

Norad

Review of Norad's support to UNIDO's Trade Capacity Building Programme 2005-2013

Final Report

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report was commissioned as a forward-looking Review of UNIDO's ability to provide effective aid cooperation with a particular focus on results and relevance. The Review covers the period 2005-2013, it has been commissioned after many years of cooperation between the two partners, and therefore results have had time to emerge. There are currently no new project proposals due to commence; however 13 of the 32 projects in the portfolio are currently ongoing, with some due for completion as late as 2017.

Overall, the Review covers the following aspects of the cooperation:

- How relevant UNIDO's TCB branch is in relation to the beneficiaries' needs, Norway's trade assistance goals and UNIDO's core mandate.
- How effective the projects have been in achieving their objectives, and to what extent impact has been achieved in the short and medium term, and how well the results management system is functioning.
- Efficiency is assessed in terms of the projects, but the main focus here is on the efficiency of the partnership cooperation.
- And lastly, sustainability of the projects, including the links with local institutions and how synergies are achieved with other stakeholders and partners.

The sections below describe very briefly the conclusions of the Review against the five OECD DAC criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, building on the evidence outlined in the finding sections of the main report.

Relevance

Overall, the Norad-UNIDO collaboration is highly relevant to both partners as well as the recipient countries. UNIDO plays a special and somewhat unique role in the TCB-field and is widely recognised to form a 'centre of excellence' in this area. Similarly, Norad plays a key role in enabling UNIDO to perform this role. By being willing to be a patient investor, with a relatively high tolerance for risk, Norad has enabled UNIDO to develop and test innovative project approaches at country and regional level as well as new project ideas such as the Global Forum products. This, combined with substantive technical management input from Oslo over the review period, has contributed greatly in establishing UNIDO's current position as a leading TCB-implementing agency within the Aid-for-Trade family.

Efficiency

In terms of efficiency of the collaboration, the picture is somewhat more mixed. Norad-UNIDO collaboration has been traditionally considered 'best-practise' within UNIDO, but with the current volume of projects and the resource constraints facing both organisations, there are significant concerns of whether the current management system is still fit for purpose. In view of the current management capacity at both Norad and UNIDO, the management arrangements overall are not optimal in terms of efficiency. After nearly a decade of working together and following some significant external changes, there is a distinct need to re-calibrate the way that the collaboration is being implemented.

Effectiveness

All projects assessed by the Review have achieved or are likely to achieve their expected outcomes at least to some extent. While the country mission to Burundi revealed minor issues with regards to the validity of some assumptions made in the final project evaluation report underpinning results, these were not sufficient to question the validity of the evaluation reports more generally. Thus, the Review concludes that overall, Norad-UNIDO collaboration has been relatively successful.

As highlighted above, there may have been some issues with the problem analysis as part of project design, especially for earlier projects. However, due to dedicated UNIDO staff and technical experts, and flexibility from Norad managers, projects have been able to be opportunistic and change direction during the implementation phases and achieve the expected outcomes. The more recent projects benefitting from a phased approach tended to go through a more robust problem analysis phase and respectively had a more solid foundation for building trust with partners, defining the intervention logic and tailoring the approach to the realities on the ground.

Similarly, and perhaps paradoxically, while delays may be on one hand considered inefficient, on the other the capacity to tolerate delays may enable Norad and UNIDO to be considered patient long-term partners by recipients. This would very likely contribute to achieving the desired outcomes in the medium to long term.

Impact and sustainability

Overall, the impact of the Norad-UNIDO collaboration would seem to be more than the sum of the impacts of the individual projects. Norad support has been integral to the process of TCB Branch becoming a leading centre of excellence for the provision of SMTQ-related projects. The intangible benefits include the development of capacity within UNIDO as well the public goods under the 'Global Forum' work stream, which reportedly have been considered useful contributions.

In terms of project benefits, some of the impact stories identified during the Review are highlighted as examples, although the Review does not suggest that these would represent a complete set of results or the most successful projects. Overall, it would seem that the highest impact and greatest likelihood for sustainability were with projects that had clear traceability to the needs of the private sector, which would act as the transitional device and translate project outputs into sustainable real-economy results.

UNIDO had not tracked the benefits streams of any of the completed and evaluated projects covered by the Review and the Review was not resourced to assess this independently beyond the beneficiary survey, so it is not possible to estimate the level of benefits after project activities had ceased. It is worth noting, however, that in cases such as the Sri Lanka Indexpo project it could have been relatively straightforward to agree to semi-annual benefit reporting if done at the outset. Incorporating such an element into future design may help reporting against impact and sustainability.

Recommendations

The first two recommendations are divided into two parts: (i) how to manage the portfolio of the already contracted ongoing projects; and (ii) how to re-calibrate the collaboration to maximise the benefits for both parties over the next 5-10 years. The recommendations are addressed to Norad and UNIDO, and both organisations will need to support each other in the implementation of any follow-up actions in order to succeed. Recommendations 3-5 have only one part, and are addressed mainly to UNIDO, although Norad should be ready to support the suggestions.

Recommendation 1: Make the project portfolio manageable and focused on results now and in the future

Short-term: Norad to help UNIDO organise a workshop in the first half of 2015 where the RBM elements of the remaining projects running from 2015 onwards will be developed using an action-learning methodology.

Long-term: Norad and UNIDO to undertake a re-calibration assessment process, and jointly review options for actioning over the medium to long term.

Recommendation 2: Acknowledge Norway's shifting priorities and be ambitious in turning these into an opportunity to leverage results

Norway has reduced the number of partner countries from 116 to 84, including 12 priority countries while removing 16 high middle income countries. The new Government has also emphasised the importance of being able to deliver tangible results.

Short-term: The existing portfolio will potentially include ongoing projects in two of Norway's 12 new priority countries. As soon as the countries are confirmed Norad and UNIDO should jointly examine options to scale-up activities in these countries.

Long-term: As part of the country prioritisation process, Norway may consider strengthening the capacity of the respective Embassies as well as focus investment through other multilateral agencies towards the priority countries. In order to leverage the most out of such a situation, Norad could ensure that UNIDO and other specialist agencies are working together in a coordinated and complimentary way to achieve their joint goals on trade and development.

UNIDO should take into account Norway's priority countries when presenting any new project concepts to Norad. Any resulting project design should take into account that Norway has demonstrated that it is a patient and risk resilient donor and a guiding design question should be 'how much can be achieved in 5 years?'

Recommendation 3: Further increase private sector involvement in SMTQ projects to demonstrate the link between trade and poverty reduction

Acknowledging that in most instances the private sector is the transitional device for translating project inputs into real-world outcomes, UNIDO should continue to develop market development practises in its approach and aspire to enhance private sector engagement in projects combined with the use of experimental data collection methodologies. This may entail using the value chain approach (targeting value chains employing the poorest) or the private-public partnership model.

Recommendation 4: Expand the 'Global Forum' into a stand-alone project

The objective of the recommendation is to further enhance the TCB Branches role as a centre of excellence in the delivery of SMTQ projects and associated public goods. The new 'Global Forum' project should capture the kind of work undertaken previously as well as allowing for a faucet for UNIDO staff to present and publish lessons learned from project implementation – for example when codifying a new project methodology such as the value chain approach. Prerequisites for such a project would be a robust problem analysis and advocacy and outreach plan.

Recommendation 5: Build on UNIDO's good practise of independent evaluation and lesson learning with internal and external partners

While UNIDO has a remarkably strong culture of evaluation and lesson learning, the TCB Branch still seems to have some way to go in addressing all the insights from the 2010 TCB thematic evaluation as well as other individual project and country reports. Hence, we recommend that UNIDO take a comprehensive approach to the findings and recommendations from this well-evidence and thorough report, and provide Norad with an update on progress against each recommendation (including a timetable for implementation), as well as how the identified Key Success Factors have been incorporated into TCB projects. This could be a living document, incorporating the findings and recommendations from this evaluation, and could be a useful reporting tool for the Norad-UNIDO bi-annual meetings.

1. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

1.1 The UNIDO-Norad collaboration on Trade Capacity Building

The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) was established in 1966 and in 1986 became the 16th specialized agency of the United Nations system, mandated to promote and accelerate the industrialisation of developing countries. UNIDO has since gained its status as a specialised agency within the UN, and its current mandate is to promote and accelerate inclusive and sustainable industrial development in developing countries and economies in transition. The organisation focuses on three main thematic areas: poverty reduction through productive activities; trade capacity-building; and energy and environment. Norad's support to UNIDO is focussed within trade capacity building activities.

The Trade Capacity Building (TCB) branch is a unit, which aims to assist developing economies to participate in global trade by improving their ability to comply with international standards. The TCB programme, which also consists of UNIDO's other private sector development services, approaches this by aiming to improve:

- Competitive productive capacities for international trade;
- Quality and compliance infrastructure; and
- Corporate social responsibility for market integration.

Norway has a long-standing partnership with UNIDO dating back to the late 1990s, and the first Norad funded project under the TCB programme was approved in 2003. The current Framework Agreement between Norad and UNIDO was signed in October 2010. Norad's programmatic support to UNIDO focuses mainly on Standards, Metrology, Testing and Quality (SMTQ) activities. This review has also considered a private sector development intervention related to technical assistance to business registration reforms in Viet Nam.

1.2 Cooperation budget

Norad is a key contributor to UNIDO, with annual contributions averaging NOK 20m (approximately €2.4m). In total, and allowing some variation for historical exchange rate fluctuations, Norad have contributed or earmarked NOK 247m (approximately €30m) across the 32 projects in the portfolio.

The project level budgets are agreed upon using individual Administrative Agreements. Budgets range from €70k, for a project which provided preparatory assistance to Malawi, to USD4.5m (approximately €3.5m) for a four year project for technical assistance to business registration reform in Vietnam. The average Norad project contribution is €923k, and a number of projects are co-financed with Finland and UNIDO.

Table 1 and Table 2 show financial figures from the UNIDO Annual Reports demonstrating the net project approvals under voluntary contributions, and the programme expenditure under from regular and operational budget for the Trade Capacity Building thematic priority compared to the UNIDO totals. In 2013, for example, net project approvals under voluntary contributions totalled €15.5m for the Trade Capacity Building thematic priority, which was 21% of the yearly UNIDO total. The 2013 Annual Report states that in 2013, Norway's total net contribution was \$4.3 million¹ (approximately €3.4m).

¹ UNIDO Annual Report 2013: Appendices. Available at: http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/PMO/PBC/PBC30/ar2013_appendices_final_20140604.pdf

Table 1: Net Project Approvals under Voluntary Contributions (US\$ excluding programme support costs)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
UNIDO Total									
Governmental Contributions	79,600	51,423	88,598	85,372	92,263	103,925	90,694	92,211	98,118
Trade Capacity Building (UNIDO thematic priority)									
Governmental Contributions	n/a	n/a	40,042	22,879	29,283	28,145	24,354	28,009	20,560

Source: Appendix B: UNIDO Annual Reports (2005-2013)

Table 2: Regular and operational budget Programme Expenditure (Euro '000)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total programme expenditure	77,732	70,526	85,420	77,779	86,179	83,490	88,173	81,890	89,438
TCB Branch programme expenditure	n/a	10,484	12,631	8,913	9,291	8,396	8,358	7,805	8,087

Source: Appendix A, Table 8: UNIDO Annual Reports (2005-2013)

2. REVIEW PURPOSE, SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

2.1 Timing of the Review

The Review, covering the period 2005-2013, has been commissioned after many years of cooperation between the two partners, and therefore results have had time to emerge. There are currently no new project proposals in the pipeline, however 13 of the 32 projects in the portfolio are currently ongoing, with some due for completion as late as 2017. This has been taken into consideration when formulating the recommendations, as the Review must be both forward looking, and pragmatic.

As previously noted, the partnership between Norad and UNIDO dates back to the late 1990s and due to recent changes within both Norad and UNIDO, there is scope for this Review to update the partnership to reflect these changes and to ensure the management of this partnership is reflective of the current structural arrangements within each organisation.

2.2 Information required and how the information will be used

The Review studied project and programme level documentation made available to us by Norad and UNIDO, the team also interviewed a number of staff and stakeholders. This information was used by the Review team to examine the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of UNIDO's projects, the TCB branch, and the Norad-UNIDO cooperation in order to provide practical, forward-looking solutions and recommendations that can help UNIDO and Norad build on and improve their collaboration in the future.

2.3 Description of the formative nature of the evaluation

The timing of the Review presents the need to suggest recommendations on how to develop the partnership moving forward. The Review has therefore adopted a formative approach – it is forward looking, and it uses unbiased analysis to ensure that it presents realistic follow up actions by Norad and UNIDO that will seek to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the management of the portfolio in the future.

2.4 Target audience

The primary audience for the Review is Norad's PSD department, and UNIDO's TCB branch. We do however expect that the Review will have utility for a wider audience as it may inform how Norway structures future funding agreements with other organisations and it may provide UNIDO with useful recommendation that can be applied to its relationship with other donors.

2.5 What aspects of the cooperation are covered

Overall, the Review covers the following aspects of the cooperation:

- How relevant UNIDO's TCB programme is in relation to the beneficiaries' needs, Norway's trade assistance goals and UNIDO's core mandate.
- How effective the projects have been in achieving their objectives, and to what extent impact has been achieved in the short and medium term, and how well the results management system is functioning.
- Efficiency is assessed in terms of the projects, but the main focus here will be on the efficiency of the overall Norad-UNIDO partnership cooperation.
- And lastly, sustainability of the projects, including the links with local institutions and how synergies are achieved with other stakeholders and partners.

2.6 Objectives

Norad performs regular reviews of partner institutions receiving, or being considered for long term support, and therefore this Review has been commissioned to provide Norad with an independent assessment of the cooperation. In addition, Norad has further identified that due to the change in Norwegian government in 2013 and with a continuous focus on results, sustainability, and efficiency there is further need to review Norad's collaboration with UNIDO as the partnership is characterised by a large administratively demanding portfolio.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Review approach, framework and methods of collection

3.1.1 Evaluability assessment

As part of the Inception Phase the Review Team conducted an evaluability assessment using a framework put forward by Davies (2013)². This framework uses three broad types of issues: project design; information availability; and institutional context (including practicalities and demands). This framework was adapted to ensure relevance with this Review and overall, the team found very positive results from the assessment, and concluded that the scope of the Review as outlined in the ToR could be evaluated.

More specifically, and with regards to project design, the evaluability assessment found that individual projects are designed very much in isolation, meaning that there is not an overall programmatic approach. Although the 32 projects do share many core themes, each project has different aims and therefore the linkages, assumptions, and causal chain between activities, outputs, outcomes varies from project to project. The policy space in which UNIDO operates is also very complicated, and although there is a clearly identified need for UNIDO's work, the linkages between UNIDO activities and impact level results can be diluted by many external influences.

With regards to information availability, the evaluability assessment found that the overwhelming majority of key project documentation required for this Review is available. This includes annual progress and financial reports, as well as many independent/self-evaluations, or project completion reports for completed projects.

Within the Institutional context, the assessment found that overall, practical considerations do not pose a great threat to the evaluability of Norad funding to UNIDO as the Review has been commissioned after many years of cooperation between the two partners, and therefore results have had time to emerge. In addition, both parties have welcomed the Review as a good opportunity to understand what lessons can be drawn, and how future partnerships can be improved upon. The scope of work and focus areas were clearly identified in the Terms of Reference, including a comprehensive list of Evaluation Questions.

3.1.2 Programme & project level

This Review is divided into two main branches of enquiry, the programme level and the project level. As discussed earlier, the cooperation is not characterised by an overall programmatic approach, and therefore this has presented some challenges for a "programmatic assessment", however this was overcome by careful consideration of how the partnership plays out in practice, assessing *what* each partner requires from the cooperation, and how this might play out in future.

Project level analysis has also been used to compliment the programme level analysis. Findings from project level analysis can in some cases be aggregated to understand how the programme is administered in practice. These findings can also be used to understand the difficulties that UNIDO and Norad face at the project level, in order to help form the recommendations on how to improve the partnership at the programme level.

² <https://www.gov.uk/.../uploads/.../wp40-planning-eval-assessments.pdf>

Within the 'project level', analysis was subdivided according to the depth of enquiry. This approach can be compared to a kind of narrowing funnel, with the broadest and most shallow end of enquiry at one end, and in-depth targeted analysis at the other.

3.2 OECD DAC criteria

The Terms of Reference for this Review included a comprehensive list of evaluation questions which were refined during the Inception Phase. The Review team plotted the evaluation questions against the activities outlined in the methodology (see Annex 1). This analysis was used to help structure the implementation phase, but it also provided a useful tool for collating the synthesising the evidence in a structured and methodological way.

3.3 Crosscutting issues

In addition to the five standard OECD DAC criteria outlined above, the Review team have also attempted to review UNIDO's TCB approach to incorporating cross cutting issues into their projects such as corruption, gender equality, environment and human rights.

3.4 Sampling strategy and primary/secondary data sources

3.4.1 Programme level

At the programme level the team conducted a documentation review using key strategic documents provided by UNIDO and Norad. This was complemented by a Programme Management Questionnaire, which aimed to gather insights from UNIDO and Norad regarding the partnership/cooperation between the two organisations. Using a semi structured interview template, key partners such as STDF, EIF and ITC were consulted to gather insights and evidence on benchmarking and strategic level programme management. Please see Annex 6 for a full list of partner institutions that were interviewed as part of this Review.

3.4.2 Project level

Top of the funnel

At the top of the funnel portfolio analysis was used to provide some light touch, macro assessment of the portfolio. This was supplemented by a beneficiary questionnaire, which was implemented through an online survey to allow for time efficient, and less biased methods of enquiry. To avoid duplication with an earlier beneficiary survey, which was conducted as part of the Thematic Evaluation of UNIDO SMTQ (2010), the Review focused its online beneficiary survey on projects post 2010. Having sent the questionnaire to 40 project beneficiaries identified by UNIDO, the team received 13 responses, constituting a response rate of 33%. As the number of responses is small, one should be very careful in attempting to make any statistical inferences from these results. Coupled with other evidence, however, the survey can act to support - or bring to question - our findings.

Middle of the funnel

A subset of key indicators from the portfolio analysis has been used to select 12 of the 32 projects in the portfolio for more in-depth review. This sample was be used to undertake 'middle of the funnel' analysis. Annex 3 provides an overview of the sampling methodology used for this tier of the funnel. Projects selected for this level of analysis are outlined in the table below. For ease of reference, we will refer to the shortened project titles throughout this report.

Table 3: Projects selected for middle of the funnel analysis

Project (short-hand)	Project (full title)
AFRIMETS II	AFRIMETS Phase II
Burundi EIF	TCB for Burundi (EIF)
Sierra Leone QCID	Quality and Compliance Infrastructure Development- Sierra Leone
DG SANCO	Strategic Cooperation Between UNIDO and European Commission Directorate General For Consumer Health And Consumers (DG SANCO) - Development and Pilot Applications of a Food Safety Alert Rapid Response Facility (FSA-RRF)
Trade Standards Compliance Report II	Trade Standards Compliance Report II
BAB-NA Institutional Cooperation	Strengthening Bangladesh Accreditation Board (BAB) through UNIDO: Institutional Cooperation Between Norwegian Accreditation (NA) and BAB
Zambia TCB	Joint UNIDO-WTO Trade Capacity Building Programme Framework for Zambia
Vietnam BRR	Technical Assistance to Business Registration Reform in Viet Nam
Guide to Private Standards	A Guide to Private Standards
SAARC II	Market Access and Trade Facilitation Support for South Asian LDCs, through Strengthening Institutional and National Capacities Related to Standards, Metrology, Testing and Quality (SMTQ) - Phase II, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal
EAC TCB	Trade Capacity Building in Agro-Industry Products for the Establishment and Proof of Compliance with International Market Requirements
Sri Lanka Indexpo	Strengthening International Certification Capacity in Sri Lanka with Particular Reference to Social Accountability Standard (SA 8000) and Food Safety Standard (HACCP/ISO 22000)

Key documents relating to the above projects were reviewed, including evaluation reports, reports, admin agreements, etc. this was supplemented by a project level questionnaire and interviews with relevant project managers. The questionnaires and interviews were used to gather factual information and individual project manager's insights in order to gain a deeper understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the projects in this sample.

Bottom of the funnel

The bottom of the funnel, which represents the narrow, but deepest level of analysis, consisted of field visits to two countries, Burundi and Bangladesh, to gain an even more detailed understanding of how Norad-funded UNIDO projects are implemented in the selected beneficiary countries. Annex 5 provides an overview of the sampling methodology used to select both countries. This level of analysis has been used allow the Review to 'ground-truth' findings from the various other work streams.

To increase synergies between the middle of the funnel and the bottom of the funnel, a number of projects can be found at both levels of the funnel including:

- Burundi EIF
- BAB-NA Institutional Cooperation
- SAARC II
- EAC TCB

In addition to these projects from the middle of the funnel, the following projects were also reviewed as part of the bottom of the funnel:

- Bangladesh BEST programme
- Bangladesh BSQP programme

Table 4: Primary and secondary data sources

Work stream		Data source
Programme Level	Desk Review	Primary: The Framework Agreement (2011) Thematic Evaluation, Thematic Evaluation Report UNIDO activities in the area of Standards, Metrology, Testing and Quality (SMTQ) (2011).
		Secondary: n/a
	Partner Interview	Primary: Interviewed a number people from organisations such as STDF, EIF and ITC, a full list of partners interviewed are provided in Annex 6.
		Secondary: n/a
	Programme Management Questionnaire/Interviews	Primary: A kick-off meeting was held between Norad, UNIDO and the Review team on 9 th September in Oslo. Further interviews were held during a two-day mission to UNIDO headquarters in Vienna, 25-26 th September 2014 and again in Oslo on Thursday 9 th October 2014.
		Secondary: Representatives from Norad and UNIDO filled in one copy of the Programme Management Questionnaire each.
Top of the funnel	Portfolio Analysis	Primary: n/a
		Secondary: Project documentation
	Beneficiary questionnaire	Primary: 40 beneficiaries were contacted during the Review, with the team receiving 13 full responses providing a 33% responses rate. Secondary: n/a
Middle of the funnel	Project questionnaire/interview	Primary: Project Managers provided responses to Project Manager Questionnaires, this was then supplemented with interviews
		Secondary: n/a
	Project desk review	Primary: n/a Secondary: Project documentation including Project Document, Project Progress Reports, Mid-term Reviews, and Final Evaluations.
Bottom of the funnel	Field visits	Primary: Interviews with partners and beneficiaries
		Secondary: Project documentation

3.5 Triangulating the data

The team have used an evaluation matrix to plot the evaluation questions against the various methods of data collection (see Annex 1). This matrix has been used throughout the evaluation process as a basis to guide each activity. The matrix has also been used to collate the evidence from each work stream under each evaluation question and triangulate this in order to synthesise the evidence into findings, and to ensure that the conclusions and recommendations are based on an unbiased and trusted evidence base.

3.6 Methodological limitation

The identification and assessment of project level outcomes within the 'middle of the funnel' was largely reliant on existing project documentation and the Project Managers' responses to the Project Manager Questionnaire. Outcomes were verified to the extent possible during the bottom of the funnel analysis, however the analysis was narrow due to the limited scope and time available for the Review. The limited scope of the Review did not allow for a comprehensive value for money analysis to be carried out at the project level.

Also, as the number of responses to the beneficiary survey is low, one should not make any statistical inferences based on the results. These should only be interpreted as indicative and understood in the light of other qualitative and quantitative evidence.

3.7 Biases

The Review is subject to a range of potential biases. Much of the primary and secondary data sources have been provided by UNIDO staff, partners and beneficiaries, and therefore some bias might arise as they may have a vested interest in presenting UNIDO's TCB branch in a positive light.

Middle of the funnel selection bias could be an issue as the availability of independent evaluations was used criteria for the selection of the sample. This meant that there was a higher proportion of older projects, and recent improvements to the project appraisal stage may not have been fully explored.

4. FINDINGS

In this section we present the evidence from our data-gathering work streams as outlined in the previous section. The section is organised by the 5 OECD DAC evaluation criteria, and each of the five sub-sections brings together the evidence from across all three sections of "the funnel" to provide the evidence base to shed light on the evaluation questions. Annex 6 provides a comprehensive list of persons consulted.

4.1 Relevance

4.1.1 Alignment to Norway's development objectives

The relevance of the UNIDO TCB activities to Norway's trade-related assistance goals as outlined in the Aid for Trade Action Plan is strong. The Plan sets out 11 priorities for Aid for Trade programming to ensure that it actually promotes poverty reduction, equitable national employment and distribution policies and takes into account environmental considerations. Table 5 below rates the Norad-UNIDO collaboration across 10 of these priorities (the priority on UN reform and "One UN" has been excluded) using the 10 non-Global Forum projects selected in the Review's sample.

Table 5: Alignment of sample projects to Norway's Aid for Trade Action Plan

Priority area	Rating
Priority to Africa and LDCs	80%
Working in 5 priority areas (Climate; Peace-building; Gender; Clean energy; Good governance)	100%
Liberalisation/privatisation not mandatory	100%
Trade benefitting women	10%
Comparative advantage of UNIDO	100%
Paris Declaration	93%
National development strategies	100%
Coordination and joint working	100%
Regional cooperation and south-south trade	90%
Private sector directly involved	100%

The overall relevance rating for the sample projects from the analysis is 87%. This is a very high score, considering that all 10 projects were given a binary rating for each priority area (0 = no explicit reference to issue in core project documentation, 1 = explicit reference to issue). The only exception was the priority on Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, where we made a binary assessment of the projects against the first four of the five principles (Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation and

Managing for results, with Mutual accountability being excluded due to a lack of a suitable verification method for this desk-based analysis). It should be noted that this kind of subjective analysis is limited, not least due to the relatively small number of projects reviewed and the inherent assumption that Norad would give each priority area an equal weighting for every single project. The results in the table can, however, be taken as indicative. In most cases it was very easy to score the projects a '1', while in a few cases it was almost as easy to score a '0'. Finally, in a small number of cases, some subjective judgement had to be used in giving a rating. We briefly justify our ratings below.

The projects in Vietnam and Sri Lanka are not in Africa or LDCs, bringing down the score for the first priority. We have taken the view that all the SMTQ projects contribute indirectly towards positive ecological benefits, with the projects that have a capacity building element also supporting good governance.

The one area where the portfolio did not fare well was on the third priority, which was due to the Burundi project being the only one of the sample projects explicitly targeting trade that benefits women. As the analysis was scored using a binary method all 10 projects received zero rating. It is noteworthy, however, that UNIDO has recently introduced a gender mainstreaming approach. This is now being piloted in Zambia phase II (see 4.1.2 below). The comparative advantage of UNIDO is discussed in more detail in section 4.1.3 below.

As outlined in section 4.1.2 below, all ten projects seemed to have considerable country-ownership and be well aligned to national priorities. The projects would also seem to have strong partnership strategies with other UN agencies, donors and local organisations. Some projects were judged to have more of an implementation monitoring rather than a results monitoring system (see Table 10 and Annex 4 for details), which brought the overall rating on Paris Declaration down.

While it could be argued that improvements in access to global markets could include access to regional or other southern markets, based on the available project documentation the Sierra Leone project did not explicitly target these. All projects were considered to involve the private sector at least to some extent. However, as outlined in section 4.4 below, the results would seem to be more significant and sustainable where the private sector was involved to a greater extent.

The assessment above omitted the Global Forum projects and the priority on the 'One UN' initiative. Fortunately UNIDO's Office of Independent Evaluation has produced separate reports on both topics³. The former synthesises the findings of the 2010 SMTQ thematic evaluation by stating it *"confirms the relevance of [Global Fund] SMTQ activities in relation to the Millennium Development Goals, to donors, to standard bodies, to UNIDO, to firms, to Governments, to Aid for Trade and for the target groups"*. The latter classifies UNIDO as an above average participant in the 'One UN' initiative, despite some challenges due to UNIDO's status as a UN specialised agency.

Box 1: SMTQ and Poverty Reduction

There is no clear consensus on the relevance of SMTQ interventions when it comes to assist the poverty reduction agenda in developing countries. An extensive WB study from 2002 revealed that compliance with standards tends to benefit large-scale companies over their small-scale competitors. On the other hand, several studies outside of the UNIDO TCB programme provide empirical evidence of the contrary effect. For instance, recent studies conducted in Madagascar and Senegal confirm that high-standards agricultural trade can have important positive effects on the wellbeing of small farmers in developing countries, namely through more competitive exports conditions and a shift in production methods that benefited poor farmers (e.g. Maertens and Swinns, Trade, Standards and Poverty, 2007).

UNIDO has undertaken a desk review of the poverty impacts of its own work, which underlines the prevailing difficulty of measuring the impact of the "trade poverty nexus". Despite efforts being made towards improving this, it remains extremely challenging to measure the impact of TCB measures, in particular given the multi-dimensional nature of poverty, lack of monitoring and a high number of unpredictable direct and indirect effects.

³ UNIDO's Contribution to One UN Mechanisms: Independent Thematic Evaluation (2011) and UNIDO's Global Forum Function: Independent Thematic Evaluation (2013)

It is also important to note that for many of the TCB projects, Norad has been closely involved in the initial project development stage as well as the management of the projects, allowing for a further mechanism to ensure relevance to Norway's trade development priorities.

In the future there is clear potential for increased alignment with the new Government's initiative to sharpen the focus of Norwegian support both geographically in Sub-Saharan Africa and LDCs but also thematically. The development of quality infrastructure is integral to promoting export opportunities for developing countries as access to both regional and global markets depends on the ability of exporters to meet required standards, whether they are SPS regulations or new private standards such as Fair Trade. Work on SMTQ can also strengthen the results from regional approaches, as reducing technical barriers to intra-regional trade is a key driver of integration. This is particularly relevant for Sub-Saharan Africa, where intra-regional trade averages only around 10% of total trade, compared to over 60% in the European Union.

4.1.2 Relevance to recipient's national and regional trade development priorities

Overall, we find that there is a strong link between the projects' objectives and activities and the identified needs of the recipient countries (or regions). Indeed, it is a UNIDO requirement for all of its projects to respond to recipient country development plans, national priorities as well as relevant UN country programmes, and our analysis, especially at the middle of the funnel, confirms this is well respected.

Table 6: DTIS alignment with country projects in LDCs

Project	Aligned with DTIS?	Notes
Burundi EIF (06/12-06/13)	Yes	The DTIS identified the need to move up the value chains in coffee. Some fruits and vegetable were also identified as "high-potential sectors for diversification into non-traditional export" and it was noted that support should be given to the export of fruit and vegetables.
Sierra Leone QCID (11/11-12/14)	Yes	The DTIS stated the need to develop the laboratory capacity in Sierra Leone. It also identified the need to develop a strategic approach to improve standards and quality management, as well as developing a "competent authority" for the fisheries sector to ensure fish exports comply with EU standards.
BAB-NA Institutional Cooperation (07/10-12/14)	Yes	Ability of Bangladesh to meet international safety standards is a key theme in the DTIS. Access and increasing the prevalence of accreditation is highlighted as a key factor for the pharmaceutical industry, which the DTIS identifies as a priority sector. On the macro level, the importance of mutual recognition agreements to support intra-regional trade is highlighted.
Zambia TCB (03/09-06/13)	Yes	As noted in the Project Document, the DTIS states that there was a lack of clarity on the roles of the institutions involved in the implementation of standards and technical regulations, as well as a lack of "suitably accredited laboratories". Therefore, according to the IF, there was a need for Zambia to revise legislation, put in place policies, and institutions that will enable more goods and services to meet international requirements.

This is supported by responses from the beneficiary survey as outlined in table 7. Based on the responses, most projects were seen to be 'very closely' aligned with the needs of the country/region.

Table 7: Beneficiary survey responses

Question: How well do the project's objectives align with the needs of the country/region?					
Very closely	Closely	Somewhat	Limited alignment	No alignment	Can't say
10	1	2	0	0	0

Alignment to the government's identified needs is an important aspect, but equally importantly and not always captured in these often political-level strategies or policies, is the alignment to the core needs of the private firms which make up the export sector. In Bangladesh, where the Review team

conducted a field mission, one key driver of the success of the ongoing Bangladesh Better Work and Standards (BEST) Programme was the direct relevance to exporters. Since the EU imposed a short-term ban on shrimp imports from Bangladesh in the late 1990's, the production and processing of shrimp as an export-oriented commercial activity, which accounts for over USD 600 million in export revenues annually, has come under stringent quality scrutiny, and has provided a clear market incentive for the industry to work with government to find solutions. The relevance of the BEST project's interventions to the direct needs of all actors in the shrimp export value chain has been fundamental to its success and achievement of impact. Similarly, demand for low-cost ISO accreditation by the private sector in Bangladesh has been critical to the BAB-NA component of the BEST project.

Targeting the private sector is not a panacea, however. The Sri Lanka Indexpo project always had a private sector approach, but did not gain any significant traction with counterparts until it was redesigned. These results are echoed in the beneficiary survey responses. While the question in table 8 is on effectiveness, it also suggests that beneficiaries feel Norad-funded UNIDO projects could have been more relevant for private sector stakeholders - providing a stark contrast with the perceived very close alignment to public policy.

Table 8: Beneficiary survey responses

Question: How effective is UNIDO at working with the private sector/exporters?					
Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	Not relevant	Can't say
2	4	5	0	1	1

4.1.3 UNIDO's comparative advantage

SMTQ and the development of quality infrastructure are relatively niche areas, with projects often requiring a highly specialised set of skills and expertise. The overwhelming response from interviews with partners and recipients was that UNIDO has a core comparative advantage in working in this field globally, with one respondent citing *"no other choice from an international view"*. This is also reflected in the beneficiary survey, where 11 out of 12 respondents agreed with the statement *"In your view, was UNIDO best placed to undertake this project"*. Responses mentioned UNIDO's previous experience, project approaches, access to experts and established partnerships with other organisations active in this field as justification for their support of the statement.

UNIDO is seen as having a strong track record on SMTQ, stretching decades, and is a key reason many of the recipients saw the agency as the best placed to deliver the projects. Bilateral donors, from SIDA to USAID, often include SMTQ components in larger trade development programmes, or have smaller individual projects (e.g. SIDA QUISP in Uganda). The German Metrology Institute (PTB), though funded almost exclusively by GIZ, is perhaps the most relevant comparator to UNIDO, having implemented dozens of QI strengthening projects across Asia and Africa. At the regional level, large trade programmes such as the multi-donor TradeMark East Africa support QI development and other activities parallel to UNIDO's TCB activities.

Analysis of the projects in the middle of the funnel, particularly those with independent evaluations, corroborate the technical strengths of UNIDO in this field.

4.1.4 Incorporating cross-cutting issues

Incorporating cross-cutting issues into programme interventions is an increasingly important feature of donor funded trade-related assistance, but something which is inherently difficult to do well, often resulting in a "tick the box" approach.

On gender, UNIDO has recently established a house-wide gender mainstreaming policy and TCB will be publishing a guide on implementation by the end of 2014. The Norad Aid for Trade evaluation from 2012 highlighted the incorporation of gender as a weak point for UNIDO, and the organisation has assured their commitment to improvement on this front.

From our analysis of the projects in our middle of the funnel sample, gender is either not examined or given only a cursory analysis in older projects, but we observe a shift towards a more thoughtful and comprehensive inclusion in the newer projects although our sample projects did not provide evidence of an actual gender analysis exercise during project design. For example, the most recently designed project (and the only project added since the 2012 evaluation report) in our portfolio is AFRIMETS. The project document has a section on gender mainstreaming, which acknowledges the scarcity of women scientists. It also states that the project will ensure that at least 15% of the participants to training will be women. The project also incorporates a gender specific element into one of its key performance indicators (highlight evaluators): *“40 African legal metrologists from regional metrology organizations are trained by international experts to meet the challenges of their regional and local economies. At least 13 participants are women”*.

Outside of our project sample, we understand that the phase II of Zambia is a pilot project for the gender mainstreaming approach, and will serve as an important test for identifying how to incorporate gender more meaningfully into TCB projects going forward. Moreover, in May 2014 UNIDO’s Gender Mainstreaming Steering Committee and TCB Branch organised a weeklong Gender Mainstreaming Training Workshop for all TCB staff. A key outcome of the workshop will be the development of a Guide to Gender Mainstreaming in TCB projects⁴.

This mixed picture is also reflected in the responses to the beneficiary surveys. While it is noteworthy that the number of ‘Can’t say’ responses is high, reducing further the statistical significance of this question, it also suggests that crosscutting issues were not at the forefront of project design.

Table 9: Beneficiary survey responses

Question: To what extent were cross cutting issues such as corruption, gender, environment and human rights incorporated into the project design? <i>Note: responses controlled for people not involved in project design.</i>					
Highly incorporated	Incorporated	Somewhat	Limited incorporation	No incorporation	Can't say
0	4	1	0	1	4

The value chain approach to SMTQ activities, as exemplified by the Burundi EIF project, can provide a robust entry point to incorporate crosscutting issues more comprehensively. An analysis of the coffee value chain in Burundi found women are heavily implicated in certain components of the value chain, and largely absent from others, allowing for interventions to more closely link gender equality where possible. The value chain approach can also be used to better capture other crosscutting issues, such as human rights (e.g. by focusing on value chains with stakeholders from the most marginalised groups or history of human rights violations) or environment (e.g. focusing on value chains most affected by climate change).

4.2 Efficiency

4.2.1 Results-Based Management (RBM) system

There is a strong push to improve the Results Based Management (RBM) systems at UNIDO. The new Director General stated improving the RBM system as one of the five key priority areas for development⁵. RBM is also the first of three key principles of the Programme for Change and Organizational Renewal (PCOR), an organisation-wide change initiative carried out by UNIDO from 2010 to 2013. It is one of the seven strategic objectives identified in the TCB Branch Strategic Plan for 2012-16. It is clear that RBM is currently being taken seriously in the strategic planning and change management exercises of UNIDO and that the organisation is willing to invest in setting up the relevant management systems at the most senior level. While we note the positive developments, as well as a trend for more robust use of monitoring systems in our MotF analysis (see Annex 4) in the recent years, using the criteria identified in Table 10 below, we would have to judge UNIDO’s system to be more of an ‘implementation monitoring’ than ‘results monitoring’ system.

⁴ See: UNIDO Gender Newsletter No 9

⁵ Source: UNIDO staff interviews

Table 9: Implementation monitoring and results monitoring: a comparison

Implementation Monitoring	Results Monitoring
A description should be given of the situation as it is before the intervention begins.	Baseline data should be established to accurately map the situation as it is before the intervention begins.
Benchmarks should be established for activities and immediate outputs.	Indicators should be established for outcomes.
Data should be collected on input, activities, and immediate outputs.	Data should be collected on outputs, with information on how this might contribute to the achievement of outcomes.
Reporting should provide a systematic coverage on the provision of inputs.	A key focus should be given to the perceptions of change among stakeholders.
Reporting should provide a systematic coverage on the production of outputs.	Reporting should provide a systematic coverage on qualitative and quantitative information on the progress toward outcomes.
Monitoring is linked to a discrete intervention, or a series of discrete interventions	Monitoring for results is done in conjunction with other strategic partners
It should capture information related to the administrative, implementation, and management issues.	It should capture information on failures and successes of the intervention in achieving its desired outcomes and broader development goals.

Source: *A handbook for Development Practitioners: Ten steps to a Results-Based Monitoring and Evaluation System* (The World Bank 2004)

The introduction of RBM systems is inherently complex and challenging, especially in an organisation of the size and complexity of UNIDO⁶. As part of the PCOR process SAP, an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system, was introduced, with the first modules on Portfolio and Project Management (PPM) and Human Capital Management being launched in January 2012. The PPM module was intended to act as the primary platform for managing UNIDO's RBM system. This has yet to successfully materialise, with the organisation-wide performance indicators currently being reviewed. The SAP implementation process has caused challenges for project teams and an unintended consequence of the delay seems to have been a fatigue among team members to utilise an ever-changing RBM system. Crucially, it is not only in-efficient that UNIDO staff have to spend time to find go-around solutions to use the software, but issues related to SAP implementation are reportedly also jeopardising the success of the BEST programme in Bangladesh. Indicatively, the latest UNIDO Technical Cooperation Guidelines, the project management procedures document, date back to 2005 and are reportedly practically redundant for the purposes of RBM. A revised version is reportedly currently being drafted.

11 of the 12 projects assessed by the Review had an identifiable results chain organised in a logical framework, with set results statements at all the relevant levels. The quality of the logical frameworks of the reviewed sample markedly improved in projects that commenced in 2010 or later. There are apparent weaknesses in the application of monitoring frameworks at the project level, as is apparent from Annex 4. Following a review of the project documents seven of the 12 were considered as 'results monitoring' and five as 'implementation monitoring'. While some progress on the issue is visible for more recent projects, there seem to be gaps in defining the source of data for performance indicators or designating responsibility for collecting such data. This is a shame, as in most cases the indicators are well designed and would fulfil the criteria of being SMART, if they just were properly implemented.

Following a review of a cross-section of the latest progress reports for the sample, only 3 of the 12 were classified as 'results monitoring' (BAB-NA, Vietnam and Zambia) while the remaining 9 were 'implementation monitoring'. The main pitfall for the reports was that they did not contain sufficient focus on the **change** that the project was intended to bring about or include **systematic quantitative information** on the progress towards outcomes. This underscores the concerns of Norad managers

⁶ See: *A Handbook for Development Practitioners: Ten Steps to a Results-Based Monitoring and Evaluation System* (The World Bank 2004)

regarding reporting not being sufficient to enable them to effectively participate in the results-based management process.

Reporting is a key part of any RBM-system because it provides the opportunity to analyse and present performance findings, providing critical, continuous and potentially real-time feedback on the progress of a given project, programme or policy⁷. However, successful reporting is predicated on a monitoring and evaluation framework being in place and capable of delivering data on performance. If there is no baseline to compare to, or projects are not collecting data against their performance indicators, the reports quickly lose their validity. UNIDO needs to prepare reports for a number of donors, each of which has their own reporting requirements (although for example in Vietnam several donors agreed to use one template) as well as their internal reporting. While this can clearly be a constraint, the issue can greatly be mitigated if the basic performance information is regularly collected and easily available for project managers to use for the production of reports.

*The value of information [often] decreases rapidly over time; so essential findings should be communicated as quickly as possible*⁸. This statement underscores the importance of the timely preparation, and submission, of reporting. UNIDO has indicated that it is putting in place semi-automated processes within the SAP system to incorporate checks and balances. One of the stated key objectives of this exercise is to ensure timely submission of reports to donors.

It is worth stressing that at the same time UNIDO has a very impressive culture of evaluation and lesson learning, with all projects above a threshold of €1m being independently evaluated by the Office for Independent Evaluation. Moreover, all evaluation reports will receive a management response, and progress against the final recommendations will be tracked at regular intervals. In addition to project evaluations the Office for Independent Evaluation commissions thematic/programmatic evaluations and country evaluations. The project evaluation reports and the respective management responses of the Norad-funded UNIDO projects as well as the TCB thematic evaluation report have formed a solid foundation of evidence for this Review.

4.2.2 Cost efficiency

Analyzing value for money can be a complex and inherently subjective exercise. This evaluation did not have the mandate or required resources for a comprehensive analysis of how efficiently UNIDO TCB operates vis-à-vis other UN or competing aid for trade implementing agencies.

As is clear from Annex 2, the number of 'live' projects within the portfolio has steadily increased, reaching a peak of 16 concurrent projects in 2011-2012. While the number has since decreased, with 13 concurrent projects at the time of writing, we understand that UNIDO has a robust pipeline of new projects to be proposed for Norad.

According to the process agreed between Norad and UNIDO, all projects, irrespective of size, go through the same approval process. Similarly, the reporting and management structures follow a 'one-size fits all' approach. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that there is a fixed cost for the management of any single project. The implication is that the smaller a project or amendment to a project, the less cost-efficient it is to administer, both for Norad and for UNIDO. Indeed, it would be expected that Norad staff are able to perform both administrative and technical management functions. Norad report that due to the time it takes to administer the current volume of projects, there is no scope to engage in technical management of the portfolio.

UNIDO commissioned Deloitte in 2010 to undertake a cost measurement study utilising data from 2009 to calculate the real support cost rate⁹ within UNIDO. It found that the TCB branch support cost rate was 16%, compared to the 13% support cost rate UNIDO currently receives from donors. The real support cost rate for TCB was found to be lower than other PTC branches and the study attributed this to the high level of delivery. The overall recommendations to improve cost recovery were to have a greater focus on large projects, focus on specific funding sources, and grouping

⁷ *ibid*

⁸ See Monitoring and Evaluating Social Programs in Developing Countries: A Handbook for Policymakers, Managers, and Researchers (The World Bank 1994)

⁹ Support Cost Rate=((direct cost + indirect cost)*% of time spent on project activities)/total project delivery in 2009

activities to enlarge delivery. The implication of the above is also that UNIDO is cross-subsidising Norad by an estimated 3%. While this suggests that Norad is being offered very good economy by UNIDO, it does underscore the importance of reducing cost-inefficiencies within management of the collaboration.

Table 10: Project efficiency

Project	Overall budget	Months	Value/month	Evaluation's comments on efficiency
BAB-NA IC	€ 1,031,062	53	€ 19,454	N/A
EAC TCB	€ 3,181,939	68	€ 46,793	Relatively cost efficient compared to other projects, but IE does not provide sufficient detail as to the evidence backing up this finding.
Burundi EIF	€ 280,348	12	€ 23,362	N/A
AFRIMETS II	€ 290,350	24	€ 12,098	N/A
SAARC II	€ 2,260,000	61	€ 37,049	<i>Conclusion: The project activities were well implemented and efficient. The cooperation with the counterparts and beneficiaries seems to have been smooth. The methods and resources applied by UNIDIO have generally been efficient. Consultants and trainers are in high regard as competent among the beneficiaries. The Steering Committees have not functioned.</i>
Sierra Leone QCID	€ 600,000	37	€ 16,216	N/A
Sri Lanka Indexpo	€ 1,089,608	75	€ 14,528	<i>Conclusion: Efficiency of the project was overall satisfactory (unsatisfactory until 2011 and satisfactory from 2011 – 2013).</i>
Vietnam BRR	€ 5,628,818	49	€ 114,874	<i>Conclusion: Compares positively to similar project undertaken in Malaysia. Highly positive feedback from stakeholders and counterpart management suggesting effective project management. Some issues with planning vs reality, but rather than suggesting inefficient delivery these are more likely to be due to optimism bias in planning.</i> Note: the IE does not seem to take into account that the costs of the project were recouped by the BRO through increased revenue, meaning it was effectively self-funding.
Zambia TCB	€ 2,398,500	51	€ 47,029	<i>Conclusion: Based on the experience with similarly sized projects in other countries, there has been value for money for most of the outputs. The processes of stakeholder consultation absorbed an important part of the resources, had an overall positive impact in creating national ownership. The value for money for activities realized in the area of standardization and testing laboratories is less clear because outputs are fragmented and only loosely linked to the objectives.</i>
TSCR II	€ 187,000	33	€ 5,667	N/A
Guide to Private Standards	€ 345,780	48	€ 7,204	N/A
DG SANCO	€ 600,000	41	€ 14,634	N/A

Similarly, from the limited evidence identified by the Review, there may be scope to improve cost-efficiency on a project level as well. The Review team has learned that management costs were identified as a key issue by at least one other major donor. Clearly these costs will vary according to the size and type of intervention given fixed cost components, but a more comprehensive financial analysis could shed more light on this critical question.

The table overleaf provides a view of the average monthly value of the projects over their entire life cycle. The projects have a very large deviation from just over €5,000 per month to over €110,000 with the average monthly value being just short of €30,000. A smaller project does not necessarily have to present lower value for money.

From our analysis of the project sample, we can highlight specific cases, which have helped to achieve efficient delivery of outputs and secure value for money. For instance, the relatively small Norad-funded bridge component of the Burundi EIF project allowed for the momentum to be maintained between the closure of the regional EAC TCB and launch of the full EIF project, likely saving 6 to 12 months of delivery time, even in the face of significant delays on the EIF side, including complications with UNOPs arrangements.

The findings above are echoed by the responses to our beneficiary survey, outlined in the table below, which broadly suggests the projects present good value for money.

Table 11: Beneficiary survey responses

Question: In comparison to other broadly comparable projects, how would you rate the cost-effectiveness or "value-for-money" of this project?					
Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	Not relevant	Can't say
2	6	3	1	0	1

4.2.3 Timeliness of delivery

Working in developing countries, especially LDCs, is often difficult and projects are subject to delays from external factors ranging from recipient government bureaucracy and capacity constraints to political instability (e.g. Bangladesh) and natural disasters (e.g. Ebola in Sierra Leone). However, internal factors can also exacerbate these realities, and our analysis finds a prevalence of delays caused by both sets of factors.

Table 13: Delays in project sample

Project	On time	Notes
AFRIMETS II (11/13-11/15)	Yes	So far project is on schedule and on budget.
Burundi EIF (06/12-06/13)	Yes	Initial delays occurred in the project approval due to issues on the EIF/UNOP side. So far, project delivery has been strong. Norad's bridge financing component likely helped to speed up the rate of delivery as it was able to undertake value chain analysis and other components during delays on the EIF Secretariat side.
Sierra Leone QCID (11/11-12/14)	No	The expected duration of this project was linked to the expected completion date of the wider WAQP programme, however a realistic assessment of the time needed for this project to be implemented was not carried out. In addition, the ongoing health crisis in West Africa has also caused delays. The Project Manager has request a cost-extension, and this is currently under consideration.
DG SANCO (07/11-12/14)	No	UNIDO provided the funds for Output 1 (Food Safety Alert Rapid Response Facility (FSA-RRF) and Output 2 (Findings of analyses of non-compliance of developing countries' exports feed into technical assistance design), Finland and Norway co-financed Output 3 (Pilot activities within the FSA-RRF are conducted for selected fisheries exporting countries). Funds were disbursed from Norad and Finland at the

		<p>beginning of the project, however Output 1 needed to be achieved before Output 3 activities could commence, and therefore the duration of the project as outlined in the Project Document did not reflect the sequential nature of the project. The project implementation is therefore delayed, when compared with the project document.</p> <p>In addition, further delays were also caused due to the slow start-up of some activities, an additional request from the AUC, and delays to the release of the final instalment from Norad also created further delays.</p>
Trade Standards Compliance Report II (03/11-12/13)	No	Delays were experienced in the implementation of the project due to the inclusion of additional unforeseen activities, and also due to initial difficulty in obtaining Japanese data in an English format.
BAB-NA Institutional Cooperation (07/10-12/14)	No	Delays due to persistent political instability in Bangladesh causing delays in being able to field NA missions. As well, appears management issues on the BAB side caused delays in the planned study tour to NA.
Zambia TCB (03/09-06/13)	No	Start-up delays in 2009 were experienced due to the establishment of the TA team. The IE also stated that cumbersome procurement processes have caused delays in implementation of programme activities
Vietnam BRR (09/08-4/12))	No	Norway, UNIDO and the One UN Plan funded (part of) phase A with a total external budget of USD 6 million (2008-2010).). There was a delay of 6 months in implementation start date of the project as a result of required Government approvals ¹⁰ , as funds could not spent until then. With SECO's participation MPI-UNIDO prepared a new Project document (October 2010). While the objectives and expected delivery of the 'new' Project was the same as the 'old', the time frame and the budget were expanded until April 2013 and the Project budget was expanded to USD 12.7 million Norad funded TFVIE08001 was operationally completed on 16.4. 2012. In late 2012, it was agreed between SECO, UNIDO and MPI that the time frame of the expanded project would be prolonged for eight months without additional funding to continue with capacity building particularly at the 63 Business Registration Offices in provinces.
Guide to Private Standards (02/08-02/12)	No	Due to the innovative nature of the research project it took over a year to recruit and contract appropriate research partners. The first survey also showed the need for additional research but the extension allowed for a significant amount of additional information to be collected on the subject matter.
SAARC II (11/07-12/12)	Yes	Overall the project delivery appears to have been relatively efficient and on time, though with external factors causing some delays. Despite political disturbances in Bangladesh, the project was able to achieve 100% of its targeted outputs, with Bhutan close to 90% (food testing lab remained to be accredited). Persistent political disturbances in Nepal allowed for only 70% of outputs to be completed, with a similar figure in the Maldives where staff shortages and political delays in implementation allowed for a similar output rate.
EAC TCB (10/06-06/12)	No	15-18 month delays occurred during the initial phase, stemming largely from difficulties in communicating with national and regional counterparts and the need to include Rwanda and Burundi following their accession to the EAC. The independent evaluation found that more direct and forceful management oversight and action coupled with a more comprehensive approach to the project's design could have mitigated these delays.
Sri Lanka Indexpo (09/06-12/12)	No	Project implementation started in 2007 fully funded by NORAD for an initial duration of two years. In January 2011 the project was extended with additional funding. In 2013 the project received a final extension with additional budget.

For instance, the procurement rules were identified both in the 2010 TCB evaluation and our analysis from the portfolio sample and field missions as impeding on timely delivery. As highlighted in earlier sections, the centralised decision and financial structure can also cause significant delays as UNIDO advisors on the ground must wait for approval from Vienna for even small expenditures

¹⁰ Technical assistance to business registration reform in Viet Nam: Independent Evaluation Report 2008-2013

The lack of reporting at the portfolio level also masks some of the overall trends in the delays and the effects on project delivery as a whole.

4.2.4 Global Forum

UNIDO's Global Forum function and Global Forum activities are identified as being distinctly separate from UNIDO's technical cooperation work. UNIDO undertook an independent thematic evaluation of the Global Forum Function in 2013, which concluded that there had been many positive assessments regarding the relevance of Global Forum activities such as conferences, expert meetings, networks and knowledge products there was much less information on efficiency, effectiveness and impacts. The evaluation report went on to suggest that this appeared to be due to "a general lack of strategy and planning, using RBM principles, for global forum activities as part of thematic and programmatic priorities"¹¹. While this was stated to have ramifications to the evaluability of the Global Forum projects (which were evident in our assessments as well), the report concluded that generally positive results were achieved at the output level. Tracing change beyond this was often challenged due to complex results chains, participation of multiple stakeholders, etc.

Responses to the beneficiary surveys would seem to suggest that UNIDO's Global Forum products were well received (when they were familiar to people). This sentiment was generally replicated in the interviews with key informants.

Table 12: Perceived quality of Global Forum products

Question: How would you rate the quality of the following UNIDO Global Forum product?					
	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	Can't say
Trade Compliance Report 1 & 2	0	4	1	0	6
UNIDO's TCB Approach - validation workshop	0	4	0	0	7
Guide to Private Sector Standards	1	3	1	0	7

4.3 Effectiveness

4.3.1 Delivering project objectives

From the examination of the 12 projects in the sample portfolio, there appears to be a mixed picture of the extent to which objectives have been achieved and several of the projects are still underway, making it too early to make a definitive assessment. Where available, the independent evaluations or mid-term reviews allowed for a useful source of evidence on the achievement of results. From this analysis, the picture was overall relatively positive, though a common theme in several evaluations was setting overly ambitious objectives, which in at least one case had to be revised half way through the project.

¹¹ UNIDO: Independent Thematic Evaluation: UNIDO's Global Forum Function, 2013

Table 15: Independent evaluation or self-evaluation comments on effectiveness

Project	Comment on effectiveness
EAC TCB	Contributions towards outcomes delivered. Outcomes 1 and Outcome 2 partially achieved
Burundi EIF	Some outcomes are already visible: consortia organized to export coffee. Coffee producer exported for the first time. Specialty coffee being recognized internationally and exported.
SAARC II	Emergent outcome-level results in all 4 countries, with contribution achieved for most outcome areas.
Sri Lanka Indexpo	Substantial, tangible results achieved at enterprises level; limited broader impact due to small market share of IndExpo and low number of CROWN awards
Vietnam BRR	Effective in delivering the planned key outputs, and reasonably effective in achieving its stated objectives in terms of reducing time and cost for registration, and make public financial statements of shareholding companies... All the targets set by the Government in its resolution 59 in 2007 have been achieved, i.e.: business- and tax code registration effectuated within 5 days; unification of the business- and tax registration files; assignment of the tax code as the unique identification number of enterprises, and establishing of a national business register database accessible for the BROs.
Zambia TCB	Progress is still predominately at output level and not all the outcomes have been achieved. Outcome 2 was nearly achieved, the National Quality Policy having been approved and its implementation started. The regulatory framework had been upgraded and the legislation was at Cabinet for approval. Outcome 3 was not achieved. The national standards body (ZABS) did not complete the modernization of its operational processes. Outcome 4 was achieved in relation to legal metrology and partly achieved regarding scientific metrology. Outcome 5 remained far from being achieved, as the laboratory infrastructure needs additional support to improve services to a minimum acceptable level. Outcome 6 was partly achieved, through the support given to 5 pilot companies
Guide to Private Standards	Both immediate objectives of the project were achieved and the feedback from users of the Guide has been very positive. Since being launched on 25 October 2010, the Guide has reached a wide audience, where the direct views of the accompanying video and the website has reached over 2500 hits.

Moreover, several of the evaluations were conducted prior or very shortly after the close of the project, making an assessment of delivery (or results) difficult. For example, the evaluation report for the EAC TCB project was undertaken prior to the project closure, with the evaluator "assuming" a number of project objectives would be realised post-project. In the case of Burundi component of this regional project, the evaluation report assumed that the ISO/HACCP training for the four identified enterprises would lead to their achieving certification at least at the HACCP level, but from our field mission, we found this was not the case, with none of the four firms having achieved certification. As well, the evaluation assumed that the EAC SPS protocol would be ratified and implemented, which appears not to have happened in the three years following the closure of the project. On the other hand, the ongoing Burundi EIF project, for which Norad provided crucial bridge funding following the closure of the EAC regional project, appears to be delivering objectives at an impressive speed, which the upcoming EIF mid-term evaluation can provide more details on.

4.3.2 Major factors influencing achievement and non-achievement

Borrowing from the comprehensive evaluation of TCB activities undertaken in 2009-10, we highlight some key drivers of successful project delivery from both the middle and bottom of the funnel.

- **Harnessing market dynamics to affect change:** as highlighted in the case of the shrimp industry in Bangladesh, the private sector's involvement is often a catalytic driver for change, especially when firms face real economic incentives to do so. Being able to identify such dynamics, which may often be only emerging, can ensure project ownership and impact.
- **Dedicated UNIDO staff and technical expertise:** from our field missions, it became clear that UNIDO has been able to attract both technically skilled and highly motivated staff who demonstrate a strong commitment to their projects. The team found that often these staff members went above and beyond their required roles, including pre-financing activities out of their own pocket, to make sure activities went ahead as scheduled in the face of bureaucratic delays. As highlighted in section 4.1.3, UNIDO is seen also to have a strong technical comparative advantage in the SMTQ field, which is vital given the sector's relative complexity.
- **Dedicated recipient counterparts:** UNIDO operates in countries with difficult political and economic environments, which pose significant risks to project delivery. In the example of the BAB-NA project, the team found that the ability of the recipient agency's management to resist political pressure allowed it to hire the most competent and motivated staff, which has ensured that the new agency is building a solid foundation. As well, selecting the most appropriate recipient counterparts is critical, as with the approach to the second phase of the AFRIMETS project which selected mid-level metrology officials (vs. very senior officials) in order to ensure skills can be put to use for many years to come.
- **Long-term, trust-building approach:** in many developing countries, particularly LDCs, recipients have experience with top-down, donor-driven projects with limited attention to ensuring ownership. Moreover, these countries have limited awareness of SMTQ issues and how these can relate to trade development, increasing the need to build awareness and understanding of how standards can be a catalyst for trade.
- **Tailored value chain approach:** from our analysis, the use of the value chain approach, from the Burundi coffee to Bangladesh shrimp projects, has been successful. The approach allows for a concrete approach to working with the private sector and making SMTQ development more directly linked to the goal of export development. As highlighted in section 5.1.4, this also allows for a strengthened approach to incorporating key cross-cutting issues.
- **Incorporating lessons from previous projects and the country context:** building on the achievements and lessons learned (as well as built up trust) from previous projects can allow for exponential results, but must be coupled with a careful analysis of ensuring sustainability and not creating a dependence on donor support. For instance, in Bangladesh, the initial BQSP programme clearly allowed for the subsequent BEST programme to catalyse on the achievements and established relationships.

From our analysis, we also find important factors which have slowed down project delivery and achievement of objectives or which pose a significant risk to do so going forward.

- **Centralised financial system:** it is clear that the centralised management system has created significant delays (see section 4.3.1) and the continued issues with the SAP implementation poses significant risks to ongoing projects, particularly the flagship BEST programme in Bangladesh funded by the EU. Respondents from the ground identified the centralisation and lack of decision making power on the ground, particularly on the financial/expenditure side a key obstacle.
- **Limited situation/problem analysis:** several of the project evaluation reports, including the TCB evaluation, outlined the lack of a systematic approach to examining the needs and demand for QI services as a weak element in project design.

4.4 Impact

Overall UNIDO is viewed by partners as being a competent organisation, which creates positive impact on the ground, and the team anticipates more evidence will be collected on this in the Final Report after the responses from the beneficiary questionnaire are collected and analysed. Though accurately assessing impact is an inherently complex exercise, we been able to identify many positive stories of change across many of the project under review:

- **DG SANCO:** under this project, the AUC requested support to establish a regional Arica-wide Rapid Food and Feed Alert Mechanism and an African Union Food Safety Management Coordination Mechanism. An AUC Continental Workshop was held to discuss both issues and the summary and recommendations from this was submitted to Ministers of Agriculture in May 2014. This was then approved and passed to the AU/EU Head of States, who also subsequently approved both mechanisms. The key success of this is down to the rapid response times achievable within this project as the preparatory work was required before the Ministers meeting. An unintended result of this project was a mapping of how FAO, UNIDO and WHO can work together, which had not been carried out previously, and offers the potential to increase synergies, coordination, and collaboration between the three organisations going forward.
- **Vietnam BRR:** an improved business environment for some 700,000 domestic formal enterprises through the establishment of a new business registration system which has reduced the cost of starting a business in Viet Nam for domestic firms at around USD 4 million per annum since June 2010 and increased the transparency in the process, thereby reduced the possibilities for rent-seeking. In 2010, the Vietnamese Government established the Agency for Business Registration to manage business registration activities, including policy making and to build capacity in business registration office in all provinces of the country. Revenues created by the National Business Registration System (NBRS) surpassed the costs of operating the nationwide system by USD 212,000 in 2013, with the operations gaining a sound footing towards financial sustainability¹².
- **Sri Lanka Indexpo:** set up new private sector certification body to provide cheaper more credible certification in Sri Lanka. At the time of writing, Indexpo is still ongoing and thus must be considered financially and technically sustainable.
- **BAB-NA:** significantly strengthened BAB, which will very likely obtain APLAC / ILAC recognition in early 2015, allowing for lower cost domestically sourced accreditation services.
- **Bangladesh BEST:** there have been concrete impacts from this project, including the strengthening of the national standards agency (BSTI), as well as significantly strengthening the ability of the shrimp export sector to meet EU SPS standards, likely saving the industry millions of dollars annually.
- **Burundi EIF:** the project has helped a number of farmers and cooperatives to obtain significant price premiums for their coffee, and has helped to secure more buyers as well as awareness of the key private standards and the requirements for meeting these standards and potential gains in terms of price premiums.

4.5 Sustainability

4.5.1 Overall UNIDO approach to sustainability

Ensuring the sustainability of outcomes is both challenging and important for all development interventions. The 2010 Thematic Evaluation found that a specific problem for the sustainability of SMQT projects is that the local capacity to use laboratory equipment is often lost quickly, and it stated that a key success factor for some projects was the use of local counterparts, as it increases ownership and sustainability.

With regards to sustainability, the 2010 Thematic Evaluation recommended the use long-term approaches in UNIDO's interventions. This view was echoed in partner interviews as partners cited the need for patience, a long-term approach, and the setting of realistic goals.

Within this Review, evidence has been gathered from UNIDO staff indicating a move towards a more holistic approach to their interventions which includes all actors along the production and consumption chain from consumers, to enterprises, to laboratories to policy makers. This move appears to be motivated by the recognition that both 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' pressures need to exist for the project to have lasting impact. This is evident from the follow-up work undertaken by the Office for

¹² UNIDO: Technical assistance to business registration reform in Viet Nam: Independent Evaluation Report 2008-2013

Independent Evaluation and recorded in the synthesis reports publicly available on the UNIDO website. The latest report published in June 2014¹³ suggests using a value chain approach, a deeper understanding of the social and political dynamics in the communities, and process use of evaluation/monitoring deliverables as potential ways of increasing sustainability in the future.

While UNIDO may not have applied a uniform codified approach to ensuring sustainability, there is a clear culture of consideration on the topic. Moreover, it would seem that sustainability concerns would be more prominent for more recent projects. Indeed, all 12 responses to the question “*Will the project’s benefits continue after the project has ended?*” in the beneficiary survey were positive. The responses in Box 2 provide some further detail of how this may occur.

Box 2: Beneficiary responses on sustainability of projects

“Definitely. I will have taken my organization ... to greater heights in responding to issues that I would like addressed.... 1) To improve the involvement of big companies in the use of the national certification body. 2) To upgrade SMEs to play in the mainstream economy through being able to understand and apply standards. 3) The introduction of standards education in primary, secondary and tertiary institutions. The trick is to introduce Programs that the Government of ... will understand and appreciate so that they are funded by the Government even after the project. The disadvantage that ... had before the project was that we did not have enough funds to sustainably initiate projects that have such an impact to the people that they look for them annually. All we ever did was vestigial and insignificant.”

“The project benefits will definitely continue beyond the project. It is adding capacity and value to an already functioning marketing system with smallholders at the core. ... has existed since 1997 and continues to grow its membership and continues to be relevant to the community.”

4.5.2 Evidence from MOTF and BOTF

Evidence at the project level indicates that sustainability considerations are increasingly addressed in the design stage of the individual projects, and in relation to the project aims and context. Importantly, the project managers retain a level of adaptability, allowing the projects to remain opportunistic with regards to emerging areas for intervention. During the review we identified a number of key considerations for ensuring sustainability that had changed during the implementation of projects and UNIDO had to be sensitive towards. These include:

- Alignment with political and organizational objectives in the beneficiary country.
- The resources available to implement policy decisions.
- The demand for QI services in various sectors.
- The degree to which key stakeholders were consulted.

Evidence gathered at the bottom of the funnel found that in Bangladesh, the SAARC II project enabled BSTI to increase revenues from certification services, strengthening its ability to self-finance capital investments and training. However in Burundi, the sustainability of the EAC project in Burundi appears to have been relatively weak, with limited impact. According to UNIDO “*the very reason [UNIDO] had recommended further assistance to Burundi after EAC was the knowledge that the starting point and absorption capacity was much weaker than the other EAC countries*”. BBN remains a very weak institution, requiring both political movement for change as well as significant technical and financial resources. The Burundi EIF project, working with the two selected value chains appears to have significantly better prospects for sustainability given the much larger presence on the ground and more comprehensive approach to working with the private sector.

¹³ UNIDO: Synthesis of lessons learned from completed evaluations 2012-2013

4.5.3 UNIDO coordination with other partners


From speaking with partner agencies and donors, there tends to be a significant effort by UNIDO to coordinate and share information to ensure project complementarity and avoid duplication of efforts. This is critical, especially in countries where there are no formal structures, such as donor working groups, for information sharing among partners along thematic lines.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The Norad-UNIDO collaboration could be described as a kind of ‘special relationship’, serving distinct if slightly separate purposes for the two organisations. Over time, working practices and conventions have developed for processing and managing the relationship. Due to a number of external pressures, including a change in government in Norway and staff turnover, including in senior management at UNIDO, these conventions have now come under question. The use of a framework agreement coupled with administrative agreements for individual projects is a hallmark for the way the collaboration has been managed. While it means that Norad has had significant level of involvement and influence on individual projects at each stage of the project cycle, as the size of the portfolio has grown, the amount of resources required for the management of the collaboration has grown in proportion.

At the same time, it is important to emphasise that achieving positive, inclusive and sustainable results in the field of trade capacity building is inherently challenging. In most cases the road to success is highly uncertain (due to a number of factors) with a significant degree of conflict between various stakeholders about how to solve the problem at hand. While the problem analysis is currently most often based on a linear model results chain formalised in a logical framework model, in actuality, the links between TCB interventions and poverty reduction (for example) are a lot more complex. One possible case is outlined in the systems dynamic mode, which is from a report on trade and poverty undertaken by UNIDO¹⁴.

Diagram 1: Systems dynamics model of trade and poverty



Source: de Goys: *Do UNIDO projects contribute to poverty reduction – evidences from UNIDO evaluations*

¹⁴ UNIDO: Desk review: What has UNIDO done to reduce poverty – Evidence from UNIDO evaluations 2008 and 2009

5.1 Relevance and efficiency

Overall, the Norad-UNIDO collaboration is highly relevant to both partners as well as the recipient countries. UNIDO plays a special and somewhat unique role in the TCB-field and is widely recognised to form a 'centre of excellence' in this area. Similarly, Norad plays a key role in enabling UNIDO to perform this role. By being willing to be a patient investor, with a relatively high tolerance for risk, Norad has enabled UNIDO to develop and test innovative project approaches at country and regional level as well as new project ideas such as the Global Forum products. This, combined with substantive technical management input from Oslo, has contributed greatly in establishing UNIDO's current position as a leading TCB-implementing agency within the Aid-for-Trade family.

As outlined above, Norad has approved every individual project, and as such there is no concern about the relevance of the portfolio with regards to Norway's trade assistance goals and priorities. However, moving forward, with constant pressure on the management resources at both Norad and UNIDO, the lack of an overall guiding framework for the selection and management of projects is likely to present an increasing challenge. Indeed, the relevance of the collaboration may only be undermined by the efficiency of its management and the effectiveness of delivering the intended high-level results in a sustainable manner, which will be discussed further below.

In terms of efficiency of the collaboration, the picture is somewhat more mixed. This is partly due to the long timeframe covered by the Review and the internal and external changes, which have occurred during that period. While Norad-UNIDO collaboration has been traditionally considered 'best-practise', with the current volume of projects and the resource constraints facing both organisations, there are significant concerns of whether the current management system is still fit for purpose. Our analysis on efficiency considered level of effort required for the management and administration of the portfolio by both parties as well the effectiveness of UNIDO implementation of the individual projects. As the mandate of the Review was to be forward-looking, the focus of our analysis is on biased to the current situation.

5.1.1 Supervision, governance, management and implementation

While the management arrangements for the collaboration may have historically been appropriate, in view of the current management capacity at Norad and UNIDO, the collaboration modalities should be revisited and additional efficiency gains sought to ensure both parties have a role that allows for maximal value-addition towards the aspired outputs. After nearly a decade of working together and following some significant external changes, there is a distinct need to re-calibrate the way that the collaboration is being implemented. Issues to be considered as part of such a re-calibration include:

- Altering the contractual basis of managing the collaboration.
- Establishing a programmatic framework to guide the selection and management of individual projects.
- Mainstreaming RBM systems across entire project portfolio.
- Streamlining the reporting systems.

The points should be considered in the priority order stated above. Each of the points is given a brief treatment below.

The way that the Norad-UNIDO collaboration is currently structured is something of an anomaly for both organisations. It is clear that the current framework agreement coupled with individual administrative agreements is not the most cost-effective way to manage a portfolio of up to 16 projects. UNIDO has presented several options to the current system, including non-project specific contributions to soft-earmarked trust funds programmable by UNIDO with single donor funding, for which approval and reporting processes can be tailored to specific donor requirements.

There seems to be little need to change the administrative arrangements for the already approved projects that will be ongoing after 2014. However, in the case that an alternate funding modality will not be agreed between Norad and UNIDO for the medium-to-long term and new projects will be agreed using the existing contractual arrangements, there will inevitably have to be a trade-off: due to the fixed management cost associated with the administering of an individual project, the number of projects must decrease. If annual contributions by Norad were to stay level, this would mean projects

would on average be larger in nominal value terms. This would also mean that relatively small projects, typified by the 'Global Forum' products, would not be viable on their own, although it would be possible to package several smaller research and outreach products into a larger multi-year research project.

Independent of the contractual arrangement, having an overarching programmatic framework to guide the selection and management of individual projects could be a useful reference point for the managers at both organisations, especially as Norway is likely to focus its international development efforts on a smaller number of countries. While a programmatic framework is by no means a prerequisite for joint future work, having a framework in place would provide a platform for strategic level discussion; enable measuring progress against targets; and thus enabling Norad colleagues to play an effective part in managing for results rather than being limited to an administrative function. If the decision would be to go for a significantly smaller number of concurrent projects, agreeing a programmatic framework may not be justified or cost-efficient, as managers could simply use the projects' RBM frameworks as their key reference points for decision-making.

A major historical weakness of UNIDO identified by this Review is the lack of a functional RBM system capable of capturing data at all levels of the results chain and systematically reporting the achievement of a project towards outcomes. There are, however, pockets of good practise within the TCB Branch and these could be mainstreamed initially across the branch, and subsequently across the entire organisation when appropriate. Such an initiative could establish the TCB Branch as a champion for the practical application of the RBM system within UNIDO. If Norad were to support the TCB Branch in such an endeavour successfully, it may not only enhance the Norad-UNIDO collaboration, but the positive impact of the investment could potentially be felt across the entire organisation.

Regardless of the future shape of the partnership structure, there will be a need to ensure reporting is fit for purpose and produced on time. There may be, for example, an increased need to report against the poverty impact or gender issues of interventions and these should be captured in the regular reports. As long as the data collection on all indicators, be it at a project or portfolio/programme level, on the achieved progress towards the expected outcomes or crosscutting issues fulfils the criteria of being reliable, valid and timely, the reports should provide a strong foundation for future Norad-UNIDO collaboration. It is noted that during the Review process Norad and UNIDO have been working together to improve the project report template. This is a positive step, though more importantly than simply rejigging the template, UNIDO must ensure that the required data is actually gathered at the project level and collated in the reports. As it is envisaged that the modality of semi-annual meetings between Norad and UNIDO will continue, these will provide a good opportunity for more informal brainstorming and project management.

At the project level, within the limitations of this Review, the efficiency of project implementation was overall considered relatively positive, with management costs of projects being broadly comparable to other modalities of support and project outputs generally been seen as meeting expected quality criteria. The one major concern to the efficiency of projects relates to the frequency of delays, which seem almost to be a feature of Norad-funded UNIDO portfolio. While all of the delays were justified by UNIDO and individually approved by Norad, the high occurrence rate does suggest that there is a disconnect between the projects' design and implementation processes. Coupled with the often highly ambitious outcome and impact statements, this may be considered an indication of systematic performance bias. This may be due to a lack of appreciation to the relative complexity of the projects' outcomes.

At the same time, and perhaps paradoxically, while delays may be from an operations management perspective considered inefficient (and which can be monetised relatively easily), it could be argued that the capacity to tolerate delays may enable Norad and UNIDO to be considered patient long-term partners by beneficiaries. This would very likely contribute to achieving the desired outcomes in the medium to long term translating to greater levels of effectiveness (which is very difficult to monetise)

It also bears mentioning that the new UNIDO leadership has thoroughly revised the project approval procedure, which may have implications for future programme efficiency, but the Review is not in a position to make an informed judgement at this early stage.

5.2 Effectiveness

The Review methodology places emphasis on the efficiency of Norad-UNIDO collaboration, helping the Review to respond to the question ‘how well did Norad and UNIDO as Norad’s agent convert inputs into outputs?’ The assessment of effectiveness, or ‘how well did the outputs achieve the desired outcomes independent of direct Norad or UNIDO control’ is very much based on the ‘middle of the funnel’ analysis, which was then ‘ground truthed’ by the two country missions at the ‘bottom of the funnel’. Together these two elements constitute a framework that enables the Review to respond to how well the Norad-funded projects have or are likely to achieve their objectives with a moderate level of confidence.

As suggested above, achieving any noticeable result from an intervention that is dependent on a third party changing their behaviour, is inherently challenging. To use the language of complex theory, these situations can often be described as ‘complicated’ or even ‘complex’¹⁵ and will be characterised by a number of common traits: nonlinearity, emergence, adaptation, uncertainty and dynamical systems change¹⁶. While there is limited evidence to suggest that UNIDO would apply a systems-oriented framework in their project design or problem analysis processes, there are clear indications that their projects can withstand and positively respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by emergence, adaptation and uncertainty. Based on the findings of this Review, all assessed projects achieved or are likely to achieve positive outcomes at least to some extent. Importantly, this includes a number of outcome statements that have been amended or introduced as new during project implementation. This suggests that there is a budding culture of being sensitive to emerging new opportunities and having the capacity to adapt the project approach to a changing environment. However, it bears stressing that the responsiveness seems to be very much down to individuals UNIDO project managers and technical experts, backed with support and trust of Norad managers.

When managing uncertainty in a complex situation, it is inherently risky to expend a lot of effort in designing an intervention if the external or internal circumstances are likely to radically change. As outlined above, there may have been some issues with the problem analysis as part of project design, especially for earlier projects in the UNIDO portfolio. However, once again due to dedicated UNIDO staff and technical experts, and flexibility from Norad managers, projects have managed to develop during implementation. UNIDO is moving towards an approach where projects undergo a phased approach, with a longer foundational period of around 12 months to commence the intervention. While our sample did not include detailed inspection of projects applying such an approach, anecdotal evidence would suggest that such projects would go through a more robust problem analysis phase and respectively had a more solid foundation for building trust with partners, defining the intervention logic and tailoring the approach to the realities on the ground. Based on the project sample we have reviewed, more work will need to be done to establish more credible baselines and needs assessments for future assignments.

Finally, as is characteristic for trade related projects, the potential impacts to be achieved by any intervention are nonlinear. In simple terms this means that relatively small investments can lead to major changes. A good case in point here is the Bangladesh BEST project, which has contributed towards Bangladeshi exporters saving millions of dollars annually.

Thus, the Review concludes that, overall, the Norad-UNIDO collaboration has been relatively effective in contributing towards the achievement of positive results, anticipated or otherwise, in diverse and complex operating environments.

5.3 Impact and sustainability

Overall, the impact of the Norad-UNIDO collaboration would seem to be more than the sum of the impacts of the individual projects in the sense that delivering projects for Norad has helped build the capacity and capability of the TCB programme, which in turn has used this for the benefit of projects funded by other donors. Norad support has been integral to the process of TCB Branch becoming a leading centre of excellence for the provision of SMTQ-related projects. The intangible benefits

¹⁵ See FASID (2010): Beyond Logframe: Using Systems Concepts in Evaluation

¹⁶ See Patton (2011): Developmental Evaluation

include the development of capacity within UNIDO as well the public goods under the 'Global Forum' work stream, which reportedly have been considered useful contributions.

One aspect of this review was to help understand how well successful strategies have been institutionalised and standardised for replication and future use. But as a matter of practise, in complex environments applying a standardised approach can be risk-prone and lead to project failure, as was the case during the first phase of the Sri Lanka project. This is due to success in such environments being highly context specific and thus applying a 'cookie-cutter' approach can lead to the ignorance of vital social, political and even technical aspects of a project that are prerequisites for an intervention to succeed. Rather than focusing on standardised methods or approaches, research¹⁷ suggests that complex environments require a focus on principles that allow a project to take into account changes in the five complexity-sensitising concepts outlined above. We have identified a number of such principles listed in section 4.3.2.

In terms of project benefits, some of the impact stories identified during the Review are highlighted as examples in section 4.4 above, although the Review does not suggest that these would represent a complete set of results or the most successful projects. Overall, it would seem that the highest impact and greatest likelihood for sustainability were with projects that had clear traceability to the needs of the private sector, which would act as the transitional device and translate project outputs into sustainable real-economy results.

UNIDO had not tracked the benefits streams of any of the completed and evaluated projects covered by the Review and the Review was not resourced to assess this independently beyond the beneficiary survey, so it is not possible to estimate the level of benefits after project activities had ceased. This includes, for example, assessing potential increases in exports. It is worth noting, however, that in cases such as the Sri Lanka Indexpo project it could have been relatively straightforward to agree to semi-annual benefit reporting if done at the outset. Incorporating such an element into future design may help reporting against impact and sustainability.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

The first two recommendations are divided into two parts: (i) how to manage the portfolio of the already contracted ongoing projects; and (ii) how to re-calibrate the collaboration to maximise the benefits for both parties over the next 5-10 years. The recommendations are addressed to Norad and UNIDO, and both organisations will need to support each other in the implementation of any follow-up actions in order to succeed. Recommendations 3-5 have only one part, and are addressed mainly to UNIDO, although Norad should be ready to support the suggestions.

Recommendation 1: Make the project portfolio manageable and focused on results now and in the future

Short-term: Norad to help UNIDO organise a workshop in the first half of 2015 where the RBM elements of the nine remaining projects running from 2015 onwards will be developed using an action-learning methodology. The aim will be to increase the capacity of TCB Branch staff, but also to design a streamlined system of data collection and reporting capable of producing information on progress towards the achievement of outcomes for all nine projects for UNIDO's internal ERP system as well as Norad managers. The outcome of the exercise is to reduce the administrative and management burden of the remaining portfolio.

Long-term: Norad and UNIDO to undertake a re-calibration assessment process, and jointly review whether in the medium to long term they prefer to do any of the following:

- Alter the contractual basis of managing the Norad-UNIDO collaboration from the current model.
- Establish a programmatic framework to guide the selection and management of individual projects.

¹⁷ *ibid*

- Mainstream RBM systems across entire project portfolio.
- Streamline the reporting systems.

This assessment should then be used as the basis for re-defining the way the collaboration is taken forward from 2015 onward.

Recommendation 2: Acknowledge Norway's shifting priorities and be ambitious in turning these into an opportunity to leverage results

Norway has reduced the number of partner countries from 116 to 84, including 12 priority countries while removing 16 high middle income countries. The new Government has also emphasised the importance of being able to deliver tangible results.

Short-term: The existing portfolio will potentially include ongoing projects in two of Norway's 12 new priority countries. As soon as the countries are confirmed Norad and UNIDO should jointly examine options to scale-up activities in these countries.

Long-term: As part of the country prioritisation process, Norway may consider strengthening the capacity of the respective Embassies as well as focusing investment through other multilateral agencies towards the priority countries. In order to leverage the most out of such a situation, Norad could ensure that UNIDO and other specialist agencies are working together in a coordinated and complimentary way to achieve their joint goals on trade and development.

UNIDO should take into account Norway's priority countries when presenting any new project concepts to Norad. Any resulting project design should take into account that Norway has demonstrated that it is a patient and risk resilient donor and a guiding design question should be 'how much can be achieved in 5 years?'

Recommendation 3: Further increase private sector involvement in SMTQ projects to demonstrate the link between trade and poverty reduction

Acknowledging that in most instances the private sector is the transitional device for translating project inputs into real-world outcomes, UNIDO should continue to develop market development practises in its approach and aspire to enhance private sector engagement in projects combined with the use of experimental data collection methodologies. This may entail using the value chain approach (targeting value chains employing the poorest) or the private-public partnership model adopted in Sri Lanka.

The ultimate aim would be to gain the ability to trace, measure and attribute changes in variables such as the number of jobs created, increase in level of salary of farmers/producers working under \$2 per day, etc. As highlighted above, the Review has found that where the market dynamics underpin the success of the project, the impact is more likely to be sustainable. Taking into account recommendations 1 and 2 above, it is reasonable to expect that in some of the new priority countries it may be necessary to first undertake a phase of improving the governance of National Quality Systems.

Recommendation 4: Expand the 'Global Forum' into a stand-alone project

The objective of the recommendation is to further enhance the TCB Branches role as a centre of excellence in the delivery of SMTQ projects and associated public goods. The new 'Global Forum' project should capture the kind of work undertaken previously as well as allowing for a faucet for UNIDO staff to present and publish lessons learned from project implementation – for example when codifying a new project methodology such as the value chain approach. Prerequisites for such a project would be a robust problem analysis and advocacy and outreach plan.

Recommendation 5: Build on UNIDO's good practise of independent evaluation and lesson learning with internal and external partners

While UNIDO has a remarkably strong culture of evaluation and lesson learning, the TCB Branch still seems to have some way to go in addressing all the insights from the 2010 TCB thematic evaluation

as well as other individual project and country reports. Hence, we recommend that UNIDO take a comprehensive approach to the findings and recommendations from this well-evidence and thorough report, and provide Norad with an update on progress against each recommendation (including a timetable for implementation), as well as how the identified Key Success Factors have been incorporated into TCB projects. This could be a living document, incorporating the findings and recommendations from this evaluation, and could be a useful reporting tool for the Norad-UNIDO bi-annual meetings.

ANNEX 1: EVALUATION MATRIX

Evaluation Question	Programme			ToF		MotF			BotF Field Visits
	Desk Review	Partner Interviews	Questionnaire	Portfolio analysis	Beneficiary questionnaire	Questionnaire	Interviews	Document review	
Relevance									
To what extent do the objectives of the projects respond to the needs and demands of the recipient countries (and the UN-framework?), and are they still valid?	x		x		x	x	x	x	x
To what extent do the objectives of the projects respond to UNIDO's core mandate and Norway's trade assistance goals and priorities, including Norwegian thematic and geographical priority areas?	x		x	x		x	x	x	x
Are UNIDO's project activities and outputs consistent with the overall goals of UNIDO?						x	x	x	x
Is UNIDO's organizational competence/expertise and outreach in regards to TCB relevant/valid (compared to other organisations/alternatives and/or coordination mechanisms such as STDF)?	x	x	x		x				x
To what extent are cross-cutting issues such as corruption, gender equality, environment and human rights incorporated into the projects, including systems for disclosure and reporting on corruption and financial irregularity (within own organisation as well as partners)?	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Effectiveness									
To what extent were the objectives of the projects achieved / are likely to be achieved? (Are results in compliance with an intervention logic, theory of change, etc. and to what extent is programme design is underpinned by evidence?)						x	x	x	x
What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?						x	x	x	x
Results Management - Is there a system for ensuring high quality needs assessments, risk assessments, baseline and endline studies, including end-user relevance and documentation of lessons learned?	x		x			x	x	x	x
Results Management - Is there a system for establishing high quality results frameworks (including indicators, targets, milestones, etc.) in project implementation, monitoring and reporting?	x		x				x	x	
Results Management - Are outcomes/outputs/activities aligned with a clearly developed strategy and an intervention logic, clear theory of change, etc.? (Explore and propose SMART indicators relevant to UNIDO's TCB mandate, at output, outcome and impact level.)			x			x	x	x	x
Results Management - Is there a system for ensuring high quality progress reporting, final reporting (narrative and financial), and reporting on cross-cutting issues, with a particular emphasis on gender?	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x

Evaluation Question	Programme			ToF		MotF			BotF Field Visits
	Desk Review	Partner Interviews	Questionnaire	Portfolio analysis	Beneficiary questionnaire	Questionnaire	Interviews	Document review	
Efficiency									
Were activities cost-efficient?	x		x			x	x	x	x
Were the objectives achieved on time?						x	x	x	x
Was the programme or project implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives?	x		x			x	x	x	x
How do the NORAD-UNIDO partnership/cooperation modalities compare with other existing partnership/cooperation modalities?	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x
How could alternative funding modalities make the cooperation more efficient (programmatic approaches)?	x	x	x						
How are the budgets structured and presented (including project specific audits to Norad)?	x		x			x	x	x	x
Are the UNIDO-Norad reporting procedures efficient?			x			x	x	x	x
Impact									
What have been the short, medium and long term results of the projects and why (taking into consideration intended and unintended results as well as external and internal influences)?					x	x	x	x	x
What real difference has the portfolio had for the beneficiaries? Are the results tangible and what, if anything, hinders progress towards desired outcomes?			x		x	x	x	x	x
Sustainability									
To what extent did the benefits of the projects continue after the projects ceased?					x	x	x	x	x
What were the major factors which influenced the achievement or non-achievement of sustainability of the projects?					x	x	x	x	x
Are their adequate strategies in place to enhance sustainability and enable donor exit?	x		x			x	x	x	x
To what extent is UNIDO able to establish relationships and integrate national/local authorities in programme interventions?						x	x	x	x
To what extent is UNIDO able to promote capacity development through local resources and 'trickle-down' effects?					x	x	x	x	x
To what extent do UNIDO coordinate with other stakeholders, partners etc.?						x	x	x	x
To what extent do UNIDO create synergies with other stakeholders, partners etc.?						x	x	x	x

ANNEX 3: MIDDLE OF THE FUNNEL SAMPLING METHODOLOGY

Portfolio analysis was conducted in order to select a representative sample, whilst also taking into consideration the evaluability of the projects. The following product selection criteria were used:

- Region;
- Income category;
- Completed/ongoing;
- Evaluation status (to ensure evaluability);
- Category of intervention (i.e. Global Forum, Regional or Targeted);
- Project Manager; and
- Duration of project

Table 1 illustrates how our chosen sample compares with the project portfolio. Table provides more detail on each of the projects that have been selected for review.

Table 1: Middle of the funnel sample: overview statistics

Criteria	Total	Sample
Region	South Asia – 8 Sub-Saharan Africa – 15 East Asia and Pacific – 4 Global – 5	South Asia – 3 Sub-Saharan Africa – 6 East Asia and the Pacific – 1 Global - 2
Income category	Low income – 9 Lower-middle income – 7 Upper-middle income – 1 n/a - 15	Low income – 3 Lower-middle income – 3 Upper-middle income – 0 n/a - 6
Completed/ongoing	Completed – 18 Ongoing - 14	Completed – 8 Ongoing - 4
Evaluation status	Self-evaluation - 3 Independent evaluation - 7	Self-evaluation - 2 Independent evaluation - 5

	Mid-term Evaluation - 1 No Evaluation/project ongoing - 21	Mid-term Evaluation - 0 No Evaluation/project ongoing - 5
Category of intervention	Global forum - 5 Regional - 10 Targeted - 17	Global forum - 2 Regional - 4 Targeted - 6
Project Manager	See Table	
Duration of project (approx)	1-2 years - 6 2-3 years - 6 3-4 years - 8 4-5 years - 6 5-6 years - 4 6-7 years - 1 Cancelled - 1	1-2 years - 2 2-3 years - 2 3-4 years - 2 4-5 years - 3 5-6 years - 2 6-7 years - 1 Cancelled - 0

Table 2: Middle of funnel sample selection

Project No(s).	Project Title	Country	Region	Income category	Ongoing/ Completed	Evaluation status	Category of intervention	Project Manager	Total approved budget	Duration (months)
TEBGD10004	Strengthening Bangladesh Accreditation Board (BAB) through UNIDO: Institutional Cooperation Between Norwegian Accreditation (NA) and BAB	Bangladesh	South Asia	Low-income	Ongoing	n/a	Targeted	PADICKAKUDI, Ouseph Chacko	€ 1,031,062	53
TFRAF06014 TFRAF06A14 TERAF06014 TERAF06A14 101082	Trade Capacity Building in Agro-Industry Products for the Establishment and Proof of Compliance with International Market Requirements	East African Community (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda)	Sub-Saharan Africa	n/a	Completed	Independent Evaluation	Regional	BAU, Bernard TEZERA, Dejene DOLUN, Ulvinur Muge	€ 3,181,939	68
TEBDI12001	TCB for Burundi (EIF)	Burundi	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low-income	Completed	Self Evaluation	Targeted	DAVILA SANCHEZ, Juan Pablo Eras	€ 280,348	12
130302	AFRIMETS Phase II	Africa Regional	Africa Regional	n/a	Ongoing	n/a	Regional	DAVILA SANCHEZ, Juan Pablo Eras	€ 290,350	24
TERAS07001 TERAS07A01 TERAS07B01 TERAS07C01 TERAS07D01	Market Access and Trade Facilitation Support for South Asian LDCs, through Strengthening Institutional and National Capacities Related to Standards, Metrology, Testing and Quality (SMTQ) - Phase II, Bangladesh, Bhutan,	SAARC II- Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal	South Asia	n/a	Completed	Independent Evaluation	Regional	PADICKAKUDI, Ouseph	€2,260,000	61

Project No(s).	Project Title	Country	Region	Income category	Ongoing/ Completed	Evaluation status	Category of intervention	Project Manager	Total approved budget	Duration (months)
	Maldives, Nepal									
TESIL11003	Quality and Compliance Infrastructure Development- Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low-income	Ongoing	n/a	Targeted	DIAZ-CASTILLO, Juan Pablo	€600,000 total (€200,000 NORAD, €200K Finland, €200K UNIDO)	37
TESRL06004	Strengthening International Certification Capacity in Sri Lanka with Particular Reference to Social Accountability Standard (SA 8000) and Food Safety (HACCP/ISO 22000) Standard	Sri Lanka	South Asia	Lower-middle-income	Completed	Independent Evaluation	Targeted	BADARNEH,Ali	€ 1,089,608	75
TFVIE08001	Technical Assistance to Business Registration Reform in Viet Nam	Vietnam	East Asia and Pacific	Lower-middle-income	Completed	Independent Evaluation	Targeted	TAS,Nilguen	\$4,503,054	49
TEZAM09001	Joint UNIDO-WTO Trade Capacity Building Programme Framework for Zambia	Zambia	Sub-Saharan Africa	Lower-middle-income	Completed	Independent Evaluation	Targeted	DOLUN,Ulvinur Muge	€ 2,398,500	51
TEGLO11004	Trade Standards Compliance Report II	Global Forum	n/a	n/a	Completed	n/a	Global Forum	KAESER,Ralf Steffen	€ 100,000 (NORAD funding) Related co-financing: € 88,495.58	33

Project No(s).	Project Title	Country	Region	Income category	Ongoing/ Completed	Evaluation status	Category of intervention	Project Manager	Total approved budget	Duration (months)
									(UNIDO funding) + additional € 87,000 (July 2012)	
TEGLO08001	A Guide to Private Standards	Global Forum	n/a	n/a	Completed	Self Evaluation	Global Forum	DOLUN ,Ulvinur Muge	€345,780.-	48
TEGLO11015	Strategic Cooperation Between UNIDO and European Commission Directorate General For Consumer Health And Consumers (DG SANCO) - Development and Pilot Applications of a Food Safety Alert Rapid Response Facility (FSA-RRF)	Africa Regional	Africa Regional	n/a	Ongoing	n/a	Regional	KAESER,Ralf Steffen	€600,000	41

ANNEX 4: ASSESSMENT OF LOGICAL FRAMEWORKS

Project	RBM	Logframe	Development Objective	Outcomes	Outputs per outcome	Evaluation comments on logic	Indicators	Sources of data	Evaluation comments on indicators	Assumptions/risks identified
AFRIMETS II (11/13-11/15)	Yes	Yes	Export rejection rates of African products due to non-equivalence of national-international metrological competence is lowered.	AFRIMETS is strengthened to provide assistance to its members, the African Metrology Institutes, to obtain international recognition of the metrology programmes	3	Overall coherent logical framework, though a more explicit link to how the strengthening of the metrology agencies will be able to deliver the development objective would be useful	Yes	Yes	Unclear whether public data on export rejection rates, and many factors will contribute to these rates. Indicator for output 1 is subjective and should be made more concrete	Good identification of assumptions (which incorporates risks to an acceptable degree)
Burundi EIF (06/12-06/13)	Yes	Yes	Improve the export performance of Burundi and access to international markets and strengthening regional capacity to comply with SPS and the National Quality System.	Outcome 1: The national quality system is strengthened to be able to provide evaluation services for compliance (inspection, standardization, analysis and testing) in accordance with international standards. Outcome 2: The export competitiveness of the targeted value chains is improved through the development of a culture of quality culture and international standards compliance. Local businesses are engaged in an export consortium and / or	1:3 2:3	Well-developed and coherent logical framework with clear link between outputs, outcomes and the overall objective	Yes	Yes	The strength of indicators is mixed, with more of a focus on inputs rather than outputs.	Solid identification of risks and assumptions.

				enhancement of local products.						
Sierra Leone QCID (11/11-12/14)	Y e s	Y e s	Integration of Sierra Leone into global trade through the establishment of a National Quality Policy and strengthening of key institutional services	Sierra Leone complies with requirements of international markets in particular in the areas of SPS and TBT issues	3	The development objective is overambitious	Y e s	Y e s	Some indicators could benefit from the inclusion of targets, as some indicators merely state that a targeted "increase" or "decrease".	Basic assumption and risks identified in the Project Document
DG SANCO (07/11-12/14)	Y e s	Y e s	Increased capacity of developing countries to comply with requirements of international markets	Increased capabilities of local quality infrastructure of supported countries	3	Focused project, clear intervention logic overall. Individual interventions within the project have not been assessed.	Y e s	Y e s	Fit for purpose	Basic assumption and risks identified in the Project Document
Trade Standards Compliance Report II (03/11-12/13)	N o	Y e s	The object of this project is to deepen the research undertaken for the first publication of the TSCR and to update the innovative analyses in order to increase UNIDO's advocacy for "smarter" and more targeted trade capacity building.	Awareness of reader of the TSCR of the impact of noncompliance with market requirements on developing countries	1	N/A	Y e s	Y e s	N/A	Yes
BAB-NA Institutional Cooperation (07/10-12/14)	Y e s	Y e s	To ensure that BAB has established the necessary infrastructure for handling applications, assessment of conformity assessment bodies and surveillance visits of accredited bodies by using technically competent personnel and an appropriate recognized quality system.	BAB becomes a signatory to Multi-Lateral Agreements established by different international accreditation institutions (APLAC and IAF).	7	Very specific project with clear objective and outcome. The overall development objective could be more closely	Y e s	Y e s	Indicators are relatively clear, though the more qualitative assessments would require follow up evaluation.	Yes
Zambia TCB	N	Y	To enhance the export	7 outcomes	1:3	Too many outputs and	Y	Y	Too many	Basic

(03/09-06/13)	o	e	performance of the Republic of Zambia by creating conditions for strengthening the national legislative and institutional framework supporting SMTQ, establishing a credible conformity assessment infrastructure and fostering integration into the multilateral trading system. Internal trade benefits to accrue concomitantly.		2:7 3:3 4:2 5:5 6:2 7:2	many are activities rather than outputs.	e	e	indicators, many are not measurable	assumption and risks identified in the Project Document
Vietnam BRR (03/08-04/12)	Y	Y	The business environment for enterprise start-up and operations is improved.	Phase 1 & 2 (Phase A, Modules I & II): Computerized National Business Registration System (NBRS), containing registration information on enterprises nationwide, is operational in 63 provinces by October 2009. Phase 3 (Phase B): The National Business Registration System (NBRS) is complemented with a computerized financial statements filing and dissemination system operational in 63 provinces by November 2009.	1:3 2:2 3:1	Overall, the log frame is well laid out, and most indicators easily measurable. The SMART concept has been effectively conceptualized by UNIDO in the BRR project. While the results chain is robust and thoroughly formulated, in retrospect the logical framework does not reflect fully the achievements of the project.	Y	Y	Each of the intended outcome/outputs is complemented by measurable indicators, expressed in quantitative terms whenever possible and including the time frame for achievement.	The programme document included a robust risk analysis. The logical framework identified only 2 assumptions underpinning outcome to impact level.
Guide to Private Standards (02/08-02/12)	N	Y	Developing country exporters/suppliers have a comprehensive source of information about the emerging private standards in selected manufacturing sectors	Immediate Objective 1: Publish and widely disseminate the "Guidebook to Private Standards" for selected manufacturing sectors and their implications for developing country exporters Immediate Objective 2:	1:4 2:1	N/A	Y	Y	N/A	No assumptions underpinning outcome-impact causality. At output-outcome level 2 assumptions,

				UNIDO PTC branches, such as TCB, PSD and IPT identifies further venues for cooperation with leading private sector firms in targeted international value chains and improve design of technical assistance projects for capacity building. A review of harmonization efforts undertaken and possibilities of UNIDO acting as a broker assessed.						no risks.
SAARC II (11/07-12/12)	N o	Y e s	N/A	Regional project with 23 national level outcomes across the four countries.	N/A	Presentation of logical framework is weak, with no mention of the overall objective or outputs related to the outcomes. Moreover, the description and order of the outcomes differs from the project document, suggesting the project document was not ground in a logical framework analysis	Y e s	Y e s	Does not differentiate between indicators for outcome/ outputs	Yes, relatively well developed.
EAC TCB (10/06-06/12)	Y e s	Y e s	To enhance intra-regional and global expert performance of selected agro-products by the 5 EAC members by establishing a mutually supportive national and regional framework for SPS compliance.	Outcome 1: At the regional level, SPS Protocol is adopted and standards and conformity assessment procedures for selected agro-products are harmonized Outcome 2: At national level, selected conformity assessment bodies are able to provide support to agro-based enterprises and the enterprises are able to increase exports.	1: 3 2: 5	Overall sound logic. The relevance of the second part of the first outcome is questionable, as this will only occur following the adoption of the SPS protocol. Several of the outputs are overly ambitious, which is an issue of project design and scope.	Y e s	Y e s	Concrete and verifiable indicators, but would need significant resources to collect the data.	Yes

<p>Sri Lanka Indexpo (09/06-12/12)</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Facilitate industrial development and export capabilities (and consequently spurring economic growth and employment opportunities) in Sri Lanka by reducing technical barriers to trade through the strengthening of standards, metrology, testing and quality institutional structures and national capacities.</p>	<p>National capacity creation related to address market access requirements and technical barriers to trade (TBT) relating to SA8000 and HACCP/ISO 22000 requirements.</p>	<p>6</p>	<p>Originally no logframe. This was developed only as part of extension phase. Unsatisfactory. Not good practise.</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>n/a</p>	<p>No</p>
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ANNEX 5: BOTTOM OF THE FUNNEL SAMPLING METHODOLOGY

In order to select two countries for analysis at the bottom of the funnel, the following selection criteria were used:

1. One project in Africa, and one in Asia
2. Selected country must have both country specific and regional projects
3. Length of engagement
4. Mix of finished/ongoing projects
5. Evaluation status
6. Various sizes of intervention

Africa

In Africa, Burundi, Malawi and Zambia were the only countries to have had both a country level and regional level project.

Overview table for Burundi, Malawi and Zambia

	Selection criteria 3 Length of engagement	Selection criteria 4 Mix of finished/ongoing projects	Selection criteria 5 Evaluation status	Selection criteria 6 Various sizes of intervention
Burundi	2006-2013	All completed	Completed/pending	€280k – 3m
Malawi	2011-present	yes	Not completed	€70k-2m
Zambia	2009-present	yes	Completed/not completed	€1.6-2.4m

Norad-funded UNIDO projects in Malawi only began in 2011, which was deemed too recent to justify selecting this as a field visit country. Equally, Zambia was selected for a country level evaluation by UNIDO in August 2013, and therefore re-evaluating projects in Zambia was not seen to constitute good value for money. Burundi, on the other hand was found to be a good option for in-depth analysis as UNIDO has been working in Burundi on two Norad-funded projects from 2006 up until 2013, there is a good variation in budget size, length of engagement and evaluation status.

Asia

In Asia, both Bangladesh and Vietnam were the only countries to have had both a country level and regional level project

Overview table for Bangladesh and Vietnam

	Filter 2 Length of engagement	Filter 3 Mix of finished/ongoing projects	Filter 4 Evaluation status	Filter 5 Various sizes of intervention
Bangladesh	2004 present	- 3 completed 2 ongoing	Completed/not completed	€ 800k – 2.2m

Vietnam	2006-2012	Both complete	Both have independent evaluation completed	€1.7-4.5m
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When these countries' project portfolio was plotted against the above criteria, the Review team selected Bangladesh as it has a good mix of completed and ongoing projects and Norad-funded UNIDO projects have been operational since 2004. There were some issues regarding the availability of key stakeholders in Bangladesh due to public holidays, however the mission was delayed to account for this.

ANNEX 6: LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS INTERVIEWED

Type	Name	Position (if available)	Organisation
Partner	Christiane Krauss	Chief coordinator	Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF), WTO
UNIDO	Nestor Bikorimana	National Project Coordinator	Burundi TCB Project
Beneficiary	Thomas Nkeshimana	Manager	Office du Thé du Burundi (OTB)
Beneficiary	Jean Nzinahori	Manager	Liquids Ltd., Burundi
Beneficiary	Christophe Niyikora	Manager	Fruitropic Ltd., Burundi
Beneficiary	Emmanuel Ntakirutimana	Manager	Akezamutima Ltd, Burundi
Beneficiary	Leonard Ntibatirirwa	EIF National Coordinator	Ministry of Trade, Industry, Posts and Tourism, Burundi (MTIPT)
Beneficiary	Damien Nakoberetse	Director	Burundian Bureau of Standards and Quality Control (BBN)
Beneficiary	Eric Ruracenyeka	Head of Training and Technical Assistance	Burundian Bureau of Standards and Quality Control (BBN)
Beneficiary	Donavine Hakizimana	Labratory Manager	INSP, Burundi
Beneficiary	Pelagie Nimbona	Labratory Manager	CNTA, Burundi
Beneficiary	Elene Semenova	Labratory Manager	FABI, Burundi (formerly FACAGRO)
Beneficiary	Aime Nzoyihera	Programme Manager	Burundi Office, TradeMark East Africa
Beneficiary	Oscar Baranyizigye	Executive Secretary	InterCafe Burundi
Beneficiary	Augustin Manirakiza	Communication and Marketing Manager	InterCafe Burundi
Beneficiary	Roland Laurent	Manager	BUCOFCO, Burundi
Beneficiary	Mare Mbasha	-	Department of External Trade, MTIPT
Beneficiary	Anitha Nshimirimana	-	Department of General Industry, MTIPT
Beneficiary	Dimas Baradamdikanya	-	Department of Industrial Development, MTIPT
Beneficiary	Marie Rose Nizigiyimana	Minister	MTIPT
UNIDO	Edgar Gravel	APLAC Lead Evaluator / Advisor for BEST (BAB-	BQI Component, BEST Programme

Type	Name	Position (if available)	Organisation
		NA component)	
Norway	Merete Lundemo	Ambassador	Royal Norwegian Embassy, Bangladesh
Norway	Imran Kabir	Economic Affairs and Trade Advisor	Royal Norwegian Embassy, Bangladesh
Norway	Arne Haug	First Secretary	Royal Norwegian Embassy, Bangladesh
UNIDO	Zaki Uz Zaman	Head of Operations	UNIDO, Bangladesh
UNIDO	Franz Hengstberger	Technical Advisor	BQI Component, BEST Programme
UNIDO	Shetty Seetharama Thombathu	Chief Technical Advisor	BEST Programme
UNIDO	David Holborne	Former CTA	BEST Programme
Partner	Anne Graendsen	Technical Director	Norwegian Accreditation
UNIDO	Khalid Saeed	Technical Advisor	BQI Component, BEST Programme (formerly Norwegian Accreditation staff)
Beneficiary	Shudhakar Dutta	Director	Bangladesh Accreditation Board (BAB)
Beneficiary	Md. Nasirul Islam	Deputy Director	Bangladesh Accreditation Board (BAB)
Beneficiary	Md. Mahbubur Rahman	Deputy Director	Bangladesh Accreditation Board (BAB)
Beneficiary	Mohammad Abbas Alam	Assistant Director	Bangladesh Accreditation Board (BAB)
Beneficiary	Monirul Hoque Pasha	Assistant Director	Bangladesh Accreditation Board (BAB)
Beneficiary	Md. Towhidur Rahman	Assistant Director	Bangladesh Accreditation Board (BAB)
Beneficiary	Syed Anwar Hosain	National Programme Coordinator & QMS Expert, BQI-BEST	BQI Component, BEST Programme
UNIDO	Md. Seraji	National IT & Accreditation Expert	BQI Component, BEST Programme
UNIDO	Mir Md. Shamsuddoha Maruf	National Administrative Associate	BQI Component, BEST Programme
Beneficiary	Syed Humayun Kabir	Director General	South Asia Regional Standards Office (SARSO)
Beneficiary	Shamim Ara Begum	Deputy Director and In-charge of Textile Laboratory	Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI)

Type	Name	Position (if available)	Organisation
Beneficiary	Iqramul Haue	Director General	Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI)
Beneficiary	Md Khademul Islam	Director, Metrology	Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI)
Beneficiary	Anowar Hossain Mollah	Deputy Director, Metrology	Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI)
Beneficiary	Mohammad Ali	Deputy Director, Metrology	Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI)
Beneficiary	Ali Mortuza	Deputy Director, Metrology	Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI)
Beneficiary	Ms. Shamim Ara Begum	Deputy Director and In-charge of Textile Laboratory	Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI)
Beneficiary	Md. Asaduzzaman	Deputy Director, Administration	Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI)
Beneficiary	Mr.Momen us Sazzad	Assistant Director, Metrology	Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI)
Beneficiary	Md. Jaydul Islam	Assistant Director, Metrology	Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI)
Beneficiary	Md. Akhteruzzaman	Director, Chemical and Director, Standards (In-charge)	Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI)
Beneficiary	Kamal Prasad Das	Director, Certification Marks	Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI)
Beneficiary	Engr. Rezaul Karim	Deputy Director, Standards	Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI)
Beneficiary	Md. Asaduzzaman	Deputy Director, Administration	Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI)
Beneficiary	Md Nozir Ahmmod Miah	Assistant Director, Certification Marks	Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI)
Beneficiary	Ayub Nobil Khan	Pro-Vice Chancellor	BGMEA University of Fashion and Technology (BUFT)
Beneficiary	Syed Masud Husain	Vice Chancellor	BGMEA University of Fashion and Technology (BUFT)
Beneficiary	Tamia Aktar	Senior Lecturer	BGMEA University of Fashion and Technology (BUFT)
Beneficiary	Morshed Mohinddin	Lecturer	BGMEA University of Fashion and Technology (BUFT)
Beneficiary	Mohammed Iftakhar	Lecturer	BGMEA University of Fashion and Technology (BUFT)
Beneficiary	Reaz Bin Mahmood	Vice President, Finance	Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers & Exporters Association (BGMEA)
Partner	Rubayat Jesmin	Senior Programme	European Union Delegation to

Type	Name	Position (if available)	Organisation
		Officer	Bangladesh
Partner	Zillul Hye Razi	Trade Advisor	European Union Delegation to Bangladesh
Partner	Katarzyna Kaszubska	Attache, Political, Trade and Press Section	European Union Delegation to Bangladesh
Beneficiary	Saleh Ahmed	Project Director (BFQ Component)	Department of Fisheries (DoF)
Beneficiary	Abdur Rashed	Head of Regional Competent Authority	Fish Inspection & Quality Control, Department of Fisheries (DoF)
Beneficiary	Md. Moniruzzaman	Deputy Director	Fish Inspection & Quality Control, Department of Fisheries (DoF)
Beneficiary	Md. Amin Ullah	President	Bangladesh Frozen Foods Exporters Assosication (BFFEA)
Beneficiary	M. Khalilullah	Vice President	Bangladesh Frozen Foods Exporters Assosication (BFFEA)
Beneficiary	Humayun Kabir	Director	Bangladesh Frozen Foods Exporters Assosication (BFFEA)
Beneficiary	Khazi Belayat	Senior Vice President	Bangladesh Frozen Foods Exporters Assosication (BFFEA)
UNIDO	Hasan Khandakar	National Project Director	BFQ Component, BEST Programme
Beneficiary	Md. Lutfur Rahman Tarafder	Project Director (BQI Component)	Ministry of Industries
Beneficiary	Feroz Ahmed	Secretary General	Bangladesh Textile Manufacturers
Beneficiary	Savar Nayarhat	Assistant Professor	National Institute of Textile Engineering and Research (NITER)
Beneficiary	Andaleeb Amin	Administrative Officer	National Institute of Textile Engineering and Research (NITER)
UNIDO	Munira Rahman	National Project Coordinator (Garments)	BWTG Component, BEST Programme
UNIDO	Maqbul Ahmed	National Project Coordinator (Garments)	BWTG Component, BEST Programme
UNIDO	Shaheen Ismail	National Project Coordinator (Garments)	BWTG Component, BEST Programme
UNIDO	Juan-Pablo Davila	Programme Officer	UNIDO HQ
UNIDO	Ouseph Padickakudi	Programme Officer	UNIDO HQ

Type	Name	Position (if available)	Organisation
Partner	Simon Heisig	Programme Officer	National Metrology Institute of Germany (PTB)
Partner	Tobias Diergardt	Programme Officer	National Metrology Institute of Germany (PTB)
Partner	Ian Dunmill	Assistant Director	International Organization of Legal Metrology (OIML)
Partner	Francoise Rauser	Affiliate Executive Secretary	International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
Programme Management	Bernardo Calzadilla-Sarmiento	Director, Trade Capacity Building Branch	UNIDO
Programme Management	Stein Hansen	Chief, UNIDO Strategic Donor Relations	UNIDO
Programme Management	Muge Dolun	Industrial Development Officer, Trade Capacity Building Branch	UNIDO
Programme Management	Akira Noro	Unit Chief, Financial Management of Technical Cooperation Unit	UNIDO
Programme Management	Margareta de Goys	Director, Office for Independent Evaluation	UNIDO
Programme Management	Javier Guarnizo	Senior Evaluation Officer, Office for Independent Evaluation	UNIDO
Programme Management	Atsushi Isoyama	Chief, Operational Efficiency and Results Monitoring Unit	UNIDO
Programme Management	Victoria Nussbaumer	Project Assistant, Operational Efficiency and Results Monitoring Unit	UNIDO
Project Management	Nilgun Tas	Chief, Competitiveness, Upgrading and Partnership Unit	UNIDO
Project Management	Ali Badarneh	Industrial Development Officer, Trade Capacity Building Branch	UNIDO
Project Management	Steffen Kaeser Chief	Quality, Standards and Conformity Unit, Trade Capacity Building Branch	UNIDO
Project Management	Juan Pablo Diaz Castillo	Associate Industrial Development Officer, Trade Capacity Building Branch	UNIDO

Type	Name	Position (if available)	Organisation
Programme Management	Marta Gjørtz	Adviser	Norad
Programme Management	Narve Rotwitt	Adviser	Norad
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