>
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<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex A - 1

Preliminary job descriptions for the evaluation team

A. Team leader

Role
Overall management of the process and main author of the thematic evaluation report

Duties
- Manage project evaluations and the team of evaluators
- Coordinate and consult with relevant units and project managers in UNIDO
- Organize consultation meetings and stimulate feedback
- Develop a matrix for desk reviews
- Support and backstop all consultants and project managers in the project evaluation process
- Liaise with and develop a work plan for the post-crisis expert
- Prepare the thematic post-crisis report – first complete draft expected December 2013, and final report to be delivered by end February 2014.

B. Evaluation consultant

Role
Support the Team Leader in implementing the thematic evaluation

Duties
- Conduct desk reviews of selected project evaluation reports (circa 10) and compile a matrix of findings, as requested (August-October 2013)
- Help prepare, review and update specific chapters of the thematic evaluation report (e.g. background section and specific categories of findings), as requested (September 2013-January 2014)
- Provide other relevant support for the thematic evaluation, as requested by the Team Leader (August 2013-January 2014)

Qualifications
- Master’s degree level in politics or economics
- Demonstrated evaluation experience

Duration: 2 months over 6 months (August 2013 – January 2014)

C. Junior evaluation consultant

Role
Support the Team Leader in implementing the thematic evaluation

Duties
- Help develop, collate and finalize the documentation, TOR and mission plans for 2013 project evaluations, as requested (August-October 2013)
- Ensure logistical support for all evaluation missions (August-October 2013)
- Liaise with project units at HQ and the field and ensure smooth implementation of evaluation missions (August-October 2013)
Organize coordination and consultation meetings as requested by the Team Leader (August-October 2013)

Compile a portfolio of all UNIDO post-crisis projects organized by project type, location, duration, budget and donor etc. (August-October 2013)

Conduct desk reviews of selected project evaluation reports (circa 10) and compile a matrix of findings, as requested (August-October 2013)

If requested, participate as a team member in the evaluation of selected post-crisis projects in Sudan (September-October 2013)

Help the Team Leader develop a matrix of the findings of all project evaluation reports included in Tables 2 and 3 of the evaluation TOR (August-October 2013)

Help prepare, review and update specific chapters of the thematic evaluation report (e.g. background section and specific categories of findings), as requested (September 2013 -January 2014)

Provide other relevant support for the thematic evaluation, as requested by the Team Leader (August 2013-January 2014)

**Qualifications**

- Master’s degree level in politics or economics
- Demonstrated working knowledge and experience of the UN system

Duration: 6 months (August 2013 – January 2014)
D. Post-crisis expert/advisor

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR PERSONNEL UNDER INDIVIDUAL SERVICE AGREEMENT (ISA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title:</th>
<th>Senior post-crisis expert/advisor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Duty Station and Location:</td>
<td>Vienna, home-based and VIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission/s to:</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start of Contract (EOD):</td>
<td>1 November 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of Contract (COB):</td>
<td>31 December 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Working Days:</td>
<td>24 (total budget €12,000 – calculate working days accordingly to match. Suggested pay rate: €500 a day)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT

In year 2010, UNIDO and the Japanese Foreign Ministry launched an initiative with a total budget of $9.8 million through the Supplementary Fund of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to support a number of African countries in their recovery efforts from crises. A Note Verbale was issued on 2 December 2010 to this effect and included the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somali and Sudan. An agreement was reached for UNIDO to design and implement a series of quick impact projects with duration of around one year under the umbrella title of “Response to humanitarian crisis in Africa”.

PROJECT CONTEXT Overview/UNIDO Project Summary/Project Purpose

The evaluation was mandated as part of UNIDO’s accountability and learning process by the decision of the Programme Approval and Monitoring Committee (AMC) meeting on 15 December 2010, and approved by the UNIDO Executive Board. The AMC decision stated:

“In view of synergies and the potential for organizational learning, the five post-conflict interventions in Sudan, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia and Democratic Republic of Congo should be subject to a combined evaluation; the modality of this evaluation and the necessary funding should be discussed between PTC/AGR/AIT and ODG/EVA. The same should be considered for the projects in Liberia and Sierra Leone as these two are very similar in concept and approach.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAIN DUTIES</th>
<th>Concrete/measurable Outputs to be achieved</th>
<th>Expected duration (days)</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide advice on the management and direction of the thematic evaluation</td>
<td>Updated evaluation plan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review and comment on the evaluation TOR and approach</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review selected project evaluation reports and provide feedback</td>
<td>Written inputs into the evaluation approach</td>
<td>2</td>
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### Annex A: Terms of Reference

<table>
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<th>Task</th>
<th>Inputs into Chapter(s)</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participate and/or take a lead in consultative meetings with senior UNIDO staff and other relevant partners, as requested</td>
<td>Chapter 1 of the report</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help identify strategic UN partners and key informants for the exercise, particularly from within the hierarchy of crisis-related agencies and the UN coordination mechanism</td>
<td>Second chapter of the report</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct interviews with selected key informants in Geneva and/or New York</td>
<td>Second chapter of the report</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft the evaluation report's chapter on “The global relief-to-development architecture of aid and UNIDO’s place”</td>
<td>Second chapter of the report</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide advisory support, guidance and inputs for other parts of the report</td>
<td>Other chapters of the report</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MINIMUM ORGANIZATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

**Education:** Advanced university degree in Economics or Politics

**Technical and Functional Experience:**
A senior development practitioner with at least 20 years of high-level management positions in UN humanitarian and development operations in crisis situations.

**Languages:** Fluency in written and spoken English is required. Fluency and/or working knowledge of another official UN language, particularly French.

### REQUIRED COMPETENCIES

**Core values:**
1. Integrity
2. Professionalism
3. Respect for diversity

**Core competencies:**
1. Results orientation and accountability
2. Planning and organizing
3. Communication and trust
4. Team orientation
5. Client orientation
6. Organizational development and innovation

**Managerial competencies (as applicable):**
1. Strategy and direction
2. Managing people and performance
3. Judgement and decision making
4. Conflict resolution
Annex A – 2

Note Verbale of December 2010

The Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna presents its compliments to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and under the instructions of the Government of Japan, has the honor to inform the latter that the Government of Japan has decided to make a contribution of nine million eight hundred thousand US dollars (US$9,800,000) (hereinafter referred to as the “Grant”) to the UNIDO for the execution of its projects “Response to humanitarian crisis in Africa” (hereinafter referred to as the “Projects”, details attached).

The Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna has further the honor to request UNIDO to assure the following points:

(1) UNIDO will notify the Government of Japan in writing of the number and type of US dollar bank account of UNIDO (and the name and address of the bank) in which the Government of Japan is to deposit the Grant.

(2) The Grant will be used for the Projects appropriately and exclusively as soon as possible for the execution of the Projects.

(3) Every effort will be made to publicize and increase the visibility of the Japanese contribution through, for example, the issuance of press releases, as well as attaching the Japanese national flag, printing “From the People of JAPAN” on UNIDO’s equipment procured with the Grant, or placing sign boards which identify the contribution of the Government of Japan in appropriate places.
(4) A detailed report on the use and effect of the Grant will be submitted to the Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna periodically and upon its request.

(5) The Government of Japan and the UNIDO will consult with each other in respect of any matter that may arise from or in connection with the Grant.

The Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) the assurances of its highest consideration.

To: The Director-General of UNIDO
Vienna
3 December 2010
Annex A: Terms of Reference

The Grant is earmarked for the following projects:

(UNIDO)
Title: Response to humanitarian crisis in Africa
Grant amount: USD 9,800,000

Kenya USD 1,500,000
Crafting a Green Future – Bamboo in the Curio and Souvenir Industry of Kenya

Somalia USD 1,200,000
Integration and Progress through Skills and Employment for Displaced Groups in Somalia

Eritrea USD 1,000,000
Community livelihoods and micro-industry support project for communities affected by natural disasters in the Northern Red Sea region.

Sudan USD 800,000
CLARIS-Skills for Peace and Income

DRC Congo USD 1,300,000
Bringing Support to the National Reconstruction Programme of DRC for livelihoods Recovery and Peace Building

Sierra Leone USD 2,000,000
Rehabilitation of training-cam-production centres in vulnerable communities of Koindu, Kpandebu and Pujeahun in Sierra Leone

Liberia USD 2,000,000
Rehabilitation of training centres in vulnerable communities in Liberia
Note Verbale of February 2012

The Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna

Annex A: Terms of Reference

Note Verbale

The Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna presents its compliments to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and under the instructions of the Government of Japan, has the honor to inform the latter that the Government of Japan has decided to make a contribution of seven million three hundred thousand U.S. dollars ($7,300,000) (hereinafter referred to as the "Grant") to the UNIDO for the execution of its projects "Vocational training in Africa" (hereinafter referred to as the "Projects", details attached). The Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna has further the honor to request UNIDO to assure the following points:

1. UNIDO will notify the Government of Japan in writing of the number and type of U.S. dollar bank account of UNIDO (and the name and address of the bank) in which the Government of Japan is to deposit the Grant.

2. The Grant and its accrued interest will be used for the Projects appropriately and exclusively as soon as possible for the execution of the Projects.

3. Every effort will be made to publicize and increase the visibility of the Japanese contribution through, for example, the issuance of press releases, as well as attaching the Japanese national flag, printing "From the People of JAPAN to UNIDO's equipment procured with the Grant, or placing sign boards which identify the contribution of the Government of Japan in appropriate places.

4. A detailed report on the use and effect of the Grant will be submitted to the Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna periodically and upon its request.

5. The Government of Japan and the UNIDO will consult with each other in respect of any matters that may arise from or in connection with the Grant.

The Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) the assurances of its highest consideration.

Vienna
30 February 2012
To the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

(attachment)

The Grant is earmarked for the following projects:

(UNIDO)
Title: Vocational training in Africa
Grant amount: USD 7,300,000

- Kenya: USD 1,500,000
- Somalia: USD 1,500,000
- South Sudan: USD 1,500,000
- DRC Congo: USD 1,300,000
- Sierra Leone: USD 800,000
- Liberia: USD 700,000
Annex B: Bibliography


Fund for Peace, Failed States Index, 2013.


IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), Fifth Assessment Report, 2013.


OCHA, Financial Tracking System for Humanitarian Assistance.


Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Data on Armed Conflict, 2013.


UNIDO General Conference, 10th session, Roundtable 4 - Issue Paper: Post-crisis industrial rehabilitation and reconstruction; General Conference, 1-5 December 2003.

UNIDO, Decisions and resolutions of the tenth session of the General Conference, GC 10/INF.4, 1-5 December 2003.

UNIDO, UNIDO activities in countries emerging from crisis situation, Report by the Director General, March 2004


UNIDO, UNIDO activities in countries emerging from crisis situations, September 2004.


### Annex C: List of persons consulted by the evaluation team

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Michaela Berndl</td>
<td>Evaluation Assistant</td>
<td>ODG/EVA (formerly of the PTC/SME Branch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilaria Borella</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>PTC/AGR/RES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aurelia Calabro</td>
<td>Unit Chief</td>
<td>PTC/AGR/RES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monica Carco</td>
<td>Unit Chief</td>
<td>PTC/BIT/ITU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucia Cartini</td>
<td>Industrial Development Officer</td>
<td>PTC/BIT/ITU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirsten Dales</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>PTC/EMB/WMU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margareta de Goys</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>ODG/EVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thierry Delbreuve</td>
<td>Deputy Chief, Coordination and</td>
<td>OCHA, Geneva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Response Division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Dethlefsen</td>
<td>Unit Chief</td>
<td>PSM/OSS/PRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renato Fornocaldo</td>
<td>Retiree (former UR in Sudan and</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayumi Fujino</td>
<td>Regional Representative</td>
<td>PRF/FLD/ASP/IND (formerly of the PTC/SME Branch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javier Guarnizo</td>
<td>Senior Evaluation Officer</td>
<td>ODG/EVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatou Haidara</td>
<td>Director (former Director of SPP)</td>
<td>PRF/PMO/OD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asif Hasnain</td>
<td>Retiree (former Deputy Director of SPP)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Juergen Hierold</td>
<td>GEF Coordinator</td>
<td>PTC/PRM/PMU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarwar Hobohm</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>ODG/SPQ/OD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anders Isaksson</td>
<td>Industrial Development Officer</td>
<td>PTC/BIT/ITU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chakib Jenane</td>
<td>Former Unit Chief and Deputy to the Director PTC/AGR/AIT</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donato Kiniger-Passigli</td>
<td>Senior Specialist, Strategy Partnerships and Crisis Response Coordination</td>
<td>ILO GENEVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbara Kreissler</td>
<td>Industrial Development Officer</td>
<td>PTC/PRM/PMU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alfredo Lazarte-Hoyle</td>
<td>Director, Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction</td>
<td>ILO Geneva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pradeep Monga</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>PTC/EWR/OD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Negus</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>OCHA, Geneva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ole Nielson</td>
<td>Unit Chief</td>
<td>PTC/MEA/RAU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gerardo Patacononi</td>
<td>Unit Chief</td>
<td>PTC/BIT/CBL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Julia Rohe</td>
<td>Quality Monitoring Officer</td>
<td>ODG/SPQ/QUA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Claudio Scaratti</td>
<td>Retiree (former Director and UR, PRF/DDG/GVA)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippe Scholtes</td>
<td>Managing Director and Director a.i. PTC/AGR/OD</td>
<td>PTC/OMD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barbara Singer</td>
<td>External Relations Officer</td>
<td>PRF/PMO/PMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jossy Thomas</td>
<td>Industrial Development Officer</td>
<td>PTC/EWR/RRE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igor Volodin</td>
<td>Unit Chief and OiC PTC/EMB</td>
<td>PTC/EMB/WMU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inez Wijngaarde</td>
<td>Retiree (former Senior Industrial Development Officer)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciyong Zou</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>PTC/PRM/OD</td>
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